N.K. Jain, JJ.
1. This special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is directed against the Judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated Nov. 21, 1980 whereby the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioner-appellant.
2. However, while interpreting the two Notifications dated May 31, 1966 and July 12, 1966 issued by the Govt. of Rajasthan, the learned single Judge has observed:
'Having regard to the context of the two notifications and having regard to the accepted construction which has been placed on the two notifications, I am of the opinion that the notifications should be so construed so as to extend the exemptions to all the items mentioned therein. This may be done either by treating the word 'raw' as surplusage in the opening part or by treating that the 'raw materials' have been defined so as to cover all the items in all the Sub-heads of the two notifications. The power of granting as well defining exemptions is vested in the State Govt. under Section 107 Sub-section (5) of the Act.'
It was further held by the learned single Judge that the orders Exs. 3, 4, 5 and 6 do not deserve to be quashed. He has further held that challenge to the notifications mentioned in Schedule 'C' was not pressed before him. The learned single Judge has further held as under:
'Although, it may be observed that the tenure of notifications in Schedules 'A' and 'B' is 10 years or till a policy decision is taken by the Govt. on the report of the High Power Committee whichever is earlier. On behalf of the petitioner, no material has been placed on record that any report was submitted by the High Power Committee and on such a report, a policy decision was taken and in pursuance of that policy decision, notifications in Schedule 'C' were issued. Apart from that, the notifications in Schedule 'C' are general in nature whereas the notifications of Schedule 'A' and 'B' relate to an individual i.e. respondent No. 3 and these notifications cannot be said to have been superseded, by notifications mentioned in Schedule 'C' Thus, the last notification in Schedule 'C' cannot be taken to over-ride or supersede the notifications in Schedules 'A' and 'B'.'
3. A very short question, that is involved in this appeal, is as to whether the use of the word 'raw materials' as used in the Notifications dated May 31, 1966 and July 12, 1966 mentioned in Schedules 'A' and 'B' cover the entire items mentioned in these Notifications as regards exemption of octroi duty?
4. We have heard Mr. D.R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Mr. D.R. Bohra, the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate and M/s. L.R. Mehta and R. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 and have carefully gone thorugh the record of the case.
5. To decide the controversy involved in this case, it will be very useful to quote the Notifications dated May 31, 1966, and July 12, 1966 mentioned in Schedules 'A' and 'B' and verbatim:
SCHEDULE-A'
RAJASTHAN VANASPATI PRODUCTS
PRIVATE LIMITED.
RAW MATERIALS
No. Tax/F. 139(1)DLB/58 Jaipur, datedMay 31, 1966.
In exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (5) of Section 107 of the Rajas-than Municipalities Act, 1959 (Act No. 38 of 1959), the State Govt. being of the opinion that reasonable grounds exist for doing so, hereby grants exemption to Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Private Ltd., Bhilwara from payment of Octroi duty on the 'following raw materials' imported from outside Bhilwara for a period of 10 years or till a policy decision is taken by the Govt. on the report of the High Power Committee, whichever is earlier, from the date of issue of this Notification in the Rajasthan Rajpatra.
'RAW MATERIALS'
1. Raw Materials:--
Ground nut, Cotton seed. Til Seed, Copra and oils and oil cakes thereof required for manufacture of products.
2. Chemicals
Caustic Soda, Nickel Formate, Nickel, Catalyst, Fullers Earth, Hyflow Supercell, Salt common Citric, Acid, Soda Ash, Sodium Sillicate, Sulphuric acid, Hydrochloric acid, Chlorine, Vitamin, Flavours and essences and colours haxene (solvent), Activited carbon and Fine Chemicals.
(Published in the Rajasthan Gazette Part IV(C) dated July 14, 1966 at page 224).'
'SCHEDULE'B''
Bhilwara Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Pvt. Ltd.,
No. Tax. F. 139(1) DLB/58. Jaipur, dated July 12, 1966.
In continuation of this Department Notification No. Tax, F.139(DLB) 58, dated 2-6-1966 and in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (5) of section 105 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (No. 38 of 1959), the State Govt. being of the opinion that reasonable grounds exist for doing so, hereby further grants exemption to Rajasthan Vanaspati Private Ltd., Bhilwara from Payment of Octori duty on -the following raw materials for a period of ten years or till a policy decision is taken by the Govt. on the report of the Committee appointed for the purpose whichever is earlier, from the date of issue of this Notification in the Rajasthan Rajpatra.
