1. These four appeals of the revenue are directed against the order of learned CWT(A)-1, Indore dated 10/11/93 relevant to assessment year 81-82 and consolidated order dated 23/12/93 for assessment year 82-83, 84-85 and 85-86.
2. Since these appeals were heard together and involve common facts, therefore, ate being disposed of by a single order for the sake of convenience.
3. Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, Indore has passed order on 5/1/2006 in WTA No. 8 of 99 and in the very first para of the said order of the Hon'ble High Court it has been made clear that appeals being W.T.A. Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1999, as all these appeals arise out of the common order passed by the I.T.A.T. and secondly, they are between the same parties i.e. in relation to one assessee except the difference being that the appeals arise out of different assessment years and lastly, common question of law is involved in all these appeals.
4. The Hon'ble High Court further noted that the appeal filed by the revenue under section under Section 27-A of the Wealth Tax Act against an order, dated 27/10/98, passed by I.T.A.T. in W.T.A. No. 42/Ind/94.
By impugned appellate order, the Tribunal was pleased to dispose of other connected appeal arising out of different assessment years relating to same assessee (respondent herein) because in all appeals, common question of law based on same fact was involved. This appeal was admitted for final hearing on following substantial question of law: Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was justified in holding that the wealth of late Shri Anandrao Puar is not assessable in the hands of the assessee even though the assessee was the sole legal heir of the deceased who died intestate. 4. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, we are constrained to allow these appeals and while setting-aside of the impugned order remand the case to the Tribunal for deciding the appeals afresh for the reasons indicated infra.
5. This is how the Tribunal decided the appeals by making following observations contained in para 5 of the impugned order.
From careful perusal of record we find that the First Appellate Authority has decided the appeal after relying upon the findings of the Tribunal in the assessee's case in ITA Nos. 34/Ind/90 and 93/Ind/90. The Tribunal has also followed its earlier decision while deciding the appeal of the assessee pertaining to the assessment years 1983-84, 1986-86 and 1987-88 in W.T.A. Nos. 537 to 542/95.
Since the Tribunal has been taking a consistent view after following the orders of the Ahamedabad Bench in the assessee's case and if this Bench in ITA No. 34/Ind/90, we do not find a cogent reason to take a different view. We, therefore, decide the issue in favour of the assessee for the reasons discussed in our earlier order passed in W.T.A. Nos. 34/Ind/90 and 93/Ind/90." 6. Mere perusal of afore quoted para which resulted in dismissal of appeals' filed by the Revenue would indicate that the Tribunal seems to have relied on some earlier decision rendered by Tribunal in the case of this very assessee in ITA No. 34/Ind/90 and 93/Ind/90 rendered by Ahmedabad Bench of Tribunal in ITA No. 34/Ind/90 referred supra. No one has filed copy of these orders for perusal of this Court which was made basis for disposal of the appeals with a view to find out and then examine the socalled reasoning contained in those orders which led to dismissal of appeals filed by the Revenue. Secondly, the Tribunal too did not even quote the reasoning from those orders in the impugned order either in verbatim or their substance so as to atleast let this Court know its worth. In these circumstances, this Court is left with no opinion except to observe that the impugned orders rendered by the Tribunal do not even contain any reasoning nor contains any finding of fact necessary for its examination by the higher appellate court. It is, therefore, a case of an order having no reasons. This Court cannot countenance such type of approach and the manner of disposal of appeals by the Tribunal which is the last court of appeal so far as facts are concerned.
7. In our considered opinion, it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to deal with the facts involved in the case then deal with the submissions urged then record its finding with reasons duly supported with recent judicial verdicts of the Supreme Court and/or High Court on the issue involved and then reach to its conclusion one way or other. In case, if the Tribunal wish to rely upon its earlier decision which is undoubtedly one of the relevant fact then brief facts and reasoning contained in relation to that decision should be mentioned in the order so that it becomes a part of their order. It must then be also mentioned as to whether the said order has become final or is subjudice in reference proceedings or appeal at the instance of aggrieved partly and if so what is its status. A further effort must be made by mentioning in the order as to whether view so taken therein by the Tribunal is upheld or not by Supreme court or High Court in some cases decided subsequent to the decision or whether it is subjudice in any higher court Mere reference of any order without anything more indicates casual approach in the disposal of cases.
