Shah, J.
1. Rule. Mr. S. N. Shelat, waives service of rue on behalf of respondents. With the Consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, the mattes were finally heard in December, 1993 and are now being disposed of by this common Judgment.
2. These three petitions are field by three different officers, then serving in Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited (I.P.C.L.) challenging the action of the respondent Corporation in rejecting the request of each petitioner to extend and grant the benefits of Voluntary Retirement Scheme and for is suance of further direction to the respondent Corporation to make payment of such benefits. At the outset it must be noted that neither in the memo of original petition not by further challenges introduced way of amendment of the petitioner, the legality or validity of any of the provisions of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme or subsequent guidelines or policy prescribed for applicability of such scheme, is challenged. The challenges centre round legality and validity or impugned administrative action of respondent in refusing to extend the benefit of the Scheme to the petitions. This Court is, therefore, not called upon to decide legality or validity of subsequent policy decision or guidelines prescribed by the Corporation for applying the Scheme.
3. The challenges to the impugned administrative action are three fold :
(1) The discretion vested in the authority to accept or reject the request for voluntary retirement is not justly and fairly exercised by following any consistent and uniform policy. The discretion is, therefore, exercised arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically or for ulterior or oblique purpose and consequent administrative action which is outcome of such exercise is required to be voided.
(2) Though mandated by the provisions of the Scheme, the respondent Corporation has failed to record and communicate reason for passing the impugned order. The impugned orders being non-speaking orders are required to be voided as in absence of any reason, judicial review of such actions becomes impossible. Recording of reasons excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness sin the process of decision-making.
(3) The impugned action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as number of other persons who were similarly situated were permitted to retire voluntarily while in the case of the petitioners the policy of pick and choose was applied thereby though similarly circumstances, the petitioners were denied the equal treatment which was meted out to other employees.
4. In order to appreciate the aforesaid challenges to the action of the respondent Corporation on not permitting the petitioners to retire voluntarily under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, facts of the case of the petitions in brief are required to be stated hereunder :
(i) Spl. C.A. No. 1769 of 1992 :
(a) The petitioner Vipin T. Mehta was appointed as Mechanical Engineer (Maintenance) in the respondent Corporation on 10th September, 1973 and served for 17 long years. When he resigned or left the services on 7th December, 1990 he was working as Deputy General Manager (Engineering Services) in the pay scale of Rs. 3000-100-3700 (pre-revision).
(b) The Bureau of Public Enterprises, Ministry of Industry, Government of India, announced a Scheme of retirement for the employees of public sector enterprises vide its Office Memorandum No. 2(36) 86-B.P.E. (WC) dated 5th October, 1988. As per the aforesaid Memorandum, an employee who has completed ten years of service and/or completed 40 years of age may seek voluntary retirement by a written request and may apply in writing to the competent authority of the respective public sector organisation.
(c) Based on the aforesaid Office Memorandum, the respondent Corporation issued Office Memorandum No. C.P.L./1/54 dated 20-4-1989 introducing a Voluntary Retirement Scheme for the employees of the respondent company.
(d) The petitioner applied and requested in writing to permit him to voluntarily retire on 9th November, 1990, as according to him, he fulfilled all the criteria of Voluntary Retirement Scheme and was eligible to the grant of benefits flowing from the Scheme.
(e) The respondent Corporation vide its letter No. PL/5/1143 dated 22-11-1990 refused the request of petitioner and informed as under :
'Having considered your request for voluntary retirement, the competent authority has not accepted the same. We, therefore, regret that your request for voluntary retirement cannot be acceded to.' (f) The subsequent request for review of its decision to the respondent-Corporation made by petitioner also came to be rejected by the corporation vide its letter dated 19th July, 1991.
(ii) Spl. Civil Application No. 1770 of 1991.
(a) The petitioner H. S. Mehta was appointed as Mechanical Engineer in the respondent-Corporation on 16th July, 1973 and served for sixteen and half years till he left on 26th February, 1990. At the time when he left the services on 26th February, 1990 he was working as Project Manager (Engineering) in the pay scale of Rs. 2600-3600 (pre-revision).
