Judgment:
Chopra, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 5-4-1990 passed in S.B, Civil Writ Petition No, 951 of 1989, whereby the learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner-respondent, directed the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. to allot the petitioner a plot of equal importance of the same measurement in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. It was further directed that the petitioner will have to pay the difference between the plot allotted to him and the rates which were prevalent in the year 1984, if there is any, and the non-petitioner U.I.T. will also be entitled to charge the amount in accordance with law and if any amount due to the petitioner towards the earlier allotment. It was also directed that the allotment shall be made within a period of three months from today and the petitioner is entitled to costs, which is quantified to the extent of Rs.2,000/-.
2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this appeal briefly stated are: that the petitioner was allotted plot No. 47-C measuing 317.50sq. yds. in the 1st extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur for a sum of Rs. 27,384.37P vide order Annexure-1 dated 11-5-1984. At the initial stage, the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 5,000 / - on 30-11-1983 vide receipt Annexure-2. Rs. 20,000/- were further deposited by him vide receipt Annexure-3 dated 6-8-1984. It is alleged that the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37P was offered several times but the appellant U.I.T. on one or the other pretext did not accept the same as the plot was not ready for allotment because the licence of the same was given to some other person. It is further alleged that the appellant U.I.T. came to know that on account of non-maintenance of disposal register, it has become a case of double allotment. The petitioner respondent then informed the appellant U.I.T. to allot him some other alternate plot and further requested that he should not be allowed to suffer on account of the mistake and negligence on the part of the employees of the appellant U.I.T. The petitioner-respondent Laxmichand also informed the appellant U.I.T. that number of plots in Sector-A and other Sectors of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur are lying vacant and, therefore, he should be allottred a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar itself.
3. However, it appears that on 8-8-1988 (which appears to be a wrong date, it must be 8-8-89), a direction was issued that the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand be allotted another plot No. 260-B in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur. This order was passed by the appellant U.I.T. after obtaining a detailed report from the office but even thereafter, nothing has been done. It was submitted that the petitioner has already suffered irreparable loss and injury inasmuch as on account of this delay, he could not raise the construction and the cost of the construction is going high day by day. He has, therefore, prayed that the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. be directed to allot him an alternate plot of the same importance in the same Scheme i.e. 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. He has further prayed that the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. may be restrained from sanctioning any plot in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur in Sector 'A' till the plot is allotted to the petitioner.
4. Initially, notice was issued to the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. to show cause also why this writ petition be not admitted and in pursuance of that notice, Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Advocate put in appearance on its behalf and filed a reply to the show cause noticei In reply to the show cause notice, it was admitted that the petitioner was allotted poll No. C-47 in 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and that plot had already been allotted to one Shri Lakhpat Raj Bagrecha in the Year 1978 and, therefore, due to oversight, this mistake had crept in. It was submitted that there were few more cases in which such kind of mistake was committed.
5. It was further submitted that the appellant U.I.T. in its meetings dated 9-6-89 and 25-7-1989 disposed of certain cases in which it was decided that such persons should be allotted alternate plots in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur. The petitioner was also allotted plot No. 260-B in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur measuring about 200 sq. yds. vide Resolution Annexure-R-2 dated 25-7-89. It was claimed that it is a case of private contract and, therefore, no writ petition can be filed.
6. Later on, the case was admitted and a detailed reply to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of the non-pctitioner-appellant U.I.T., in which, the contentions which were raised in reply to the show cause notice were reiterated. It was further contended that the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37P, was never offered and, therefore, the petitoner-respon-dent Laxmichand is guilty of non-payment of full price of the plot in dispute and, hence, his allotment came to an end automatically. However, as a benevolent gesture, the non-petitioner-appellant decided on 9-6-1989 vide its Resolution Annexure-R-1 that an alternate plot be allotted to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand along with other similarly situated applicants. It has been claimed that no duty lay on the appellant U.I.T. to allot a plot to the petitioner Laxmichand in the same scheme. It was submitted that it is a case of private contract and, therefore, this writ petition is not maintainable. It was further submitted that this writ petition is highly belated and, therefore, on that account, it be dismissed. According to the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T., as per the provisions of Rule 17(5) of the Rajasthan Urban Improve ment Trust (Disposal of Urban Lands) Rules, 1974 (for short 'the Rules') this allotment came to an end automatically. It was submitted that the petitioner has an alternative remedy available to him under Rule 30 of the aforesaid Rules for redressal of his grievances by filing an appeal before the State Govt. and since that remedy has not been availed by him, this writ petition be dismissed.
