ORDER
R.R. Yadav, J.
1. The petitioner-Corporation calls in question assessment and imposition of tax amounting to Rs. 22,248/- by the Assistant Collector, Land and Building Tax Department, Sri Ganganagar under Section 6 Of the Rajasthan Lands & Buildings Tax Act, 1964 in respect of the land and Building situated in District Sri Ganganagar.
2. The factual matrix of the present writpetition lies in short compass. It is alleged inthe writ petition by the petitioner thatAssistant Collector, Land and Building TaxDepartment, Sri Ganganagar (respondentNo. 2) issued a notice under the provision ofthe Rajasthan lands and Buildings Tax Act,1964 (Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ofl1964) to the properties of the petitionersituated in Sri Ganganagar. The petitioner-Corporation did not file any return butappeared before respondent No. 2 in responseto the notice issued by him and urged beforehim that the land or building of the petitioner-Corporation cannot be assessed under the Actof 1964. Respondent No. 2 did not accept thecontention of the petitioner-Corporation andassessed the land and building of the petitioner-Corporation to tax amounting toRupees 22,248/-.
3. Aggrieved by the order issued by the Assistant Collector, Land & Building tax Department, Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 2) dated 22-12-81, the petitioner-Corporation filed an appeal before the Deputy Director (Appellate Authority), Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur where the appeal wasregistered as Appeal No. 1 of 1983 and thesame was allowed vide Annx. 1s to the writpetition.
4. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Deputy director/Appellate Authority), Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur (resondent No. 3), the Assistant Collector, Land and Building Tax Department, Sri Gahganagar (respondent No. 2) filed a revision petition under Section 19 of the Rajasthan 'L'ands and Buildings Tax Act, 1964 before the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (respondent No. 4). The Board of Revenue set aside the order passed by the Deputy Director (Appellate Authority), Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur vide Annx. 2 to the writ petition.
5. The petitioner-Corporation is seekingrelief for quashing the impugned orderAnnx. 2 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 4 and also prayed for declaration that the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption from such imposition oftax as contemplated under Section 6(a) of the Actof 1964.
6. After service of notices upon the respondents, they have filed a return to the writpetition and have stated that it is irrelevant tosay that the petitioner-Corporation is a 'State'within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. According to the answeringrespondents, the exempt ion under Section 6(a) ofthe Act of 1964 has been granted only to theLands and Buildings owned or administeredby the State Government or the CentralGovernment or the Local Authority. Sincethe petitioner-Corporation does hot fallwithin the meaning of the afore-mentionedthree categories, therefore, it is wholly irrelevant to claim exemption from payment oftax merely on the ground that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of'State' as contemplated under Article 12 of theConstitution of India.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. H.N. Calla and leanted Additional Advocate General Mr. L. Sirdawat at length and have critically gone through thematerial available on record.
8. The main thrust of the arguments ofthe learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. H. N. Calla in the instant writ petition are; firstly, the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 as it, falls within the definition of the 'State' as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India secondly, the petitioner-Corporation being Statutory Corporation created under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962, therefore, they are entitled to get the benefit as con-templated inder Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India; and lastly, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Corporation is entitled to get exemption withinthe meaning of Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964.
9. Mr. L. S. Udawat, learned Additional Advocate General refuted the aforesaid argument's and contended that even if the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of 'the State' or other authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Corporation is not entitled to get the benefit of tax exemption imposed under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964.
10. In reply to the second argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner, learned Addl. Advocate General urged before me that the property in dispute is owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation, which is created inder Section 3 of the Ware-housing Act, 1962 and as such, it has a corporate personality of its own, therefore, the property upon which, the tax has been imposed it cannot be said to be property of the Government of India. According to him, the provisions of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India are not attracted in the present case.
11. Lastly, Mr. L.S. Udawat, learned Additional Advocate General strenuously argued before me that the exemptions from taxation granted by the State Legislature under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 may be strictly construed and it may not be extended beyond the express requirements of the language used in the aforesaid Section.
12. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. In my humble opinion, in the present writpetition, interpretation of the provisions of Article 12, Article 285 of the Constitution of India and Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 are attracted. In view of the arguments raised at the Bar 1 think it proper to formulate the following questions in order to appreciate the arguments advanced at the Bar with circumspection :--
(i) WHETHER the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption under Section 6(a) of the act of 1964 merely because it falls within the definition of 'State' or other authority as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India?
(ii) WHETHER the property owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation, which is a statutory Corporation created under Section 3 of the Ware-housing Corporation Act, 1962 has a corporate personality of its, own and such property owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation can be said to be the property of the Government of India within the meaning of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India?
(iii) WHETHER the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption as contemplated under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964?