(b) The petitioner applied and requested in writing on 15th January, 1990 to permit him to retire under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and to give him benefits flowing from the Scheme as he fulfilled all the criteria of the Scheme. He repeated his request by his letter dated 9th February, 1990 for granting voluntary retirement benefits and requested that his resignation should be accepted without any prejudice to his request for voluntary retirement under the Scheme.
(c) The respondent-Corporation vide its letter dated 19th February, 1990 refused the request of the petitioner and stated as under :
'In this connection, this is to inform you that your resignation has been accepted by the competent authority and you will be relieved from the duties of this Corporation only on clearing all outstanding dues to the Corporation. However, your request for voluntary retirement has not been accepted by the competent authority.' (d) The subsequent written representation calling upon the respondent-Corporation to review its decision dated 10th June, 1990 and 24th December, 1990 were not considered.
(iii) Spl. C.A. No. 1796 of 1992 :
(a) The petitioner J. S. Arora was appointed as Shift Engineer (Trainee) (Chemical) in the respondent-Corporation in August, 1971 and served for 20 years till he left on 27th August, 1991. When he left the services, he was serving as Deputy General Manager (Projects) in the pay scale of Rs. 3000-100-3700 (pre-revision).
(b) The petitioner applied in writing to the respondent Corporation vide application dated 1st July, 1991 to permit him to retire voluntarily and to offer him the benefit flowing from the Voluntary Retirement Scheme as he fulfilled all the criteria of Voluntary Retirement Scheme. He repeated the request on 24th July, 1991 and requested the Corporation to relieve him from service on 27th August, 1991, failing which he tendered his resignation with effect from 26th July, 1991 without prejudice to his previous request for voluntary retirement.
(c) In response to the application of the petitioner, respondent Corporation vide its letter No. PL/5/258 dated 8th August, 1991 refused the request of petitioner and informed as under :
'Having considered your request for voluntary retirement, the competent authority has not accepted the same. We, therefore, regret that your request for voluntary retirement cannot be acceded to.' (d) The subsequent written representation made by petitioner to the respondent Corporation on 24th September, 1991 and 25th October, 1991 to review its decision were not replied by the respondent Corporation.
4. Provisions of Voluntary Retirement Scheme :
In order to appreciate the case of each petitioner for his entitlement to the benefits flowing from the Scheme, it would be necessary to make reference to the provisions of Voluntary Retirement Scheme. The same is issued by Office Memorandum No. CPL/1/154 dated 20th April, 1989. Clause-2 of the Scheme provides that it shall apply to all the regular employees who are on the rolls of I.P.C.L Clause-3 of the Scheme prescribes conditions and eligibility of the employees for grant of benefits in the Scheme and sub-clauses (a) to (c) thereof being relevant for the purpose of these petitions are reproduced hereunder :
'(3) Conditions :
(a) A regular employee of the Corporation who has completed ten years of service as a regular employee in the Corporation and completed 40 years of age may seek voluntary retirement by a written request.
The period of training/apprenticeship or service on consolidated pay, if any, prior to absorption in the services of the Corporation shall not be included for reckoning ten years of service.
(b) The grant of voluntary retirement will be absolutely at Management's discretion and the Management may refuse to grant voluntary retirement to any employee.
(c) The terminal payments available to an employee who seeks voluntary retirement would be :
(i) the balance in his Provident Fund Account payable as per the Provident Fund Rules of the Corporation.
(ii) cash equivalent of accumulated Privilege Leave as per the Leave Rules of the Corporation.'
5. From the aforesaid provisions of the Scheme, it becomes at once clear that a regular employee of the respondent Corporation who has completed ten years of service as a regular employee and who has completed 40 years of age is eligible to apply for VoluntaryRetirement. It is not disputed in case of each petitioner that each petitioner was eligible, as he has satisfied the aforesaid twin conditions of eligibility. The Corporation has, however, invoked power under Clause 3(b) and has submitted before the Court that whether to grant or not, the benefit of the Scheme was within the absolute discretion of the respondent Corporation and that consistent with its policy decision it has for very good and cogent reasons, refused permission to each petitioner to retire voluntarily under the Scheme.
6. Case of the Respondent Corporation :
In each petition, in response to the notice issued by the learned single Judge, one Mr. B. M. Joshi, Deputy Legal Manager of the I.P.C.L. has filed affidavit-in-reply. The gist of the defence is that the Scheme of Voluntary Retirement announced by the Bureau of Public Enterprises was a model to be placed for consideration by the Public Sector Undertakings. It was simply in the nature of guidelines. The main objective of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme were as under :
(a) To weed out surplus and unwanted persons who are no more useful to the company;
(b) To achieve optimum manpower utilisation;
(c) To improve average age mix; and
(d) To improve overall efficiency.
7. It is the case of the respondent Corporation that during the initial operation of the Scheme, i.e., in 1989, the growth prospects within the Corporation were limited for a large number of highly qualified officers at Senior level. This factor was one of the criteria then taken into consideration while dealing with the cases of individual officers for voluntary retirement benefit.
8. It is their further case that subsequently, however, the market scenario changed him more and more approvals granted by the Government for starting industries in the petrochemical sector to various parties including public sector undertakings. As a result of this it was noticed that some of the senior level officers of the Corporation were allured by such outside industries for employment at a high level with huge pay packets and other perks. There was a spate of applications requesting for Voluntary Retirement from senior officers with a high degree of talents and potentials whose services were very much required by the Corporation. Besides, with the advent of consideration of the Corporation of the Corporation's proposal for Gandhar Project and other projects in Baroda totalling an investment of over Rs. 4,000/- crores, the Corporation needed senior officers to the man high level posts and with the loss of such talented officers with potentials leaving the Corporation for purely financial gains, it was felt that this would adversely affect the quality of manpower needed by the Corporation. In the context of the change in the scenario, it was decided in January, 1990 to evolve detailed norms consistent with the spirit of the Scheme to consider favourably only such cases that fulfil one of the following criteria :
(i) If the employees is declared surplus and no substitute is asked for the Department/Section concerned;
(ii) Where, in the light of the past service record of the employee, if it is considered that his continuance in service would not be beneficial to the interests of the Corporation;
(iii) The ratings of his Crs. and Performance Appraisal over last 3-4 years are mediocre or below average;
(iv) If the employees has attained the age of 56 years and his services are considered as dispensable;
(v) In the circumstances where applicant may not have further growth opportunities in the Corporation.
9. It is further case that pursuant to aforesaid detailed norms, all cases for voluntary retirement after January, 1990 were considered by a Committee on case-to-case basis and on merits, keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines. The order appointing Committee is annexed at Annexure 'B' to the affidavit-in-reply. The case of each petitioner was considered by the Committee on merits and as the petitioner did not fulfil the above guidelines/norms, request of each petitioner for voluntary retirement was not recommended by the Committee and, therefore, the same was rejected.
10. Legal Submissions :
(i) Exercise of Discretionary Power : K. C. Yagnik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that though Clause 3(b) of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the Corporation gives absolute discretion to the management to accept or reject the request for voluntary retirement, nonetheless, such discretion shall have to be exercised justly and fairly. In absence of any uniform and consistent policy either in accepting or rejecting the request for voluntary retirement benefit, the respondent Corporation is left with unfettered uncanalized discretionary power which is in fact used for oblique ulterior purposes by exercising the same arbitrary, capriciously and whimsically and, therefore, the impugned action of the respondent Corporation is required to be voided being unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(ii) On the other hand, Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation strenuously urged before the Court that having evolved a well defined scheme of voluntary retirement, the Corporation has subsequently evolved a policy prescribing definite guidelines which were to be followed while considering an application for voluntary retirement. With the change of market scenario and business competition, detailed norms were prescribed for considering all cases for voluntary retirement and the work was assigned to a Committee so as to obviate or totally exclude the personal opinion of any individual and to encourage independent, impartial and collective decision of a team of persons. In his submission, a Committee appointed for this purpose has considered the case of each petitioner and has not accepted the request for voluntary retirement and, therefore, the decision of the Corporation cannot be voided either as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or an unreasonable or as discriminatory. In the alternative he submitted that it is a matter of policy for the respondent Corporation to decide as to who should be permitted to retire voluntarily (prematurely) so as to get rid of surplus, unwanted or average persons and as to who should not be encouraged, their services being badly needed by the Corporation. He further submitted that the decision should be left to the employer, consistent with the manifold objectives sought to be achieved by introducing such Scheme of Voluntary Retirement. He submitted that since clear discernible principles are evolved for considering the applications for voluntary retirement and as such principles are uniformly applied by the Committee. Interference of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is uncalled for and unwarranted.
(iii) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State. Non-arbitrariness, in substance, is only fair play in action. It is difficult to accept that the State or State instrumentality can be permitted to act otherwise in any field of its activities irrespective of the nature of its functions. When power is conceded to a public authority, it is wrong to assume that such power is unfettered or uncontrolled excepting specific cases where conferment of absolute discretion may be desirable for strong reasons of public policy. The whole concept of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public authority which possession powers solely in order that it may use them for the public good. The repository of power being a public authority, it is expected to exercise the same for public good. The power to be exercised by such authority, therefore, cannot be 'absolute' even if it so described. It shall have to be subjected to certain limits. There is nothing paradoxical in the imposition of such legal limits. It would indeed be paradoxical if they were not imposed. Such power is to be contrasted with the powers which are given for personal benefit of the person empowered. In such cases discretion may be absolute. Such power tends to become absolute and investiture of such power is sworn enemy of the rule of law. It is in this sense that Justice Douglas observed in United States v. Wunderlick (1951-32 US 98 : 96 Law Ed. 113) 'Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler..... Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered. Discretion means, sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not humour : It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful.' It is in the aforesaid sense that this Court is required to be decided as to whether discretion left to the Corporation is 'absolute' or it is subjected to certain well defined norms so as to be reviewable. There is nothing like unreviewable administrative discretion which should be just as much as contradiction in terms as unfettered discretion. There is, therefore, substance in the submission of Mr. Yagnik that though Clause-3(b) refers to 'absolute discretion' of the management while considering the application for voluntary retirement, in reality exercise of such discretion is always subjected to a fair play in action. Discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits. In this sense, it can be said that even while exercising such power where 'absolute discretion' in vested in the authority, its decision should be made by the application of known principles and rules. Whether any impugned decision is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical or not, it can be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. However, an obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the process of decision-making and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. In the aforesaid sense, the exercise of the power by the respondent Corporation is required to be examined.
11. Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation fairly stated that exercise of the so-called 'absolute discretion' conferred by Clause 3(b) of Scheme cannot be arbitrary, whimsical and above reviewability. The Corporation would not claim that its exercise of decision-making is outcome of its uncontrolled and unfettered discretion. He submitted that in the initial period of around six to eight months of introduction of policy, all applications from candidates were entertained, but immediately the change in the market scenario was noticed, with more and more approval granted by the Government for starting industries in Petrochemicals Sector to various parties including public sector undertakings. It was, therefore, noticed that some of the senior level officers of the Corporation were allured by such outside industries for employment at a high level with huge pay packets and other perks. There was a spate of applications requesting for voluntary retirement from senior officers with a higher degree of talents and potentials whose service were very much required by the Corporation. Besides, with the advent of consideration of Corporation's proposal for Gandhar Project and other projects the Corporation badly needed officers to man high level posts and, therefore, exodus of talented officers with potential was required to be curbed and with that objective since January, 1990, norms were prescribed consistent with the spirit of the Scheme and such norms were to be applied uniformly by a Committee of Senior Personnel. He, therefore, submitted that well defined guidelines were prescribed while considering the application for voluntary retirement and a Committee of high officials considered the applications. In his submission, therefore, decision of such a Committee based on guidelines or norms prescribed in changed circumstances, cannot be faulted or voided as arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory. He submitted that decision of the Corporation in case of each petitioner is individually reached by the Committee by applying the aforesaid discernible principle which is well prescribed in advance. He further submitted that in such action, justness and fairness is perceptible, if not transparent.
12. In my opinion, there is considerable force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. S. N. Shelat and it shall have to be accepted. There is plausible reason or discernible principle. There are well defined norms or guidelines prescribed well in advance and the same are applied by a Committee of independent persons. The norms prescribed cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. They are not at all challenged on the that count. Once, the norms are found to be non-arbitrary, just and fair and once it is found that norms are applied by the Committee, in my opinion, it is difficult for this Court to strike down or invalidate the action as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or unreasonable.
