Mohit S. Shah, J.
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the High Court order dated 27-4-2005 and the Government notification dated 16-8-2005 compulsorily retiring the petitioner, a Judicial Officer holding the post of Civil Judge (S.D.) and Judicial Magistrate First Class, from service after a disciplinary inquiry.
2. The facts leading to filing of this petition, briefly stated, are as under:
2.1. The petitioner who was born on 7-5-1955, joined judicial service on 9-11-1981. After his appointment to the post of Civil Judge (J.D.) and J.M.F.C, the petitioner was posted at Navsari, and was thereafter, transferred to different places, such as Pardi, Valsad, Devdhar, Bharuch, Savli, Visnagar and Baroda. The petitioner was thereafter promoted to the post of Civil Judge (S.D.) on 10-6-1996 and was posted at Amreli.
2.2. The petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 16-12-1997 (which order was implemented on 17-12-1997) in view of the contemplated departmental inquiry on the basis of allegations made against the petitioner that during his tenure as Civil Judge (J.D.) and J.M.F.C, Visnagar between 15-6-1992 and 12-6-1994, the petitioner had granted bail orders in seven cases where the offences were punishable with life imprisonment being offences punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. The petitioner was thereafter served with charge-sheet dated 3-8-1998, levelling in all 17 charges including charge Nos. 4 and 6 which read as under:
(IV) In seven criminal cases (numbers given) 'the accused persons were arrested and produced before you for a serious offence punishable under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code for which punishment provided is imprisonment for life and fine and though you were very well aware that cases under Section 307 of I.P.C. are exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, and Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail, you, after accepting huge amounts released the accused persons on bail, in the said matters, holding that there was no prima facie case against the said accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 of I.P.C.
(VI) In Regular Civil Suit No. 56 of 1994 filed by Sumitraben Rameshchandra on 27-5-1994, against Naranbhai Prahladbhai Patel & Others, for permanent injunction, you granted ex-parte injunction against the defendant, but on the next day, i.e. on 28-5-1994, on the application of the defendant and without giving opportunity of being heard to the plaintiff as provided in Rule 4 of Order 39 of Civil Procedure Code, you, with an oblique motive, modified the said ex-parte order and directed both the parties to maintain status quo and because of the same the defendants took the benefit of putting up a door in the wall adjoining the disputed land and continued the said door under order of status quo.
seven other charges also pertained to judicial orders passed by the petitioner is Civil Judge (J.D.) and J.M.F.C. at Viramgam. Charge Nos. 10 to 13 pertained :o the petitioner's conduct at Viramgam regarding the petitioner's dress habits, lse of unparliamentary language on dais and maintaining relations with an Advocate and with an accused.
2.3. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet and denied the same. It was also contended that no departmental inquiry could be held in relation to the judicial orders passed by the petitioner which were never challenged by any party and which were not interfered with by any appellate or revisional Court.
2.4. After considering the evidence on record, the Inquiry Officer, a Fudge of the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad submitted report dated 22-1-2001 Annexure-G pages 151 to 219). The findings of the Inquiry Officer were as under:
Except charge Nos. 4 and 6 no other charges are proved against the delinquent.
So far as charge No. 4 is concerned, there is no direct evidence to show that corrupt practice was done by the delinquent Mr. Vyas. But he has gone beyond his power in enlarging the accused on bail in case of Section 307 I.P. Code etc. Thus, we can say that there is possibility of the delinquent for making corrupt practice and we can also say that the delinquent is found guilty of aforesaid acts of misconduct.
So far as charge No. 6 is concerned, order of ad interim injunction was modified by him without giving an opportunity to the other party and order of status quo was passed by him illegally. It further shows that he is guilty of indulging in corrupt practice and also guilty of the aforesaid acts of misconduct.