13. It would be expedient to discuss the aforesaid questions formulated by me in seriatim in order to appreciate the rival contentions raised at the Bar.
14. WHETHER THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION IS ENTITLED TO GET EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 6(a) OF THE ACT OF 1964 MERELY BECAUSE IT FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF THE STATE OR OTHER AUTHORITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:-
(I) Before discussing the first question formulated by me, it would be expedient to quote Article 12 of the Constitution of India in extenso :-
'Article 12. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each ofthe States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.'
In my humble opinion, the present Article gives an extended meaning to the word 'the State' wherever they occur in Part 111 of the Constitution, which deals with fundamental rights. Unless the context otherwise requires 'the State' will include not only the Executive and Legislative organs of the Union and the State but also local bodies, such as Municipal Authorities as well as 'other authorities' which include the 'instrumentalities or agencies' of the State or Bodies or institutions which discharge public functions of a Government character. In my considered opinion, the definition of 'the State' given under Article 12 of the Constitution of India is only applicable for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution meaning thereby the instrumentalities or agencies of 'the State' are also subject to all constitutional limitations as enshrined under Part 111 of the Constitution. Thus, wherever the instrumentalities or agencies of the State are found guilty of violating any provisions of Part III of the Constitution, a writ petition can be entertained and writ can be issued against such instrumentalities or agencies of the State similarly as issued against the State. But for the aforesaid reasons, every instrumentality of the Government is not necessarily a Government Department.
(ii) My attention was invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner towards the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 26, 27, 31, 31A, 35, 40, 41 and 42 of the Warehousing Corporation Act. 1962. A bare look at these various provisions of the Ware Housing Corporation Act will make it clear that it is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provision of the Act to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and may by its name sue and be sued. It can acquire, hold and dispose of any property for the purposes of its business.
(iii) After close scrutiny of the aforesaid Sections, there can be no two opinions about the fact that the petitioner-Corporation is aninstrumentality or agency of the Government of India within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India after applying the tests as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1857), Sukh Dev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (AIR 1975 SC 1331 : (1975) 3 SCR 619, R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority (AIR 1979 SC 1628), Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardhi (AIR 1981 SC 487 : (1981) 2 SCR 79. Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 212 : (1981) 2 SCR 111), P. K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC 541), Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath Gangoli (AIR 1986 SC 1571) and Tckraj Vasandhi Alias K. L. Basandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 469).
(iv) It is true that a similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training (AIR 1992 SC 76): 1991 AIR SCW 2749, where after taking note of the earlier decisions referred in the preceding paragraphs, their Lordships ruled in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid decision as follows : --
Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression 'State'. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution,' corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as 'State' under Article 12. The State control, however vast and pervasive, is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is 'State' If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance,there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as 'State 'within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.'
(v) In order to determine as to whether the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of 'the State'. 1 have to examine the question in the light of the recent decision given by their Lordships in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna (supra), in which all earlier decisions of the Apex Court have been taken into account.
(vi) In the present case, the share-holder of the petitioner-Corporation are the Central Government and other financial Institutions prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Ware-housing Corporation Act. 1962. The Central Government is authorised under the said Act to appoint six Directors, the Managing Director, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. The Central Government is also empowered to remove the Directors. The Finance, Accounts and Audit is controlled by the Central Government under the Central Ware-Housing Corporation Act, 1962 and by the State Government in the case of the State Ware Housing Corporation. The Government has power to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and it is the Government, which can dissolve the Management of the Corporation. The shares of the Corporation, are guaranteed by the Government as to the re-payment of the principal and the payment of the Annual Dividend. The Corporation exists for the larger good of the Nation, inasmuch as, agriculture produce and other notified commodities other than agriculture produce are stored scientifically adequately, so that, public distribution system can be maintained and sustained keeping in view the quantity and quality of the goods. The shares of the Corporation are not transferable except with the leave of the Central Government or the Financing Institutions. The Corporation gets its fund from the Central Government after due appropriation made by the Parliament in this behalf and that fund will be maintained by the Corporation. The averments made in paragraph 1 of the writ petition are not denied by the answering-respondents and in reply to the avermentsmade in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, the answering-respondents have stated in their reply that the facts stated in paragraph 1 with regard to the establishment of the Central Ware-housing Corporation and its functions are not disputed.
(vii) In view of the facts and circumstances stated above after applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in Chander Mohan Khanna's case (supra), I am of the opinion that the combination of Central aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the petitioner-Corporation and rendering of an important public service by the petitioner-Corporation being obligatory functions of the Central Government leads towards an irresistible conclusion that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of the 'State'.