8. This Court as an appellate court can not record its own finding on facts. This Court has to examine the finding recorded by the Tribunal keeping in view the parameters specified in Section 27-a ibid, or Section 260-A of Income Tax Act as the case may be. But when there is no finding apparently visible in the impugned appellate order much less its reasoning then such and order can not be upheld. This Court is really concerned with the reasoning that led to the Tribunal to decide the issue in a particular manner. It is the reasoning or we may call "judicial reasoning" that matters for upholding or for setting-aside by the appellate court in hierarchy of jurisdiction. Once a particular point is decided in relation to one assessee by giving reasons then there is no need to decide the same issue again and again but at the same time, it must atleast be made part of the impugned order. If Tribunal committed an error in not mentioning the reasoning in the impugned order, the department committed further mistake in not filing the copies of those orders alongwith the appeal so as to make those orders part of the appellate record.
9. This Court in its appellate powers can frame additional substantial question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal.
Similarly this Court also possesses powers to remand the case to Tribunal in case, if we come to a conclusion that appeal can not be decided on merits unless a finding is recorded on facts by the Tribunal. In order to do complete justice between the parties and with a view to enable this Court to remand the case to Tribunal, we consider it proper to frame following additional substantial question of law, which does arise out of the case: In the absence of any finding and/or reasoning recorded in the impugned order, whether Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal by mere reference to one earlier decision of Tribunal.
10. We are of the opinion that aforesaid substantial question of law which does arise out of the impugned order deserves to be answered in affirmative and in favour of appellant. As a consequence, the matter has got to be remanded to Tribunal for fresh hearing of the appeals on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties. Since the matter is being remanded to the Tribunal, the parties are at liberty to bring to the notice of the Tribunal any relevant facts if came into existence pending these appeals and which have any bearing over the issues involved. Needless to observe, the Tribunal shall decide the appeals strictly in accordance with law keeping in view the aforementioned.
observations. Let the appeals be decided within 6 months as an outer limit. Parties to appear before the Tribunal on 6/2/2000. In view of the nature of order, which we have passed, remanding the appeal for hearing, we do not wish to answer the original question framed.
5. That is why these appeals have come up for hearing before this Bench and the assessee filed written submissions as well as following three orders of the Tribunal: 1. Copy of order of I.T.A.T. for the above mentioned four assessment year.
2. copy of order of I.T.A.T. Ahmedabad Bench for Income Tax assessment years 1981-82 & 82-83 being ITA Nos. 1865/Ahd/88 & 1583/Ahd/86.
3. Copy of order of I.T.A.T. Indore Bench in the Wealth Tax appeals in the assessment year 1982-83 being W.T.A. Nos. 34/Ind/90 & 53/Ind/90.
6. The department has submitted in writing vide communication dated 6/3/2006 that there is no order of Tribunal of Ahmedabad Bench or the order of High Court in the case record for assessment year 81-82.
7. Learned D. R. while relying upon the order of the Assessing Officer has pleaded that since late husband of the assessee died without executing any will, therefore, provisions of Section 19A of Wealth Tax Act which corresponds with the provisions of Section 168 of Income Tax Act was for as explanation contained in this provision is concerned, does not apply in this case. Therefore, learned CWT(A) was not justified in directing the Assessing Officer to exclude from the wealth of the assessee the value of immovable properties belong to the deceased husband of the assessee for any of the years under appeal. As such, his order should be reversed. So far as case law relied upon by CWT(A) is concerned, same relates to the case where deceased has executed the will and those are not the case where person died intestate as such are distinguishable on facts and cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.
