1. This appeal of the assessee is directed against the order of the CIT(A)-X, Chennai, dt. 14th Jan., 2000. The relevant assessment year involved in this appeal is 1996-97.
2. The only issue raised in this appeal is against the denial of exemption from capital gains under Section 54F of the IT Act, 1961, in respect of construction of one residential house. The briefly stated facts are that for the asst. yr. 1996-97, the assessee filed a return of.income on 2nd July, 1996. In this return of income, the assessee claimed exemption from capital gains under Section 54F of the Act on account of investment in residential house. This return, after processing under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act was taken up for scrutiny under Section 143(2) of the Act. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee filed a revised return on 21st Aug., 1998 in which he declared the income from house property at Rs. 24,620. The AO, after going through the revised return, found that the assessee has another residential house from which the income from house property was declared. He disallowed the exemption under Section 54F of the Act as claimed by the assessee by giving the reasoning that the assessee is owning another house and the condition for allowance of exemption under Section 54F of the Act is that the assessee should not have any other house, then only he is entitled for exemption under Section 54F of the Act. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal against the disallowance of exemption before the CIT(A) who confirmed the finding of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee is in second appeal before the Tribunal.
3. First of all, the assessee has raised additional grounds and the issue arises out of these additional grounds is as to whether the AO has erred in acting on revised return which is out of time and barred by limitation as per the provisions of Section 139(5) of the Act or not. From the assessment order, it is gathered that the factum regarding the revised return was available. The assessee filed the original return on 2nd July, 1996 within the due date for the asst. yr.
1996-97 and he filed the revised return on 21st Aug., 1998 which is barred by limitation. The assessee should have filed the revised return on or before 31st March, 1998 whereas it was filed on 21st Aug., 1998.
The learned counsel as well as the learned Departmental Representative agreed that this revised return was not filed within the due date and barred by limitation. As these facts are available in the orders of the lower authorities and this being the legal issue, we have no hesitation in admitting the same. Accordingly, the additional grounds are admitted.
4. The learned counsel for the assessee, Shri S. Sridhar argued that the AO has erred in acting upon the revised return which is barred by limitation and it is not a valid return. Further, he argued that the AO could not have treated the same as revised return and acted upon as contemplated by Section 139(5) of the Act because it was not filed within the time allowed under Section 139(5) of the Act. In view of this, the learned counsel for the assessee argued that the assessment is liable to be annulled. He further argued that in case of annulment of an assessment, the time-limit for taking further proceedings based on the original return filed by the assessee on 2nd July, 1996 is also barred by limitation as per the provisions of Section 153(1) of the Act. To support his arguments, he relied on the followed precedents : 2. Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha (Dead) Through LRs. Etc. v. CIT 5. On the other hand, the learned Departmental Representative, Shri K.Srinivasan argued that from the facts of the case, it is clear that the AO has processed the return filed on 2nd July, 1996 and thereafter notice under Section 143(2) of the Act for scrutiny was issued and the so-called revised return was filed on 21st Aug., 1998 after issuance of notice under Section 143(2) of the Act. During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO has never acted on the revised return but due to the information provided in the revised return that he is.having another residential house from where he has declared the income from house property, he has taken the same for assessment. Once it is noticed that the assessee has another house property, he has disallowed the exemption under Section 54F of the Act. Hence, the argument of the assessee that the AO has acted on the revised return (is) not based on the facts on record. These facts speak out of the assessment orders. He further argued that the facts in the case law cited by the learned counsel for the assessee are entirely distinguishable from the facts of the present case as the assessment proceedings were initiated on the original return and not on the revised return. It is an admitted fact that the revised return is a belated one and barred by limitation.
Further, the learned Departmental Representative argued that the plea of the assessee that the AO has acted on the revised return is not based on any facts and accordingly, the lower authorities disallowed the exemption under Section 54F of the Act which is based on the original return.
6. We have heard both the sides on this legal issue and gone through the case records including the precedents relied on. The facts of the case are very clear that the AO has taken up the assessment proceedings for scrutiny under Section 143(2) of the Act on the original return filed on 2nd July, 1996. The assessee during the course of scrutiny, revised the return on 21st Aug., 1988 in which he declared rental income from another house property and the AO has taken the information out of this revised return that the assessee is having another house and accordingly, he disallowed the exemption under Section 54F of the Act.