(viii) After holding that the petitioner-corporation falls within the definition of the 'State' as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. I am further of the opinion that it is subject to all constitutional limitations as contemplated under Part III of the Constitution. The petitioner-Corporation being the 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is amenable for writ jurisdiction and a writ can be issued against it for any act or omission of the mandatory provisions enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. For the reasons stated above, the petitioner-Corporation cannot be permitted to claim exemption from payment of tux under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 merely because it falls within the extended meaning of word 'the State' or 'other Authorities for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution.
15. WHETHER THE PROPERTY OWNED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION. WHICH IS A STATUTORY CORPORATION CREATED UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE WARE-HOUSING CORPORATION ACT, 1962 HAS A CORPORATE PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN AND SUCH PROPERTY OWNED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION CAN BE SAID TO RE THE PROPERTYOF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 285(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
(i) The system of double Government set up by our federal constitution requires, for its smooth working the immunity of the property of one Government from taxation by another. Article 285 of the Constitution of India deals with immunity of the property of the Union from the State taxation. In order to, appreciate the present controversy it would be expedient to quote Article 285 of the Constitution of India for ready reference : -
'Article 285, Exemption of property of the Union from the State taxation :
(1) The property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any other authority within a State.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall, until Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State from levying any tax on any property of the Union to which such property was immediately before the commencement of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as that tax continues to be levied in that Slate.'
(ii) A close scrutiny of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India reveals that the property owned by a Government Company or a Statutory Corporation, which has a corporate personality of its own, cannot be said to be 'property of the Union' and as such liable to State or Municipal taxation.
(iii) The aforesaid question about the interpretation of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Western Coal-fields Limited v. Special Area Development Authority Korba, (AIR 1981 SC 697), in which Hon'ble Chandrachud C.J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court ruled in paragraph 20 as follows: -
'The third contention of the Attorney General flows from the provisions ofArticle 285(1) of the Constitution which says that the property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any aulhority within a State. Section 127 A(2) of the M.P. Municipalities Act and Section 136 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act also provide that the property tax shall not be leviable, inter alia, on 'buildings and lands owned by or vesting in the Union Government'. Relying on these provisions, it is contended by the Attorney General that since the appellant Companies are wholly owned by the Government of India, the lands and buildings owned by the companies cannot be subjected to property tax. The short answer to this contention is that even though the entire share capital of the appellant companies themselves are owned by the Government of India. The Companies, which are incorporated under the Companies Act, have a cororate personality of their own distinct from that of the Government of India. The lands and buildings are vested in and owned by the companies, the Government of India only owns the share capital. In Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 530,555 : (AIR 1970 SC 564 at page 584) (The Banks Nationalisation case) it was held:-
'A company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the Company is not the property of the share-holders. A share-holder has merely in interest in the Company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability and by a share in the profit.'
(iii) In paragraph 21-A, their Lordships of the Supreme Court after critical examination of its earlier decision in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Income-tax Officer (AIR 1964 SC 1486) puts the matter beyond all doubt. In that case, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation claimed exemption from taxation under Article 289 of the Constitution, by which, the property and income of a State is exempted from Union taxation. In that case,while rejecting the Corporation's claim held that though it was wholly controlled by the State Government it had a separate entity and its income was not the income of the State Government, Honble Gajendragadkar, C.J. while speaking for the Court, referred with approval to the judgment of Lord Denning in Tamlin v. Hansaford, 1950 KB 18, in which the learned Judge observed :--
In the eye of law, the Corporation is its own master and is answerable as fully as any other person or corporation. It is not the Crown and has none of the immunities or privileges of the Crown. Its servants are not civil servants and its property is not Crown property. It is as much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of the King. It is of course a public authority and its purposes, no doubt are public purposes but it is not a Government department nor do its powers fall within the province of Government.'
(iv) From the aforesaid discussion, I am ofthe opinion that so far As the property in dispute is concerned, it is the property of the petitioner-Corporation and will not be the property of the Central Government within the meaning of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India. In the same manner, as the employees of the petitioner Corporation will not become the employees of the Central Government as ruled by the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra). In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly ruled that the employees of the Corporation i.e. Life Insurance Corporation do not become the employees of the Union Government. A reference may be made to paragraph 67 of the judgment of Hon'ble A.N. Ray, C.J. speaking for the Court, wherein it has been held that Rules and Regulations framed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation have the force of law. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. By way of abundant caution, the Apex Court ruled that these employees are not servants ofthe Union or the State. These statutory bodies are 'authorities' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble K.K. Methew, J. in his supporting judgment in paragraph 112, held : '1 do not think there is any basis for the apprehension expressed that by holding that these public corporations are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12, the employees of these corporations would become government servants.'