7. A rejoinder to the reply to the writ petition has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand, in which, the contentions raised in the writ petition were reiterated and it was submitted that certain plots are available with the non-petitioner-appellant in Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and, therefore, he be allotted a plot in the same scheme. This request of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand has been accepted by the learned single Judge vide his order dated April 5, 1990.
8. Aggrieved against this judgment of the learned single Judge dated April 5, 1990, the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. has filed this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949.
9. We have heard Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant U.I.T. and Mr. K.N. Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent Laxmichand and have carefully gone through the record of the case.
10. It was contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that this writ petition is highly belated and, therefore, it should be dismissed on that ground. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai (AIR 1964 SC 1006), wherein it has been laid down that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. However, the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured.
The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable.
11. A similar view has been expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Amrit Lal v. Collector, C.E.C. Revenue (AIR 1975 SC 538) and a Division Bench of this Court in Surajmal v. State (AIR 1974 Raj 116), wherein it has been held that save in exceptional cases, if a litigant comes to Court of law after the period of limitation prescribed for a particular relief, the Court would ordinarily decline to grant it on the ground of delay and it does not make any difference whether the relief is claimed in regard to the violation of fundamental rights or otherwise. We have considered these authorities and we are afraid that they are not applicable to the facts of this case. It is true that in this case, the allotment was made in favour of the respondent Laxmichand way back in the year 1984 and in pursuance of that allotment, the respondent has already deposited a sum of Rs. 25,000/-but the possession of the polt allotted to him could not be handed over because it turned out to be a case of double allotment. Hence, that plot was not available for allotment and this mistake was realised by the appellant U.I.T. It is unfortunate that a public Institution like the Urban Improvement Trust, which is the creation of a Statute, acts in such a callous and irresponsible manner. So much so, that in that very Scheme, according to the learned single Judge, 100 persons have been allotted plots which have already been allotted to other persons. Be that as it may, while realising this mistake, the appellant U.I.T. itself has decided as late as in the year 1989 that the persons who have suffered on account of its mistake and who have deposited their money with it should be offered alternate plots for allotment and that was done in the months of June and July, 1989 and, therefore, when the appellant U.I.T. itself has decided to rectify its mistake, this writ petition cannot be said to be belated and it cannot be thrown out on that count.
12. It was next contended by Mr. MR. Singhvi, the learned counsel for the appellant that the allotment made in favour of the respondent has automatically come to an end because of the application of Rule 17(5) of the Rules, which provides that an allottee has to deposit the remaining amount within 30 days of the allotment and if it is not done then he can do so within the next 30 days by depositing the amount with an interest @ 15% p.a. from the date of allotment, failing which, the allotment of land shall automatically stand concelled. However, it has been provided that the Chairman may regularise such allotment of land withdrawing the automatic cancellation within a period of ten months from the date of said automatic cancellation, if the allottee is prepared to pay the full amount of cost plus interest @ 15% p. a. up to the date of regularisation of allotment of land in addition also an amount of penalty at the rates provided by Rule 17(5) of the Rules. It has further been provided that after the expiry of the period of ten months from the date of the said automatic cancellation, the Chairman shall have no power to regularise such allotment of land in any case, and if the Chairman considers necessary in the interest of the Trust, he may refer the case to the State Govt. even after the expiry of the period mentioned in Clause (ii) of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 17 of the Rules, and the State Govt. after considering the recommendations made by the Chairman may permit such regularisation on payment by the allotee, the amount of cost of land plus interest and penalty as provided in Clause (i) of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 17 of the Rules up to the month in which the case was referred to the State Govt. by the Chairman.
13. Much stress was laid on the provisions of Rule 17(5) of the Rules and it was submitted that the respondent has only deposited a sum of Rs. 5,000/- in time. The remaining amount of Rs. 20,000/- have been deposited by him on 6-8-1984 i.e. after the period of sixty days from the date of allotment and even the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37P. has not been deposited so far. This contention could have assumed great importance, had it not been a case of double (allotment. When the plot itself was not available for allotment, application of Rule 17(5) of the Rules is out of question. The provisions of Rule 17(5) of the Rules can only be attrracted when the plot is available for allotment and the applicant guilty of latches. In this view of the matter, the argument of Mr. Singhvi that the allotment made in favour of the respondent had automatically come to an end as per the provisions of Rule 17(5) of the Rules has no force and it is rejected.