(1) RAW MATERIALS: Soyabeen Oil, Sunflower Oil.
(2) FUELS AND LUBRICANTS:
Furnace Oil, steam Coke, hard coke, Kerosine low and high speed diesel oil, lubricants and greases.
(3) PACKING MATERIALS:
Tin plate, tin containers, empty 'drums, gunny bags hessian cloth, jute, twine, wooden packing cases, hoop iron nails, wires, paper and card board labels, coirs, hay, paints pastes, soldering metals like lead, zinc, tin and copper.
(4) OTHER ITEMS:
Machinery and electrical parts, electrical accessories, including bulbs and tube lights, structural, hardwares, insulation legging and packing materials, fire bricks fire-clay, filter cloth and filter papers, laboratories apart us and instruments.
6. The contention of Mr. D.R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant is that when these two notifications were issued by the State Govt. in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 107(5) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, the State Govt. has categorically mentioned in the upper part of these Notifications that the 'following raw materials are exempted from the payment of octroi duty and, therefore, only raw materials can be exempted from octroi duty and no other things. In the Notification dated May 31, 1966, under the major head 'raw materials', two Sub-heads have been carved out and they are (1) Raw Materials and (2) Chemicals, which have been quoted above. In the notification dated July 12, 1966, under the head 'Raw Material', only Soyabean Oil and Sunflower Oil have been mentioned and other three Sub-heads are (i) Fuels and Lubricants; (ii) Packing Materials and (iii) Other items. It was, therefore, contended by Mr. D. R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant that Fuel and Lubricants, Packing Materials, Chemicals etc. cannot be exempted from octroi duty.
7. As per Mr. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant when the State Govt. has used a particular expression in the Notifications i.e., 'following raw materials' then a literal meaning should be assigned to these words. In this respect, he drew our attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kanailal v. Paramnidhi, AIR 1957 SC 907, wherein it has been observed as follows at page 910:
'The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the Statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act while the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the Act purports to remedy and correct.'
Thus, it is clear that the words used in the material provisions of the Statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions thai the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimaterly arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act while the other constructions is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is true that the Court cannot add words to a section unless the section as it stands if interpreted literally will render it meaningless or make it of doubtful meaning. In this respect, reliance can be placed on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh, AIR 1959 SC 1331.
8. This takes us to the same rule of interpretation that ordinarily the words used by the legislature has to be given a literal and grammatical meaning but if that meaning makes a provision meaningless or creates doubt then of course, the Courts cannot become mere spectator and they will have to interpret the words in the manner which furthers the object of the Act.
9. In Dinesh Chandra v. Slate of Assam, AIR 1978 SC 17 : (1977 Lab 1C 1852), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that the cardinal rule of construction is that no words should be considered redundant or surplus in interpreting provisions of a statute or a rule. As back as in the year 1950, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jugalkishore v. Raw Cotton Co., AIR 1955 SC 376 have held that the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal intepretation.
10. Mr. Bhandari also drew my attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mandal AIR 1950 SC 265, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature, if such meaning is clear on the face of the Statute or the Rules. Thus, as per Mr. Bhandari, the Supreme Court was of the view that no such meaning should be provided to a legislation which may stifle the very object of the Statute. Mere hardship or inconvenience are no grounds for interpreting the Statute literally, if their meaning is clear but if it is not clear then of course, the difficulty arises and then one has to look into the parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kanailal's case (supra) and Jugalkishore's case (supra) for interpretation.
11. Mr. Bhandari also drew my attention to a decision of the Privy Council rendered in Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47 : (1939 (40) Cri LJ 364) wherein it has been held that plain meaning should be attributed to words and when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions. In a recent decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishanlal, 1991 (1) JT (SC) 258 : (AIR 1991 SC 558) have observed that unless there is any ambiguity, the Court should adopt literal construction.
12. Mr. Bhandari next drew my attention to the following observations made by thelearned Author S.G.G. Edgar in his book'Craies on Statute Law (7th Edition) (pages106-107):
'It was held that, in order to give a meaning to the section, the words 'and is' must be rejected. So in Stone v. Yeovil Corporation (1876) 1CPD 691, 701, where Section 9 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 was in question, Brett J. said : The word 'such' in the second branch of that clause would seem at first sight to apply to lands purchased or taken; but if so read, it is insensible. It is a canon of construction that, if it be possible, effect must be given to every word of an Act of Parliament or other document, but that if there be a word or a phrase there in to which no sensible meaning can be given, it must be eliminated. It seems to me therefore that the word such' must be eliminated from this part of the clause.'