8. As per written submission filed by the assessee, the brief facts of the case are that the assessee's husband Maharaja Anandrao Puar of Dhar died intestate on 25/4/1980. The sole surviving member after his death was the assessee. The assessee filed estate duty return of her late husband ion 8/5/81 declaring the value of estate passing on his death of Rs. 81,51,191/- on which estate duty payable worked out to Rs. 59,00,518/-. The estate duty order was passed on 31/12/86 assessing the total estate at Rs. 1,18,66,273/- creating a gross demand of Rs 82,14,824/-. Appeal against the said order was decided by the appellate Controller of Estate Duty vide his order dated 21/4/1988. The assesses filed separate Income Tax and Wealth tax returns of the estate of her late husband for the assessment years 81-82 to 87-88 declaring net income and net wealth of the estate before Assessing Officer Indore for these assessment years. Substantive assessments have been made both of income tax and wealth tax of the estate for the said assessment years 1981-82 to 1987-88. That the assessee filed her personal income tax and wealth tax returns for the assessment year 1981-82 to 1987-88 before Assessing Officer Baroda. From assessment year 1988-89 onwards she declared the income and wealth of the estate of her husband alongwith her personal income and wealth. As per Section 24B of the Income Tax Act, 1922, the income of a deceased could be assessed only for the year in which he died. The said provisions did not extent to tax liability of the estate of a deceased person beyond the previous year in which the person died. CIT v. Amarchand N. Shroff (1963) 48 ITR (SC) 59 & 65 & CIT v. James Anderson 51 ITR 345 (SC). To overcome this lacuna, certain sections in chapter XV were introduced in the income tax act 1961. Particular reference in respect of taxation of the income of the deceased can be made to Sections 159 to 168. In the present case, Section 168 which is a complete code in itself will apply. That as per Section 168 till the estate of the deceased is distributed or determined a separate assessment of the estate will have to be done in the hands of the executor administering the estate. Section 168(2) also provides that the assessment of an executor shall be made separately from any assessment that may be made on him in respect of his own income. Section 168(3) further provides that separate assessments will be made for each year of the estate and that of the beneficiaries according to their several interest till complete distribution of the estate is done. That explanation to Section 168(4) defines executor to include an administrator or other person administering the estate of the deceased person. Thus Section 168 is very clear that till the divisible estate of the deceased is determined, separate assessment has to be done of the estate. In the present case, the estate of the deceased was liable to estate duty, which was as high as 85% in excess of Rs. 20,00,000/-. Therefore, the executor of the estate i.e. the assessee had to wait till the estate duty assessment was completed which was passed on 31/12/86. Though the appeal against the said order before appellate controller and I.T.A.T. had not been finalized, yet the assessee filed separate income tax and wealth tax returns of the estate upto the assessment year 87-88. This stand of the assessee is duly supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Navnitlal Sakarlal 193 ITR 16 (SC) wherein though the estate duty assessment had become final, yet, since the estate duty was not paid by the executor and the residual estate distributed among the beneficiaries, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that as per Section 168(3) of the Income Tax Act, the executor will continue to be separately assessed in respect of the estate remaining to be distributed to the beneficiaries. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Navnitlal Sakarlai (supra) also discussed their earlier decision in the case of Leelavethane v. CED , wherein it was clarified that estate duty is a personal liability of the heirs and that the fact that a part of estate duty liability being outstanding could not be ignored in deciding the issue as to whether the administration of the estate is complete. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Bakshi Sampuran Singh 133 ITR 650 (P&H) held that even if the executor is the sole beneficiary, it does not necessarily follow that he receives the income in the later capacity.
The income received by the executor during the course of administration of the estate belongs to him and he is liable to be assessed as such.
The title of the residuary legatee accrues only when the administration is complete and after the residue is ascertained and not till then, this principle is enshrined in Section 168. Likewise, the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs. A. Ghosh reported in 159 ITR 124 (Cal) considered the case of the assessed who was the sole executrix and the sole residuary legatee under the last will and testament of her deceased husband. It was held that the income derived from the estate of the deceased husband and credited to the personal account of the assessee could not be included in the assessment of the assessee under Section 168(). It was immaterial if the executrix herself was the residuary legatee and as such was entitled to the remaining income of the estate after the same was fully administered, since before the end of the relevant previous years estate duty assessments had not been completed and since the estate duty was a first charge on the estate and that had remained unpaid. Further, the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs. Usha D. Shah 127 ITR 850 (Bom.) has explained the scope of the term executor, which is not to be understood in the restricted sense since as the explanation to Section 168 given an extended meaning to the word "executor" so as to include an administrator or other person administering the estate of the deceased person, i.e., one who is in de-facto management of the property of the deceased person. In this case, the deceased had left no will yet his estate was assessed separately in the hands of the executor under Section 16B. Looked from another angle, it is settled law that the same income/wealth cannot be taxed substantively in two hands for which reference is made to the earlier decision of Supreme Court in the case of Laxmipal Singhania v. CIT . In the present case, the Income Tax and wealth tax assessments for the years 1981-82 to 1987-88 were made on substantive basis in respect of the estate of the assessee's late husband. These assessments had also travelled upto the stage of CIT(A) and the Tribunal. Taxes in respect of these assessments were recovered and finally paid on substantive basis and not on protective basis. Therefore, assessment of the same income/wealth of the estate for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1987-88 cannot again be done on substantive basis, in the hands of the assessee. It is submitted that all these issues have been argued and discussed at length in the following orders of I.T.A.T. (i) ITA No. 1583/Ahd/86 for assessment year 82-83 (Ahmedabad Bench) and ITA No. 1865/Ahd/88 for assessment year 81-82 (Ahmedabad Bench).
