Judgment:
D.H. Waghela, J.
1. This appeal is preferred from the judgment and order dated 30.3.2001 of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Veraval in Sessions Case No. 422 of 1999 whereby the appellant is convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 392 and 394 of IPC and Section 135 of Bombay Police Act, 1951 with consequent orders of sentences and fines and default stipulations.
2. On 30.8.1999, an FIR came to be lodged by PSI, Sutrapada, District Junagadh, on the basis of an anonymous call received at 07.45 a.m. According to the FIR (Ex.48), the PSI made an entry and went to the spot near GHCL factory where a dead body and a gray coloured ambassador car No. GTQ 7771 were found. The dead body lying on the road had multiple injuries and, during the inquest panchnama, a driving license was found from its pocket whereby the deceased was identified to be Mukesh J. Davda, resident of Vadinar, District Jamnagar (described hereinafter for convenience as 'the deceased'). The car had marks and stains of blood on the seats and floor. As the investigation proceeded and evidence was collected, the appellant was found to be involved and chargesheet was filed pursuant to which charge for the aforesaid offences was framed on 21.9.2000.
3. The prosecution case as unfolded before the trial Court was that the appellant had gone to the residence of the deceased and was introduced by him to his wife on 26.8.1999. The deceased victim and the appellant had talked about requirement of Rs. 60,000/- for submitting a tender. Thereafter, the deceased had asked his wife about availability of fund and since she had only Rs. 25,000/- with her, the deceased had approached his parents and brought the remaining amount of Rs. 35,000/-. Thereafter on 29.8.1999, the deceased had left his house with Rs. 60,000/- in ambassador car No. GTQ 7771 after telling his wife that he would go only if the appellant-accused would be available. On the next day, the father of the deceased called the wife to break the news of death of her husband and she told her father-in-law that the deceased had gone with Rs. 60,000/- to Sutrapada with the appellant for submitting tender. Thereupon, father of the deceased went to enquire about the appellant at his residence in village Timbdi but he was told that the appellant had gone away on the previous night. During the investigation, a sum of Rs. 59,850/- was recovered from the appellant's house and blood-stained clothes, knife and a blood-stained stone were discovered at the instance of the appellant who was taken into police custody for investigation.
4. The prosecution mainly relied upon depositions of Chhayaben, wife of deceased (PW.1 Ex.12), Jayantilal Liladhar, father of deceased (PW.2 Ex.14), Damayantiben, wife of Jayantilal (PW.3 Ex.15), Dr. Dipakkumar J. Sinha (PW.4 Ex.17), Sarman Mensi Vaja, Panch (PW.5 Ex.19) and Vaja Samat, Panch (PW.8 Ex.25) and documentary evidence as under:
Postmortem note at Ex.18, Panchnama of the scene of offence Ex.20, Panchnama Ex.21, 26, 28, 30, 31 and 32 and notification dated 29.7.1999 of District Magistrate, Junagadh under Section 37 of Bombay Police Act.
The investigation officers deposed at Ex.51 and 58, whereas PSI Kalubhai A.Odhedhra deposed at Ex.61 to prove the panchnama (Ex.32) by which the amount of Rs. 59,850/- was recovered from the house of the appellant who was present there and as yet not arrested on 31.8.1999. In the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the appellant adopted the stand of complete denial and ignorance about the evidence appearing against him. In his further statement at Ex.64, he claimed to be holding a license of a fair price shop and the money recovered from him were stated to have been meant for payment into the treasury for the foodgrains.
5. Even as there was no eye witness and the prosecution case rested upon strong circumstantial evidence, the trial Court, after careful scrutiny and elaborate discussion of evidence, arrived at the finding that the appellant had committed murder of the deceased and robbed him of cash after injuring him with deadly weapons held in violation of the aforesaid notification.
