H.K. Rathod, J.
1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Premal S. Rachh for M/s. Thakkar Associates for appellant employer, learned Advocate Mr. UT Mishra for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and learned Advocate Mr. Barot for learned Advocate Ms. Avani S. Mehta for respondent No. 3.
2. Through this appeal, appellant has challenged judgment rendered by learned Ex Officio Commissioner for Workmen Compensation Jamnagar in WC (Fatal) Case No. 37 of 2000 Exh. 70 dated 16.5.2006 wherein Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has exonerated respondent No. 3 insurance company while deciding issue No. 5A and 5B and ordered that entire amount of compensation with penalty and interest is to be paid by employer as directed by Commissioner.
3. While admitting this appeal, this Court passed following order on 23rd April, 2007:
Ms. Pahwa, learned advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that initially the appellant has deposited an amount of Rs. 2,18,470/- by Demand Draft dated 13.4.2007 and subsequently, a further sum of Rs. 2,30,809/- has been deposited by way of penalty and interest as ordered by the learned Commissioner for Workmen Compensation, Jamnagar. Thus, they have complied with the statutory requirements as required to be complied with under Section 30(1) and the proviso thereto of the Workmen Compensation Act.
Admit.
Office is directed to call for the Records & Proceedings of the Workman Compensation (Fatal) Case No. 37 of 2000 from the learned Commissioner for Workmen Compensation and Judge Labour Court, Jamnagar, so as to reach this Court on or before 13.6.2007.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, Office is directed to notify this First Appeal for the final hearing on 20th June, 2007.
4. Thus, considering statement made by learned Advocate on behalf of appellant that appellant has deposited an amount of Rs. 2,18,470 by Demand Draft d ated 13.4.2007 and subsequently a further sum of Rs. 2,30,809.00 by way of penalty and interest as ordered by learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Jamnagar, appeal was admitted by this Court on 23.4.2007.
5. Learned Advocate Mr. Rachh for appellant has raised contention that the WC Commissioner has committed gross error in deciding issue No. 5A and 5B against appellant by exonerating insurance company. He submitted that learned Commissioner ought to have held that insurance company is liable to indemnify insured employer with effect from the date on which premium was paid by appellant and accepted by insurance company. As per his submission, that aspect was totally ignored by claims tribunal while examining matter and, therefore, matter would require interference of this Court.
6. As against that, learned Advocate Mr. Barot appearing for learned Advocate Ms. Avani S. Mehta for respondent No. 3 insurance company has vehemently submitted that insurance policy was issued by insurance company on 28th March, 2000, meaning thereby, liability was accepted by company on 28th March, 2000 and not prior to that period because it was not a contract arrived at between parties prior to 28th March, 2000 therefore, learned Commissioner was right in exonerating insurance company. He also raised contention that merely because premium was accepted without any contract on 22nd March, 2000, it would not create any liability against insurance company to pay compensation till issuance of policy, which was issued on 28th March, 2000 and accident took place on 25th March, 2000 on which date, policy of insurance was not in force and, therefore, learned commissioner was right in exonerating insurance company. Except these submissions, no other submission was made by learned Advocate Mr. Barot and no decision was cited by him in support of submissions recorded hereinabove.
7. Learned Advocate Mr. UT Mishra appearing for respondents original claimants has submitted that respondents claimants are entitled for amount of compensation for which appellant has timely paid amount of premium to insurance company and, therefore, insurance company must indemnify insured.
8. I have considered submissions made by learned advocates for parties. I have also perused impugned award made by learned Commissioner.
9. In this appeal, short question is arising for consideration of this Court which is almost undisputed between the parties. Appellant has paid premium before insurance company on 22nd March, 2000, having receipt of paid premium produced before Commissioner Exh. 61. Thereafter, insurance company has issued policy Exh. 50 on 28th March, 2000 for a period upto 27th March, 2001. Accident occurred on 25th March, 2000. In light of aforesaid undisputed facts between the parties, short question arising for determination is, whether insurance company is liable to indemnify owner insured with effect from the date on which premium was accepted on 22nd March, 2000 or whether insurance company is liable only from the date on which insurance policy was issued on 28th March, 2000?