(ii) WTA No. 34/IND/90 and 53/IND/90 for assessment year 82-83 (Indore Bench).
The I.T.A.T. Indore Bench has followed these decisions in their various orders of Income Tax and wealth tax for the assessment year 81-82 to 87-88.
9. After hearing both the sides and considering the material on record as well as case law cited, we find it to be an undisputed fact that the husband of the assessee has not executed any will prior to his death so he died intestate. In view of this fact, it is to be examined whether the estate of the deceased person came in the hands of the assessee, who is the only legal heir of her deceased husband, is liable to be separately assessed and could validly be excluded from the total wealth of the assessee for the years under consideration as held by learned CWT(A) or not. Section 19A of Wealth Tax Act 1957 pertains to "assessment in the case of executors" which reads as under: 19A. (1) Subject as hereinafter provided, the net wealth of the estate of a deceased person shall be chargeable to tax in the hands of the executor or executors.
(2) The executor or executors shall for the purposes of this Act be treated as an individual.
(3) The status of the executor or executors shall for the purposes of this Act as regards residence and citizenship be the same as that of the deceased on the valuation date immediately preceding his death.
(4) The assessment of an executor under this section shall be made separately from any assessment that may be made on him in respect of his own net wealth or on the net wealth of the deceased under Section 19.
(5) Separate assessments shall be made under this section in respect of the net wealth as on each valuation date as is included in the period from the date of the death of the deceased to the date of complete distribution to the beneficiaries of the estate according to their several interests.
(6) In computing the net wealth on any valuation date under this section; any assets of the estate distributed to, or applied to the benefit of, any specific legatee of the estate prior to that valuation date shall be excluded, but the assets so excluded shall, to the extent such assets are held by the legatee on any valuation date, be included in the net wealth of such specific legatee on that valuation date. Explanation.-In this section, "executor" includes an administrator or other person administering the estate of a deceased person.
As per above noted explanation, an 'administrator' is an 'executor' but none of these terms is defined in the Act so in order to find out its true meaning aid is necessarily to be taken from Indian Succession Act 1925 in which "executor" is defined as "a person to whom the execution of the last will of the deceased person, by the testator's appointment confided". The estates of the person dying intestate can also be subjected to administration, an administration is granted to the persons specified in relevant provisions of Indian Succession Act.
Letters of administration as provided under Indian Succession Act, entitle the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administration has been granted, at the moment of his death and as per Section 168 of Income Tax Act, the reference in explanation to "...other person administering the estate of a deceased person" is intended to apply to those persons who are found to be administering without having been appointed by the court as administrator, the estate of a deceased person who had left behind a will without naming an executor and in respect of whose will it is not necessary to obtain letters of administration and have an administrator appointed by court. Administrator appointed by court in respect of estates of those dying intestate are made assessable as per Section 160(1)(iii) of the IT Act as representative assessee -as persons appointed by or under any order of a court who receive or are entitled to receive income on behalf and for the benefit of any other person. So special provision in Section 168 of Income Tax is there in respect of income from estates of persons dying testate, by in effect, deeming the continued existence of deceased testator until such time as the administration of the estate of the deceased is completed by distribution of all the legacies in terms of his will. The scheme of the provision which contemplates the existence of an estate which must needs be administered which would be the case where the deceased has left a will but position is quite contrary where assessee has not executed any will. The Income Tax Act and Wealth Tax Act, though operate in different field as the first deals with the income received or accrued throughout the assessment year, the other deals with net wealth as on valuation date, yet however does not make any significant difference to the interpretation of Section 19A of Wealth Tax Act as Section 168 of the Income Tax Act, in so far as the Explanation attached to those provision which are worded in identical language or concerned. So in our considered view the extended definition of "executor" given in the explanation to Section 168 or 19A is only intended to apply to the de facto administrator of a estate of a deceased, who had died testate, beside the person to whom letters of administration with, a copy of will annexed is granted by the court and such provisions are totally inapplicable to the wealth from the estate of the person who has died intestate.