2.5. In view of the above inquiry report, the High Court on the administrative side issued show-cause notice dated 28-2-2002 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the High Court on the administrative side should not accept the inquiry report and the petitioner should not be visited with a major penalty. The petitioner submitted his reply dated nil (Annexure-I) to the show-cause notice. After hearing the petitioner, the disciplinary committee of the High Court submitted a report recommending acceptance of the report of the Inquiry officer and imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner. In absence of any dissent from any other learned Judge of the High Court on the administrative side, the impugned order dated 17-5-2005 came to be passed by the High Court on the administrative side. As regards the defence of the petitioner that departmental inquiry could not be held in respect of judicial orders passed by the petitioner, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan : (1993)ILLJ777SC and in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Patnaik : AIR1996SC280 , the High Court on the administrative side held as under:
Viewed in light of above-stated principles the report of Inquiry Officer with which the High Court concurs establishes that the delinquent by flouting settled principles for grant of bail has acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty. The material shows that in reckless manner delinquent has exercised judicial powers contrary to well-settled norms. This is certainly unbecoming of a judicial officer. While exercising judicial powers the delinquent had omitted to follow the prescribed conditions which are essential before enlarging accused involved in serious offences on bail as well as before modifying the order of injunction. This is not a case of mere technical violation or that the order is wrong which can be challenged before higher forum. Many a times it happens that powerful accused having political will prevail upon State from challenging wrong orders. Not only the delinquent has failed to maintain devotion to duty, he has acted negligently and omitted to follow prescribed criteria for grant of bail and passed orders recklessly.
Having regard to the facts of the case, the High Court is of the view that charge No. IV and VI levelled against the delinquent are proved. It is proved that by implication the delinquent was guilty of corrupt practice as well as of dereliction of duty while discharging judicial function and had acted in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.
As the delinquent has completed more than 16 years service and he is under suspension since last 7 years, the High Court is of the opinion that punishment of compulsory retirement from service should be imposed on the delinquent. Accordingly, the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of the delinquent from service.
On the basis of the above order of the High Court on the administrative side, the State Government issued notification dated 16-8-2005 compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service.
3. Mr. Unwala, learned Advocate for the petitioner has raised the following contentions : -
(i) As per the settled legal position, no departmental inquiry could have been held against the petitioner in respect of judicial orders passed by the petitioner in discharge of his duties as Judicial Magistrate, First Class. None of those orders was challenged before any appellate or revisional Court. Reliance is placed on several decisions of the Apex Court discussed hereinafter.
(ii) The petitioner rendered services as a Judicial Officer at several places from the date of his joining service in the year. ,1981 till the date of his suspension in December, 1997. The petitioner has never been informed about any complaint made against him at any place other than Viramgam. In fact, the petitioner was promoted as Civil Judge (S.D.) on 10-6-1996, and therefore, also no complaint should have been entertained in respect of the prior period (15-6-1992 to 12-6-1994) when the petitioner was Civil Judge (J.D.) and J.M.F.C, Visnagar.
(iii) In his entire judicial career spanning over 16 years, the petitioner had passed thousands of judicial orders and hundreds of orders on bail applications. It is unfair to pick up seven orders of bail where the disciplinary authority on the administrative side disagrees with the orders passed by the petitioner on the judicial side and on that basis alone comes to the conclusion of corruption by implication.
(iv) Section 437 of Cr.P.C. does not completely prohibit a Judicial Magistrate from granting bail for an offence punishable with life imprisonment. The Magistrate does have the jurisdiction to hold in the facts of a given case that the allegations against the accused and the material on record are not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable with life imprisonment or with death.
Strong reliance is placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Harihar Chaitanya v. State of U.P. in support of the contention that the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of the Investigating Officer in regard to the applicability of the Section under which the alleged offence falls. The Magistrate can prima facie look into the contents of the F.I.R. and disagree with the opinion formed by the police about the penal provision which covers the case.
Out of seven cases under consideration, in as many as five cases, the learned Public Prosecutor had given consent to the accused being released on bail. Out of the remaining two cases, in one case, the complainant had suffered only a contused laserated wound and was treated in the hospital as an out-door patient. In the seventh case, there were cross-complaints. None of those seven orders were either challenged by the State Government or by the private complainant. The accused in these seven cases were ordinary people whose liberty the petitioner protected by exercising the power under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. of a Judicial Magistrate, First Class presiding over the Magistrate's Court at Taluka headquarters and that even if the petitioner had committed any errors they were errors of judgment and no oblique motive could be attributed to such orders.