7. Now, we have to go through the case law relied on by the assessee's counsel in the case of Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha (supra) wherein the Hon'ble apex Court has held (from head note) as under: For the years 1964-65 and 1965-66, the assessee did not file his returns within the period prescribed by Sub-section (1) of Section 139 of the IT Act, 1961. No notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 139 was also issued to him. The assessee filed returns for both the assessment years under Sub-section (4) of Section 139. The assessee thereafter filed revised returns for the two assessment years, on 18th Jan., 1969 and 17th July, 1969, respectively, declaring the total income, at figures lower than those declared in the original returns. The ITO, by orders dt. 15th Jan., 1990 and 6th July, 1990, respectively, completed the assessments for the two assessment years in question and also initiated penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act. The High Court, on a reference, held that even in the case of a return filed under Sub-section (4) of Section 139, a revised return was permissible and that, therefore, the assessment orders in question must be deemed to have been made within the period of limitation of one year from the date of the revised return provided in Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 153 of the Act. The High Court also held that the larger period of eight years in cases of concealment of income, provided by Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 153, was also attracted in this case and that on this count also, the assessment orders must be held to have been made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Act. On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, allowing the appeal, (i) that no revised return can be filed under Sub-section (5) of Section 139 in a case where the return is filed under Section 139(4). Once this is so the revised returns filed by the assessee for both the said assessment years were invalid in law and could not have been treated and acted upon as revised returns contemplated by Sub-section (5) of Section 139.
Consequently, Section 153(1) was not attracted.
The furnishing of a revised return before the assessment is made is provided for by Sub-section (5) of Section 139 of the Act. According to this sub-section 'any person having furnished a return under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2)' may furnish a revised return at any time before the assessment is made if he discovers any omission or any wrong statement in the original return. The very fact that this right is given to a person who has filed a return under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 139 means by necessary implication that such a right is denied to a person who files the return under Sub-section (4) of Section 139 of the Act.
Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 153 employs both the expressions 'return' and 'revised return' and refers to both Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 139. Reasonably read it means the return filed under Sub-section (4) and the revised return filed under Sub-section (5) of Section 139 of the Act. It would not be reasonable to construe the said clause as indirectly conferring a right to file a revised return under Sub-section (4) which is not conferred directly by Sub-section (5) of Section 139 of the Act.
For Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 153 to apply, the ITO must, within the period of four years (or whatever the applicable period of limitation) either initiate proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) or record his opinion that it is a case falling under Section 271(1)(c); unless such a step is taken, it cannot be said that it is a case falling under Section 271(1)(c), for the purposes of Section 153(1)(b) of the Act.
8. Further, the case law relied on by the assessee's counsel, in the case of Padma Timber Depot (supra), the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court (from headnote) in the following relevant paragraph has held as under: (ii) That, in the present case, the assessee did not file a return under Section 139(1) nor was any notice issued to it under Section 139(2). The return could not, therefore, be regarded as one filed under Section 139(2). The return under Section 139(4) for the asst.
yr. 1976-77 could be filed by the assessee under Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (b) within two years from the end of the assessment year, that is to say, on or before 31st March, 1979. The assessee filed the return on 1st June, 1979, so that it could not be regarded as one filed under Section 139(4). A return filed by an assessee after the expiry of the time-limit specified in Section 139 is nan est in law and it is not open to the Revenue to take note of such a return and proceed to make an assessment. It was for this reason that the ITO took proceedings under Section 148 and regularized the assessment proceedings. As the assessment was made under Section 143(3) r/w Section 147, it was not a 'regular assessment' and the levy of interest under Sections 139(8) and 217 was not valid.
9. In the case of Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha (supra) the dispute is that no revised return can be filed under Sub-section (5) of Section 139 in a case where the return is filed under Section 139(4) of the Act and the return, if any, filed will be non est. In the present case in hand, the evidence are entirely different and. distinguishable from the facts of the case law of the Hon'ble apex Court cited above. In this case, no doubt that the revised return was barred by limitation and invalid one. The AO cannot take any cognizance of that return. The AO while framing the regular assessment by issuing notice under Section 143(2) of the Act, has not taken any cognizance of the revised return but he has taken the information from the revised return to the extent that the assessee is having another residential house from where he has declared the income from house property in the revised return of income and the AO has not acted on the revised return rather the assessment order was passed within the time-limit allowed to the original return.
