Akshay H. Mehta, J.
1. In this petition, the petitioner has sought to challenge order passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange at New Delhi dated 2-2-2007 below the application given in Appeal No. 121 of 1999. By the said order, the application filed by the petitioner for dispensation of making pre-deposit has been rejected and appeal has been ordered to be listed on 22-5-2007 for hearing. It is stated at the Bar that the appeal is not yet heard.
2. The facts, in short, giving rise to the present petition can be stated as under:
2.1. The deceased father of the petitioner viz., Shri Ishwardas Bechardas Patel was in the Angadia business as a partner of M/s. Patel Ishwardas Bechardas, a firm having four partners including him. The other three partners were his brothers. On 5-1-1994 a team of Preventive Officers under the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') visited the Mumbai branch of the partnership firm and seized various documents and other record as also Indian currency worth Rs. 2.15 lacs. Subsequently, a show-cause notice dated 6-6-1994 was issued to late Ishwardas calling upon him to explain why penalty on him should not be imposed for the violation of the provisions of Sections 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) of the Act on the basis that a total sum of Rs. 28,80,00,000/- was received by him from foreign countries since the year 1988 till the date of surprise checking. Late Ishwardas filed reply to the said notice dated 17-3-1997. Ultimately, upon adjudication, the Special Director of Enforcement (Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973) at Bombay passed order dated 30-6-1998, which was despatched on 18-3-1999 and received by late Ishwardas at Mumbai on 1-4-1999. Patel Ishwardas Bechardas expired after the order of adjudication was passed but before the appeal was filed. Hence, the present petitioner and his mother - Smt. Joitiben Ishwardas Patel filed appeal under Section 52 of the Act before the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Tribunal at Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal')- The appeal is numbered as Appeal No. 121 of 1999. It appears from the record that Smt. Joitiben Patel has also expired on 24-9-2005. Hence, the petitioner alone is now prosecuting the appeal.
2.2. Along with the appeal, the petitioner filed application for dispensation of making pre-deposit in view of 2nd proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 52 of the Act. The record shows that hearing of the said application was fixed on 19-12-2005, 8-3-2006, 29-5-2006, 11-7-2006 and 27-10-2006, but the hearing could not take place as the petitioner sought accommodation. Ultimately, on 2-2-2007 the hearing was fixed. On that day (sic) the learned Advocate for the petitioner sought time on the ground of non-availability of senior Counsel, but the request was turned down by the Tribunal and the hearing was done. The Tribunal found that the order under challenge before it was not ex-facie bad. It also found that Patel Ishwardas Bechardas, the original notice, was member of the H.U.F. which owned sufficient properties. Hence, the Tribunal, considering the totality of the case and scheme of the Act, directed the petitioner to deposit amount of penalty within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. The Tribunal also expressed the consequence of failure on the part of the petitioner to deposit the amount and said that the appeal would be dismissed on that ground alone. Hence, this petition.
3. I have heard Mr. S.H. Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Harin Raval, learned Asstt. Solicitor General for respondents. At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Raval has raised objection with regard to maintainability of the petition on the ground that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this petition. In view of the same, Mr. Sanjanwala for the petitioner has addressed me on the ground of jurisdiction and the maintainability of the petition as well as on merits of the case. He has submitted that since part of cause of action has arisen within the territory of this State, i.e., at Mehsana, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. He has further submitted that head office of the partnership firm of which late Ishwardas was a partner, is at Ahmedabad. He has further submitted that the property forming part of the H.U.F., namely a residential premises, is situated at Mehsana and if the attachment of the said property has to take place, it would be at Mehsana. He has further submitted that the impugned order has been served on the petitioner at Mehsana, at his residence and the consequences of this order will affect the petitioner at Mehsana. Hence, this petition is maintainable before this Court.
3.1. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, he has submitted that the impugned order is without application of mind. He has further submitted that before imposing the condition of pre-deposit, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to ascertain the financial condition of the petitioner and to know whether such condition would cause undue hardship to the petitioner. According to him, the Tribunal ought to have dispensed with the requirement of pre-deposit of the amount in question. He has further submitted that this is a case of personal penalty, and therefore, with the death of the petitioner's father, the cause has also got extinct and the petitioner cannot be visited with consequential penal measures. He has relied on decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court to support his submission with regard to maintainability of the petition as well as the submissions assailing the merits of the case.