6. Learned Counsel Mr. Satyam Chhaya, appearing for the appellant, vehemently argued that in absence of any eye witness to the brutal killing of the deceased and the accusation being against the person trusted by him, the chain of circumstantial evidence was required to be proved beyond any reasonable doubt; and the prosecution having failed in doing so, the appellant was entitled to acquittal or at least the benefit of doubt. He submitted that deposition of the widow (Ex.12) was not reliable as she could not have cash balance of Rs. 25,000/- nor could the mother of the deceased (Ex.15) have Rs. 35,000/- to be immediately given to the deceased. He submitted that even if such amounts were handed over by the wife of the deceased on the night before the incident, she could not have identified the currency notes produced in the Court as muddamal article No. 9 to be the same money, since the currency notes did not carry any identification mark and details of denomination of currency notes were not mentioned in the recovery panchnama. Not only that identification of the currency notes which allegedly connected the appellant with the offence was doubtful but it was in the prosecution case itself that other valuable articles and even cash of Rs. 1852/- were recovered from the deceased at the time of inquest, which was inconsistent with the motive attributed to the appellant. Learned Counsel also submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever of the deceased having picked up or travelled with the appellant on the fateful night and the appellant, father of a young child and having a fair price shop, had no reason to inflict so many injuries upon the deceased and kill him for Rs. 60,000/-.
7. Learned A.P.P. Mr. Shukla submitted that all the circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt pointed only to the appellant and considering the arguments of the appellant in light of the evidence led by the prosecution, the trial Court has reached inescapable conclusion about commission of the offence by the appellant. He submitted that no case was made out by the appellant for interfering with the impugned judgment and the appeal deserved to be dismissed.
8. The following judgments were cited and discussed at the bar for the propositions which are extracted hereunder:
(a) Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. Balaprasanna : 2008CriLJ4332 :
24. In Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 1999CriLJ4561 , the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act was analysed in great detail and it was concluded as follows:
12. True, such information is admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but admissibility alone would not render the evidence, pertaining to the above information, reliable. While testing the reliability of such evidence, the court has to see whether it was voluntarily stated by the accused.32. Law is well settled that when the prosecution relies upon circumstantial evidence, all the links in the chain of circumstances must be complete and should be proved through cogent evidence.
(b). Ashok Somalal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat 2007 (2) GLH 520:
21. The other relevant witness in this respect is the panch of discovery panchnama Ex.34, PW.8 - Chandulal Mathurbhai, examined at Ex.32. It is the prosecution case that all the weapons even used by the other accused were discovered at the instance of only accused, i.e. accused No. 2. The evidence of discovery is also not helpful to the prosecution case. Ex.34 panchnama of discovery is firstly not proved and secondly in para-2 of his deposition, this witness Chandulal categorically stated that the discloser statement was made by the accused No. 2 before the Police Sub-Inspector and not before the panchas. The discovery, therefore, is hit by the provisions of the Evidence Act, not only that but this witness stated that all the weapons as used by all the accused, were discovered at the instance of the accused No. 2 and such discovery is not creditworthy.(c) Jogta Kikla v. The State 1962 (3) GLR 571:.In such a case, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove the actual statement said to have been made by the appellant. If a complicated question is put to the appellant and the appellant nods, we are not sure whether the nodding refers to the whole statement or to the last portion of the statement. In this case, there is no statement on which the prosecution can rely. Even the P.S.I. in his evidence has deposed that the accused volunteered to produce clothes and scythe from the places where he had kept. It is difficult to understand the expression 'volunteered' as referring to a statement made by the appellant. The impression that the accused had volunteered is an impression said to have been created on the witness. The Court is bound to know what was the fact which created that impression. The prosecution has not proved the statement alleged to have been made by the appellant. In these circumstances, there is no evidence to show that it was the appellant who had concealed these articles at the places where they were found.(d) Kana Mohan Sutar v. State : (1984)1GLR78 :
3. ..He was called as a panch. In his deposition he has stated that the accused was sitting there and when he was asked where are the weapons, the accused is reported to have said that they are lying at home. Thereafter, according to this witness, the accused led the Police and the Panchas to his residence and discovered the axe which is the Muddamal Article No. 6 certified by the serologist as containing blood. This witness does not say that the accused sated that he had concealed the muddamal axe and that he was willing to discover the same. In absence of such a statement by the accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to show that the accused discovered the axe. The accused may have knowledge of the weapons concealed by some one else at a particular place and he may discover it but unless there is reliable evidence that the accused had concealed the same weapon it would not be linked with the alleged offence....(e) Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra : 1992CriLJ1545 :