13. The impugned action can also be defended by alternative submission of Mr. S. N. Shelat. He submitted that the scope of judicial review is limited to oversee the executive action for the purpose of satisfying that it is not vitiated by the vice of arbitrariness and nothing more. The policy to permit an employee to retire voluntarily with benefits can be evolved by the employer and how such policy should be operated is ordinarily to be left to the executive. Once it is shown to the Court that policy decision is taken based on cogent, relevant and germane factors, it is not open to the Court of law to find fault with such policy. The wisdom of the policy or the lack of it or the desirability of a better alternative is not within the permissible scope of judicial review. It is not for the Courts to recast the policy or to substitute it with another which is considered to be more appropriate. Once the attack on the ground of arbitrariness is successfully repelled by showing that the act which was done was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances, of the case, the power of judicial review would come to an end. In the present case, the facts and circumstances under which norms are prescribed for the purpose of considering application of Voluntary Retirement Scheme and application of such norms by an Independent Committee of highly placed officials, in my opinion, is nothing but prescribing a policy which is to be applied and there is a clear discernible reason or principle which is applied by such Committee while considering applications of individuals. The decision of the Committee, as is clear from the affidavit-in-reply, cannot be said to be uninformed decision or arbitrary or capricious decision.
14. In order to make good the aforesaid submission, Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarati v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1991 SC 537 and in the case of G. B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, reported in AIR 1991 (3) SCC 91. In the latter case, the Apex Court was called upon to decide the legality and validity of the action of Jalgaon Municipal Council in entering into contract with private developer or builder for construction of commercial complex. Under the project it was contemplated that it shall be executed by the developer on self-financing basis subject to handing over the administrative building of the complex to the municipality free of cost and allotting some shops at a fixed rate/free of cost to certain specified persons while having right to dispose of the remaining accommodation at its own discretion and to retain the premia received by way of reimbursement of its financial outlays plus profit. One of the challenges to the execution of the project was that it was unconventional in nature and was unreasonable and untenable. While negating the challenge on the ground that the project was unconventional the Apex Court made certain pertinent observations about the scope of reviewability of such action off the public authority. The Court found that the question was not whether the project was unconventional by any standard of the extant practices, but whether there was something in the law rendering it impermissible. In this connection, the Apex Court made certain pertinent observations and quoted the memorable opinion of Gerard Brennan in 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action'. The learned Author has observed as under :
'The Courts are kept out of the lush filed of administrative policy, except when policy is inconsistent with the express or implied provisions of a statute which creates the power to which the policy relates or when a decision made in purported exercise of a power is such that a repository of the power, acting reasonably and in good faith, could not have made it. In the latter case, 'something overwhelming' must appear, before the Court will intervene. That is, and ought to be, a difficult onus for an applicant to discharge. The Courts are not very good at formulating or evaluating policy. Sometimes when the Courts have intervened on policy grounds, the Court's view of the range of policies open under the statute or of what is unreasonable policy has not won public acceptances. On the contrary, curial views of policy have been subjected to stringent criticism. In the world of politics, the Court's opinion on policy are naturally less likely to reflect the popular view than the policies of a democratically elected Government or of expert administrators.....'
The Apex Court in further elaboration of the aforesaid principle, made following pertinent observations :
'The concern of public law is to discipline the public power by forging 'legal techniques as part of the way in which public power is made operational and part of the process through which it is attempted to render such public power legitimate and to think of issues of legal regulation of public power in way that goes deeper than particular instances and elaborate issues of general principle'. There is, however, as Professor Wade points out, ample room, within the legal boundaries for radical differences of opinion in which neither side is unreasonable. In Tameside case Lord Denning pointed out the error or confusing differences of opinion, however, strong, with unreasonableness on the part of one side or the other. Lord Diplock said that the very concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred.
In the even increasing tempo of urban life and the emerging stresses and strains of planning, wide range of policy options not inconsistent with the objectives of the statute should be held permissible. Referring to the 'Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation' learned author says :
Administrative law is, in essence, a search for a theory of how public policy should be made. Two powerful traditions mark the boundaries of that search. On one side, we leave the choice among competing values to a largely unstructured process of pulling and hauling by individuals directly accountable to the citizenry. On the other side, we demand a highly structured process of party controlled proof and argument before a neutral arbiter to resolve disputes over the application of rules to specific facts. Between these extremes is that vast landscape we call policy-making the reconciliation and elaboration of lofty values into operational guidelines for the daily conduct of society's business.'