10. Aforesaid legal questions have been raised by learned Advocate Mr. Rachh on behalf of appellant. Insurance Company appearing before this Court has not disputed Exh. 61 receipt of premium paid by appellant to insurance company on 22nd March, 2000. Appellant has also not disputed insurance policy issued on 28th March, 2000. Therefore, this aspect is required to be examined by this Court since learned Commissioner has come to conclusion that insurance company is liable only from the date on which policy of insurance was issued i.e. From 28th March, 2000 and exonerated insurance company since accident had taken place on 25th March,2000 i.e. prior to 28th March, 2000. Findings given by Commissioner in this regard have been challenged by appellant.
11. In view of this back ground, view taken by Division Bench of this Court in case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhal Nalkantha Khadi Gramodyog Mandal, Ranpur and Ors. Reported in : (2004)1GLR452 is required to be considered. In said matter, it was held by Division Bench of this Court that once, authorized agent accepts the proposal form with advance premium either in cash or by cheque or by a bank draft, he receives that money as the agent of the insurance company. It was also held that so far as the insured is concerned, payment is complete, of course, subject to realization of the negotiable instrument as discussed in para 4 of that judgment. In said judgment, Section 64VB of Insurance Company Act was considered by division bench of this Court.
12. Similar aspect has also been examined by Division Bench o this Court recently in case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Abhesing Pratapsing Waghela and Ors., reported in 2006 (3) GLH page 173. In said matter, cheque for amount of premium was accepted by insurance company on 23rd January, 1995. Insurance Policy was issued on 30th January, 1995. Division Bench of this Court held that liability of insurance company begins from 23rd itself, the date on which premium was paid by insured. Relevant observations made by division bench of this Court in para 8 of said judgment are reproduced as under:
8. We are, however, of the view that by subsequently issuing the formal document of policy of insurance and giving it effect from 30.1.1995, the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability which it had undertaken on 23.1.1995 by accepting the premium by cheque. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company on the provisions of Section 64VB of the Act is also of no avail to the Insurance Company. The Section provides that 'no risk shall be assumed by the insurance Company unless premium is received in advance'. This provides that the risk may be assumed earlier than the date on which the premium has been paid in cash to the insured. Hence it was open to the insurance company to assume the risk on receiving the cheque on 23.1.1995 and by issuing document Exh. 38 which has to be treated as a cover note though it purported to be a Motor Input Advice-cum-Receipt. Any dishonour of the cheque thereafter would confer on the Insurance Company the right to avoid liability already incurred, only by following the procedure under Section 147(4) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal did not commit any error in holding the Insurance Company jointly and severally liable with the owner and driver of the vehicle in question.
13. Apex Court has also considered similar aspect in case of Dedappa and Ors. v. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2008SC767 . Apex Court has considered that on the date on which accident occurred, there was a policy of insurance in respect of vehicle in question, third party would have claim against insurance company and owner of vehicle would have to be indemnified in respect of claim of that third party. It was also held therein that subsequent cancellation of policy of insurance on the ground of non payment of premium would not affect rights already accrued in favour of third party, meaning thereby, that on the date on which accident occurred, policy was in existence. Relevant observations made by apex court in para 20 and 21 are reproduced as under:
20. The ratio of the said decision was, however, noticed by this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rula and Ors. : [2000]2SCR148 . It was held that ordinarily a liability under the contract of insurance would arise only on payment of premium, if such payment was made a condition precedent for taking effect of the insurance policy but such a condition which is intended for the benefit of the insurer can be waived by it.
14. It was opined:
If, on the date of accident, there was a policy of insurance in respect of the vehicle in question, the third party would have a claim against the Insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle would have to be indemnified in respect of the claim of that party. Subsequent cancellation of the insurance policy on the ground of non-payment of premium would not affect the rights already accrued in favour of the third party.
15. The dicta laid down therein clarifies that if on the date of accident the policy subsists, then only the third party would be entitled to avail the benefit thereof.