9. ......It is true as contended for the appellant that the evidence on record is not sufficient to arrive at an immediate motive to commit the crime and the case depends on circumstantial evidence. But in circumstantial evidence also, when the facts are clear, it is immaterial that no motive has been proved. Men do not act wholly without motive. Failure to discover the motive of the offence does not signify the non-existence of the crime. The failure to discover motive by appropriate clinching evidence may be a weakness in the proof of the prosecution case, but it is not necessarily fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never an indispensable factor for conviction. In Atley v. State of U.P. : 1955CriLJ1653 , this Court held that where there is clear evidence that the person has committed the offence, it is immaterial whether no motive for commission of the crime has been shown. Therefore, even in the case of circumstantial evidence, absence of motive which may be one of the strongest links to connect the chain would not necessarily become fatal provided the other circumstances would complete the chain and connect the accused with the commission of the offence, leaving no room for reasonable doubt, even from the proved circumstances....(f) Jivanbhai Talsibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat : (2004)1GLR460 :
11. Learned trial Judge has of course considered the recovery of weapon from the accused persons and the blood-stains found on clothes of accused Harshad as relevant and important piece of evidence and has treated this evidence as an important corroborative piece of evidence while accepting the oral version of the prosecution witnesses. But on close scrutiny of the evidence, it is found that the learned trial Judge has referred to certain impermissible part of evidence, which cannot be said to be a legal evidence. None of the panch witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and the version of police officer in reference to prove the panchnama drawn during the course of investigation can be accepted, provided the oral evidence of the police officer found trustworthy and is supported with some corroborative circumstances. For this purpose, we have seen oral version of police officer P.W.16 Shri Waghela and on plain reading of deposition of Shri Waghela, we found that he has not even cared to prove the contents of panchnama drawn by him. He has proved only the fact of drawing panchnama and obtaining signature of panchas in his presence. As per settled legal proposition, contents of all the panchnama is required to be proved. It cannot be read as evidence rather as corroborative piece of evidence. So it is not legally possible for this Court to say that weapons have been recovered from accused or they were tendered by the accused before the Investigating Officer as stated by him in his deposition....(g) Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 1991CriLJ2653 :
6. ....evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof....(h) Vinugiri Motigiri v. State of Gujarat 2002 (1) GLH 176:
24.2 It was submitted that since the panch witnesses have turned hostile, the Court cannot rely on the evidence of discovery. This submission is erroneous, because, as held by the Supreme Court in Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1978 SC 1511, if the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses do not support the prosecution version. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State, Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil reported in (2001) 1 SCC 652, while considering the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and Section 114 thereof, the Supreme Court has held that there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written. The obligation to call independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code. The legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be made in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the locality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. It was held that it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused, the document prepared by the investigating officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be attested by the independent witnesses. It was held that if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The Court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. The Court observed that, it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust and that it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, and to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions. It was held that when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused, it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. In the present case also, we find that the version given by the police officer about the discovery of the weapons at the instance of the accused persons is reliable and re-assures the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who have deposed as to the participation of the accused persons in the crime. Even without these discovery panchnamas, as noted by us hereinabove, there is reliable evidence to connect all these accused with the crime, and, their evidence is sufficient to hold that these accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly and with a view to achieve their common object of intentionally causing death of deceased Hareshbhai they had on 15-9-1992 around 9.30 in the morning, attacked him with knives and a gupti and caused eighteen incised wounds which resulted in his death.(i) State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite 2009 AIR SCW 222:
8. ....We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P. : 1996CriLJ3461 wherein it has been observed thus:21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....