(v) It is submitted that even if the so-called errors could be treated as warranting any punishment, the punishment of compulsory retirement was too harsh, that the petitioner may be directed to be reinstated and that at the most some minor penalty of stoppage of increments without future effect could have been imposed.
4. On the other hand, Mr. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court opposed the petition and made the following submissions:
(a) In Prakash Kaur v. Sohansingh Khadaksing : (1984)1GLR345 and in Thakor Kanjibhai Shakarabhai v. Thakor Ambaram Kanjibhai 1985 23 GLH 15, the Hon'ble High Court on the judicial side had already interpreted the provisions of Section 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code and held that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail for offences punishable with life imprisonment or death.
The first proviso to Section 437(1) confers jurisdiction on the Magistrate to release the accused involved in an offence punishable with capital punishment or life imprisonment, where the accused is under the age of 16 years or is a woman or is sick or infirm. None of the seven cases under consideration fell in any of the above categories. There were no special reasons for exercising the powers under proviso to Section 437(1) of the Act. The orders passed by the petitioner in the cases under consideration did not disclose any special reasons. Hence, in view of the aforesaid decisions, the High Court on the administrative side was justified in drawing adverse inferences against the petitioner.
(b) For an inquiry to be instituted against a Judicial Officer under the provisions of Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 it is not necessary that the officer should be charged with corruption. It is sufficient if the officer is guilty of any conduct as mentioned in Rule 3 of the said Rules.
(c) Merely because the petitioner was promoted in 1996, that cannot be a ground for exonerating the petitioner of the charges levelled against him in respect of his conduct in the years 1992-1994, when the petitioner was Civil Judge, (J.D.), Viramgam.
(d) This Court exercising the powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution would not sit in appeal over the corporate decision of the High Court on the administrative side and interfere with the order of punishment, merely because this Court may not agree with the findings of the High Court on the administrative side and may have taken a different view of the matter.
5. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions. Before dealing with the submissions, we may first set out the provisions of Section 437 as were in force at the relevant time.
437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence :- (1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Sessions, he may be released on bail, but
(i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;
(ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence.
Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in Clause (i) or Clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm:
Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in Clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason:
Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court:
(2) If it appears to such Officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, subject to the provisions of Section 446A and pending such inquiry, be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such Officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.
Sub-section (3) empowers the Court to impose conditions while releasing the accused on bail.
(4) An Officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), shall record in writing his or its reasons or special reasons for so doing.
(5) and (6)....
(7) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered.
6. The above provisions came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1978 SC 179 as under:
19. Section 437, Cr.P.C. deals, inter alia, with two stages during the initial period of the investigation of a non-bailable offence. Even the officer in charge of the police station may, by recording his reasons in writing, release a person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence provided there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence. Quick arrests by the police may be necessary when there are sufficient materials for the accusation or even for suspicion. When such an accused is produced before the Court, the Court has a discretion to grant bail in all non-bailable cases except those punishable with death or imprisonment for life if there appear to be reasons to believe that he has been guilty of such offences. The Courts oversee the action of the police and exercise judicial discretion in granting bail always bearing in mind that the liberty of an individual is not unnecessarily and unduly abridged and at the same time the cause of justice does not suffer. After the Court releases a person on bail under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 437, Cr.P.C. it may direct him to be arrested again when it considers necessary so to do. This will be also in exercise of its judicial discretion on valid grounds.