16. Almost an identical question again came up for consideration before this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Seema Malhotra and Ors. : [2001]1SCR1131 , a Division Bench noticed both the aforementioned decisions and analysed the same in the light of Section 64-VB of the 1938 Act. It was held:
17. In a contract of insurance when the insured gives a cheque towards payment of premium or part of the premium, such a contract consists of reciprocal promise. The drawer of the cheque promises the insurer that the cheque, on presentation, would yield the amount in cash. It cannot be forgotten that a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker. A bill of exchange is an instrument in writing containing an unconditional order directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money to a certain person. It involves a promise that such money would be paid.
18. Thus, when the insured fails to pay the premium promised, or when the cheque issued by him towards the premium is returned dishonoured by the bank concerned the insurer need not perform his part of the promise. The corollary is that the insured cannot claim performance from the insurer in such a situation.
19. Under Section 25 of the Contract Act an agreement made without consideration is void. Section 65 of the Contract Act says that when a contract becomes void any person who has received any advantage under such contract is bound to restore it to the person from whom he received it. So, even if the insurer has disbursed the amount covered by the policy to the insured before the cheque was returned dishonoured, the insurer is entitled to get the money back.
20. However, if the insured makes up the premium even after the cheque was dishonoured but before the date of accident it would be a different case as payment of consideration can be treated as paid in the order in which the nature of transaction required it. As such an event did not happen in this case, the Insurance Company is legally justified in refusing to pay the amount claimed by the respondents.
21. Recently also, similar question has been examined by apex court in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.. Abhaysing Pratapsing Waghela and Ors. reported in 2008 (12) SCALE page 5. As per facts of said reported decision, accident had taken place on 27th January, 1995. Cheque was tendered to officer of Insurance Co. on 23rd January, 1995 which was dishonoured and, thereafter, amount of premium was paid in cash and received by insurance Co. In between, insurance company has not canceled insurance policy, therefore, apex court has come to conclusion that if cover note is issued by insurance company, it remains valid till it is cancelled. Cover note had been issued which is in terms of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 145 of the Act would come within the purview of definition 'certificate of insurance'. It also would come within the purview of definition 'insurance policy' therefore, undisputedly, insurance policy was cancelled only after accident had taken place. Finding of fact was therefore recorded that prior to deposit of premium of insurance in cash by owner of vehicle, cover note was not cancelled. Relevant discussion made by apex court in para 16, 17 and 18 is reproduced as under:
16. Indisputably, the first respondent is a third party in relation to the contract of insurance which had been entered into by and between the appellant and the owner of the vehicle in question. We have noticed hereinbefore that a document was produced before the Tribunal. Even according to the appellant, although it was only a Motor Input Advice cum Receipt, it contained the Cover Note No. 279106. We, therefore, have to suppose that a Cover Note had, in fact, been issued. If a Cover Note had been issued which in terms of Clause (b) of sub-Section 1 of Section 145 of the Act would come within the purview of definition of certificate of insurance; it also would come within the purview of the definition of a insurance policy. If a Cover Note is issued, it remains valid till it is cancelled. Indisputably, the insurance policy was cancelled only after the accident took place. A finding of fact, therefore, has been arrived at that prior to the deposit of the premium of insurance in cash by the owner of the vehicle, the cover note was not cancelled.
17. It is in the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion, that thejudgment of the High Court cannot be faulted. No doubt, a contract of insurance is to be governed by the terms thereof, but a distinction must be borne in mind between a contract of insurance which has been entered into for the purpose of giving effect to the object and purport of the statute and one which provides for reimbursement of the liability of the owner of the vehicle strictly in terms thereof. In that limited sense, a contract of insurance entered into for the purpose of covering a third party risk would not be purely contractual. We may place on record that an ordinary contract of insurance does not have a statutory flavour. The Act merely imposes an obligation on the part of the insurance company to reimburse the claimant both in terms of the Act as also the Contract. So far as the liability of the insurance company which comes within the purview of Sections 146 and 147 is concerned, the same subserves a constitutional goal, namely, social justice. A contract of insurance covering the third party risk must, therefore, be viewed differently vis-a-vis a contract of insurance qua contract.
18. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut : AIR2007SC1414 , this Court opined:
23. As noted above, there is no contractual relation between the third party and the insurer. Because of the statutory intervention in terms of Section 149, the same becomes operative in essence and Section 149 provides complete insulation.
24. In the background of the statutory provisions, one thing is crystal clear i.e. The statute is beneficial
one qua the third party. But that benefit cannot be extended to the owner of the offending vehicle. The logic of fake license has to be considered differently in respect of third party and in respect of own damage claims.
22. The same view was reiterated in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and Ors. : AIR2007SC1609 stating:
14. The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods.
This Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.v. Sudhakaran K.V. And Ors. : AIR2008SC2729 held:
14. The provisions of the Act and, in particular, Section 147 of the Act were enacted for the purpose of enforcing the principles of social justice. It, however, must be kept confined to a third party risk. A contract of insurance which is not statutory in nature should be construed like any other contract.
23. This Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Inderjeet Kaur (1998) 1 SCC 71 held that once a certificate of insurance is issued, the insurance company would not be absolved of its obligations to third parties
24. Yet again in Deddappa and Ors. v. Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. : AIR2008SC767 , having regard to the provisions contained in Section 54(v) of the Insurance Act, 1938, in the fact situation obtaining therein, it was opined:
A contract is based on reciprocal promise. Reciprocal promises by the parties are condition precedents for a valid contract. A contract furthermore must be for consideration.
25. In light of aforesaid decisions as referred to and discussed by this Court, looking to facts of this case, accident occurred on 25th March, 2000. Amount of premium was paid in cash to insurance company on 22nd March, 2000 against which Exh. 61 receipt of receiving premium was issued by insurance company in favour of appellant and thereafter, insurance policy was issued on 28th March, 2000, therefore, according to my opinion, liability has been accepted by insurance company on the date on which premium was accepted by insurance co. and receipt acknowledging such payment was issued by it. Subsequent issuance of policy of insurance therefore cannot make it effective from the date of issue thereof i.e. 28th March, 2000 but it must have to be made effective from 22nd March, 2000 and accident took place on 25th March, 2000, therefore, insurance company is liable to pay compensation as per terms of policy of insurance to respondent No. 1 and 2 by way of indemnifying employer, therefore, according to my opinion, learned Commissioner has committed an error in not considering legal effect of cash payment of premium made by appellant to insurance co. on 22nd March, 2000 because if conclusion of Commissioner is to be considered correct, then, there was no meaning or purpose to have advance payment to company by employer and receiving receipt of premium from insurance company. Therefore, finding given by commissioner on issue No. 5A and 5B is clearly erroneous and contrary to law laid down by this Court as apex court and, therefore, finding of learned Commissioner on issue No. 5A and 5B is required to be set aside because as per Exh. 61, appellant has paid premium of insurance to insurance company on 22nd March, 2000, the date on which liability was accepted by insurance company to indemnify employer as per terms and conditions of policy of insurance. For that, insurance company cannot deny this legal and contractual obligation for making payment of compensation to respondent No. 1 and 2 by way of indemnifying appellant by insurance company, therefore, decision of learned Commissioner exonerating insurance company is required to be reversed by declaring that respondent insurance company is liable to indemnify appellant in this matter.
26. Learned Advocate Mr. Barot for learned Advocate Ms. Avani S. Mehta for respondent No. 3 insurance company has raised contention that insurance company though held liable for compensation which is to be paid to respondents claimants, respondent company is not liable to pay penalty as required under Section 4(A)(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He relied upon decision of apex court in case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya and Anr. 2006-II-LLJ page 782. He also submitted that this aspect has been considered by apex court in case of Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi and Ors. : AIR1997SC3854 and L.R. Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Mahavir Mahto and Anr. reported in : (2001)ILLJ181SC . He submitted that aforesaid decisions have been referred to and relied upon by apex court in case of HA Modhiya (Supra) and, therefore, liability of insurance company is only in respect of compensation awarded by learned Commissioner and interest thereon but insurance company is not liable to pay penalty but it is the liability of employer.