3.2. As against that, Mr. Raval for the respondents has submitted that since the cause of action has arisen at Mumbai and the adjudication has also taken place at Mumbai. The order, on adjudication has been passed at Mumbai and that has been received by late Ishwardas Patel at Mumbai. Against this order, appeal is filed at Delhi and the impugned order of the Tribunal is also passed at Delhi. Hence, this Court has no jurisdiction. He has submitted that merely because petitioner stays at Mehsana and the property owned by the H.U.F. is at Mehsana, it does not mean that the part of cause of action has arisen at Mehsana. He has submitted that as the violation of the provisions of the Act and detection thereof have taken place at Mumbai, either the Court at Mumbai or the Court at Delhi has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition. He has further submitted that the order requiring the petitioner to comply with sub-Section (2) of Section 52 of the Act, is a discretionary order, and therefore, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He has further submitted that since the late Ishwardas Patel was involved in a serious matter of illegal hawala transactions and upon proper adjudication, the penalty has been imposed by the adjudicating authority, there is no need to grant any relief to the petitioner, otherwise it would amount to staying the order of penalty to be paid to the State. He has submitted that the petitioner has been adopting unfair tactics of delaying the matter and his conduct is not clean, hence, no discretionary relief can be granted to him. He has placed reliance on decision of the Apex Court to support his submission with regard to maintainability of the petition.
4. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsels for the parties. I have also closely perused the record as well as decisions cited at the Bar. There is no dispute that the surprise checking by the team of Preventive Officers took place on 5-1-1994 at Mumbai office of the firm of M/s. Patel Ishwardas Bechardas. It is also not in dispute that Patel Ishwardas was served with the notice and he had tendered his detailed reply thereto. It is also not in dispute that upon the adjudication, the Special Director, F.E.R.A. has imposed penalty of Rs. 7,00,00,000/- on late Ishwardas Patel and he has also directed to confiscate amount of Rs. 2.15 lacs alleged to have been recovered from the Mumbai office. It is also not in dispute that the appeal has been preferred along with the application for dispensation of the pre-deposit, but the application has been rejected. The disputed questions are whether the petition at the instance of the petitioner before this Court to challenge order dated 2-2-2007 dismissing the application is maintainable. Further, whether the Tribunal has committed error in not appreciating the fact that this is a case of personal penalty and with the death of Ishwardas Patel, the proceedings get abated and the petitioner cannot be visited with any penal consequences. It is disputed whether the Tribunal has failed to consider the fact that the petitioner will suffer undue hardship if he is required to comply with sub-Section (2) of Section 52 of the Act.
4.1. In view of the aforesaid disputed issues, 1 will first discuss and decide the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Raval, which is with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this petition. According to Mr. Sanjanwala, part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. To substantiate this, he has placed reliance on 4 factors, namely : (1) the petitioner is a resident of Mehsana, (2) the property which is likely to be adversely affected is at Mehsana, (3) the impugned order is served on the petitioner at Mehsana, and (4) the head office of the partnership firm wherein the late Ishwardas was partner, is at Ahmedabad. According to Mr. Sanjanwala, for the present, to decide the question with regard to territorial jurisdiction, this Court is only required to peruse the averments made in the petition as they are and on the basis of the same, arrive at a conclusion whether cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. According to him, if the petitioner did not comply with the condition imposed by the Tribunal, the appeal filed by the petitioner would be dismissed and the property of the petitioner would be attached. Thus, the direct consequence of impugned order will adversely affect the property as well as the petitioner at Mehsana. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on provisions of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India and two decisions, one of the Apex Court and the other of this Court. Article 226(2) reads as under:
(1) xxx xxx xxx(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
According to him, when the direct consequences of the impugned order are likely to fall on the petitioner at Mehsana, it can undoubtedly be said that part of cause of action has arisen at Mehsana, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and therefore, this Court can exercise power under Article 226 notwithstanding the fact that the main event has taken place at Mumbai and the impugned order is passed by the Tribunal situated at Delhi. To support his contention that the part of cause of action has arisen at Mehsana, he has placed reliance on the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Alka Synthetics Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (S.E.B.I.) reported in 1997 (3) GCD 88 (Guj.). He has drawn my attention to the following Paragraph:
29. The above decisions fortify the conclusions to which I have reached that the place where the order is served on the person affected affecting his rights at that place is a part of cause of action, and gives territorial jurisdiction to the Courts within whose territory the place at which service of the order has been affected affecting the rights of the person concerned is situated or to say the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction lies citus of right which is affected by the impugned order and that right is actually affected by service of impugned order within that territory has the jurisdiction to entertain challenge as to validity of such orders.
