Judgment:
C.K. Thakker, J.
1. Both these appeals arise out of a judgment and order, dated April 17, 1996 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 1901 of 1996.
2. Letters Patent Appeal No. 528 of 1996 is filed by Gujarat University whereas Letters Patent Appeal No. 530 of 1996 is filed by three appellants who were original respondents No. 4, 7 and 10 respectively in Special Civil Application No. 1901 of 1996. That petition was filed by four petitioners, inter alia, praying to this Court to issue a writ of Mandamus or a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside a decision of the Vice-Chancellor, Gujarat University, respondent No. 1 bifurcating seats of Master of Dental Surgery Course ('M.D.S.' for short) by providing admission twice a year instead of once a year. A prayer was also made to declare that the action of the University in changing the rule by providing admission to M.D.S. Course twice a year was contrary to law, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
3. It was the case of the petitioners that they were students at the Bachelor of Dental Suregery Course ('B.D.S.' for short) and they had successfully completed the said Course at the Government Dental College and Hospital at Ahmedabad. Since they had passed the final year of B.D.S. in June 1995, they were eligible for internship from August 1995 which they were undergoing. There is no dispute between the parties that admission to M.D.S. Course pre-supposes clearance of B.D.S. Examination. At B.D.S. Course, examinations are held twice a year. If a student clears the said examination, he can undertake M.D.S. Course. It is also undisputed that admission to M.D.S. Course was on annual basis until commencement of the academic year 1994-95. With effect from 1st January 1994, however, admission rules were changed and it was decided to give admission to M.D.S. Course twice a year. Rule 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of 1994 rules which were relevant read as under:
3.1. For this purpose selection will be done once in each Academic Term.
First Academic Term: 1st January to 30th June.
Second Academic Term: 1st July to 31st December.
3.2. Seats allotted under Rule 3.0 will be distributed in the ratio of 3: 1 for First and Second Academic Term respectively.
3.3. The Vice-Chancellor can make adjustment of seats and adjustment of dates of admission, if the circumstances so demand.
Thus, a scheme was evolved to bifurcate admission twice a year and selection was sought to be made once in each academic term; first term from January to June and second term from July to December. The seats were also distributed in the ratio of 3: 1 for 1st and 2nd academic term respectively. Power was conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to make adjustment of seats as well as adjustment of dates of admission if the circumstances so demanded.
4. The rules were to be given effect from January 1, 1994. It, however, appears that they were not implemented and the system of giving admission twice a year at the commencement of each academic year during the same year was kept in cold storage without at all implementing it. No admissions were offered to any student on the basis of amended rules. In 1995 again, the admissions were given on yearly basis and seats were filled up for the academic year starting from 1st July. In other words, 1994 rules providing for splitting of academic year into two terms for selection and allocation of seats at M.D.S. Course was never implemented. Rule 3.1 of 1995 Rules provided selection to be made once in an academic year on 1st July and the terms were to begin from that date. It appears that a petition was filed, being Special Civil Application No. 6759 of 1995 by Dr. P.L. Shekhda and others in which direction was sought against the Gujarat University to offer admission twice a year at M.D.S. Course so that the students clearing B.D.S. examination in the first term of the year might not have to wait and forego one term. A representation was also made to the University requesting the University to do needful in the matter. When the above petition came up for hearing before the learned single Judge, the representation was pending. In these circumstances, the learned single Judge (Coram: R.K. Abichandani, J.) disposed of the petition on February 8, 1996 by making the following order:
The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits on instruction that it seems that the representations which are pending with the University Authorities, may be decided. It is submitted that the representations made in July 1995 and thereafter on 3rd August 1995 but no decision is yet taken by the Vice-Chancellor on these representations. It will be proper for the Vice-Chancellor to consider the representations and take a decision in accordance with the law expeditiously preferably within two weeks from to day. Copies of the representations will be given by the petitioners to the learned Counsel for the respondents-authorities today, as stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. These copies will be forwarded to the respondents-authorities for decision in accordance with law. In view of this, no further orders are required to be made on this petition. The petition is, therefore, rejected. If the order that may be passed is against the petitioner, it will be open for the petitioner to challenge the same in accordance with law.
The University, in compliance with the order passed by the learned single Judge, considered the matter. The Vice-Chancellor of the University directed the said representation to be placed before the Dental Admission Committee which was convened on March 7, 1996. In the said meeting the following members were present:
1. Dr. Ketan Desai,Dean, Medical Faculty
2. Dr. K.H. Shah, Dean, Dental College
3. Dr. C.A. Desai,Dean, B.J. Medical College
4. Dr. G.J. Dave
5. Dr. A.N. Patel
6. Dr. K.F. Joshi
7. Dr. V.K. Patel
It is the case of the University that the Committee considered the representation of the students and was of the opinion that the decision which was taken to have admission twice a year in 1994 for academic year 1994-95 was proper and that it should again be adopted for the year starting from 1st of January, 1996. It was, therefore, decided to amend the Rules. Accordingly, it was resolved on 7th March, 1996 to have admission to M.D.S. Course twice a year and to allot 75% seats for regular batch and 25% seats for repeater batch. It was also decided to implement the amended Rules for the batch of 1996. The Executive Council at its meeting held on March 20, 1996 accepted the above recommendation of the University and accordingly it was decided to give admissions on that basis from January 1, 1996. Rule 3 of 1996 Rules provides for admission to Post-Graduate Courses in accordance with the policy of the University to give admissions twice a year. Rule 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of 1996 Rules read as under:
3.1 For this purpose selection will be done once in each academic term.
First Academic Term: 1st January to 30th June.
Second Academic Term: 1st July to 31st December.
3.2 Allocation of seats under Rule 3.0 will be in the ratio of 3: 1 for regular and repeater batch respectively.
3.3 The Vice-Chancellor can make adjustment of seats and adjustment of dates of admission, if the circumstances so demand.
Being aggrieved by the new Rules, introducing and re-starting admissions twice a year which was sought to be introduced by 1994 Rules, the petitioners have approached this Court.
5. The learned single Judge after hearing the Counsel and considering rival contentions of the parties, declared the new Rules as ultra vires and unconstitutional. In Paras 50 and 51, the learned single Judge observed:
50. As a result challenge to impugned amendment for division of actual seats in two parts and devising rule for attaining the objective of seeing definite number of seats for repeaters of Gujarat University by opening two-time admissions in one academic year in the scheme of present set of Rules must succeed.
51. Accordingly, this petition succeeds. The amendment in the rules for M.D.S. Course which had been made effective from 20-3-1996 for the purpose of preponing the admission from July 1996 to an earlier date before completion of the academic year in progress and classifying the sources of admission as regulars and repeaters are declared ultra vires and inoperative.
It is against this order that the above two Appeals are filed by the University and by the students adversely affected by the above judgment.
6. We have heard exiensivcly Mr. S.N. Shelat for Gujarat University and Mr. Jayant Patel for the students who are aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge as also Mr. G.M. Joshi for the original petitioners, who succeeded before the learned single Judge.
7. Mr. Shelat and Mr. Patel contended that the learned single Judge has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding the rules ultra vires and unconstitutional. It was submitted that the University has power, authority and jurisdiction to frame rules which have been framed in accordance with law. The said action cannot be said to be contrary to law, ultra vires, or violative of provisions of Constitution. It was also submitted that starting and completion of academic terms, giving of admissions and allocation of seats, is a policy decision -- pure and simple. Ordinarily, in such policy decisions, a High Court would be loath to interfere and in particular when a decision is taken by an expert body of educational institution, it would be desirable that such decision should not be set aside in exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was urged that when in bona fide exercise of powers, it was resolved by a committee headed by experts in the field to have admissions to M.D.S. Course twice a year and when the Executive Council accepted the decision and recommended the University to amend the Rule and the amendment has been effected, the High Court ought not to have interfered with such decision. It was argued that the learned single Judge has committed an error of law in interpreting the expression 'repeater' by resorting to dictionary. The said term was used not in its literal sense but to describe the said class as belonged to a batch 'other than regular'. In other words, according to the learned Counsel, a 'repeater' is not necessarily a student who had once 'failed' but is a student who is not a 'regular'.
8. Mr. Joshi, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the learned single Judge. He submitted that the Rules have been framed only with a view to favour and accomodate some 'fortunate few'. According to him, all the Committee Members were highly educated persons and it cannot be contended that they were not aware of the distinction 'regular' and 'repeater' and that the expression 'repeater' was loosely used. Mr. Joshi also submitted that the connotation 'repeater' has only one meaning and when the said meaning has been given by the learned single Judge and Rule is held to be ultra vires, no fault can be found against the decision of the learned single Judge. It was also contended that the learned single Judge was right in observing that the distinction sought to be made between the two classes, namely, 'regular' and 'repeater' cannot be said to be legal or reasonable and when it is held to be violative of Article 14 of Constitution, the learned single Judge was right in holding the classification as arbitrary, discriminatory and irrational. Mr. Joshi, therefore, submitted that both the appeals should be dismissed.
9. Having given anxious consideration to rival contentions, we are of the opinion that the appeals must be allowed. In our opinion, the Rules framed by the University cannot be held ultra vires or unconstitutional. We are also of the opinion that the rule providing admission twice a year is in the nature of a policy decision and that too in the field of education. Such action, though subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not be lightly interfered with unless the Court is satisfied that the action is de hors the Act or is arbitrary or unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. So far as mala fide and colourable exercise of power by the respondents is concerned, no doubt, it was contended by the petitioners before the learned single Judge that the Rules were changed in the year 1996 only with a view to accommodate 'favourables'. and were not framed in the larger interest of student community, the said contention does not appear to have weighed with the learned single Judge and the learned single Judge has not declared the rules ultra vires on the ground that they have been framed with a view to grant benefit to a particular class of students. Even otherwise also, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstance of the case, it cannot be said that the action was taken by a responsible body for a 'fortunate few'. It cannot be forgotten that even in 1994, such a provision was made introducing admission twice a year. True it is, that the Rules were not implemented then. That, however, is besides the point. We are told that in some Universities, a policy of giving admission twice a year is in vogue. Mr. Joshi, no doubt, stated that in most of the Universities, admissions are given only once a year and so far as Gujarat University is concerned, never in past, admissions were given twice a year. In our view, however, it is for the University to decide and in that field University is the best judge and normally and in ordinary circumstances, its decision will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to law or otherwise illegal. It was strenuously argued by Mr. Joshi that 'merit' has given go-bye by introducing admissions twice a year. We are unable to accept the said argument of Mr. Joshi. In our opinion, the appellants are right in submitting that 'merit and merit alone' is the sole criterion for giving admission to M.D.S. Course. According to us, distinction must be made between giving of admission on the basis of merit and spliting of academic terms for giving admission. The former is basis and foundation whereas the latter is policy. So far as eligibility is concerned, Rule 1 of the Rules of 1996 provides the test for admission and there is no change in the said eligibility test from the test laid down in previous years of 1994 and 1995. All students who are similarly situated and having requisite qualification of passing B.D.S. examination were and are eligible to get admission at M.D.S. Course and are qualified and on the basis of list prepared, according to merits, they can be given admission. The test with regard to trials and failures at B.D.S. examination and deduction of marks also remains the same. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the students who are otherwise similarly situated have been treated differently. It is settled law that if the persons similarly situated are treated differently, grievance can be made and the action can be held to be discriminatory in nature and, hence, violative of the doctrine of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. But if all equals are treated equally, there is no violation of Article 14. Since similarly situated students are treated similarly forming one class, there cannot be any grievance on the part of the petitioners. In our opinion, Article 14 cannot be invoked in such cases and the rule cannot be held to be ultra vires on that count.
10. Regarding giving of admissions twice a year in two terms, it cannot be said that the action is without authority or is otherwise unlawful. As submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants and conceded by Mr. Joshi, in some Universities such practice is in vogue. Even in this University, according to the learned Counsel for the appellants, in some courses admissions are given twice a year. But even otherwise also, if the University has considered the matter and has taken a decision in the larger interest of student community so that their valuable six months may not be wasted and/or they may not suffer and a step in that direction has been taken by introducing the present system even for the first time, in our considered opinion, no fault can be found. It cannot be said that such a step ought not to have been taken and that it would be contrary to law, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Such matters should better left to the discretion of authorities. Institutions which are expected to take into account welfare and interest of the student community, will indeed take an appropriate decision in such matters. An extraordinary remedy under Article 226 is ill-suited to challenge propriety of such decisions.
11. Mr. Joshi, vehemently urged that distinction which was sought to be made between 'regular' and 'repeater' students is arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. Since all the students are similarly situated, having necessary qualification of passing B.D.S. Examination, there cannot be a class among class and such a distinction is artificial, irrational and is violative of the doctrine of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. It appears that the said argument weighed with the learned single Judge, who observed:
I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the classification of candidates amongst regular and repeater under Rule 3.2 is not founded on intelligible differentia inasmuch as the object with which Rule is framed itself fails the test of reasonableness and defies the rational for which classification can be made in the field of admissions to higher discipline of education within the constitutional framework.
It must be conceded that in order to meet the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, viz., (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia between those who are included in the class and those who are left out, and (ii) such differentia must have reasonable and rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. If the above dual test is not complied with, a classification would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The question, however, is whether in the instant case, any classification is sought to be made between the persons similarly situated by placing them in two different classes and if so, whether it is based on intelligible differentia which has rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved thereby. The contention of Mr. Joshi is that there are two classes of students; viz., 'regulars' and 'repeaters. A classification is sought to be made between those two classes and as the said classification is neither based on intelligible differentia nor it has any nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby, namely, giving admission at M.D.S. Course, such classification is hit as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and cannot be upheld by a Court of law. The learned single Judge held the classification bad upholding the argument and observing that 'regulars' and 'repeaters' are two distinct, separate and different classes sought to be created by the University. For that purpose, the learned single Judge interpreted expression 'repeater' by resorting to dictionary. According to the learned single Judge, since the object is one and the same, namely, securing admission at M.D.S. Course and as the distinction was irrational, artificial and not germane to the object sought to be achieved, it must be held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. With respect to the learned single Judge, we are unable to agree with the said reasoning. It is true that the expressions which have been used in the Rules are 'regular' and 'repeater'. The question, however, is: 'Is the expression 'repeater' used in the sense in which it is described or defined in disctionary; i.e. a student, who has appeared at the examination and has failed or has appeared again as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner or is a student who is not a 'regular' one. The case of the University is that the expression 'repeater', is used to mean a student who is not a 'regular'. In this connection, Mr. Shelat drew out attention to an affidavit filed by G.J. Dave, one of the members of Committee appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. The deponent in his affidavit dated April 12, 1996, stated in Para 2:
2. I submit that qualifying examination for admission to the M.D.S. Course of the Dental Faculty is Higher Secondary Certificate examination (H.S.C.), results of which are normally declared in April/May. The course leading to the degree of B.D.S. is of 4 years. Ordinance 75 deals with the arrangement of the terms as regards undergraduate students. In respect of B.D.S. Course, the commencement of the first term is 15th June, while commencement of the second term is llth November. It is competent for the Vice-Chancellor to re-arrange the terms for the reasons deemed sufficient by him. The Vice-Chancellor, therefore, re-arranges the terms having regard to the factum of the declaration of the result of H.S.C. examination and the time taken for grant of admission to the students. The arrangement of the terms, therefore, changes every year. I further submit that after the 4 years course is completed, the student is required to put in Dental Rotating Internship for a duration of one year. If things are normal, a student who joined on 15th June will, after four years, get himself declared successful in April/May. Thereafter he has to undetake internship, and he will be again eligible for admission after the completion of the internship, which may be in May/June, and he become eligible for admission to the Postgraduate course. I further submit that the University also holds examinations in October, for those students who have taken drop and/or who have failed at the examination for all the four B.D.S. examinations. Accordingly, those students who pass the examination in October, in due course, will get their internship completed in the month of November/December, after one year, and would become eligible for admission in January. So far till 1994, admission were granted only once a year, in July. Amongst the students, those who become eligible in July are known as 'regular students', while those who become eligible in January are known as 'repeater' and/ or 'casual batch'. Having regard to the students who have already become eligible in December/January, the Faculty was of the opinion that the University should open admission to M.D.S. course in January also. Those students who join in January and/ or subsequently are required to put in 4 terms to be eligible for admission to the examination leading to the Post-graduate degree in M.D.S. Ordinance 129 deals with conduct of examination, and provides that there shall be examination twice a year for the Faculty of Dental Surgery.