As per the original return, the assessment was to be completed by 31st March', 1999 and the assessment was completed on 19th Feb., 1999. With regard to the case law in the case of Padma Timber Depot (supra), the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a return filed by the assessee after the expiry of the time-limit specified under Section 139(1) of the Act is non est in law. It is not open to the Revenue to take note of such a return and proceed to make an assessment. Here, the original return filed under Section 139(1) of the Act was a valid return and the revised return was not a valid return and the same is non est. The AO has acted on the original return only. As far as revised return is concerned, the AO has taken as information to complete the assessment on original return. In view of these facts, the case law cited by the learned counsel for the assessee is not applicable to the present case in hand as the facts are entirely different and distinguishable.
10. Regarding another case law relied on by the assessee's counsel in the case of CIT v. Mrs. Ratanbai N.K. Dubash (supra), the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has annulled.the assessment on the ground of limitation and held as under: An assessment should, therefore, be annulled where the assessment proceeding is a nullity, in the sense that the AO had no jurisdiction to take the proceeding and/or to make a final order of assessment himself. Once the assessment is annulled, the order of assessment will cease to exist. The ITO will be at the stage where the illegality supervened, which resulted in the annulment of the assessment. It would be open to the ITO to take up the matter from the point at which the illegality supervened and to pass a fresh order even in the case of annulment of the assessment, if it can be made according to the provisions of law and if the time-limit for taking further proceedings in the matter and making the assessment, if any, is still available. In the instant case, there is a time-limit for making an assessment. An extended time-limit has been provided for making fresh assessment in cases where the original assessment has been set aside by the appellate authority under Section 251 of the Act. No extended limitation is, however, available under Section 251 for making fresh assessment in a case where the original assessment is annulled. If the original time-limit is still available, the ITO may proceed from the stage at which the illegality which resulted in the annulment of the assessment supervened and to make the assessment afresh.
Here, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has held that time-limit cannot be extended but in the present case in hand, the AO has framed the assessment on original return within the time-limit allowed as per the provisions of Section 153(1)(a) of the Act. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case and the case law discussed above, we are of the view that the AO has rightly acted on the original return only and he has not acted on the revised return and moreover he has only extracted the information from the so-called revised return of the assessee which is non est. Accordingly, we uphold the orders of the lower authorities on this issue.
11. On merits, the assessee's plea is that he is not having any other house in his name and due to inadvertence, he has declared the income from house property which is owned by bigger HUF, Shri V. Ramakrishnan.
The facts leading to the issue are that.Shri V. Ramakrishnan was Karta of the HUF and the partition had taken place vide partnership deed dt.
11th March, 1976 among the assessee and other coparceners. The relevant portion of. translated copy of partition deed dt. llth March, 1976 is being reproduced from the assessee's paper book at p, 23 as under: This document of family partition entered into on this 11th day of March, 1976 among (1) V. Ramakrishnan, son of Neerkondar Venkataswamy Naidu, residing at No. 765, Trichy Road, Ondiputhur, Coimbatore (2) R. Manohar (3) R. Vijayakumar both sons of V. Ramakrishnan and (4) minor R. Sureshkumar aged about 10 years by his father and guardian V. Ramakrishnan.
Whereas we have been enjoying commonly all our family properties till to date. We have agreed to partition the said family properties in our own interest and as per the comprise made by the persons interested in our family. We have already divided among ourselves the movable properties belonging to our family. We agree that, the properties purchased in the individual names of parties No. 1, 2 and 3 and registered with the Registrar, Chithoor Taluk, Palakkad District in document Nos. 997 and 998 of 1964 shall be enjoyed by the respective parties and only in respect of the properties in Singanallur is to be partitioned in this deed.