While delivering the aforesaid decision, the learned single Judge has referred to and relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. v. M.D. Juvekar reported in 0043/1988 : (1988)IILLJ534Guj . The learned single Judge in Para 24 of his judgment, has quoted a Paragraph from the decision of the Division Bench, which is also extensively relied on by Mr. Sanjanwala. It reads as under:
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the order of termination of service, though passed at New Delhi, was communicated to the respondent-employee at Ahmedabad since he was at the relevant time on leave. Whether it was for the convenience of the respondent-employee or for any other reason is not material, what is material is the fact that it was communicated to him at Ahmedabad. In our view, therefore, the decision on which Mr. Bhatt places reliance cannot come to the rescue of the appellants since it in terms states that the cause of action would arise not only at the place where the order of termination of service was made, but also at the place where its consequences fell on the employee. We cannot subscribe to the submission that the consequence of the termination order fell on the respondent-employee at Calcutta, the fact that it was communicated about had notwithstanding merely because the employee was posted at Calcutta Unit. It may be that on the receipt of the order by the Calcutta Unit, a part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen at Calcutta also but that cannot nullify that fact that the consequences of the order fell on the respondent-employee when he was informed about the same at Ahmedabad. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the aforesaid decision in fact is an authority for the proposition that a part of the cause of action arose at the place where the order of termination of service was communicated to the concerned employee.
Mr. Sanjanwala, has therefore, submitted that when the order is served on the petitioner at Mehsana and the consequence thereof can fall on the petitioner at Mehsana, part of cause of action can be said to have arisen at Mehsana. Mr. Sanjanwala has also drawn my attention to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Navinchadra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in : AIR2000SC2966 and has further submitted that when part of cause of action has arisen at Mehsana, in view of Article 226(2) this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. He has placed reliance on the following Paragraphs of this decision:
36. It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which Clause (1-A) was added to Article 226. That Clause was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment. Now Clause (2) of Article 226 reads thus:
226 (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.37. The object of the amendment by inserting Clause (2) in the Article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus, the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which 'the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises', and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Court.
38. 'Cause of action' is a phenomenon well understood in legal parlance. Mohapatra, J., has well delineated the import of the said expression by referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The collocation of the words 'cause of action, wholly or in part, arises' seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which Section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the Courts. As per that Section the suit could be instituted in a Court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the 'cause of action, wholly or in part, arises'. Judicial pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to mean 'the bundle of facts which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court'.
4.2. To test the submissions of Mr. Sanjanwala, it is necessary to take note of certain events and the places where they have occurred:
A group of Preventive Officers of F.E.R.A. visited the Mumbai Branch of the firm on 5-1-1994 and seized documents, papers, etc., as also currency worth Rs. 2.15 lacs. The inquiry or investigation was made at Mumbai. He was arrested on 7-1-1994 and appears to have been produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Mumbai. On 6-6-1994 the show-cause notice was served on the father of the petitioner at Mumbai. His reply dated 17-3-1997 was submitted to the respondent-authority at Mumbai. In pursuance of the show-cause notice the proceedings for contravention of Sections 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) of the Act were initiated by the Special Director of Enforcement (Foreign Exchage Regulation Act, 1973) at Mumbai. The order dated 30-6-1998 was passed at Mumbai and that was despatched on 18-3-1999 and was served on petitioner's father at 20, 2nd Phopal Wadi, Behind Surati Hotel, Bhuleshwar Road, Kalbadevi, Mumbai-400 002. Against the said order, the petitioner has preferred appeal under Section 52 of the Act before the Appellate Tribunal at Delhi. The application for dispensation of the pre-deposit in accordance with the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 52 of the Act was also submitted along with the appeal at Delhi. The Tribunal has passed order dated 2-2-2007 which is under challenge at Delhi.
4.3. Thus, all the events relating to the dispute have occurred at the places outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. There is no controversy on this count. So far as these events are concerned, none of them can enable this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It may be further noted here that so far as the factual averments made in the petition are concerned, the events which are narrated here are stated and even if they are taken as they are without evaluating the merits thereof, they cannot give any valid and legal reason to this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is only the consequential effect of the dismissal of the application and the likely dismissal of the appeal which is sought to be relied on by the petitioner to contend that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition, together with the fact that head office of the partnership firm is in Ahmedabad and also the fact that the petitioner is resident of Mehsana where the impugned order is served on him.