27. Learned Advocate Mr. Premal S. Rachh for appellant has not disputed this legal position and submitted that according to decision of apex court relied upon by learned Advocate Mr. Barot, insurance company is not liable to make payment of penalty but employer is liable to pay penalty to claimants.
28. After considering submissions made by both learned advocates, in HA Modhiya (Supra) wherein apex court has observed as under in para 16, 17, 20, 23 and 24:
16. In Ved Prakash Garg (supra), this Court undoubtedly held that in terms of the contract of insurance entered into by and between the employer and the insurer under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which would also apply in a given case to the claim under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the insurer would also be liable for payment of interest stating : 1997 AIR SCW 3775,Paras 12 and 13
17. A conjoint reading of these provisions in the insurance policy shows that the insurance company insured the employer-owners of the insured motor vehicles against all liabilities arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act for which statutory coverage was required under Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is analogous to Section 147 of the present Motor Vehicles Act noted earlier. Section 149 deals with 'Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third-party risks'. The moot question is whether the insurance coverage as available to the insured employer- owners of the motor vehicles in relation to their liabilities under the Workmen's Compensation Act on account of motor accident injuries caused to their workmen would include additional statutory liability foisted on the insured employers under Section 4A(3) of the Compensation Act.
18. The question posed for our consideration is required to be resolved in the light of the aforesaid statutory schemes of the two interacting Acts. It is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that the respondent-insurance companies concerned will be statutorily as well as contractually liable to make good the claims for compensation arising out of the employers' liability computed as per the provisions of the Compensation Act. The short question is whether the phrase 'liability arising under the Compensation Act' as employed by the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act and as found in proviso to Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section II of the insurance policy, would cover only the principal amount of compensation as computed by the Workmen's Commissioner under the Compensation Act and made payable by the insured employer or whether it could also include interest and penalty as imposed on the insured employer under contingencies contemplated by Section 4A(3)(a) and (b) of the Compensation Act.
17. Yet again in L.R. Ferro Alloys Ltd. (supra), this Court opined that if an amount of compensation is not deposited within a period of one month, the insurance company shall be liable to reimburse the owner only the amount of compensation with interest therefrom but not the penalty imposed on insurer-employer for default of payment of amount stating:
The only contention put forth before us is that the entire liability including penalty and interest will have to be reimbursed by the insurance company and this aspect has not been examined by the learned Single Judge in the High Court and needs examination at our hands. In Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi this Court after examining the entire scheme of the Act held that payment of interest and penalty are two distinct liabilities arising under the Act, while liability to pay interest is part and parcel of legal liability to pay compensation upon default of payment of that amount within one month. Therefore, claim for compensation along with interest will have to be made good jointly by the insurance company with the insured employer. But, so far as the penalty imposed on the insured employer is on account of his personal fault the insurance company cannot be made liable to reimburse penalty imposed on the employer. Hence the compensation with interest is payable by theinsurance company but not penalty. Following the said decision and for the reasons stated therein, we modify the order made by the High Court to that extent. The appeal is allowed in part accordingly.20. The views taken by us find support from a recent judgment of this Court in P. J. Narayan v. Union of India and Ors. wherein it was held:
1. This writ petition is for the purpose of directing Insurance Company to delete the clause in the Insurance Policy which provides that in case of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Insurance Company will not be liable to pay interest. We see no substance in the writ petition. There is no statutory liability on the Insurance Company. The statutory liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act is on the employer. An insurance is a matter of contract between the Insurance Company and the insured. It is always open to the Insurance Company to refuse to insure. Similarly they are entitled to provide by contract that they will not take on liability for interest. In the absence of any statute to that effect, insurance Company cannot be forced by Courts to take on liabilities which they do not want to take on. The Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.23. The law relating to contracts of insurance is part of the general law of contract. So said Roskill Lord Justice in Cehave v. Bremer (1976) QB 44. This view was approved by Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith v. Hanson-Tangen 1976 (1) WLR 989, wherein he said 'it is desirable that the same legal principles should apply to the law of contract as a whole and that different principles should not apply to the different branches of that law'. A contract of insurance is to be construed in the first place from the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their primary, natural, ordinary and popular sense. (See Colinvaux's Law of Insurance 7th Edition, Paragraph 2-01). A policy of insurance has therefore to be construed like any other contract. On a construction of the contract in question it is clear that the insurer had not undertaken the liability for interest and penalty, but had undertaken to indemnify the employer only to reimburse the compensation the employer was liable to pay among other things under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Unless one is in a position to void the exclusion clause concerning liability for interest ad penalty imposed on the insured on account of his failure to comply with the requirements of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923, the insurer cannot be made liable to the insured for those amounts.