Even at the time of arguments, an attempt was made on behalf of the University to read the expression 'repeater' in a manner as to mean and include all students other than those who were 'regular'. The learned single Judge has also dealt with such submission of the Counsel for the University and stated:
Faced with the situation, learned Addl. Advocate General, vehemently urged that the Court should lean in favour of reading down the Rule to uphold its constitutionality. In fact it was stated by learned Counsel for the University at this stage that classification on the basis of regular and repeater was not really meant respondents being not an expert body in legislation, the Rule has been ineptly framed. According to the learned Addl. Advocate General what was really meant to be conveyed by Rule 3.2 was, the allocation of term and second term as was the case in the Rules framed which were made effective from 1-1-1994 and like Rule which is applicable for admission to Postgraduate studies in the Faculty of Medicine. The Rule should be read down by reading as it was in the Rules effective from 1-1-1994. This contention was supported by learned Counsel appearing for other respondents who are all repeaters. It was further contended that Academic Council not being an expert legislative body, enough latitude be given in construing Rules framed by it.
The learned single Judge, however, rejected the said argument by observing:
On a careful scrutiny of the facts of this case, I am unable to accede to this contention. Firstly, as per the contention of the authorities, Rules are required to be framed by the Academic Council. The constitution of Academic Council goes to show that it consists of learned men of letters whose professed profession is to communicate their thought, their ideas with the students by use of appropriate words only, it cannot be said that the framing of Rules was undertaken by persons who are not well-versed with the meaning of expression used by them, howsoever, imperfect the language may be. Moreover, it is not even remotely possible to connect regulars and repeaters as an expression connected with the commencement of Courses from 1st January or 1st July. There is intrinsic strong evidence to negate the suggestion that the Rule framer and authorities had any other meaning in their mind. In this field, the rule making authority was not venturing to frame the rule for the first time. Rule 3.2 as was framed by the same authority with effect from 1-1-1994 read as under:
3.2. Seats allotted under Rule 3.0 will be distributed in the ratio of 3: 1 for first and second term respectively.
Under the Rules governing admission to Post-graduate discipline in medical faculty, where the practice of two times admission during the same academic year was prevalent, Rule 3.2 in the Rules published to be effective from 1-1-1996 reads in identical terms as set out above for MDS course. For conveying the same message through amendment no reason appears to be there for adopting the language which now finds place in the Rule 3.2.
12. In our considered view, submission made on behalf of the University must be accepted. It is clear from the fact that the decision was taken by the Committee after considering various circumstances, namely, that in 1994, a decision was taken to give admission twice a year; that it was not implemented at that time; that the petition was filed in this Court and a direction was issued by this Court to decide the representation made by the affected students, etc. If in the light of all these circumstances, a decision was taken and rules were amended by introducing policy of giving admission twice a year, in our opinion, the University is right in submitting that the community was taken with a view to extend benefit to the student community in the larger interest and the expression 'repeater' should be interpreted liberally and its meaning should not be restricted to repeaters or failures as contended by the petitioners. 'Repeaters' would include all who are similarly situated and do not fall within the connotation 'regulars'. Once this position is accepted, the conclusion is inescapable that admissions are to be given on the basis of merits alone and that eligibility criterion has not been given go-bye. The contention of the petitioners that there are two classes and though both the classes are similarly situated, a distinction is made between them and that such classification is not based on intelligible differentia and there is no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved thereby also falls to the ground. The policy of giving admission twice a year is within the power and authority of the University and it cannot be objected to.
13. It is settled law that a Court of law cannot interfere or adjudicate upon policy matters. Such policy matters are normally not subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by an authority merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been better, fairer, wiser or more logical. The Apex Court in a number of decisions has held that policy questions depend upon various factors and as Court of law is not expected to sit in judgment over the wisdom of policy makers and to substitute its own wisdom or prudence for that of policy makers. We do not wish to burden our judgment with all those decisions and it would be sufficient if reference may be made to one or two of them.
14. In State of U.P. v. D.K. Singh : AIR1987SC190 , a question was raised whether a Post-Graduate Medical Course should commence from January or from July. The Supreme Court held that such matters should be left to the authorities. Their Lordships observed:
When an academic year should commence and when it should end is eminently a matter for the education authorities and not for the Court.
14.1 In Bennet Coleman v. Union of India : [1973]2SCR757 , the validity of import policy for the newsprint adopted by the Government was challenged. Refusing to adjudicate upon the same, the Supreme Court stated:
The argument of the petitioners that Government should have accorded greater priority to the import of newsprint to supply the need of all newspapers proprietors to the maximum extent is a matter relating to the policy of import and this Court cannot be propelled into the unchartered ocean of Government policy.
(emphasis supplied)
We may, however, hasten to add that if the policy adopted by an authority is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, mala fide or violative of the provisions of the Constitution, it cannot be upheld. If the decision is contrary to law or there is legal infirmity in such a decision, the action should be quashed and set aside. In the instant case, however, we are satisfied that the decision has been taken to give admission twice a year at M.D.S. course in the larger interest of students as claimed by the University and we do not see any infirmity in it. The said decision, therefore, does not call for interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
15. Mr. Joshi also contended that Rules are legislative and/or quasi-legislative in character. The Court, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, can neither add nor amend to what has been enacted by the rule making authority. He also submitted that all the Committee Members were highly educated. They themselves have passed a number of examinations and, therefore, they were aware of distinction between two connotations 'regular' and 'repeater'. It is, therefore, unthinkable and inconceivable that they used above expressions loosely and without understanding difference between the two. The learned single Judge appears to have upheld the contention of the petitioner and observed that the Academic Council consisted of learned men of letters, and it could not be said that they did not understand true meaning of expressions used by them. In our view, what emerges from the reading of the Rules, in the light of the affidavit filed by one of the Members of the Committee is that the expression 'repeater' was used in juxtaposition to the expression 'regular' and the meaning of the word 'repeater' must get colour from the word 'regular'. Ambit and scope of the term 'repeater' should not be restricted to failures or the students who have appeared earlier.
16. Mr. Joshi also submitted that as per well settled law, the Rule must be read as it is, and not in the light of subsequent explanation, put forward by the authority in affidavit or otherwise, vide Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas : [1952]1SCR135 and Mohindersing Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner : [1978]2SCR272 . In our view, however, the expression 'repeaters' is not used by the University in a restricted manner and that the said word takes within its sweep those students who are not 'regulars'. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decisions, therefore, cannot carry the case of the petitioners any further.
17. Mr. Joshi then urged that though Rules were framed in March 1996, the effect was given from 1st January 1996. The Counsel contended that the Rules are in the nature of delegated legislation and no retrospective effect can be given to such Rules. We do not see substance even in that contention. As is clear, the Rules were framed for giving admission to students in M.D.S. Course at affiliated Dental Colleges for the year 1996. Obviously, therefore, those Rules must be made applicable from January 1996. Again, as stated by Mr. Dave in his affidavit, the Vice-Chancellor having declared nil batch for 1995, no admissions were given. Admissions for all the available seats for that year were offered in July 1995 only. Therefore, admissions were to be given under the new Rules in respect of available seats from January 1996. The said action, therefore, cannot be said to be contrary to law nor it can be said that retrospective effect was given to the Rules. It was also stated by the Deputy Registrar of the University in counter-affidavit that the academic term commenced from January 1996 and for the year 1996, seats were available for admission which were to be allocated under the new Rules to be divided in the ratio of 3: 1. The Rules are statutory in nature framed by the University in exercise of powers under the Gujarat University Act, 1949. They have been framed for the academic year commencing from January 1996.
18. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the action taken by the University cannot be said to be contrary to law and the Rules cannot be held ultra vires or unconstitutional. The decision of the learned single Judge in view of the foregoing reasons cannot be confirmed and it is required to be set aside. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed. The order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside and the Rules for admission to M.D.S. Course for the year 1996 framed by the Gujarat University are held to be legal, valid and lawful. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.