4.4. At this juncture, it will be worthwhile to refer to the decision cited by Mr. Raval rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. reported in : 2001(134)ELT596(SC) . In the said case, the Union of India challenged the judgment and order of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application Nos. 3282 and 3279 of 1999, wherein this Court allowed the petitions and granted the relief as prayed for by Adani Exports Ltd., despite the objection raised by Union of India with regard to maintainability of the petition before this Court for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Apex Court in Paras 12 and 13 of its judgment has narrated the factors which have been taken into consideration by it for determining the issue regarding territorial jurisdiction. They are as under:
12. We will now examine whether any of the facts mentioned in Para 16 of the applications or for that matter in the entire special civil applications would give rise to any part of the cause of action at Ahmedabad, at least for the purpose of conferring territorial jurisdiction on the High Court at Ahmedabad. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that it is an admitted fact that none of the respondents in the civil applications (appellants herein) are stationed at Ahmedabad. It is also an admitted fact that the pass-book in questions, benefit of which the respondent is seeking in the civil applications, is issued by an authority who is stationed at Chennai. The designated authority who is the competent person in respect of the matters concerning the pass-book scheme and who discharges various functions under the scheme is also stationed at Chennai. The entries in the pass-book under the scheme concerned are to be made by the authorities at Chennai. The export of prawns made by the respondents and the import of the inputs, benefit of which the respondents are seeking in the applications, also will have to be made through the same port i.e., Chennai.
13. In spite of the above admitted facts, the respondents herein plead that as per the plea raised by them in Para 16 of the special civil application, the following facts give rise to the cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction on the Court at Ahmedabad. They are:
(i) the respondents carry on their business of export and import from Ahmedabad;
(ii) their orders of export and import are placed from and are executed from Ahmedabad;
(iii) documents and payments for export and import are sent/made at Ahmedabad;
(iv) the credit of duty claimed in respect of export are handled from Ahmedabad since export orders were received at Ahmedabad and payment also received at Ahmedabad;
(v) non-granting and denial of utilization of the credit in the pass-book will affect the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad;
(v) the respondents have executed a Bank Guarantee through their bankers at Ahmedabad as well as a bond at Ahmedabad.
It has thereafter, concluded as under:
17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. If we apply this principle, then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the Courts at Ahmedabad.
18. As we have noticed earlier, the facts that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. Non-granting and denial of credit in the pass-book having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a Court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants.
4.5. It is, therefore, clear that despite Adani Exports Ltd., having its main business carried on from Ahmedabad and the non-granting and denial of utilization of credit in the pass-book would have affected their business at Ahmedabad, the Apex Court held that none of the facts pleaded by Adani Exports Ltd., had any bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case and none of the facts pleaded by it fell into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court at Ahmedabad. It is obvious that the denial of and non-granting of utilization of credit in the pass-book were to adversely affect the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad causing substantial financial setback. In other words, the consequences of non-granting and denial of utilization of the credit in the pass-book were directly to fall on the business of Adani Exports Ltd. at Ahmedabad, despite that the Apex Court held that it is not a fact which would give rise to a cause of action in Ahmedabad.
4.6. It is also necessary to refer to another decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Alchemist Limited v. State Bank of Sikkim reported in : AIR2007SC1812 , where similar issue of territorial jurisdiction was involved. While considering the issue, the Apex Court in Para 7 has enumerated the facts pleaded by the appellant-Company of that case and the submissions based on these facts by the appellant-Company, in Para 8 of the judgment. They are reproduced verbatim hereinbelow:
7. The Appellant-Company, contended that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Appellant-Company, for such submission, relied on the following facts:
(i) The Appellant-Company has its Registered and Corporate Office at Chandigarh;
(ii) The Appellant-Company carries on business at Chandigarh;
(iii) The offer of the Appellant-Company was accepted on February 20, 2004 and the acceptance was communicated to it at Chandigarh;
(iv) Part performance of the contract took place at Chandigarh inasmuch as Rs. 4.50 crores had been deposited by the Appellant-Company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh as per the request of the first respondent;
(v) The Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chandigarh to ascertain the bona fides of the Appellant-Company;
(vi) Negotiations were held between the parties in the third week of March, 2005 at Chandigarh;
(vii) Letter of revocation dated February 23, 2006 was received by the Appellant-Company at Chandigarh. Consequences of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the Appellant-Company is aggrieved.