24. Section 17 of the Workmen's Compensation Act voids only a contract or agreement whereby a workman relinquishes any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury arising out of or in the course of the employment and insofar as it purports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay compensation under the Act. As my learned brother has noticed, in the Workmen's Compensation Act, there are no provisions corresponding to those in the Motor Vehicles Act, insisting on the insurer covering the entire liability arising out of an award towards compensation to a third party arising out of a motor accident. It is not brought to our notice that there is any other law enacted which stands in the way of an insurance company and the insured entering into a contract confining the obligation of the insurance company to indemnify to a particular head or to a particular amount when it relates to a claim for compensation to a third party arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In this situation, the obligation of the insurance company clearly stands limited and the relevant proviso providing for exclusion of liability for interest or penalty has to be given effect to. Unlike the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act the Workmen's Compensation Act, does not confer a right on the claimant for compensation under that Act to claim the payment of compensation in its entirety from the insurer himself. The entitlement of the claimant under the Workmen's Compensation Act is to claim the compensation from the employer. As between the employer and the insurer, the rights and obligations would depend upon the terms of the insurance contract. Construing the contract involved here it is clear that the insurer has specifically excluded any liability for interest or penalty under the Workmen's Compensation Act and confined its liability to indemnify the employer only against the amount of compensation ordered to be paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The High Court was, therefore, not correct in holding that the appellant-insurance company, is also liable to pay the interest on the amount of compensation awarded by the Commissioner. The workman has to recover it from the employer.
29. Therefore, considering submissions from both learned advocates and decision of apex court in case of HA Modhiya (Supra) wherein apex court has considered decisions in case of Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi and Ors. : AIR1997SC3854 and L.R. Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Mahavir Mahto and Anr. reported in : (2001)ILLJ181SC , according to my opinion, appellant shall have to pay penalty at the rate of 50%, Rs. 1,09,235.00 and insurance company has to pay only Rs. 2,18,470.00 with 9% interest from the date of application 20th June, 2000 to appellant employer. Except, insurance company is not liable to pay any amount to appellant employer.
30. Therefore, this appeal is allowed and it is directed to respondent No. 3 Insurance Co. to indemnify appellant by paying compensation as per order of learned Commissioner in WC (Fatal) Case No. 37 of 2000 Exh. 70 dated 16th May, 2006 and within two months. It is made clear that insurance company shall have to pay amount of compensation as quantified by learned Commissioner, Rs. 2,18,470.00 alone with interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum with effect from 20th June, 2000 and insurance company is not liable to pay amount of 50 per cent penalty of Rs. 1,09,235.00 to appellant employer and cost is also required to be paid by employer. The amounts which are deposited by appellant before learned Commissioner at Jamnagar Rs. 2,18,470.00 and Rs. 2,30,809.00 which are lying with the learned Commissioner, which have been invested in FDRs are directed to be paid to respondent Ramniklal Laxmichand Khimasia by account payee cheque drawn in his favour while encashing said FDRs as early as possible. Now this much amount which has been deposited by appellant before learned Commissioner at Jamnagar, same is to be paid now by respondent No. 3 insurance company except amount of penalty as referred to above to appellant employer within period of two months by way of account payee cheque in the name of Kantilal Gordhandas Lalakia without fail. This appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.