Judgment:
N.K. Jain, J.
1. By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to quash the retention of original deed by the respondent and also prays that the respondent be directed to deliver the original title deed expeditiously.
2. This writ petition has been filed on May 18, 1996. In pursuance of the show-cause notice issued on May 27, 1996, the respondent has filed a reply. A rejoinder has also been filed.
3. As agreed by learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally.
4. The petitioner's case is that during the search conducted by the Income-tax Department authorities at the residential premises of the petitioner on May 8, 1988, the original title deed of the disputed property situated at E-10, Gokhle Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur, was also seized and taken into possession by the authorities, vide annexure 1.
5. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the seizure and detention of the original title deed is bad and without jurisdiction particularly when the factum of purchase of the disputed property was disclosed in the income-tax return and assessment and valuation has already been made, prior to search. He submits that the disputed property has been shown in the wealth-tax return also. He also submits that it was necessary for the authorities to disclose reasons for retention of the documents beyond the limit of 180 days. He has reliedon CIT v. Tarsem Kumar : [1986]161ITR505(SC) Om Parhash Jindal v. Union of India M.K. Gabriel Babu v. Asstt. Director of Income-tax, Investigation : [1990]186ITR435(Ker) and CIT v. Oriental Rubber Works : [1984]145ITR477(SC) .
6. On the other hand, Mr. Bapna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, urges that the search and seizure of the title deed has been made as per the provisions of Section 132(3) of the Income-tax Act and such seizure is not illegal or unauthorised. He also submits that approval for retaining the document has been taken from the Commissioner which is up to December 31, 1996. He further submits that this court should not go into the disputed questions of fact and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. He submits that disclosing of the property is not material as the property can be undervalued and even if the petitioner feels that she is entitled for the document she can approach the Board.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as the case law cited at the Bar.
8. Section 132(1) provides that where the Director-General or Director or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as may be empowered in this behalf by the Board, in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe that any person is in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing and such money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represents either wholly or partly income or property, then the said authorities may authorise any officer to enter and search any building, place, vessel, vehicle or aircraft where he has reason to suspect that such books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing are kept. The officer so authorised can seize any such books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing found as a result of such search. In view of the settled legal position, I am not inclined to interfere in the writ jurisdiction particularly when the retention beyond the limit of 180 days as provided under Sub-section (8) of Section 132 of the Income-tax Act has been approved by the competent authority up to December 31, 1996. So far as the contention that the property was not undisclosed, therefore, the document could not be seized is concerned, the same cannot be accepted at this stage being a question of fact and further the seizure was made in the year 1988 whereas the petitioner has challenged the retention in the year 1996 without availing of the remedy available to her under Sub-section (10) of Section 132 ofthe Income-tax Act. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the petitioner will not suffer any irreparable loss by retention of the original deed. However, it is made clear that the authorities will decide the matter before the expiry of the period of retention granted by the competent authorities, i.e., prior to December 31, 1996. In case the petitioner feels that she is entitled for return of document prior to that, she will be free to approach the Board as provided under Sub-section (10) of Section 132 of the Income-tax Act. Under the circumstances of the case and looking to the stage when the petitioner has approached this court, the cases cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are not of any help and I need not discuss them in detail. In view of this, no relief can be granted to the petitioner under Article 226, the scope of which is very limited.
9. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed.