S.D. Shah, J.
1. The petitioner before this Court is the defendant of H.R.P. Suit No. 3888 of 1977 which is instituted in the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad by the respondent-plaintiff seeking his eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as on the ground of acquisition of suitable residential accommodation by the tenant after coming into force of the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act.
2. The suit was filed by one Vasumatiben Maganlal Manani as plaintiff through her Power of Attorney-holder - Rajabhai Manani, and it appears that Vakalat Patra as well as the plaint of the suit were signed by the Power of Attorney-holder on behalf of Vasumatiben Manani.
The defendant resisted the suit by filing written statement. Issues were, thereafter, framed by the trial Court and the evidence of the plaintiff was recorded. The plaintiff, thereafter, gave purshis of closure of evidence on 13-4-1982 and the oral evidence of the defendant was also recorded and the suit was adjourned for arguments. Thereafter, on 10th June, 1982 the defendant moved an application to amend the written statement inter alia to introduce the defence that the plaint was not properly signed by the plaintiff as required under Order 6 Rule 14 of the C.P. Code and said amendment was granted by the trial Court. The trial Court thereafter framed two following additional issues:
6(a) Whether the defendant proves that the plaint deserves to be rejected as contended in Para 4-A of the Written Statement? if Yes
6(b) Whether the plaintiff proves that the signatory of the plaint is entitled to sign and verify the plaint on her behalf as her attorney?
Thereafter, after recording further evidence, the trial Court by judgment and decree, dated 7th July, 1982 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and recorded the finding on issue No. 6(a) against plaintiff and issue No. 6(b) in favour of plaintiff.
Being aggrieved by said judgment and decree passed by the Court of Small Causes, the plaintiff-landlady preferred Appeal being Appeal No. 314 of 1982 before the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court and while such appeal was pending, she tendered an application at Exh. 29, dated 15th July, 1991 to permit her to sign the plaint and Vakalat Patra in place of the signature affixed by her Power of Attorney-holder.
3. Such application made by the plaintiff-landlady was resisted by the tenant vide his reply at Exh. 67 firstly on the ground that such a permission cannot be granted at such a belated stage and secondly on the ground that despite the fact such a specific objection was taken in the written statement by amendment the landlady has not cured the defect or irregularity in the pleading and has invited a finding adverse to her and when such a finding is recorded, it is not permissible to move such an application which has the effect of rendering the finding of the Small Causes Court ineffective or meaningless.
4. The Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court by its judgment and order, dated 6-9-1995 allowed the application of the plaintiff and allowed the plaintiff-landlady to sign the plaint and Vakalat Patra. It is this order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court which is under challenge before this Court at the instance of the petitioner-tenant.
5. Mr. Amar Bhatt, learned Counsel for Mr. S.N. Soparkar appearing for the petitioner has vehemently urged before this Court that the application of this nature at the stage of appeal ought not to have been granted as the effect of granting such application is to render the findings reached by the trial Court ineffective and meaningless. Secondly, he submitted that it would render nugatory the positive defence taken by the tenant to the effect that the plaint was not properly signed, and hence, such plaint was liable to be rejected, more so, because such contention was specifically raised, issue was specifically framed, and finding on such issue was already specifically recorded against the plaintiff-landlady. In his submission, order of this nature would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court as the application at Exh. 29 cannot be precisely said to be one under Order 6 Rule 17 of C.P. Code nor is any provision of law shown to the Court under which such an application at the appeal stage could be entertained by the appellate Court. He submitted that though the application contains the averment that the application is to amend the plaint, what is being done is not the amendment of the plaint within the meaning of Order 6 Rule 17 of C.P. Code, but it would tantamount to legalising or regularising ex post-facto the defect which existed under Order 6 Rule 14 of C.P. Code.
On the other hand, Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Advocate appearing for respondent submitted that the order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court is discretionary order which could be passed by it within its jurisdiction. Secondly, he submitted that the question as to whether the plaint and Vakalat Patra are properly signed and verified or not is purely a question of procedure and irregularity or illegality committed in compliance of such procedure is purely formal and technical in nature and should not result into rejection of the plaint filed by the respondent-landlady. It is more so because there existed a deed of Power of Attorney in favour of the husband of the landlady who authorised the husband to institute a suit for eviction of tenant and therefore, when the Power of Attorney-holder can also sign the pleading or Vakalat Patra, if under bona fide belief the plaint and Vakalat Patra are signed by such Power of Attorney-holder procedural defect becomes more formal and technical which should not result into non-suiting the plaintiff-landlady as that would perpetuate miscarriage of justice.
6. In order to appreciate the aforesaid rival contentions raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it would be just and proper at this stage to make reference to the text of Order 6 Rules 14 and 15 of C.P. Code:
Pleading to be Signed:
Order 6, Rule 14. Every pleading should be signed by the party and his pleader (if any):
Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.
Verification of Pleadings:
15.(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed.
7. Under Order 6 'Pleading' shall mean plaint or written statement. Such pleading is required to be signed (shall be) by a party and his pleader (if any). However, the proviso to Rule 14 contemplates that where a party is by reason of absence or for other good cause unable to sign the pleading it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue on his behalf. In the present case, undoubtedly, in the year 1977 when the suit was filed the landlady-Vasumatiben was not absent, as could be seen from her cross-examination. She could have, therefore, signed the pleading. However, it is submitted before this Court that no other good cause is shown as to why she could not sign and verify the pleading. The reason which is put forward by the landlady is that since the deed of Power of Attorney was executed in favour of her husband by her authorising him to institute a suit for eviction of tenant such authorised person has signed the plaint and that she never knew the procedural requirement that the plaint should be signed and versified by herself only. Rule 15 similarly provides that every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
8. The object of requiring every pleading to be signed by the party is to prevent, as far as possible, disputes, as to whether the suit was instituted by the plaintiff or with the plaintiffs knowledge and authority. From the language of the Rule, even an authorised agent may validly sign the pleading under certain circumstances, namely, where the party pleading is by reason of absence or for other good cause unable to sign the pleading. The absence must be of such a kind as makes it impossible for the party to sign the pleading. The important question which is required to be considered and answered by this Court is as to what is the effect of non-compliance with the aforesaid provision of Order 6 Rule 14, or what is the effect of omission on the part of the party to sign the pleading. Would the pleading of a party become meaningless so as to incur the liability of rejection of plaint or written statement as such because of such defect? Is the defect of such a nature a substantive defect so as to affect the right or authority of the party to sign the pleading? In the alternative, is a defect one of procedure only or is formal only and can be removed on subsequent date irrespective of question of limitation?
9. It appears that there existed a divergence of judicial opinion on the aforesaid question. The predominance of the view is that an omission or non-compliance with the requirement of Order 6 Rule 14 is merely an irregularity or a defect of procedure and it does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. The High Courts which have taken such view are the High Courts of Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Nagpur and Allahabad. This can be said to be one predominant view on the subject. As will be noted hereinafter, these High Courts have gone to the extent of observing that the omission or mistake in the signature is not fatal to the suit, but is capable of being cured at a later stage by appropriate amendment even at appellate stage. The High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Madras have granted such amendment of the plaint even at the appellate stage.
10. The opposite view which is taken by number of other High Courts is that the defect or omission of complying with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of C.P. Code is not merely an irregularity or formal defect but is a matter of substance and the suit cannot be said to be validly instituted if the plaint does not comply with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14. These High Courts have taken a view that in case of such defect the Court must proceed to reject the plaint. Such view has found favour with the earlier decision of the High Courts of Bombay as well as Punjab to which reference has been made hereafter.
11. Before this Court proceeds to consider the aforesaid divergence of opinion amongst various High Courts and to record its own opinion, it shall have to be kept in mind that the C.P. Code is essentially a statute which prescribes and regulates the procedure to be followed by civil Courts on institution of suit, application or appeal as the case may be. It is, by this time, well established that the procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure where no specific provisions of fair-play is violated with a view to promote substantial justice.
12. The primary function of Court of law is to dispense justice based on substantive rights of the parties and matters of procedure should not boggle unnecessarily the judicial mind when equity requires that the defect or irregularity in procedure is one which can be cured without any injustice to the other party. Ordinarily, the rules of procedure or processual rules are not treated as obligatory or mandatory, the non-compliance of which must necessarily result into depriving the party of its substantive right. If the defect or irregularity in the procedure is one which can be said to be purely technical or formal, the endeavour of the Court of law should be to permit curing of such defect rather than to treat such defect to a status of violation of substantive right thereby denying justice to the party.
Keeping in mind the aforesaid observations with regard to approach of the Court to the rules of procedure it would now be necessary for this Court to have a peep into the divergence of judicial opinion at this stage.
13. In the case of Nanjibhai Jethabhai v. Popatlal Shriraj reported in AIR 1932 Bom. 367, before the learned single Judge, His Lordship Justice Mirza, the plaintiff was one Nanjibhai Jethabhai. The plaint was signed by one Nanjibhai Jethabhai by the hand of Bhikhalal Nagardas Munim. The said Bhikhalal Nagardas held no general Power of Attorney from the plaintiff which would authorise him to sign the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff. On facts, it was found by the Court that on the date of filing of plaint, the plaintiff was out of Bombay. The question before the learned single Judge was as to whether the Munim who has signed the plaint can be said to have been 'fully authorised by the plaintiff to sign it on his behalf. The Court, therefore, found that the plaint failed to conform to the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of C.P. Code. It was, therefore, submitted before the Court that there was no plaint before the Court which can be said to be properly presented as required by Order 4 Rule 1. It was at that stage that the Counsel appearing for the plaintiff applied to the Court that he may be allowed to amend the plaint by the plaintiff signing it and verifying it. The application raised a question as to whether if the plaint is allowed to be amended in that manner, a right which may have accrued to the defendants by lapse of time in making the plaintiffs claim time-barred would not be prejudiced. In the alternative, it was contended on behalf of the defendants that if the amendment is allowed, the claim of the plaintiff should be considered as having been made at the date of the amendment and not at the date of the suit, so that the defendants may be enabled to plead that the plaintiffs claim is time-barred.
14. The learned single Judge thereafter referred to the observations of the Privy Council in the case of Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Budhan Saha Das reported in ILR 17 Calcutta 580 where their Lordships of the Privy Council expressed the opinion that there was no rule that a person named as co-plaintiff was not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signed and verified the plaint. The learned single Judge found that from certain expressions in their Lordship's judgment it appeared that they were of opinion that the signing of the plaint was not an essential part of it. The Court also noticed that the High Court of Allahabad was consistent in its view and in the case of Rajit Ram v. Kateshwar Nath reported in ILR 18 All.' 396 and in the case of Shib Deo Misra v. Ram Prasad reported in ILR 22 All. 55, it was held that mere fact that the suit has not been signed and verified by the plaintiff or by the person duly authorised by him will not make the plaint absolutely void. In the case of Shib Deo Misra (supra) Stretchy, C.J. of Allahabad High Court speaking on behalf of the Full Bench made observations to which Mirza, J. extensively referred to. Said observations are worth - quoting:
The argument on behalf of the appellant is shortly this: that where a plaint is not signed in accordance with Section 51 (now Order 6 Rules 14 & 15(1)) not merely is there 'an error, defect or irregularity' but there is no suit; the plaint is 'waste paper', and the Court has no suit before it which it can legally decree. From this argument I entirely dissent. Section 48 (now Order 4 Rule 1) of the Code shows that a suit is instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or the proper officer. The Code contains no definition of a plaint, but Section 50 (now Order Rules 1, 2, 4, 5 & 6) shows what a plaint substantially is, and states the various particulars which it must contain. It says nothing about signature, and in no way suggests that what it describes as a plaint is not a plaint if it is unsigned or if the signature is in any way defective. Section 51 (now Order 6 Rules 14 and 15(1)) deals with the signature and verification of the plaint. It places the signature and verification on exactly the same footing.... There is nothing whatever in Section 51 to suggest that if its terms are not complied with the defect stands on any different footing from the other defect mentioned in Section 53(b) (now Order 6 Rule 17, Order 7 Rule 11) or involves any other consequence than rejection of the plaint if not amended in accordance with an order for amendment, or that the defect cannot be waived like other initial irregularities, or that the plaint by reason of the defect is not necessarily, 'waste paper' or that there is no suit legally before the Court. The object of the verification of the plaint is to fix upon the plaintiff the responsibility for the statements which it contains, and to afford a guarantee of his good faith. The object of the signature to the plaint is to prevent, as far as possible, disputes as to whether the suit was instituted with the plaintiffs knowledge and authority. I do not underrate the importance of this; but there may be other ways of establishing the plaintiffs responsibility besides signature, and that the fact that the Code contains no provision requiring an appellant to sign his memorandum of appeal supports this view.