21. Section 437, Cr.P.C. is concerned only with the Court of Magistrate. It expressly excludes the High Court and the Court of Sessions. The language of Section 437(1) may be contrasted with Section 437(7) to which we have already made a reference. While under Sub-section (1) of Section 437, Cr.P.C. the words are : 'If there appear to be reasonable grounds for beliving that he has been guilty'. Sub-section (7) says : 'that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence'. This difference in language occurs on account of the stage at which the two sub-sections operate. During the initial investigation of a case in order to confine a person in detention, there should only appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, whereas after submission of charge-sheet or during trial for such an offence the Court has an opportunity to form somewhat clear opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence. At that stage, the degree of certainty of opinion in that behalf is more after the trial is over and judgment is deferred then at a pre-trial stage even after the charge-sheet. There is a noticeable trend in the above provisions of law that even in case of such non-bailable offences a person need not be detained in custody for any period more than it is absolutely necessary, if there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of such an offence. There will be, however, certain overriding considerations to which we shall refer hereafter. Whenever a person is arrested by the police for such an offence, there should be materials produced before the Courts to come to a conclusion as to the nature of the case he is involved in or he is suspected of. If at that stage from the materials available there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Court has no other option than to commit him to custody. At that stage, the Court is concerned with the existence of the materials against the -accused and not as to whether those materials are credible or not on the merits.
22. In other non-bailable cases, the Court will exercise its judicial discretion in favour of granting bail subject to Sub-section (3) of Section 437, Cr.P.C. if it deems necessary to act under it. Unless exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the Court which may defeat proper investigation and a fair trial, the Court will not decline to grant bail to a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is also clear that when an accused is brought before the Court of a Magistrate with the allegation against him of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he has ordinarily no option in the matter but to refuse bail subject, however, to the first proviso to Section 437(1), Cr.P.C. and in a case where the Magistrate entertains a reasonable belief on the materials that the accused has not been guilty of such an offence. This will, however, be an extraordinary occasion since there will be some materials at the stage of initial arrest, for the accusation or for strong suspicion of commission by the person of such an offence.
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Thereafter, these provisions also came to be interpreted by two learned single Judges of this Court.
7.1. In Prakash Kaur v. Sohansingh Khadaksing : (1984)1GLR345 , a learned single Judge of this Court held as under:
Section 437 of the Code provides as to when bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offences. There is a dichotomy dealing with non-bailable offences. There are two types of non-bailable offences-offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the rest of the non-bailable offences. As far as the first category of non-bailable offences is concerned, provisions of Section 437(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code impose a bar to grant of bail by the Court or the officer in charge of a police station to an accused person if there appear reasonable grounds, for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. At this stage, the Court or an officer in charge of a police station has only to see as to whether there appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has been guilty of such an offence or not. It is to be noted that what is required to be seen is the reasonable grounds and not the evidence. In this connection, the Supreme Court in the case of Gurcharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1978 SC 179 has stated to the effect that the words 'or suspected of the commission of were introduced in the provisions of Section 497 of Old Criminal Procedure Code by an amendment in 1955. These words have been retained in the new Criminal Procedure Code in Section 437. In this background, the Supreme Court has observed:.It is difficult to conceive how if a police officer arrests a person on a reasonable suspicion of commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life (Section 41, Cr.P.C. of the new Code) and forwards him to a Magistrate (Section 167(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code) the Magistrate at that stage will have reasons to hold that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he has not been guilty of such an offence. At that stage, unless the Magistrate is able to act under the proviso to Section 437(1), Cr.P.C. Bail appears to be out of question. The only limited inquiry may then relate to the materials for the suspicion....
7.2. Again in Thakor Kanjibhai Shakarabhai v. Thakor Ambaram Kanjibhai 1985 GLH (UJ 23) 15, (Misc. Criminal Application No. 2015 of 1984), another learned single Judge of this Court held as under:
Section 437 provides that the Court may release the accused on bail if there appears no reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If the circumstances of the case are such the Court trying the accused can impose imprisonment for life for an offence punishable under Section 326. Section 437(1)(i) in terms provides that when any person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested and is brought before the Court other than the High Court or Court of Sessions, such person shall not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It cannot be said that this bar would not operate in respect of offences punishable with imprisonment for life or in the alternative imprisonment for ten years because the Court trying the case is empowered to impose a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life. In this set of circumstances, the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced would not have jurisdiction to release him on bail except in cases which fall in the excepted categories of proviso to Section 437(1). Therefore, at the initial stage when the accused are produced before the Magistrate and it is alleged that the accused have committed an offence punishable under Section 326, then the Magistrate would not have jurisdiction to release the accused on bail.