14. It was argued by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that it is a case of private contract and for enforcement of a private contract, a writ petition does not lie under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this respect, he has placed reliance on adecision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh (AIR 1976 SC 2216) and Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar (AIR 1977 SC 1496), wherein it has been held that if the contract does not contain any statutory terms or obligations then no statutory power/obligation can be attracted and, therefore, in such matters of breach of contract, extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be attracted. Such a contention was raised even before the learned single Judge and it has been repelled by saying that it is not a case of private contract but it is a case of statutory contract, which has been entered into between the parties.
15. In this case, the respondent has been allotted the plot in dispute under the provisions of the Rules and according to the Rules, the scheme has to be framed by the U.I.T. and that has to be got approved from the Chief Town' Planner and thereafter, the land has to be divided into commercial and residential purposes. Thereafter, plots are to be carved out and they can only be leased out for 99 years. They cannot be sold to any party. Certain reservations can also be made according to Rules. Thus, the land is being leased out by the U.I.T. in pursuance of the Rules. It invites applications for allotment and thereafter, it can allot the land either by way of allotment through lots or by open auction.
Thus., the contract of sale of land by the U.I.T. is governed by the Rules and, therefore, it has statutory overtones and so, it cannot be said to be case of private contract as such.
16. Even if for the sake of argument, it is held to be a case of contract between two contracting parties then too, the Institution like U.I.T. which can be described as 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution cannot act arbitrarily. It has to act fairly and reasonably as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions..
17. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in K.C. Rout v. State (AIR 1979 Orissa 120) observed that the Govt. is bound to act in a manner which would hold out ideal conduct for citizens to imbibe and it cannot undertake performance of its functions in a manner which would lead to litigations and drive law-abiding citizens to raise dispute for enforcing their admitted rights. By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the minds of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the Slate must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto.
18. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Prasad Mishra v. O.N.G.C. (AIR 1987 Cal 1) has held that fair play and justice ought to be the basic criterion on which a governmental agency should act. The concept of justice and rule of law is not however a static one, but it ought to keep pace with the socio economic changes in the country. Doctrine of promissory estoppels ought to be applied against the government or the governmental agency where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate such a course. It is, however, also true that the doctrine of promissory estoppels is an equitable doctrine and it must yield when the equity so requires. Thus, we are firmly of the view that it is not a case of private contract as the contract is governed by certain statutory Rules. The plots cannot be sold by the U.I.T., through private bargain. They can only be leased out either through open auctions or through inviting applications and then allotting them by drawing lots as per the Rules. Thus, it has all statutory overtones. Even if it is assumed that strictly speaking it is not a statutory contract then too, the appellant U.I.T. is bound to act in a manner which would hold out ideal conduct for citizens to imbibe and it cannot undertake performance of its functions in a manner which would lead to litigants and drive law-abiding citizens to raise dispute for enforcing their admitted rights. By its conduct and performance, the statutory body like U.I.T. must create a sense of security in the minds of the citizens while dealing with the U.I.T. must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. Thus, this argument of Mr. Singhvi also cannot be sustained.
19. Mr. K.N. Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent has, however, approached this aspect of the matter with a slightly different angle. He has submitted that even if, strictly speaking, it is not treated as a statutory contract then too, U.I.T. being a statutory body, it is obliged to perform its statutory obligations under the Rules. According to Mr. Joshi, scheme for the development of the City has to be framed by the U.I.T. and that has to be got approved from the Chief Town Planner and, thereafter, the land has to be divided into commercial and residential purposes and then plots are to be carved out by it. Plots can only be leased out for 99 years but they cannot be sold to anyone. Certain reservations can also be made. He has submitted that the lands is being leased out by the U.I.T. in accordance with the Rules. It invites applications for allotment and thereafter, it can lease out the land either by way of allotment through lots or by open auctions. Thus, it has all statutory overtones. Mr. Joshi has submitted that once the U.I.T. invites applications for allotment of plots and allots certain plots in favour of certain applicants but later on it is revealed that on account of its own mistake, those' plots have already been allotted to some other applicants then in such circumstances, taking recourse to Section 20 of the Contract Act, it cannot back out the promise made by it. He has further submitted that U.I.T. being the
'other authority' has to act fairly and reasonably so that the people may not loose faith in such public institutions. In this respect, he has drawn our attention to the decision in Surendra Prasad Misra's case (supra) wherein, it has been observed: 'that where Govt. or Government agency makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee and if the promisee acting in accordance therewith and thereby alters.'