In respect of house properties, they shall be considered as common properties in the interest of the family and No. 1 shall maintain such properties as manager of the family. We agree that the shares divided hereunder shall be the properties of the individuals concerned and to be enjoyed as much hereafter. As per this partition, A. Schedule properties shall belong to No. 2-R. Manohar, C. Schedule properties shall belong to No. 3-R. Vijayakumar and the D. Schedule properties shall belong to minor-R. Sureshkumar and the E. Schedule properties shall continue to be the common properties of the joint family.
Further, Schedule E, which is kept as common property, is prescribed at p. 25 of the assessee's paper book which reads as under : Site measuring 0.34-1/2 acres in S.F. No. 268, Singanallur Village, Coimbatore Taluk, Singanallur sub-Registration District within Coimbatore Registration District including tiles houses having frontage in North, East and South sides including doors, windows, light fittings, EB deposits with pathway, rights. Door Nos. 755A to 12. It transpires that the property as prescribed in Sen. E is the same property from which the, assessee has declared the rental income in the revised return and the address was given as situated at 236, Trichy Road, Ondipudur, Coimbatore. A long litigation was carried out on this property and a suit was filed by one of the coparceners of the property, Shri R. Manoharan, for partition of this Schedule E property in the Court of 3rd Addl. Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, on 23rd May, 1988 under Order VII, Rule 1, CPC. The Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore vide its order in O.S. No. 533/1988 on 8th March, 1996 has allowed the partition suit of the property and the subordinate Court has finally passed the decree at p. 5 and the relevant part of the order reads as under: (i) That the suit property be divided into 4 equal shares and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff be allotted one such share.
Typed copy of the suit order is placed in the assessee's paper book at pp. 44 to 50 and the description of this property in the suit order has been given at p. 49 which reads as under : In Coimbatore Regn. District, Singanallur sub-Registration, Coimbatore Taluk, Coimbatore Municipal Corporation Limits, Singanallur Village, (end of the 4th page of this original) S.F. No. 268 and extent of Ac. 0.34-1/2 cents together with half share in the well with rights of channel, North South East facing buildings thereon together with water tap, electricity service connection with right of pathway. Old Nos. 755A to 773 their new Nos. 228, 236, 238, 240, 241, 242, 758, 762, 763, 765, 766, 767.
In this description the new number of the property has been described and the same property from which the assessee has declared the rental income which described as new No. 236 after 228. The claim of the assessee is that the income from house property declared in the revised return before the AO as well as the CIT(A) was of HUF. The CIT(A) in his order has admitted that the assessee has collected the rent from HUF property which was declared in the revised return due to inadvertence. The relevant portion of the order of the CIT(A) reads as under : 3.1 It is also submitted that the appellant was permitted by the HUF in which he is a member to collect certain rental income which he has admitted in the return and the appellant should not be denied the benefit of exemption under Section 54F. An affidavit has been also filed stating that the appellant did not possess any building other than the one which was constructed and on which exemption was claimed.
13. It is pertinent to note that against the order of 3rd Addl.
Subordinate Judge, further litigation was carried out to the Court of 1st Addl. District Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate of Coimbatore and an appeal suit was filed wherein the appeal was dismissed upholding the order of 3rd Addl. Subordinate Judge in respect of partition in the HUF property on 10th July, 1998. The relevant order of Addl. District Judge forms part of the assessee's paper book at pp. 55 to 59. The assessee claimed before the lower authorities as well as before the Bench that neither in the past years nor in the future years, the assessee has declared any income from this house property which belongs to the HUF. Only this year, due to inadvertence he has declared the income from this house property in his return of income. But now, the question arises as to whether the assessee owned the property belonged to the HUF or not. As per the partition deed dt. llth March, 1976, the above-mentioned Schedule E property was not partitioned and the same was treated as the property of bigger HUF and partial partition was carried out in the family of the assessee. Subsequently, one of the coparceners Shri R. Manoharan who is a party in the partition deed dt.
11th March, 1976, has filed a suit before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, asking for partition of HUF property. The subordinate Court has passed an order on 8th March, 1996 of partition by dividing the property among the coparceners allotting one share each and the matter was again carried over to the Appellate Court before the Addl. District Judge, Coimbatore and the Addl. District Judge on 10th July, 1998 dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower Court's partition decree. It is observed from the records that no further appeal was carried over by the assessee as well as other coparceners regarding the property as to whether it belongs to HUF up to the date of the order of the Addl. District Judge, dt. 10th July, 1998.