Further, under Sub-section (4) of Section 437 if the Court releases the accused on bail under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) he is required to record in writing his reasons for doing so. The order passed by the learned Magistrate on the face of it shows that he has not given any reasons why he is releasing the accused on bail.
8. In view of the above decisions, it is clear that when the Magistrate considers the application for bail for offences punishable with death or life imprisonment, ordinarily the Magistrate is to refuse the bail unless the case falls under any of the excepted categories (accused being below 16 years of age, woman, sick or infirm person). If the case does not fall in any such excepted category, the Magistrate may grant bail only in an exceptional or extraordinary case, where the Magistrate entertains the reasonable belief on the material that the accused has not been guilty of any offences punishable with death or life imprisonment.
9. Admittedly, in seven cases under consideration, the accused were not persons below the age of 16 years or women or sick or infirm persons. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that when the learned A.P.P. had given consent in as many as five cases and the consent was not off the record, but actually recorded in the orders passed by the learned Magistrate, no oblique motive could be attributed to the learned Magistrate. It is submitted that in the facts of the seven cases, the alleged acts did not constitute an offence punishable under Section 307 of I.P.C., but were offences punishable under Section 323 or 324 of I.P.C., where the injuries were on the back of the complainant or on the back side of the complainant and the injuries were simple injuries. The learned P.P. had also conceded that they did not amount to serious injuries. Merely because the police had mentioned in the F.I.Rs. the offence punishable under Section 307 such label on the offence was not binding on the Court and it was open to the Magistrate to consider what offence was committed on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the material before the Court. In three cases, the learned Magistrate also considered that there were cross-complaints and that the accused had filed two complaints being Misc. Criminal Application No. 61 of 1993 and Misc. Criminal Application No. 62 of 1993. It is also pertinent to note that out of seven cases under consideration, in six cases the accused were shown to be poor persons either doing agricultural work or some other low paid work. In the cases arising from C.R. No. 3 of 1994, the accused were going to the village with their cattle and there was altercation on account of complainant scolding the accused which resulted into a fight. In Misc. Criminal Application No. 61 of 1993, the case of the accused was that they had gone to scold the complainant and others for teasing wife of Narsinhbhai and that they were falsely involved in the case by making allegations of attempt to commit murder. The complainant and both his witnesses were only given first aid, and immediately discharged from the hospital on the same day and in fact they were also arrested on the next day in view of the complaint made by the accused against the complainant and his witnesses. The learned A.P.P. had also conceded that no offence punishable under Section 307 was made out.
In Misc. Criminal Application No. 62 of 1993, there were cross-complaints. The accused as well as the complainant were agriculturists and there was a cross-fight and the case of the accused was that the accused had used dharia for their self-defence which resulted into the injury on the complainant which was 4 x 1 cm. incise wound on the head.
Similarly in the case arising from Mandal (C.R. No. 58 of 1993 - Ganesh Bhagwanbhai Brothers), this was also a case of cross-complaints. The complainant and his witnesses were grazing the cattle in the field of the accused and the accused tried to prevent that, which resulted into the incident. The learned Magistrate held that there was a sudden fight. The injuries were simple and there was no attempt to murder. Hence, there was no offence punishable under Section 307 and the learned A.P.P. had also conceded that the offences were not punishable under Section 307 or 326.
10. We may now refer to two cases, where no consent of the learned A.P.P. was recorded in the orders. In the bail application arising from F.I.R. No. 3 of 1994, the incident had taken place on account of dispute between the agriculturists. There was one contused laserated wound of 1 cm. and the other injuries were simple stick injuries. The blow attributed by farsi was shown in the medical certificate as wound caused by a hard and blunt object. This incident also occurred when there was an altercation between the complainant and the accused when they were going with the cattle in the outskirts of the village at about 8-30 in the morning of 6-1-1994.