9. Keeping in view the above legal propositions, the facts proved in the present case have to be re-examined with a view to finding out whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to hold that the appellant was guilty of serious offence of murder without leaving room for any reasonable doubt or an alternative plausible hypothesis.
9.1 The wife of the deceased examined at Ex.12 clearly deposed, without being in any way shaken or contradicted in the cross-examination, that a talk of submitting a tender had taken place between the appellant and her husband three days before the deceased left with money at 09 'o clock in the night in their Ambassador car, with a clear statement that he would go only if the appellant was there and that he would return otherwise. The deceased was found to have been killed and lying near the same car on the next morning. She also testified to the deceased having left with Rs. 60,000/- given by her and identified the currency notes recovered from the appellant (muddamal article No. 7) to be the major part of that sum. The father of the deceased deposing at Ex.14 stated that upon receiving information about death of his son on 30.8.1999, he called for PW.1 (Ex.12) and learned from her that the deceased had proceeded to submit the tender, with the money, with the appellant who was residing in village Timbdi. Therefore, he enquired at the house of the appellant where only his mother was present; and she stated that the appellant had gone out of station with the deceased. Then the father went to Sutrapada and identified the dead body of the deceased with marks of injuries on his neck and head. The mother of the deceased examined at Ex.15 clearly deposed that the deceased had demanded and received from her on 28.8.1999 the sum of Rs. 35,000/- in currency notes of denomination of 100 for submitting the tender for scrap and she was also told by the deceased that he was going with the appellant to submit the tender and pay the money. Both these witnesses had categorically denied the suggestions to the contrary made in the cross-examination. Dr. Deepakkumar J. Sinha examined at Ex.17 had carried out the postmortem from 11.00 a.m. to 01.45 p.m. on 30.8.1999 and found 15 external injuries on the body of the deceased out of which two had resulted into serious internal injuries, one being fracture of the left frontal bone of the head and the other being incised wound on the neck cutting the vein and wind pipe below the voice box. Those injuries could have been inflicted by the stone (muddamal article No. 29) and the knife produced as muddamal article No. 31. The cause of death was testified to be bleeding and shock due to the fracture and cutting of the wind pipe. He stated the likely time of death to be 5 to 6 hours before the postmortem, i.e. around 6'o clock in the morning of 30.8.1999. It was admitted by him in the cross-examination that the incised wound was of oval shape and injury on the head could have been caused by falling on any hard and blunt substance.
9.2 PW.5 Sarman Mensi Vaja deposed at Ex.19 that he was taken as a panch witness on 30.8.1999 by the police to the place from where the car and the dead body were found. Confirming his signature on the panchnama at Ex.20, he stated that stains of blood were found on the back-seat of the car GTQ 7771 and a nylon cord stained with blood and two plastic bottles were recovered from the car. Other pieces of cotton with stains of blood and a pair of sleepers were also recovered from the foot-rest of the car. There were stains of blood on the back-rest and foot-rest of the back-seat and a blue-coloured nakpin with marks of blood was also recovered from the car. According to the panchnama at Ex.20, it was made between 10.30 and 11.30 a.m. and the car was found in running condition with the door on the driver's side open; and the dead body was found on the road hear GHCL factory with stain of blood of around one feet diameter nearby. Ex.21 is the panchnama drawn on the same day in the evening in presence of the same witness for taking and sealing the samples and articles taken from what was apparently the scene of offence. Manjibhai Cheenabhai was examined at Ex.22 for proving the rojnama (Ex.23) of the parade which was held by Executive Magistrate on 09.09.1999 for identification of the appellant by the witness Shri Mahendra H. Trivedi. However, that witness (Ex.22) turned around in the cross-examination and stated that he was only called into the office of the Magistrate for signing the panchnama. Rambhai Jadavbhai, aged 15, was examined at Ex.24, without administering oath on account of his being minor. He identified the appellant as the person who had approached him at his farm for water at 07.00 a.m. on the day of the incident. He, however, admitted in his cross-examination that he could not remember all of the many persons passing by his field and that he had seen the appellant on a previous occasion in the custody of police.