10. Similar situation came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of A and F Harvey Ltd. v. CWT while considering the scope of Section 19A of the Wealth-tax Act, the Explanation to which is in identical terms to the Explanation to Section 168 of the Income-tax Act, observed that (page 336) : " It is clear from the express language of this section that it provides for assessment of the assets of a deceased in the hands of the executor or executors. From the very nature of the case, the section will apply only to a case where an assessee dies having executed a will and appointed an executor or executors. If file had died intestate, the estate would have gone to his heirs and, therefore, it is in the hands of the heirs that the assessment will have to be made and not in the hands of anybody else".
11. Yet in another case of CWT v. Keshub Mahindra the Bombay High Court, held that Section 19A of the Wealth-tax Act is applicable only to case where the deceased had died after executing a will.
12. In order to interpret the words "or other person administering the estate" found in the Explanation to Section 168 of the Income Tax Act, therefore, are not to be read as having brought within its fold every de facto administrator of every undistributed estate of every deceased person whether or not the deceased had executed a will. The question as to whether an administrator pendente lite appointed by the court during the pendency of probate proceedings can be regarded as an administrator for the purposes of Section 168 of the Income-tax Act was considered by the Calcutta: High Court in the case of Mahamaya Dassi v. CIT . The court, speaking through Sabyasachi Mukherji J.(as he then was), held that the administrator pendente lite was different from the administrator contemplated by Section 168 of the Income-tax Act and that Section 168 would not apply to such administrator, pendente lite. The court observed (page 762) : "We have noted Section 168 and sub Sections (3) and (4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 168, in our opinion contemplates the distribution of the assets in the case of the administration of an estate by the executor.
If the executor or the administrator cannot distribute the assets then Sub-section (3) and Sub-section (4) would inappropriate." In the case of CIT v. Navnitlal Sakarlal [1980] 125 ITR 67, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, speaking through Divan C.J., held that (page 74) : " ...the word 'executor' in Section 168 means an executor* known under the Indian Succession Act as well as an administrator known under the Indian Succession Act, and what is more, any other person administering the estate of a deceased person is also included! in this special definition of the word 'executor' though, under the Indian Succession Act, such other person administering the estate of the deceased would never be referred to either as an 'executor' or as an 'administrator'".
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs.
Usha D. Shah speaking through M. N. Chandurikar J.(as he then was) held that the mother of the deceased who had died intestate would be assessable under Section 168 during the period when there were disputes between her and the assessee whose status as daughter-in-law was under dispute. That decision was explained by a later Division Bench of the same court speaking through the same learned judge in the case of CWT v. Keshub Mahindra .
The court at page, 46 of the report noted that the entire estate left behind by the husband of the assessee, Usha, was being managed by her mother-in-law, who had disputed the very status of the assessee as the wife of her son, and that there was ultimately a settlement as a result of which certain sum was paid to the assessee as the widow. For the assessment years which preceded the date of the settlement, the daughter-in-law whose status during those years was very much in dispute could not be assessed to tax by treating her as one of the sharers in the income of the estate of her husband.
13. Yet another case, similar point came up for consideration before the Full Bench of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax v. P. Manonmani reported in 245 ITR 48 and after discussion various aspects of these provisions and different case law, Hon'ble High Court has opined as under: The assessable person under Section 168 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is the executor. An administrator is also an executor for purposes of this section by virtue of the Explanation. Neither term has been defined in the Act. One has necessarily to look to the Indian Succession Act, 1925, for ascertaining their meaning.
"Administrator" is defined in Section 2(a) of that Act as" person appointed by competent authority to administer the estate of a deceased person when there is no executor". "Executor" is defined in Section 2(c) of that Act as "a person to whom the execution of the last will of the deceased person is, by the testator's appointment confided". Estates of persons dying intestate can also be subjected to administration, and administration is granted to the persons specified in Section 218 or 219 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
Letters of administration as provided in Section 220 of that Act entitle the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administration had been granted, at the moment of his death. In Section 168, the reference in the Explanation to "...other person administering the estate of a deceased person" is intended to apply to those persons who are found to be administering without having been appointed by the court as administrator, the estate of a deceased person who has left behind a will without naming an executor, and in respect of whose will it is not necessary to obtain letters of administration and have an administrator appointed by a court. Administrators appointed by a court in respect of the estates of those dying intestate are made assessable under Section 160(1)(iii) of the Income tax Act as representative assessees-as persons appointed by or under any order of a court who receive or are entitled to receive income on behalf or for benefit of any other person. Parliament has made a special provision in Section 168 in respect of income from estates of persons dying testate, by in effect, deeming the continued existence of the deceased testator till such time as the administration of his estate is completed by the distribution of all the legacies in terms of his will. The undistributed income from such estate is made assessable by treating it as the income of an individual or association of persons depending upon whether there is only one or a plurality of executor or administrator-whether de jure or de facto.