The other incident was in Misc. Criminal Application No. 62 of 1993, where also there were cross-complaints and the complaint of the accused was also lodged.
11. Looking to the contents of the bail applications and the orders passed by the petitioner, it thus appears that while the seven cases under consideration did not fall in the excepted eateries mentioned in the first proviso to Section 437(1), with the consent of the learned A.P.P., the petitioner granted bail in five matters, where there were disputes between the complainant and injured witnesses who were agriculturists and the accused were also agriculturists. It is true that as per the decisions of the Apex Court and of the learned single Judges of this Court, in such cases, the Magistrate should not have treated them as extraordinary or exceptional cases, but we do note the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that at the relevant time, i.e. in 1993-1994, the Magistrates were passing such orders when, prima facie, they were satisfied that the offence did not amount to offence under Section 307 of I.P.C. It was on account of such approach on the part of the Magistrates that this Court on the administrative side had to establish a State Judicial Academy for imparting proper in-service training to the Magistrates to impress upon them that the Magistrate is not to grant bail for offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the accused belongs to any of the excepted categories indicated in the first proviso to Section 437(1), or on an extraordinary occasion as observed in Gurucharan Singh's case (supra).
12. Mr. Unwala, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions in support of his contention that disciplinary inquiry should not be held against a Judicial Officer on the ground of alleged errors in passing judicial orders:
(i) P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. : (2001)IILLJ1249SC
(ii) K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P. : 1993CriLJ1377
(iii) Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India : [1997]2SCR420
(iv) Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad : (2007)4SCC247 .
In P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. : (2001)IILLJ1249SC , the Apex Court held as under:
7. ...That there was possibility on a given act of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a Judicial Officer for taking one view and too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The Enquiry Officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate Court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus Judicial Officers cannot act independently of fearlessly. Indeed, the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan's case : (1993)ILLJ777SC and A.N. Saxena's case : 1992CriLJ1940 that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Judicial Officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case.
Similarly, in Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad : (2007)4SCC247 , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court after review of several decisions, held as under:
11. ...If the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. The appellant officer was well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. Unlike provisions for granting bail in the T.A.D.A. Act or the N.D.P.S. Act, there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail and if any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer for passing such an order, it would adversely affect the morale of subordinate judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise this power freely and independently.
12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional Courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher Courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower Courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution.
13. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of P. & H. : AIR1988SC1395 , this Court observed that while exercising control over subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect subordinate judicial officers. An honest and strict Judicial Officer is likely to have adversaries. If complaints are entertained in trifling matters and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints, no Judicial Officer would feel secure and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect honest Judicial Officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
14. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P. : 1993CriLJ1377 , where the High Court reversed the order passed by the lower Court making remarks about interestedness and motive of the lower Court in passing the unmerited order, this Court observed that one of the functions of the higher Court is either to modify or set aside erroneous orders passed by the lower Courts. Our legal system acknowledges fallibility of Judges. It has to be kept in mind that a subordinate Judicial Officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure - contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. He does not enjoy the detached atmosphere of the higher Court. Every error, however gross it may be, should not be attributed to improper motives. The Judges of the High Court have a responsibility to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. No greater damage can be done to the administration of justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary if the higher Courts express lack of faith in the subordinate judiciary for some reason or the other. That amounts to destruction of judiciary from within.
15. In Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar : 1996CriLJ2469 , this Court observed under a similar circumstance that in our system appellate and revisional Courts have been set up with the pre-supposition that the lower Courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in decision-making in law and in fact. The higher Courts have been established to correct errors. In cases wherein tolerable error is pointed out, it is functionally required to correct the error in an appropriate case and in a manner befitting maintaining dignity of the Court and independence of the judiciary. The higher Court should convey its message in the judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellowed, but clear and result-oriented and rarely a rebuke.
16. In a series of other case also, this Court disfavoured the practice of passing strictures or orders against the subordinate officers. (See Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India : [1997]2SCR420 , Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma : [1968]1SCR813 ).