(v) The aforesaid discussion leads towards an irresistible conclusion that the petitioner-Corporation is not entitled to get tax exemption under Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India, as claimed by it, in as much as the property owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation which has a corporate personality of its own cannot be said to be the property of the Union.
16. WHETHER THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION IS ENTITLED : TO GET EXEMPTION AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 6(a) OF THE ACT OF 1964:-
(i) The Act of 1964 as amended by Amending Act No. 15 of 1973 and Amending Act No. 18 of 1973 has been enacted under Entry No. 49 of the State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, therefore, the aforesaid enactment under which the tax has been imposed upon the petitioner-Corporation, is undoubtedly within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, which is to be strictly construed as urged by the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. L.S. Udawat.
(ii) The Act of 1964 applies to all Lands and Buildings situated within the Municipal limits including the industrial establishment except those enumerated under Section 6 of the Act of 1964 and such properties notified to be specifically exempted from payment of tax under Section 21 of the Act of 1964, which provides that the State Government or such other authorities or officers authorised by the State Government in this behalf may, if they considers necessary in the public interest by notification in the official Gazette exempt, reduce or remit prospectively or retrospectively, the tax payable in respect of any classof Lands and buildings tax by any class of persons. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 21. the Government of Rajasthan or its authority or its officer referred to in sub-sec. (1) may at any time cancel or modify any order issued under sub-sec. (1) and upon such cancellation the tax shall be payable in respect of the lands or buildings with effect from time when such cancellation is made, provided that, no such cancellation shall be made unless the party likely to be affected by such cancellation has a reasonable opportunity to make him representation.
17. Now, I propose to take up the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner-Corporation is a 'local authority' within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 and as such, entitled to exemption from payment of tax under the aforesaid Act, on lands and buildings owned by it. 'Local Authority' has not been defined anywhere in the Act of 1964 but it is defined under Section 32(43) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1953. According to which, the definition of 'local authority' means a Municipal Board, Committee, Corporation or Council, a District Board. Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti, a Panchayat or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by Government with the control or management of municipal or local fund.
17A. In my humble opinion, the definition of 'local authority' given under the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 is exhaustive and it does not include the petitioner-Corporation within its ambit. The first part expressly specifies the Municipal Board, Committee, Corporation or Council, a District Board, a Zila Parishad, a Panchayat Samiti, which indicates the nature of local authorities who are charged, with the duties to look after the civic amenities of the people of the State. It further indicates to the effect that constitution of such local authority must be a democratic institution where members constituting the local authority must be elected by the people of the State of Rajasthan whose affairs are to be looked after by such local authority, whereas the secondpart 'other authority' used under Section 32(43) is generic in nature, therefore, 'other authority' will be treated to be covered within the definition only if such 'other authority' is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government of Rajasthan with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner-Corporation cannot be taken to be a 'local authority' within the definition of Section 32 (43) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, inasmuch as, the Government of Rajasthan has not locally entitled to it or entrusted to it with the control or management of its municipal or local fund. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of 'local authority' given under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 is fallacious and is not acceptable.
18. A parimatcria provisions in Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, where identical 'definition of 'local authority' came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. R.C. Jain(AIR 1981 SC 951), where Hon'ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court ruled in para 2 of the aforesaid decision, which is quoted below in extenso :-
'Let us, therefore, concentrate and confine our attention and enquiry to the definition of 'Local Authority' in Section 3(31) of the General Causes Act. A proper and careful scrutiny of the language of Section 3(31) suggests that an authority, in order to be a local Authority, must be of like nature and character as a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing, therefore, many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, but, possessing one essential feature namely, that it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control and management of a municipal or local fund. What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body or Port Commis-sioners shares with any other local authority? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies. They must not be mere Government agencies but must be legally independent entities. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by inhabitants of the area, Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, an appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next, they must be entrusted to Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality like health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. etc. Broadly we may say that they may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Finally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges or fees. This may be in addition to moneys provided by Government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise. What is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority.'
19. Applying the aforesaid tests in the present case, the petitioner-Corporation does not fall within the definition of 'Local Authority' as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in as much the managing body of the petitioner-Corporation is neither an elected by the people of Rajas-than nor charged with civic duties like health, education services, water and sewerage, town planning and developments, Road, Markets, Transportation Social welfare activities etc. The petitioner-Corporation has not been entrusted by the State Government of Rajas-than with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. The petitioner-Corporation has not been given power by theState Government of Rajasthan to levy taxes, cess or fees in furtherance of its activities, therefore, in my considered opinion, it does not fall within the definition of 'local authority' as contemplated under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 and a contention contrary to it is not acceptable to me.
As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion the instant writ petition lacks merit and it is thereby dismissed with costs which is assessed to be Rs. 2500/-.