The learned Author has further stated:
'The question at times arises whether, admitting a statute to have a certain intention, it must, through defective drafting or faulty expression, fail of its intended effect or whether necessary alternations may be made by the Court. The rule on this subject laid down in the Privy Council in Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 App Cas 627, 634 is as follows: 'It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that, where the intention of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskiifulness or ignorance of law. It may be necessary for a court of justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify it except necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used.'
The learned Author has also observed as follows:
'But a Court of law will reject words as surplusage, if it appears that, by 'attempting to give a meaning to every word, we should, 'as Coleridge, J. said in R. v. East Ardsley (Inhabitants) (1850) 14 QB 793, 801 have to make the Act of Parliament insensible,' or if it is clear that otherwise the manifest intention of the legislation will be defeated.'
Thus, if the literal meaning makes a piece of legislation insensible as held in R. v. East Ardsley (Inhabitants) (1850) 14 QB 793, 801 or the intention of the legislature is reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law then red undant word has 10 be rejected as surplus and that is permissible by law. In Calendonian Ry. v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 App Cas 114', 121, 122, Lord Selborne observed that the literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature, as apparent by the statute and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which that intention will be better effectuated.
13. Mr. Bhandari next referred to certain observations made by the learned Author Justice G.P. Singh in his treatise' Principles of Statutory Interpretation' (5th Edition 1992), wherein under the head of Language of the Statute should be read as it is, it has been stated as follows:
'The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution or words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.'
14. However, the learned Author has stated that this rule like all other rules is subject to exceptions.
15. The Courts cannot legislate but while interpreting statutes, they can certainly adopt the rule of intepretation. Where, the interpretation results in absurdity or is capable of two meanings then only that interpretation should be given to the words which furthers the object of the statute rather than defeating it.
16. It was contended by Mr. D. R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant that if a wholesale exemption of octroi is granted in favour of the respondent, it will certainly result in fraud upon the Act. In this respect, Mr. Bhandari has drawn our attention to certain observations made by the learned Author Bindra in his treatise 'Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes. 7th Edition' (Page 510), which areas under
'Fraud upon an Act. It is well known principle of law that the provisions of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance.' .......... A Court of Law will not tolerate such an evasion of an Act of Parliament as amounts to a position 'Fraud upon the Act', such an evasion being a fraud on the law or an insult to an Act of Parliament'. ............ It is no doubt the duty of the Court so to construe, statutes as to suppress the mischief against which they are directed and to advance the remedy which they are intended to provide, but it is one thing to construe the words of a statute, and another to extend its operation beyond what the words of it express.'
17. We have thoughfully considered these submissions made by Mr. D. R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant. Some of these authorities were also cited before the learned single Judge. The gist of these authorities also the observations made by learned Authors in their Law-Books is that normally a plain grammatical and literal meaning should be given to the words used by the Statute but it that material word is capable of two constructions then the one which furthers the object, for which, the Statute has been carved out should be adopted and no such interpretation should be given to the words used which may stifle the very object of the Statute, or it may result in absurdity or mischief.
18. It may be stated here that while issuing the impugned Notifications dated May 31, 1966 and July 12. 1966 mentioned in Schedules 'A' and 'B', the intention of the State Govt. was absolutely clear that the respondent through his application wanted exemption of octroi duty for the new establishment of his Industrial Unit and in doing so, it has claimed exemption of octroi duty of the raw materials. Chemicals, Fuels and Lubricants, Packing materials and other building items because its Industrial Unit was to be established in a less developed area and the State Govt. wanted to give impetus to the establishment of such Industrial Units in such areas, which may afford employment to a large number of the people and, therefore, the State Govt. thought it proper to grant these exemptions.