8. It was, therefore, submitted that at least a part of cause of action had certainly arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, and hence, it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside by directing the Court to decide the writ petition on merits.
It is necessary to state here that while opposing the maintainability of the proceedings before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the State Bank of Sikkim had pleaded the following facts:
(i) Registered and Corporate Office of the first respondent Bank is at Gangtok i.e., Sikkim;
(ii) Secretariat of the second respondent State is situated at Gangtok i.e., Sikkim;
(iii) Offers were called for from various parties at Gangtok;
(iv) All offers were scrutinized and a decision to accept offer of the Appellant-Company was taken by the first-respondent Bank at Gangtok;
(v) The State Government's decision not to approve the proposal of the Appellant-Bank was taken at Gangtok;
(vi) The meeting of the Board of Directors of the first - respondent Bank was convened at Gangtok and a resolution was passed to withdraw the letter dated February 20, 2004 at Gangtok;
(vii) A communication was dispatched by the first - respondent Bank to the Appellant-Company on February 23, 2004 from Gangtok.
After considering several decisions of the Apex Court including the decision in Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (supra) the Apex Court has drawn the conclusion as under:
44. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the Appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition.
45. For the foregoing reasons, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
The aforesaid facts show that amongst other factors, the factor regarding the letter of revocation dated 23-2-2006 which was dispatched from Gangtok and was received by the Appellant-Company at Chandigarh, and the consequences, of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the Appellant Company was aggrieved, was pleaded by the Appellant-Company. Despite that the Apex Court held that the facts stated in Para 7 cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
4.7. Over and above the aforesaid decisions, there is also a need to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Textile Labour Union, Nadiad v. Union of India reported in : (2007)2GLR1202 . The said petition was filed by the Textile Labour Union of the Mafatlal Industries Ltd., situated at Nadiad. They had challenged the order of the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi dated 30-10-2002 in the said petition. The respondent of the said petition raised preliminary objection with regard to the lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioners of that petition advanced submissions to support the maintainability of the petition which have been incorporated in Para 6 of the judgment of the Division Bench. The said Paragraph reads as under:
6. However, learned Senior Advocate Shri Yatin N. Oza appearing with Shri B. P. Gupta for the petitioner-Union submitted that both, the Delhi High Court as well as this Court will have territorial jurisdiction as the main cause of action has arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He submitted that the workers of the petitioner-Union are at Nadiad of State of Gujarat; their wages have been frozen as per the impugned order passed by B.I.F.R., at Annexure-A, they would be vitally and directly affected and as they are in Gujarat, this Court will have jurisdiction. It was submitted by Shri Oza that substantial injury would be caused to them as the implementation of Clause E(v) of Para 5 of the scheme sanctioned by B.I.F.R. would also be in Gujarat.
The Division Bench ultimately proceeded to hold as under:
7. Coming to the facts of this case, a scheme was floated by B.I.F.R., as per its impugned order at Annexure-A, way back on 30-10-2002, which includes several clauses. The petitioner is aggrieved with only a portion of Clause E(v) of Para 5 of it, whereby the wages of the workers have been frozen for 5 years. That period would come to an end in this October, 2007. When there is an agreement arrived at with the management, at the instance of Operating Agency and when B.I.F.R. had passed the order at Delhi and the appeal was also filed at Delhi, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation, then, in our considered opinion, this Court will have no jurisdiction. If at all any Court had jurisdiction, then it would be the Delhi High Court. Even assuming for the sake of argument that this Court had also parallel territorial jurisdiction, then also, relying on the judgment of 3 Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots case (supra) we would have refused to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens, as, in our considered opinion, proper forum would be the Delhi High Court.
Despite the fact that as a direct consequence of order sanctioning the scheme by the B.I.F.R. the wages of workers at Nadiad were to be frozen the Division Bench said that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, the decisions of the Apex Court rendered in the cases of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. : 2001(134)ELT596(SC) , Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim : AIR2007SC1812 and decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Textile Labour Union, Nadiad v. Union of India : (2007)2GLR1202 clearly show that the consequences that are already fallen or are likely to fall upon the petitioner at a particular place is not a factor which can be taken into consideration for determining the issue regarding territorial jurisdiction positively. In other words, it is not a relevant, essential, integral or material fact which can constitute cause of action and confer jurisdiction on a particular Court. It is also required to be noted that the question with regard to territorial jurisdiction can be decided only on the basis of the facts or events that have already occurred since it is the cause of action which has already arisen, which confers the territorial jurisdiction on a particular Court. In the present case, it is pleaded by Mr. Sanjanwala that the consequences are likely to fall on the petitioner's property at Mehsana. That event has still not occurred. Even occurrence of the said event, in my opinion, in view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by different decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court will have no bearing on the question of territorial jurisdiction and so also the place of office or business. In view of the aforesaid, the decision of the learned single Judge in Alka Synthetics Ltd. v. S.E.B.I. (supra) will not render any help to the petitioner.