The intention to apply this provision only to income from estates of those who died testate, is evident from the caption, viz., "executor", of the part in which this section occurs, which caption is applicable only to cases where the deceased had left a will; the reference in Sub-section (4) to specific legatees who can exist only in cases where a will is in existence, the scheme of the provision which contemplates the existence of an estate which must needs be administered which would be the case where the deceased has left a will, the reference in Sub-section (3) to the distribution of the estate to the beneficiaries who can only exist where there is a will, such beneficiaries tracing their right to the will which confers such benefit on them; the notable omission to use the term "heirs" in any part of the section which term would have been used had it been the intention to apply the provision to cases of intestate succession, as such heirs are not beneficiaries" depending for their legacy on a testamentary instrument but who solely by reason of their relationship with the testator, are by law entitled to succeed to the estate vesting in defined shares where there is more than one heir at the moment of the death of the testator. After having provided for a separate part for executors in the Chapter dealing with liability in special cases and providing therein for the assessment of the executor till the date of complete distribution to the beneficiaries of the estate, and also providing for the exclusion from such assessments of the income distributed to, or applied for, the benefit of any specific legatee of the estate during the relevant previous year, Parliament did not intend, suddenly, by the back door as it were, to enlarge the scope of the provision to take within its fold estates of all deceased persons, irrespective of whether the deceased had died testate or interstate.
The Explanation at the end of Sub-section (4) is only intended to clarify that irrespective of the nomenclature and irrespective of whether the person administering the estate of such a deceased who had died testate, was appointee by the court, the section is to apply to all persons 'whether de jure or de facto administering the estate of a deceased person who has died testate. Had it' been the intention of Parliament to make income of estates of all deceased persons prior to the distribution thereof to those entitled thereto, the subject matter of this provision, the language appropriate only to estates of those who died testate would not have been employed.
While ascertaining the true scope of a provision in a statute, attention must necessarily be paid not only to the text, viz., the words employed in the relevant provision, but also the context. The text of the provision and context in which it occurs clearly indicate that this provision was intended to apply only to income of estates of persons who died testate. The words "or other person administering the estate" found in the Explanation to Section 168 of the Income-tax Act, therefore, are not to be read as having brought within its fold every de facto administrator of every undistributed estate of every deceased person whether or not tile deceased had executed a will. The Income-tax Act and the Wealth-tax Act operate in two different fields. While the first deals with income received or accrued throughout the assessment year, the other deals with net 'wealth as on the valuation date. That, however, does not make any significant difference to the interpretation of Section 19A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and Section 168 of the Income-tax Act in so far as the Explanations attached to those provisions which are couched in identical language are concerned. The extended definition of "executor" given in the Explanation to Section 168 of the Income tax Act is only intended to apply to the de facto administrator of the estate of a deceased person, who had died testate, besides the person to whom letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed is granted by the coml. Section 168 of the Income-tax Act is inapplicable to income from estates of persons who have died intestate.
14. In the above authoritative pronouncement of Madras High Court in which some of the case law as relied upon by Learned Counsel for the assessee in his written submission have also been considered to hold that in respect of wealth of a deceased dying intestate, provisions of Section 19A of Wealth tax Act which corresponds with the provisions of Section 168 so far as explanation contained in both the provisions is concerned does not apply.
15. Therefore, keeping in view entirety of facts and circumstances, relevant! provisions of law, the ratio of various decisions as noted above and in the light of discussion held above, we hold that wealth of the deceased which devolved upon the assessee on the death of her husband would be includable in her wealth and Assessing Officer is fully justified in including such wealth of the deceased in the wealth of the assessee for the years under consideration and CWT(A) was not legally correct in passing a direction to exclude such wealth. As such, while accepting the appeal of the revenue, we set aside the orders of CWT(A) and restore those of the Assessing Officer. So far as case law relied upon by assessee's counsel is concerned, either it does not directly relate to the issue in hand or the same pertains to the deceased who has died testate or in whose case letters of administration with a copy of Will annexed was granted by the court. As such these are not of any help to the assessee.