14. It is an admitted fact and not disputed by the Department that the property belongs to HUF only. The dispute is that on which date the partition of the property came into force and on which date the ownership belongs to the assessee and whether it belongs to the date of filing of suit before the Subordinate Judge on 23rd May, 1988 or on the date of decision of the Subordinate Judge on 8th March, 1996. The Revenue's case is that the property was partitioned by filing the suit before the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge has passed the order on 8th March, 1996 dividing the property into 4 equal shares and allotted one such share to each coparcener. Now, it is to be decided that as to whether the ownership of this property is described or not and whether the title is perfect or not. The ownership of the property is either vested or contingent. It is vested when the owner's title is already perfect and it is contingent, when his title is as yet imperfect, but is capable of becoming perfect on the fulfilment of certain conditions. If ownership is vested then it is absolute and if it is yet to be perfect on fulfilment of certain conditions, it is conditional. In the former case, the investitive fact from which it derives the right is complete in all its parts; whereas in the latter it is incomplete on the concept of vested and contingent ownership. The view very clearly has been explained in Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition written by P. J. Fitzgerald. The relevant portion of the description is reproduced as it is : Ownership is either vested or contingent. It is vested when the owner's title is already perfect; it is contingent when his title is as yet imperfect, but is capable of becoming perfect on the fulfilment of some condition. In the former case, the ownership is absolute; in the latter it is merely conditional. In the former case the investitive fact from which he derives the right is complete in all its parts; in the latter it is incomplete, by reason of the absence of some necessary element, which is nevertheless capable of being supplied in the future. In the meantime, therefore, his ownership is contingent and it will not become vested until the necessary condition is fulfilled. A testator, for example, may leave property to his wife for her life and on her death to A, if he is then alive, but if A is then dead, to B. A and B are both owners of the property in question, but their ownership is merely contingent.
That of A is conditional on his surviving the testator's widow; while that of B is conditional on the death of A in the widow's lifetime.
In English law, an estate may be vested even though it does not give a right to immediate possession. Thus, on a devise to A for life with remainder to B in fee simple, B's interest is vested because there is nothing but A's prior interest to stand between him and the actual enjoyment of the land. In technical language, B" interest is vested in interest, though not vested in possession, it becomes vested in possession only on the death of A. An estate may be vested in interest although the facts may be such that it never becomes vested in possession and so never gives a right to the actual enjoyment of the land. Thus, on a devise to A for life with remainder to B for life with remainder to C in fee simple, B's estate is vested in interest notwithstanding that if B dies before A his interest will never vest in possession. For there is still nothing but A's estate between B and the enjoyment of the land.
The contingent ownership of a thing does not necessarily involve its contingent existence. Shares and other choses in action may have an absolute existence, though the ownership of them may be contingently and alternatively in A and B. Money in a bank may be certainly owing to someone, though it may depend on a condition, whether it is owing to C or D. On the other hand, it may be that the right is contingent in respect of its existence, no less than in respect of its ownership. This is so whenever there is no alternative owner and when, therefore, the right will belong to no one unless it becomes vested in the contingent owner by the fulfilment of the condition.
It is to be noticed that the contingent ownership of a thing is something more than a simple chance or possibility of becoming the owner. It is more than a mere spes acquisitionis. I have no contingent ownership of a piece of land merely because I may buy it, if I so wish; or because peradventure its owner may leave it to me by his will. Contingent ownership is based not upon the mere possibility of future acquisition, but upon the present existence of an inchoate or incomplete title.
The conditions on which contingent ownership depends are termed conditions precedent to distinguish them from another kind known as conditions subsequent. A condition precedent is one by the fulfilment of which an inchoate title is completed; a condition subsequent is one on the fulfilment of which a title already completed is extinguished. In the former case I acquire absolutely what I have already acquired conditionally. In the latter case I lose absolutely what I have already lost conditionally. A condition precedent involves an inchoate or incomplete investitive fact; a condition subsequent involves an incomplete or inchoate divestitive fact (v). He who owns property subject to a power of sole or power of appointment vested in someone else owns it subject to condition subsequent. His title is complete, but there is already in existence an incomplete divestitive fact, which may one day complete itself and cut short his ownership.