15. From the aforesaid approach on the question of policy decision of executive, this Court has to keep in mind as to whether the policy evolved by the respondent Corporation by prescribing norms/guidelines to be followed by an impartial Committee can be, in any way, said to be inconsistent with the expressed or implied provisions of a statute. Secondly, it is also required to be asked whether the decision of the Committee based on application of such well defined norms can be said to be unreasonable or lacking in good faith. While examining this second aspect of the challenge, 'something overwhelming' must appear. Thirdly, in the matter of policy-making when the challenge is raised to a policy decision and its application, the right of the maker of the policy of 'trial and error' shall have to be considered. So long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of authority, judicial interdiction is to be avoided. Experimentation by the executive is to be encouraged and denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequence to the nation. So long as the maker of the policy has acted fairly and justly and their action is not lacking in bona fides the Court would be loath to interfere in the matter of policy-making and applying such policy. Having evolved the Scheme of Voluntary Retirement and having found that indiscrete grant of such benefit may wipe the Corporation out of highly skilled manpower as well as finances, and may improve the position of the competing business rivals, the Corporation has evolved a policy and prescribed guidelines and norms to be applied by a Committee of persons. On application of such guidelines and norms, which are referred to hereinabove, the Corporation has in the case of each petitioner, through its Committee of experts, found that none of the petitioners fulfilled the criteria. The benefits of the Scheme by way of ex gratia payment were not meant for being misused or for grant of undue advantage in favour of an employee who was otherwise leaving the services for his better prospects or for better financial gains elsewhere. An employee going out for making financial or other better prospects was likely to abuse the welfare scheme by applying for voluntary retirement and for grant of the benefits flowing therefrom while his services were in fact badly needed by the Corporation. I am, therefore, of the opinion that a scheme of this nature which is made with the avowed object of weeding out surplus and unwanted persons who were no more useful to the Corporation and to achieve optimum manpower utilization shall have to be applied and implemented justly, fairly and reasonably. Any employee who is likely to be declared surplus, whose substitute is no longer required, who is an unwanted person, whose past service record is not favourable to his continuance and shows that he would not be beneficial to the interest of the Corporation, who is found to be mediocre or just average, who is as good as deadwood is to be encouraged to say good bye to the Corporation under such Scheme. Those employees who are highly skilled, whose dexterity, knowledge and experiences constitute 'manpower assets' of the company, those employees who are indispensable and whose services are badly needed by the Corporation, those employees on whom the Corporation bank for its upward progress to withstand the competing rivals in the business world are not entitled to be governed by such Scheme. This Scheme was not intended to be a substitute for resignation with all benefits. When it was realized that unfettered and uncontrolled operation of the Scheme may result into exodus of talented and potential officers bidding good-bye to the Corporation and that the Corporation would be denuded of all its talented manpower who would immediately join the trade rivals alluring them with better service perks, operation of the Scheme was controlled by prescribing reasonable guidelines and norms to be applied by an independent and impartial Committee. In my opinion, the action of the respondent-Corporation in evolving such policy and applying the same uniformly by prescribing norms and guidelines which ultimately helps in better and beneficial working of the Corporation, is permissible in law and no interference of the Court is called for. The decision of the Corporation cannot be said to be unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary, Corporation cannot be said to be guilty of pick and chose. The specific instances of officers who were permitted to retire are the instances of the initial period of application of Voluntary Retirement Scheme when unfettered applications of the Scheme were not realised. In fact, the norms and guidelines were formulated in January 1990 and September, 1990 for applying the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and since case of each petitioner did not satisfy such norms, he is not permitted to retire voluntarily. It is pointed out that Mr. K. P. Nanavati, Mr. Sudha Chander and Shri S. K. Maheshwari were granted benefit of voluntary retirement in July 1989, October 1989 and September 1989 respectively, i.e., much prior to the prescription of guidelines and norms for applying the scheme of voluntary retirement.
16. Apart from aforesaid considerations which justify the ultimate action of the respondent-Corporation, in my opinion, there is one additional, relevant and germane consideration which is required to be highlighted. I may at once clarify that my decision to uphold the action of the respondent Corporation is based on aforesaid considerations and in absence of this additional consideration also I would have reached the same decision which I have reached.