15. However, in the subsequent case of Chunilal Bhagwanji v. Kanmal Lalchand reported in AIR 1944 Bom. 201, Mr. Justice Beaumont, the Honourable Chief Justice, Bombay has to deal with the fact situation when the question was as to whether the next friend of a minor can appoint recognised agent and whether such next friend has power to pass a general Power of Attorney in respect of the minor's property. Ordinarily a general Power of Attorney would entitle the attorney to file suits in the name of unspecified minor. A person acting under such general Power of Attorney has no authority either to present the plaint or to sign it and as the plaint is presented by someone who had no authority to present it the Court took the view that it was not valid plaint and the suit was not validly commenced. The Court also took the view that such a defect cannot be cured by amendment and the only course open to suitor is to file a fresh suit. Though there existed a distinction between general Power of Attorney and specific Power of Attorney where parties specifically authorise to sign a plaint in a suit instituted on behalf of donee. It is not necessary for this Court to go into that question at this stage. As per the aforesaid view of Bombay High Court, which is prior to the reorganization of the States, it can be said to be binding on this Court.
16. However, there is yet another decision in the field which is also of the Bombay High Court in the case of The Prince Line Ltd. v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in : AIR1950Bom130 . Before the Bombay High Court, in this case, it was found that the plaint was not properly signed and verified as required by Order 6 Rule 14 C.P.C. Justice Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) took the view that unless and until a plaint is presented to the Court complying with the provisions contained in the Order 6 Rules 14 & 16, it cannot be said that proper plaint is presented to the Court and unless such proper plaint is presented to the Court it cannot be said that the suit has been instituted in the Court by a party. The Court has always got the discretion, if the plaint is not properly presented or is not signed and verified in accordance with the provision, to allow the plaintiff to remedy the defect at a later stage even though the period of limitation might have already expired. However, it is a matter of discretion of the Court which the Court exercises after due consideration of facts and circumstances of the case before it. If the Court exercises the discretion and allows the defect to be cured, it can do so irrespective of the fact that the defendant has vested in him by that time a right to plead the bar of limitation. It may be stated that in para 3 of the reported judgment the learned Judge made reference to various decisions of other High Courts including Calcutta High Court reported in : AIR1927Cal376 where it was held that the defect was a mere irregularity that can be cured by amendment and the plaint must be under the circumstances taken to have been presented on that date when the plaint was amended. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Privy Council reported in 1947 IA 255 as well as the decision of Allahabad High Court reported in 0043/1924 : AIR1925All79 where the view was taken that the plaint which was filed without having been duly verified in the manner prescribed by the C.P. Code was not an invalid document, but may be verified at a later stage of the suit, even after the expiry of limitation. The Court, therefore, held that the omission was an irregularity which can be cured even at a later stage and merely on the ground of such defect plaint cannot be said to be altogether invalid and by subsequent amendment of the plaint the defect could be cured. The learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court after following the view of the Privy Council in the case of Charandas v. Amir Khan reported in 47 IA 255 has gone a step further by holding that although the power of Court to amend the plaint should not as a rule be exercised where the effect was to take away from the defendant a legal right which had accrued to him by the lapse of time, yet there were cases in which that consideration was outweighed by the special circumstances of the case. After referring to the aforesaid various decisions, the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court took the view that in appropriate cases and in order to meet the ends of justice the Court has always got the power to allow the defect to be cured by amendment of the plaint or by allowing the re-signing and re-declaration of the plaint even at the stage when the defendant would be entitled to plead the bar of limitation.