15. In the present case also, no doubt, after the order of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, ordering partition of property among parties in equal shares, the assessee became contingent owner but the right vests in the HUF and not to the assessee individually. He became vested owner only after the order of the appellate Court i.e., Addl.
District Judge, Coimbatore, dismissing the appeal and upholding the order of the Subordinate Judge on 10th July, 1998. No further appeal was carried out against the order of the Addl. District Judge and the assessee became the vested owner of 1/4th share of the above property from that date. In our opinion, the assessee became the owner of the HUF property on partition only on 10th July, 1998 after the judgment of the Addl. Distt. Court Judge, Coimbatore. Earlier to that, the property was vested in the HUF.16. Further, we have to discuss the ownership in view of Section 22 of the IT Act, 1961 and the provisions of Section 9(i) of the IT Act, 1922, were substantially the same. The whole of Section 9 of the old Act was redrafted into several separate sections viz., Sections 22 to 27 under the IT Act, 1961. For the purposes of Section 9 of the IT Act, 1922, the owner must be the person who can exercise the rights of the owners, not, on doubt but in his own right. The person who receives the income from the property in his own right can be termed as the owner of the property. In the common law, the owner means who got valid title legally conveyed to him after complying with the requirement of various law such as Transfer of Property Act, the Registration Act, etc. but in the context of the provisions of Section 22 of the IT Act, 1961, the AO should go into the real test of ownership to tax the income who is entitled to receive the income from the property in his own right and not as a beneficial owner. In view of this discussion also, we are of the view that in the present case in hand, the assessee has only contingent right and at the most he may be termed as a beneficial owner. If we accept that he has declared the income from house property, in any case for claiming exemption under Section 54F of the Act, the assessee could not be put in jeopardy by treating him as the owner of the another residential house which vests not in him rather vests in the HUF till the decision of the appellate Court, i.e., Addl.
District Court's order which is dt. 10th July, 1998. Here, we have to refer the case law of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case CIT v. Podar Cement (P) Ltd. wherein the Hon'ble apex Court very beautifully considered the case law in the case of R.B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala v. CIT which is reproduced as it is : The question is who is'the 'owner' referred to in this section Is it the person in whom the property vests or is it he who is entitled to some beneficial interest in the property It must be remembered that Section 9 brings to tax the income from property and not the interest of a person in the property. A property cannot be owned by two persons, each one having independent and exclusive right over it. Hence, for the purpose of Section 9, the owner must be that person who can exercise the rights of the owner, not on behalf of the owner but in his own right.
The learned Judge observed that "it is true that equitable considerations are irrelevant in interpreting tax laws. But, those laws, like all other laws, have to be interpreted reasonably and in consonance with justice." Again at p. 577, it was held that "for determining the person liable to pay tax, the test laid down by the Court was- to find out the person entitled to that income." Again at p.
578 it was observed : "No one denies that an evacuee from Pakistan has a residual right in the property that he left in Pakistan. But the real question is, can that right be considered as ownership within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. As mentioned earlier that section seeks to bring to tax income of the property in the hands of the owner.
Hence, the focus of that section is one the receipt of the income....
The meaning that we give to the word 'owner' in Section 9 must not be such as to make that provision capable of being made an instrument of oppression. It must be in consonance with the principles underlying the Act." 17. We do not agree with the finding of the CIT(A) that in the partition deed there is no mention of property located at 236, Trichy Road, Ondiputhur. This is very clearly mentioned in the order of the Subordinate Judge as well as Addl. Dist. Judge, Coimbatore, in the Schedule E and the clear description of the property is given as No.236 after the new No. 228. Hence, there is no dispute on this issue as it is the same property viz., No. 236 which is under litigation as well as the assessee has declared the income from the same property.
18. In view of these facts and circumstances narrated above and the precedents relied upon, we are of the view that the assessee was not vested owner of the residential house property from where the income from house property was declared in the revised return of income rather bigger HUF, i.e., V. Ramakrishnan was the owner of the property.
Accordingly, we hold that the assessee is entitled for exemption under Section 54F of the Act for investing the long-term capital gains in the construction of new residential house and set aside the orders of the lower authorities.