17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India : (2000)ILLJ728SC , this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the Judicial Officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances, it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate Judicial Officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level.
It is significant to note that after making the above observations, the Apex Court also noted that apart from the merits of the case, the Court also went into the confidential reports of the appellant-officer and noted that the officer's integrity and honesty had never been doubted at any point of time.
13. It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Pardiwala learned Standing Counsel for the High Court, that the appellant officer in the above case before the Apex Court was the Sessions Judge who was competent to grant bail and there was no statutory bar against granting bail. On the other hand, in the instant case, Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 437 prohibits the Magistrate from granting bail to accused involved in offences punishable with imprisonment for life or death, subject to the exceptions contained in the first proviso. As noted above, the bail orders were passed in the year 1993-1994 and it appears that it was on account of such orders that the High Court on the administrative side also felt the need to set up a State Judicial Academy in 1994-1995 to impart training to the subordinate judiciary so that Judicial Officers act within the bounds of the statutory provisions as interpreted in the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. Even proceeding on the basis that the petitioner passed orders in cases which were not exceptional cases and that in that sense, the orders were passed beyond the scope of the authority of the Magistrate, the question is whether the petitioner can be said to have conducted himself in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or whether there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive. The Apex Court has reiterated in the above decision Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad : (2007)4SCC247 that in our system appellate and revisional Courts have been set up with the pre-supposition that the lower Courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in decision-making in law and in fact. The higher Courts have been established to correct errors.
14. In view of the above observations, even proceeding on the basis that the petitioner committed jurisdictional error in the seven cases under consideration, we cannot overlook the facts that the petitioner was a Judicial Magistrate presiding over the Criminal Court at Taluka headquarters and in as many as five cases, out of the seven cases, the learned P.P. had conceded that the alleged acts did not constitute offences punishable under Section 307 I.P.C., that the accused as well as the complainant and injured witnesses in six cases were agriculturists (and not 'powerful accused') or the incidents arose out of sudden quarrels and in some cases there were even cross-complaints and that in five out of seven cases, the complainants/injured witnesses were only treated as outdoor patients and that except in one case (where P.P. had given consent), Section 326 was not even invoked in the F.I.R., in this set of circumstances, it is not possible to hold, by implication, that the petitioner had passed the bail orders due to corrupt motive or to unduly favour a party.
15. At the hearing of this petition, we also requested the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court to make available the service record of the petitioner, and on going through the confidential reports, we found that the petitioner's integrity and honesty had never been doubted at any point of time. On the contrary, for a number of years, the reporting and reviewing officers had certified that the petitioner's integrity is beyond doubt. We also requested the learned Standing Counsel to indicate any other material which could have a bearing on the controversy, particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner was promoted to the higher post of Civil Judge (S.D.) in the year 1996 after complaints were made in the year 1995 about the judicial orders passed by him in the year 1993-1994. On perusal of the relevant file, we even find that a Senior Judge of this Court had visited Viramgam and heard the Advocates at Viramgam regarding the allegations. It was thereafter that the petitioner was promoted as Civil Judge (S.D.) in the year 1996. None of these aspects appear to have been noticed by the Disciplinary Committee or the High Court on the administrative side.
16. In the above background, we are of the view that the petitioner's granting bail for offences punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. in the years 1993 and 1994 cannot be construed as acting in a manner to unduly favour a party or passing orders with corrupt motive. Granting bail in the cases under consideration in 1993-1994 cannot warrant the penal order of compulsory retirement which has resulted into denial of pensionary benefits for the services rendered since 1981. We are informed that the Officer compulsorily retired by way of punishment is not entitled to any pensionary benefits, unless the Government decides in its discretion to grant compassionate pension which is very rarely granted and that too of a very small amount. The impugned order of compulsory retirement, therefore, deserves to be set aside as shockingly disproportionate.