17. Yet in another subsequent decision in the case of Dahyabhai Girdhardas v. Bobaji Dahyaji Kotwal reported in : AIR1953Bom28 His Lordship Chagla, C.J. of Bombay High Court was confronted with identical question. It was found that the plaint was signed by the son of the plaintiff who had no proper authority to sign. When an application to amend the plaint was moved it was held that the plaintiff can be allowed to amend the plaint at a later stage by allowing the plaintiff to sign the plaint irrespective of law of limitation inasmuch as the defect is merely formal. Honourable Chief Justice Mr. Chagla did not follow the view taken by Beaumont, C.J. in the case of Chunilal Bhagwanji reported in AIR 1944 Bom. 201 but relied upon the decision of Mirza, J. in the case of Nanjibhai v. Popatlal reported in AIR 1932 Bom. 367. Dealing with the views expressed by Sir John Beaumont, the Honourable Chief Justice Mr. Chagla observed as under:
If Sir John Beaumont was right in the view that he took then the suit before the Privy Council was never instituted as far as the co-plaintiffs were concerned. Therefore, with very great respect, in my opinion, the learned Chief Justice was in error in the view that he took. Ordinarily, 1 would have been bound by his judgment as a judgment of co-ordinate authority, but there is the judgment of Mirza, J. and also the judgment of Privy Council to which I have referred. With respect, I prefer the judgment of Mirza, J. in Nanjibhai v. Popatlal.
It is thus clear that the view of Mirza, J. was preferred to that of John Beaumont as the said view was consistent with the view expressed by the Privy Council.
18. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, once again, in the case of All India Reporter, Bombay v. Ramchandra Dhondo Datar reported in : AIR1961Bom292 took the view that the provisions contained in Order 6 Rules 14 and 15 of C.P. Code with regard to signing and verification of plaint are mere matters of procedure and if a plaint is not properly signed or verified but is admitted and entered in the Register of Suits it does not cease to be a plaint and the suit cannot be said not to have been instituted merely because of the existence of defects or irregularities in the matter of signing and verification of plaint. The Division Bench followed the aforesaid earlier decisions of High Courts and it is not necessary for this Court to multiply the decisions of the Bombay High Court which are more or less consistent excepting the one view which was taken by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice John Beaumont which is not approved consistently by subsequent decisions of the Bombay High Court.
19. In view of aforesaid series of decisions of Bombay High Court which are rendered prior to the formation of Gujarat State in 1960 and in view of the fact that this Court is bound by the decision of the Bombay High Court rendered prior to reorganisation of the Gujarat State, in the opinion of this Court, a further peep into the divergent opinion is not called for and it could very well be avoided.