9.3 Vaja Samat was examined at Ex.25 to prove the panchnama at Ex.26 pursuant to which the stone (muddamal article No. 29) and blood-stained underwear of the appellant (muddamal article No. 30) were discovered at the instance of the appellant. It was, however, pointed out from his deposition that no talk had taken place in his presence before he signed on the preliminary panchnama wherein incriminatory statement was stated to have been made by the appellant with expression of willingness to show the muddamal articles. The muddamal stone and the underwear, so discovered at the instance of the appellant, were found from an open area near the place where the dead body was found. Khimjibhai Kanchibhai (Ex.27) was examined to prove the panchnama at Ex.28 by which samples of blood and hair of the appellant were taken for chemical examination. Ex.30 is the inquest panchnama, according to which, at 08.30 a.m. on 30.8.1999, the dead body was found with blood all over its body, on the road near GHCL factory leading towards Kadwar. Blood was still oozing out from the injury near the left eye of the deceased at that time and there were about 18 injuries on his torso with corresponding tearing of the underwear. There were other minor injuries on the lower part of his body and a wrist watch, an inhaler, a handkerchief and total sum of Rs. 1,852/- were also found alongwith driving license and a comb on the body. Ex.31 is the panchnama made for receiving and sealing the articles and clothes of the deceased after his postmortem and to record the injuries found on the body. Ex.32 is the panchnama made between 05.50 and 07.15 of 31.8.1999 to record recovery of Rs. 59,850/- from the appellant himself, who was found to be present at his house and who is stated to have confessed the offence before he was arrested.
9.4 Police Sub-Inspector Shri Balwantsinh Chavda, who made an entry on receiving an anonymous call on 30.8.1999 and proceeded to enquire was examined at Ex.51. He deposed that, according to the anonymous call, a dead body and an Ambassador car in running condition were lying near GHCL factory. He had proceeded to the scene, made inquest panchnama and forwarded the dead body for postmortem. After registering the offence of murder, he had proceeded to investigate, called dog squad and officers of Forensic Science Laboratory. The investigation then entrusted to Police Inspector Shri B.R.Patel, but after four days, he had resumed investigation and after obtaining police custody of the appellant, he had taken the appellant to various places and recorded statement of witnesses. He deposed that two witnesses, namely, Jitesh Hemraj and Bachhubhai Vittalbhai, had made statements before him about sale of black-coloured portfolio to the appellant and about seeing the person similar to the appellant on the driving seat of the Ambassador car. But those witnesses were not examined before the Court. Ex.54 is the list of articles sent for forensic examination with a request to give opinion. Police Inspector Shri B.R.Patel is examined at Ex.58 and he has confirmed the making of panchnama for the recovery of muddamal article Nos. 29, 30 and 32. Kalubhai A. Odhedhara deposed at Ex.61 that he was specifically deputed by D.S.P., Junagadh to assist the investigation. On 31.8.1999, he had gone with the panchas to the house of the appellant at village Timbdi and recovered the sum of Rs. 59,850/- taken out by the appellant and made panchnama (Ex.32), while also recovering the portfolio (muddamal article No. 27) from which the money was recovered. In reply to a specific question in the cross-examination, he deposed that the appellant was not arrested till he had gone to his house and he denied that the portfolio and the money were recovered by himself after torturing the appellant. He also denied that the appellant had stated at the time of recovery that the money had accrued from his business of foodgrains. Documentary evidence at Ex.63 to 71 are reports of scientific analysis of evidence about which there is no controversy and the further statement of the appellant is at Ex.64.