17. It is required to be noted that the Scheme has twin objectives to achieve. Firstly, it acts as an 'exist policy'. It encourages those eligible officers to bid adieu to the Corporation who were mediocre or below average, who were declared surplus or those whose continuance in service was not in any way beneficial to the Corporation. Such officers were encouraged to leave. Secondly, it helped those officers to leave who had no further growth prospects, who were suffering stagnation or who had reached saturation point in the performance beyond which they cannot go. It is obvious that from these objectives it cannot be said that Corporation wanted the Scheme to apply to all, indiscriminately, so as to denude itself of its highly efficient indispensable manpower. It may be noted that in the initial years of their life when they were graduates or double graduates possessing good academic record, the officers badly needed field for experience where they could prove their worth. It was crucial period of 'trial and error'. They tried, erred, failed, retired, learned, succeeded and gained - many at time at the cost and at times to the advantage of the Corporation. This Corporation provided them the training ground and put them to a demanding position in the fond hope that their vast training, knowledge or working and infrastructure of the Corporation and unparalleled experience would enrich the Corporation. Their need was immensely felt when rival competitors entered the business field. Shortage or practical unavailability of experienced and knowledgeable manpower was felt in the market. At that time Corporation in its commercial business interest wanted assistance of its experienced manpower, to whose development it has contributed immensely. Now for some transient economic gain in the nature of rise in salary and perks these officers want to bid adieu to the Corporation. By their exit they want to sub-serve their self-interest as against the larger interest of development of the Corporation which proved to be their alma matter in the field of career marking. The Corporation does not prevent them for tendering resignation and with heavy heart, even accepts such resignation. They, however want price of ingratitude, benefits of retirement scheme as to enrich themselves with further certainty of promoting and championing cause of business rival. If Corporation says 'No', its decision cannot be interfered with.
18. I may mention at this stage that Mr. K. C. Yagnik learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the decision of the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in the case of P. Adishesha Reddy v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited, reported in 1993 I LLJ 379. It was a case where employees of the respondent Goldmines sought voluntary retirement in terms of the notification and management refused their prayer on the ground that their services were required by the management. The learned single Judge took the view that it was choice of the workmen either to continue or not, unless such voluntary retirement is prohibited by the service regulations, it was open to the workmen to retire voluntarily. He further took the view that not permitting the workman to retire voluntarily would amount to forced labour and therefore, it would be against public policy. In my opinion, the aforesaid decision can have no application to a Scheme of Voluntary Retirement evolved by the employer with avowed objective of getting rid of surplus, inefficient and average manpower. The policy evolved with the object is to be controlled and limited by reasonable guidelines and norms for its application. A policy of this nature cannot be indiscriminately applied and operated so as to cause to the Corporation loss of excellent manpower along with loss of huge finances. If an officer is not permitted to retire under a Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it cannot be said that he is forced to serve, the option of resignation is not denied to him. In fact, resignation of all the petitioners are accepted. The Officers who want to exploit the situation and who are bidding good-bye to their master with the objective of making fortune by joining employer who are offering better salary and perks and whose services are very badly needed by the Corporation can be rightly and justly denied the benefits of the Scheme as the Scheme was not intended to result into inundation of skilled and dexterous manpower from the Corporation. The aforesaid decision of learned single Judge of Karnataka High Court cannot have application to the fact situation obtaining before this Court and even otherwise in my opinion the said decision does not lay down the correct principles of law in the context of the Scheme of Voluntary Retirement evolved by the employer with the avowed objective of getting rid of surplus and mediocre manpower. The decision of Karnataka High Court cannot apply.
19. Speaking order :
Mr. K. C. Yagnik, learned Counsel for the petitioners seriously urged before this Court that under the Scheme of Voluntary Retirement as evolved by Bureau of Public Enterprises on 5th October, 1988, it was clearly stipulated that management will have right not to grant voluntary retirement for reasons to be recorded in writing. He therefore, submitted that the respondent-Corporation was required to record reasons for rejecting case of each petitioner. He further submitted that since the Corporation has recorded no reasons while negating request of each petitioner, the action of the respondent Corporation is vitiated and is required to be quashed and set aside. On the other hand, Mr. S. N. Shelat submitted that reasons which have weighted with the authority for not granting the application of the petitioner are already stated in the affidavit-in-reply and in fact a Committee of persons has applied its mind and has rejected the application of the petitioners. Since the reasons are already disclosed in the affidavit-in-reply, there is no need of formal communication thereof to the petitioners and that the action of the Corporation cannot be voided on such ground. He submitted that when reasons are made known to the Court and when such reasons are just and valid reasons, Court should not invalidate otherwise legal action.