This position, the Govt. or the Governmental agency would be held to be bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. or the Governmental agency at the instance of the promise, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise or that the promise has not been reduced to writing in the form of a contract as required under Article 299 of the Constitution. It was in this context that the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has observed that fair play and justice ought to be the basic criterion on which a Governmental agency should' act. It was further observed that if a promise can form part of a cause of action connected with statutory obligation, it is too late in the day to contend that it ought to be restricted to the extent above and no further extension ought to be allowed. In this case, the major part of the consideration has already passed i.e. the petitoner-respondent has altered his situation by depositing a sum of Rs. 25.000/- with the appellant U.I.T. way back in the year 1984, which are still lying with it and, therefore, the appellant U.I.T. cannot back out of its promise, which was held out by it that it will allot a plot to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in 1st Extension of Kamla Nahru Nagar, Jodhpur. No particular plots were advertised to be allotted to the applicants, The petitioner-respondent Laxmichand had applied for allotment of a plot in 1st Extension Kamla Nahru Nagar, Jodhpur and he was allotted Plot No.47-C in first extension Kamila Nehru Nagar Jodhpur. That was the act of the appellant U.I.T. and not of the respondent Laxmichand. This allotment was permissible under the Rules.
However, it turned out that plot was not available for allotment because it had already been allotted to someone else. That is no fault of the respondent Laxmichand. He cannot suffer for negligence, callousness and non-maintenance of the essential record by the appellant U.I.T. and, therefore, in such circumstances, in Surendra Prasad Misra's case (supra), it was further observed that the writ Corut would be within its jurisdiction to enforce the equity as found to be existing and can compel the government or the governmental agency to perform its part of the bargain. If an act of the Government or the Governmental agency is apparently not in accordance with the rule of taw, equity and fair play, it would be a plain exercise of judicial power for the writ Court to intervene.
20. There is no doubt about this fact that equity stands in favour of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand, who deserves allotment of a plot in Kamla Nahru Nagar, Jodhpur because he had applied for allotment of a plot in Karnla Nahru Nagar, Jodhpur in pursuance of an advertisement of the appellant U.I.T. and has parted with the huge amount in favour of the U.I.T. The appellant U.I.T. did not return that amount to the respondent Laxmichand and has utilised it for its own purpose. Thus, the equity, fair play and justice demands that respondent Laxmichand should be allotted an alternate plot and probably that weighed with the appellant U.I.T. and, therefore, it decided to offer a plot in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur to him. The learned single Judge in Surendra Prasad Misra's case (supra) has further observed that when there is manifest in justice and after coming to a finding that an eqnity exists in favour of the petitioner, the writ Court can mould the relief in order to dojustice between the parties. The concept of justice cannot be restricted to a strait jacket formula, but is very wide and the law Courts exist to do justice and come in aid of a person who seeks justice against an administrative caprice and its ipse dixit.
21. Our attention was also drawn to a Division Bench decision of the Orissa High Corut in K.C. Rout v. State (supra), wherein a particular lease was granted by the statutory authorities in favour of the petitioner under the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that the lessee has statutory right to force the lessor to put him in possession of the leasehold property. Section 108, Clause (b) of the T.P. Act casts that obligation on the lessor. When there is a valid and duly registered lease in favour of a lessee, right to property is created in his favour and he is entitled to have possession and enjoy the leasehold in accordance with law. If the lessor omits to perform its part of the obligation of putting the lessee in possession the lessee of the property has a statutory right to enforce performance of the obligation. The lessee is entitled to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction for enforcement of his statutory right. It was also observed that 'where on the basis of the representation made by the State Govt. that the lessee will be provided with alternate site and will enjoy the property for 90 years, the lessee surrendered the legal right created in his favour under the first lease deed and a valid lease-deed in respect of the alternate site was also executed and registered in his favour and thus, the lessee changed his position to his prejudice relying on representation, the lessee is entitled on the basis of promissory estoppel to claim possession of the alternate site from the State Govt. It was in this context that it was held that the Govt. is bound to act in a manner which would hold out ideal conduct for citizens to imbibe and it cannot undertake performance of its functions in a manner which would lead to litigations and drive law abiding citizens to raise dispute for enforcing their admitted rights. By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the minds of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the State must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto. In this case too, in pursuance of the allotment order, initially the petitioner has deposited a sum of Rupees 5,000/- and later on he has deposited a sum of Rs. 20.000/- with the appellant U.I.T. on 6-8-1984 and the appellant U.I.T. vide its resolution dated 9-6-89 offered an alternate plot to the respondent in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur and, therefore, then the petitioner has changed his position to his prejudice, the appellant U.I.T. is now estopped to wriggle out from this promise by taking recourse to Section 20 of the Contract Act.