4.8. It may further be noted here that in the decision relied on by Mr. Sanjanwala in the case of Navinchadra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra : AIR2000SC2966 the Apex Court has categorically held that the place of residence of the person moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the cause of action in that particular writ petition. It has further held that the question whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of particular Court's jurisdiction would depend upon the facts in each case. It may be further noted here that there are several basic differences between the facts of the case of Navinchadra N. Majithia : AIR2000SC2966 and the case on hand. In that case, large number of events had taken place at Mumbai in respect of the allegations contained in the First Information Report registered at Shillong. Major part of the investigation in relation to the said F.I.R. was to be carried out at Mumbai. In that petition alternative prayer of transfer of investigation to Mumbai was also made; whereas in the present case, all the events leading to the dispute have occurred in Mumbai and none of the events has occurred either in Ahmedabad or in Mehsana. The office of late Ishwardas Patel situated at Mumbai was visited by a team of Preventive Officers under the Act at Mumbai and the questionable documents, papers, etc., as also currency of Rs. 2.15 lacs were seized from that office at Mumbai. The show-cause notice issued by the Director of Enforcement i.e., respondent No. 3 was at Mumbai and it was replied to by the late father of the petitioner at Mumbai. The order (original) dated 30-6-1998 was passed, upon adjudication by respondent No. 3, at Mumbai and it was despatched on 18-3-1999 which was received by late Ishwardas B. Patel, father of the petitioner at Mumbai. Against the said order, the petitioner has preferred appeal under Section 52 of the Act before the Appellate Tribunal at Delhi. The impugned order is passed by the Appellate Tribunal at Delhi. Further, while referring to the case of Navinchadra : AIR2000SC2966 , the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Adani Export Ltd. : 2001(134)ELT596(SC) , has observed that judgment in Navinchadra's case : AIR2000SC2966 had been delivered in a matter involving criminal dispute and consequences of such dispute could have direct bearing on the personal freedom of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and therefore, the consideration that arises in deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction in cases involving criminal offences may not apply to civil dispute like the Special Civil Application with which the Apex Court was concerned i.e., Union of India's case : 2001(134)ELT596(SC) . Thus, when the basic facts have difference to such an extent, in my opinion, the decision relied on by Mr. Sanjanwala will not render any help to the petitioner. The aforesaid discussion also clearly shows that the place of residence of the petitioner is not relevant factor to determine the question with regard to the territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, it is held by the Apex Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India : 2004(186)ELT3(SC) that situs of office of the party has no relevance for this purpose. In other words, the places of residence and business by themselves do not form integral part of the bundle of facts giving rise to the dispute between the parties which can be termed as cause of action. Therefore, none of Mr. Sanjanwala's submissions on the question of jurisdiction can be accepted.
5. To sum up:
I. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent with regard to lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition is upheld on the following grounds:
(a) None of the events leading to the initiation of proceedings for the contravention of Sections 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) of the Act has occurred either in Ahmedabad or in Mehsana.
(b) The proceedings were conducted by respondent No. 3 at Mumbai and the decision was given at Mumbai.
(c) Against the said decision, the petitioner has preferred appeal under Section 52 of the Act before the Appellate Tribunal at Delhi along with the application for dispensation of the pre-deposit.
(d) Application has been rejected by the Appellate Tribunal by order dated 2-2-2007 at Delhi.
II. The facts (i) that the petitioner is resident of Mehsana, (ii) the H.U.F. property of the petitioner, which is likely to be attached, upon dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance of the pre-deposit condition is at Mehsana, and (iii) Head office of the firm of Ishwardas Patel is at Ahmedabad, have no relevance for the purpose of deciding question of territorial jurisdiction in this case, and they cannot be said to be material or integral part of the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action.
6. Since, I have upheld the preliminary objection with regard to lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court, I have not touched the merits of the case and the decisions cited in respect thereto.
The net result is that I am of the opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition and the Registry is directed to return the petition to the petitioner for its presentation before the appropriate forum.