20. Mr. K. C. Yagnik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in this connection placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Siemens Engineering & Management v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785, Vasudev Vishwanath Saraf v. New Education Institute, reported in AIR 1986 SC 2105 and in the case of S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1984. The recording of reasons by an Administrative Officer, excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. It is now well settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi judicial function, it is required to record the reasons in support of the order. In the present case, the power is exercised by the Committee constituted under the guidelines/norms prescribed by the Corporation. It is true that in the order communicated to each petitioner, reasons are not specifically recorded. However, reasons are clearly stated in the affidavit-in-reply filed in each case and these reasons are the reasons which have weighed with the authority. In my opinion, therefore, simply on the ground that reasons are not recorded in the order and communicated to the petitioner, the action of the respondent-Corporation is not required to be voided because even if such exercise is undertaken, no useful purpose will be served as this Court will simply strike down the action of rejecting the application of each petitioner and shall direct the respondent-Corporation to record reasons and communicates the same to the petitioners Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation has rightly pointed out to the Court that reasons recorded in the affidavit-in-reply are the very reasons which have weighted with the respondent-Corporation while rejecting the application of each petitioner for voluntary retirement and, therefore, in my opinion he is right in containing that no useful purpose will be served by undertaking such exercise when reasons are made known to the Court and if such reasons are not found to be assailable or as violative of any of the rights of the petitioners. Therefore, while holding that the respondent Corporation should record reasons and should communicate the same to the concerned employees, I am not striking down the action of the respondent Corporation in these cases as in my opinion no useful purpose will be served because reasons are already stated in the affidavit-in-reply and since no such reasons are not in any way assailable, no interference of this Court is called for.
21. As regards third statement, it is contended by the petitioner that in cases of three individual officers, viz., Mr. K. P. Nanavati, Mrs. Sudha Chander and Shri S. K. Maheshwari, the benefit of Voluntary Retirement Scheme was granted while the same was denied to the petitioners, who were in every respect similarly situated. It is, therefore, submitted that respondent Corporation has adopted the policy of pick and choose and has thus violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In affidavit-in-reply, the respondent Corporation has contended that in fact, during the initial operation of the Scheme, i.e., in 1989 the growth prospects within the Corporation were limited for number of highly qualified officers at Senior level and that factor was one of the criteria then taken into consideration. However, within short time thereafter, the market scenario changed with more and more approvals granted by the Government for starting industries in Petrochemicals Sector to various parties. Besides, with the advent of consideration of the Corporation's proposal for Gandhar Project and other projects at Baroda, totalling an investment of over Rs. 4,000/- crores the Corporation needed senior officers to man high level posts. In the context of change in the scenario, detailed norms consistent with the spirit of the Scheme, were evolved and were applied from January, 1990. The cases of the aforesaid three individuals are referable to the period prior to December, 1989. Mr. K. P. Nanavati was granted benefit of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme in July, 1989, Mrs. Sudha Chander was granted benefit of the voluntary retirement in October, 1989 and Shri S. K. Maheshwari was granted benefit of the voluntary retirement in September, 1989. All these cases were considered and grated prior to the formulation of the administrative guidelines and norms and therefore, it is not correct to state that Corporation has applied the policy of pick and choose. In view of the aforesaid factual data supplied by the Corporation and in view of the fact that after the formulation of guidelines and norms from January, 1990, the Corporation has consistently applied such norms through a Committee of persons, the charge of adopting policy of pick and choose is not made out. On the contrary, Corporation has acted consistent with the well formulated guidelines and norms and, therefore the challenge on this count must also fall.
22. Aforesaid submissions were the only submissions which were made at the time of hearing by Mr. K. C. Yagnik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. Since I do not find any substance in any of the submissions made, the petitions must fail. Rule in each petition is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.