22. In Union of India v. Wearwell cycle Co. Ltd., (AIR 1986 Delhi 5), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has observed :
'that the decision to transfer a property forming part of the compensation pool made in exercise of the power under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act read with R. 87 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules framed there under could only be by the statutory authorities under the Act and non-making thereof in the name of the President could not be stated as in breach of Art. 299 of the Constitution. The transfer instrument need alone be executed in the name of the President.'
It was further observed as follows :
'that once the Govt. had decided to transfer a property froming part of the compensation pool to a particular displaced person who was in occupation of such property resiling from such decision without any valid reason was arbitrary and in breach of Article 14 of the Constitution so that the aggrieved person was entitled to invoke Article 226 to compel the authorities to perform its duty in accordance with law. It was not a mere breach of contract and the party could not be asked to seek his remedy in a civil suit.'
Our attention has also been drawn to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G.S.F.C. v. Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1983 SC 848), wherein certain promise was held out by the Gujarat State Finance Corpn. to advance certain amount of loan to the respondent and thereafter, it wriggled out from that promise and it was in that context that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that it is too late in the day to contend that the instrumentality of the State which would be 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution can commit breach of a solemn undertaking on which other side has acted and then contend that the party suffering by the breach of contract may sue for damages but cannot compel specific performance of the contract, It was submitted by Mr. Singhvi that if plot No.47-C in First Extension, Kamla Nahru Nagar, Jodhpur was not made available to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand then he should have filed a suit for damages and no specific performance of the contract can be granted.
23. It may again be stated at the cost of repetition, that the respondent applied for a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme and in that scheme, Plot No.47-C was allotted to him by the appellant U.I.T. by drawing the lots. Thus, contract between the parties was to allot a plot to the respondent in 1st Extension of the Kamla Nehru Nagar, Scheme of Jodhpur, for which, in our humble opinion, specific performance of the contract can be claimed because when Plot No.47-C, which came to be allotted to respondent by drawing lots, was found not available for allotment, it does not mean that other plots will not be made available to him in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur. At this stage, it will be useful to advert to an argument of Mr. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant U.I.T. that the Court cannot carve out a new contract between the parties, if the old contract is not enforceable. Actually, the contract between the parties was for allotment of a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur and the petitioner did not apply for a particular plot in this very scheme and, therefore, that contract can certainly be enforceable and when this contract has statutory overtonnes and if the statutory authorities are not acting fairly and reasonably then certainly the respondent is entitled to get redressal of his grievance by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
24. It was contended by Mr. M. R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant U.I.T. that the learned single Judge while relying on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Sunita (AIR 1989 SC 1637) have observed that a plot be allotted to the respondent Laxmichand in the same scheme for which he has applied for. He has submitted that that decision does not lay down any law and, therefore, it has no binding force on this Court as a precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. In this respect, he has placed reliance on an authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwanlal (AIR 1963 SC 499), wherein it has been observed that a case cannot be an authority on a point of fact and each case will have to be examined in the light of the circumstances existing in it. He further referred to the following three decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court:
1.Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956 SC 460).
2. Prakash Chandra v. State of U.P. (AIR 1960 SC 195); and
3. Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 1384).
There is no quarrel about this principle that a case decided on facts cannot be an authority, which has a binding force as a precedence under Article 141 of the Constitution but that does not mean that if in given facts of a case, a particular decision has been rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court then in similar circumstances. Such a decision should not be given any weight and importance. In this respect, the learned single Judge has placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad, Deccan v. M/s. Vaziar Sultan and Sons (AIR 1959 SC 814). Mr. Singhvi has contended that it was never ' his intention that the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme should not be given due weight but what he wanted to canvass was that such decisions cannot be taken as binding precedents. So far as this particular proposition is concerned, we have no quarrel about it. Even in the case of Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Sunita (supra), certain plots were allotted to certain persons in a particular scheme but the land on which those plots were situated was not available for allotment on account of certain factors which were beyond the control of the HUD A and, therefore, alternate plots were offered and out of 306 drawees, 278 persons accepted that alternate offer but the rest of the persons claimed that certain plots are still available in these very schemes and, therefore they should be allotted in these very schemes for which they applied for and,, therefore, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, were pleased; to hold that When plots ate available in those schemes and they are being advertised for safe by auction, the petitioners, are entitled to claim allotment of those plots. ;The facts of that case are almost similar to the facts of the present pase. In the present case also, the appellant U.I.T., has issued advertisements Annexures 4 to 7 for sale of certain residential plots in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur and these plots are situated in First Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. When these plots are available for sale and their sale has been advertised, the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand is entitled to be allotted a plot in the First Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur.