10. It could be gathered from the above evidence, without any reasonable doubt, that the deceased had proceeded in his car, with money, towards Sutrapada for submitting the tender and there was no reason to doubt the statement made before his wife that he would proceed towards the destination only if the appellant would accompany him. According to the unshaken testimony of the father of the deceased, he had enquired on the next day at the residence of the appellant and he was told by his mother that the appellant had gone with the deceased. Thereafter, recovery of nearly the same amount of money from the appellant and identification thereof by the wife of the deceased established a link with the appellant and the object of the offence. Discovery at the instance of the appellant of the blood-stained weapons and his own blood stained underwear further established his involvement in the offence after the forensic reports about the blood on the articles proved it to be of the same group as that of the deceased. The injuries found on the body of the deceased were confirmed to have been possible by the weapons discovered at the instance of the appellant. Therefore, it clearly appeared that, in the early hours of the morning of 30.8.1999, the deceased was assaulted with the weapons wielded by the appellant on the back-seat of his own car and in the scuffle that might have ensued, the deceased could have received all the injuries. The evidence on record did not leave any room for suspecting that the deceased could have been killed by any other person for any other object and hence the circumstances were completely consistent with the finding of guilt of the appellant, even in absence of any eye witness.
11. Against the above backdrop of facts and legal propositions, it was argued for the appellant that the confessional statement leading to the discovery of incriminating articles were not admissible in evidence under the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, 'the Act'), insofar as the panch witnesses had not testified to the information being given by the appellant and that having led to the discovery. It was contended that mere discovery of the articles alleged to have been used as weapons for committing the murder could not connect the appellant with the crime and there was no evidence of the appellant having concealed those articles. It was submitted that the motive attributed to the appellant was not plausible as the appellant, in the prime of his youth having a very young son and business of his own, could not have committed such a serious offence just for grabbing the amount of Rs. 60,000/- while not touching the other valuable articles, including cash, found on the body of the deceased. In the context of these arguments, it was seen that the amount carried by the deceased was recovered from the appellant and there was no explanation whatsoever for the blood-stained articles being discovered at the instance of the appellant. As held by this Court in Vinugiri Motigiri (supra), there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written; and recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. The Court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. When a police officer gives evidence in Court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused, it is open to the Court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. In the facts of the present case, the version given by the police officer about discovery of the weapons at the instance of the accused person is reliable and that directly connects the accused with the offence.
12. As held in Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (supra), even in a case based on circumstantial evidence, when the facts are clear, it is immaterial that no motive has been proved. Mere failure to discover the motive by appropriate clinching evidence may be a weakness in the proof of the prosecution case, but it is not necessarily fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never an indispensable factor for conviction. The Supreme Court went on to hold in Atley v. State of U.P. : 1955CriLJ1653 that, even in the case of circumstantial evidence, absence of motive which may be one of the strongest links to connect the chain would not necessarily become fatal provided the other circumstances would complete the chain and connect the accused with the commission of the offence, leaving no room for reasonable doubt, from the proved circumstances. The case on hand is not one of complete absence of proof of motive, insofar as the sum of Rs. 60,000/- was a good enough amount in the rural setting to inspire an immature mind to pocket it by illegal means. It was quite probable that an altercation would have taken place between the deceased and the appellant as was indicated by the number of injuries inflicted upon the deceased. The appellant has abstained from throwing any light in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. or further statement (Ex.64) not only on the circumstances appearing against him but on his own whereabouts on the fateful night. Therefore, the arguments about linking of the appellant with the offence only by discovery of the weapons at his instance while he was in police custody and complete lack of proof of motive have to be negatived.
13. In the facts and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. No other ground has emerged or is urged to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.