17. Mr. Pardiwala has relied upon the decision in S.N. Jog v. State of M.P. 1981 (2) SLR 352 in support of the contention that when the impugned decision was in case of a subordinate Judge, reached in a Judges' meeting of the High Court, it is actually a corporate decision emerging as a result of discussion in the meeting, where all possible points of view are likely to be visualized and duly protected and that the corporate decision reached by a large body of individuals of equal authority after discussion in a meeting is an inherent safeguard against arbitrariness or want of bona fides.
18. We have considered the above submission and the decision relied upon. While there is no question of want of bona fides on the part of the respondents, having given anxious consideration to all the aspects of the case at hand and having watched the decision-making process in this institution in several disciplinary jurisdiction matters from close quarters for the last five years, we may only say that the principle is required to be applied with great caution.
19. Our attention has also been invited to the decision of the Apex Court in Nawal Singh v. State of U.P. 2004 (1) SLR 3, where the Court considered the provisions of U.P. Fundamental Rules, Rule 56 providing for compulsory retirement and of the U.P. Judicial Officers (Retirement on Superannuation) Rules, 1992. In the said decision, the Court while upholding the exercise of power of compulsory retirement (not after a disciplinary inquiry, but by way of premature retirement or by not extending the services of an officer beyond the age of 58 years) impressed upon the High Court the need to exercise this power more frequently.
20. In response to a query from the Court, the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court has stated that apart from the cases where disciplinary inquiries were held and orders of dismissal/removal/compulsory retirement from service were passed or apart from the cases where the services of officers were not continued beyond the age of 58 years, that is they were not continued upto 60 years, no orders of premature retirement under Rule 161 B.C.S.R. have been passed by the High Court in the last ten years.
21. Even while taking the view that the penal order of compulsory retirement deserves to be set aside for the reasons indicated hereinabove, the next question is what reliefs may be granted to the petitioner. Ordinarily, in such cases of the disciplinary inquiry, the matter is to be remitted back to the disciplinary authority which would consider the matter afresh after taking into consideration the observations made in the judicial verdict. However, it is now also recognized that in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, in such extreme or rare cases, the Court can substitute its own view while setting aside the order of the disciplinary authority [vide Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India 2001 (2) SCC 386 (Paras 69 to 71)]
22. In the instant case, the orders of bail in question were passed in the years 1993-1994 and the petitioner who had otherwise unblemished record remained under suspension pending departmental inquiry from 17-12-1997 till the impugned notification was issued on 16-8-2005. The petition is now allowed more than three years after it was filed. In this set of circumstances, we have considered the matter in light of the above principles enunciated in Om Kumar's case (supra), we are of the view that a Judicial Magistrate who has not remained within the bounds of his jurisdiction is not required to be continued in service. At the same time, having regard to the facts that in as many as five out of seven cases, the learned P.P. had given consent recorded in the orders and that in almost all cases the accused were poor agriculturists or lowly paid persons (not powerful accused), that the judicial orders in question were passed in the year 1993-1994 and that the petitioner had otherwise unblemished record, that the petitioner remained under suspension from 17-12-1997 till the impugned notification was issued on 16-8-2005 and that the petitioner had completed 50 years of age when the impugned notification was issued and having regard to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Om Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689 (Para 71), the impugned order/notification dated 27-4-2005/16-8-2005 be substituted by an order to be passed under the relevant service rule prematurely retiring the petitioner from service w.e.f. 16-8-2005, without paying the petitioner any monetary benefit for the period of suspension except the subsistence allowance already paid to the petitioner, but the petitioner shall be entitled to receive the retiral benefits on the basis of his pay which he would have drawn on 16-8-2005 had he not been suspended.
23. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order dated 27-4-2005/notification dated 16-8-2005 is set aside and the same shall be substituted by the order/notification to be issued by the respondents under the relevant service rules prematurely retiring the petitioner from service w.e.f. 16-8-2005 without paying the petitioner any monetary benefit for the period of suspension except the subsistence allowance already paid to the petitioner, but the petitioner shall be entitled to receive the retiral benefits on the basis of his pay which he would have drawn on 16-8-2005 had he not been suspended.
24. The above directions shall be complied with within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment.
Rule is made absolute to the above extent only.