25. It was contended by the Mr. Singhvi that issue of a direction to allot a plot to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in First Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur will disturb the entire scheme. We are unable to understand how the allotment of a plot will disturb the entire scheme of the U.I.T. because plots can be sold or leased out either by allotment in lots or by auction. It hardly matters whether a plot is leased out either by allotment in lots or by open auction and such a disposal of plots cannot disturb the entire scheme as such and, therefore, to this extent, we cannot sustain the objection of Mr. Singhvi.
26. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Haryana Urban Development Authority's case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case and the ratio of that decision can safely be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case. In this respect, Mr. Joshi has gone a step further and has submitted that while sitting in appeal, the appellate Court is only required to find out whether the learned Judge has rendered a just decision and if the decision in the facts and circumstances, of that case is just even if that, decision is unauthorised that should be-sus-tained. In this respect, reliance, has been, placed on a decision of their Lordships, of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Swallesh v. 'Illrd ' Addl District Judge, Meerut (AIR 1988 SC 94).
27. Mr. Joshi has submitted that in thiscase, the learned single Judge after taking intoconsideration all the facts and circumstancesof the case came to the conclusion that plotsare available for allotment in Kamla NehruNagar, Jodhpur and, therefore, 'a plot Of:equal importance should be allotted to- thepetitioner-respondent Laxmicharid at the'rates which prevailed in the: year 1984.Mr. Singhvi has submitted that the phrase'equal importance' is causing great anxiety,because the officers of the U.I.T. are unable to'define this phrase. While issuing direction tothe non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. to allot aplot of equal importance to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in the First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur, the intention of the learned single Judge by usingthis phrase 'equal importance' was that thepetitioner should be allotted a plot in the FirstExtension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpurkeeping in view the situation and surroundings which Plot No. 47-C in First ExtensionKamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur enjoyed as regards approach to the road 'and other civilfacilities, which were available there aridhence that should not cause much concern tothe appellant U.I.T.
28. It was next contended by Mr. Singhvi that the plot of the same size in First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur is not available with the appellant U.I.T. Mr. Joshi has, however, submitted that the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand may be allotted any plot preferably in Sector-A, First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and if that plot carried an excess area to the size of plot No. 47-C in the First Extension Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur then the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand is ready to pay for the excess area of the plot at the market price.
This proposal appears to be just and proper inthe facts and circumstances of this case. According to Annexures-4 to 7, the appellantU.I.T. proposes to auction plots measuring 'about 100 to 600 sq. yds. 200 to 600 sq. yds. ;and 375 t6 525 sq. yds; in size in this very jscheme of Kamla Nehru Nagar, First Extension scheme, Jodhpur arid the appellantU.l.T. may allot any of these plots to thepetitioner-respondent Laxmichand in theFirst Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar,.Jodhpur.'
39. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and the appellant U.l.T. is directed to allot a plot in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nalgar, I Jodhpur to the petitioner-respondent Laxrhichand and if the plot allotted to the responent is in excess of the area comprised of plot No. 47-C, 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur then the respondent will be obliged to pay the prevalent market price for the exess area of that plot. So far as the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37P. is concerned, that will be payable by the respondent with interest @ 15% p.a. from the date of allotment i.e. 11-5-1984 within a period of fifteen days from today. The appellant is granted two months time to make a regular allotment of plot, in favour of the respondent from, today in the light of this appellate judgment. The respondent will also deposit the excess amount at the prevalent market rate on the date of allotment for the additional area of plot allotted to him over and above the area of plot No. 47-C in 1st Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur as and when demanded by the appellant U.l.T. in the light of this judgment within one month of the notice of demands served on him.
30. As this case was purely based on legal pleas, the costs of this appeal as also of the writ petition will be easy.