19. Mr. D. R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant has placed much stress on the word 'raw', . which has been used in the expression 'following raw materials' in the upper part of the impugned notifications dated May 31, 1966 and July 12, 1966 mentioned in Schedules 'A' and 'B'. He has totally overlooked the word following' in the expression 'following raw materials'. No doubt, it is a case of draft man's unskilfulness. The word 'raw' could have been avoided and only the words 'following materials could have served the purpose. How-ever, if the word 'raw' has to he given its plain grammatical and literal meaning then it would certainly stifle the very object of granting exemption to Chemicals, Fuels and Lubricants. .Packing Materials and other items and therefore, such an interpretation cannot be allowed to be given. In this respect, Mr. L. R. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 has drawn our attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra S. F. C. v. Jaycce Drugs and Pharm., 1991 (2) SCC 637: (1991 AIR SCW 612), wherein it has been observed that while interpreting the Statutes construction should subserve purpose of the enactment and should not defeat it. The construction should be such that no part of the enactment is rendered otiose or surplus.
20. Mr. L. R. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 has next drawn our attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India. AIR 1990 SC 689. wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that it is well settled that the heading prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words of the provision; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous, nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provision.
21. In this case, after mentioning in the upper part of the Notifications dated May 31, 1966 and July 12, 1966 mentioned in schedules 'A' and 'B' the words 'the following raw materials', four and two Sub-heads have been carved out respectively, in each of , these Notifications, which arc as follows :
Notification dated July 12, 1966(Schedule 'A') (1) Raw Materials; (2) Fuels and Lubricants; (3) Packing materials and (4) Other items
Notification D - May 31, 1966 (Schedule 'A') L Raw Materials and 2. Chemicals.
If the rule making authority only wanted to provide exemptions to the 'raw materials', there was no necessity to mention separate Sub-heads like Raw Materials, Fuels and Lubricants; Chemicals, Packing materials and other items. If the intention of the rule making authority was not to grant exemption of octroi duty to other articles except raw materials, then they would have certainly mentioned in these Notifications that only raw materials are to be exempted from octroi duty. Thus, after using the phrase 'the State Govt. being of the opinion that reasonable grounds exist for doing so, hereby further grants exemption to Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Private Ltd., Bhilwara from payment of octroi duty on the 'following raw' materials', when Fuels and Lubricants; Packing materials, chemicals and other items have been included in these two Notifications then : no such interpretation can be given to the words 'raw materials' which will nullify the exemption of octroi duty that has been granted by the Govt. in respect of these items.
22. It is interesting to note here that for six complete years, the petitioner-appellant has given this very interpretation to these words and has granted exemption of octroi duty on these articles also but on a legal advice being furnished by a particular Barrister, they have now turned round and have taken the plea that only raw materials are exempted from octroi duty and other articles are not exempted from octroi duty. If such an interpretation is given, it will make the mention of Chemicals in Notification dated May 31, 1966 and Fuels and Lubricants; 'Packing Materials and other items mentioned in the Notification dated July 12, 1966 Otiose and meaningless. Moreover, when such a fiscal provision has to be interpreted and the words used are capable of two meanings, then the one which favours the assessee has to be preferred than the one which favours the revenue.
23. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that keeping in view the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra S. F. C.'s case (supra) and M/s. Fric India Ltd.'s case (supra) and further keeping in view' the principle propounded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kanuilal's case (supra) and Jugalkishore's case (supra) and number of other authorities including English athorities, the use of word 'raw' in the phrase 'following raw materials' is surplus and redundant. It is on account of draftman's unskilfulness that he has used the word 'raw' in the expression 'following raw materials'. Actually', keeping in view the object of the Notification, he should have used the words 'following materials' in these two notifications. In our opinion, the learned single Judge was perfectly justified in giving this Interpretation to these two notifications. We are entirely in agreement with the learned single Judge that the word 'raw' used in the phrase 'following raw materials' is surplus and redundant. Any other interpretation will make these two notifications absurd and I meaningless. The interpretation sought to be 'put to these notifications by Mr. D. R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant cannot be accepted in the light of the aforesaid principles propounded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for interpretation of the Statutes. In this view of the matter, we entirely agree with the learned single Judge that the orders Exs. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 cannot be quashed.
24. Mr. D. R. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant has tried to challenge the notifications mentioned in Schedule 'C' but those Notifications were not challenged before the learned single Judge and, therefore, they cannot be allowed to be challenged now. Moreover, there is no evidence on record to show that these notifications were issued after taking into consideration the report of the High Power Committee by the Govt. and when that is not there, the Notifications mentioned in Schedule 'C', which are of general application cannot override the notifications mentioned in Schedules 'A' and 'B', which pertain to a particular Industry.
25. In the result, we find no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.