In the case of Kalyanbhai Manibhai v. Enaben Mangaldas reported in 8 GLT 66 His Lordship T.U. Mehta (as His Lordship then was) took the view that under Order 6 Rule 14 pleading could be signed by the person authorised but if there is defect it can always be cured even at appellate stage and the defect about signature could be cured even after period of limitation has expired. This Court relied upon the provision of Section 99 of C.P. Code and took the view that the reason behind the rule is contained in Section 99 of the C.P. Code which says that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect of irregularity in any proceedings in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
20. The Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Smt. Mukhtiar Kaur v. Smt. Ghulab Kaur reported in took the view that the defect in signing and verification is only an irregularity which may be remedied under Section 99 of C.P. Code. Similar view is taken by yet another High Court, i.e., Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Karamsingh v. Ram Rachhpal Singh reported in , where Honourable Justice Mr. R.S. Pathak (as His Lordship then was ) took the view that the requirement of Rule 14 of Order 6 is procedural and the party can make good the deficiency at a later stage and therefore, the rejection of a plaint on that ground would not be valid and the proper course for the Court would be to give an opportunity to the plaintiff to sign and verify the plaint.
21. The only dissenting view or contrary view of Order 6 Rule 14 is taken by Justice Sir Beaumont in the case of Chunilal Bhagwanji (supra) and since the said view has not been approved by the very High Court subsequently in a series of decisions, it is difficult for this Court to hold that the requirement of Order 6 Rule 14 is a matter of substance and the suit cannot be said to be validly instituted if the plaint does not comply with the provisions of that Rule.
22. Mr. Amar Bhatt, learned Advocate appearing for petitioner has however, submitted before this Court that even if the defect of such nature can be regarded as a mere procedural or formal when a specific objection is taken by the defendant-tenant to the effect that the plaint is not properly signed and verified and when oral evidence is also led on the point after raising additional issues, the plaintiff-landlady ought to have put her house in order and ought to have cured the defect. She did not choose to do so. She, on the contrary, invited the decision of the trial Court and the trial Court nonsuited her on the ground that the plaint instituted by her was invalid and it was not in compliance with Order 6 Rule 14 of C.P. Code. In such a fact situation, when the application is made at a belated stage before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, great prejudice is caused to the petitioner-tenant because right of limitation which has accrued to him would be rendered nugatory and secondly because the success of defendant-tenant in the suit though on such formal or technical ground would be rendered nugatory. He has invited attention of this Court to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sakuntala S. Tiwari v. Hemchand M. Singhania reported in : [1987]3SCR306 where the view was taken by the Apex Court that suit for possession filed by the landlady under provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Article 67 of the Limitation Act of 1963 is attracted, and under said Article time begins to run only when the tenancy is determined and such time is period of 12 years from the date of determination of tenancy. In his submission in the present case, if the amendment is allowed at this later stage by the Appellate Bench the amendment would relate back to the date of suit and the resultant effect thereof would be that the petitioner-tenant would be denied his right of defence of limitation which is otherwise available to him. In my opinion, the aforesaid submission cannot be countenanced and is misconceived, if predominance of judicial opinion quoted hereinabove is taken into consideration where number of High Courts including the Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court have consistently taken the view that non-compliance of Order 6 Rule 14 C.P.C. is merely a formal defect or procedural irregularity which can be cured and/or corrected or ratified at any stage of the proceedings including the appellate stage irrespective of bar of limitation.
23. It is also required to be noted that in the context of amendment of pleading under Order 6 Rule 17 of C.P. Code even the Apex Court has now permitted amendment of pleading even when such amendment would in a given case deprive the other party of his right of pleading on limitation as his defence. In the present case, since the amendment is merely of a formal or technical nature, the plaint as instituted cannot be said to be invalid on the date of the suit and if the plaint is not invalid regularising such plaint by validating such plaint by permitting the party to sign or verify the pleading it cannot be said that any substantive averment is introduced whereby the right to plead limitation should be reserved in favour of other party. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the aforesaid objection.
24. In the aforesaid position of law, the judgment and order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court below Exh. 29 in Civil Appeal No. 314 of 1982 is required to be upheld and is upheld subject of course to condition that the respondent-landlady pays costs of such belated amendment to the petitioner-tenant. Such cost is qualified at Rs. 1,000/- and the respondent-landlady is directed to pay costs to the petitioner-tenant. Rule is made absolute accordingly.