Judgment:
ORDER
1. The petitioner is serving as Talati-cum-Mantri and his services have been suspended by order dated May 11, 1988 by the Deputy District Development Officer, Jamnagar. The petitioner challenged the legality and validity of the order of suspension by filing suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, and Jamnagar. The trial Court granted interim relief staying the operation and further implementation of order of suspension, as prayed for in the application Exh. 5 against which the opponent original defendant filed civil miscellaneous appeal in the Court of District Judge, Jamnagar. The learned District Judge, who heard the appeal, reversed the order passed by the trial Court below Exh. 5. While deciding the appeal the learned District Judge also decided the contention regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, to entertain the aforesaid suit.
2. It was contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-District Panchayat that the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, and Jamnagar had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to pass the order. It was submitted that the Panchayat was 'State' within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the suit could have been filed and entertained only by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. In support of the aforesaid contention the learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mathuradas Mohantal Kedia v. S. D. Munshaw, reported in AIR 1981 SC 53, and also upon a decision of this High Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mangal Traders, reported in (1987) (1) 28 Guj LR 514 : (AIR 1987 Guj 234). After referring to the aforesaid two decisions the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that in view of the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, suit against Panchayat could have been filed only in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) and hence the learned Joint Civil Judge (J.D.) had no jurisdiction to pass the order. He further held that since the order was without jurisdiction it could not be confirmed by the Court and therefore it deserves to be set aside on that ground alone. However, there after he has decided the matter on merits also.
3. The learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the aforesaid finding is clearly erroneous. There is substance in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant. In the case of Mathuradas Mohanlal Kedia v. S. D. Nunshaw, reported in AIR 1981 SC 53, the Supreme Court has certainly held that Panchayat is 'State' within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution. But all the instrumentalities of the State as defined in art. 12 of the Constitution of India are not State Government or Central Government. Reference made to the decision of this Court reported in (1987) (1) 28 Guj LR 514: (AIR .1987 Guj 234), in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mangal Traders is irrelevant. It was a case under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The plaintiffs who were dealing in certain essential commodities had filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) with a prayer that the office of the Civil Supplies Department be restrained from carrying on search and seizure. Against the interim order passed by, the trial Court, the matter had culminated into revision application before this High Court. While deciding the revision application the Court inter alia observed that if the order is passed by a Court, which has no jurisdiction to pass the order, then it cannot be said that the order is legal and valid. There is nothing in the judgment, which may even remotely indicate that Panchayat being 'State' the suit has to be filed against it only in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) and cannot be filed in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.).
4. The phrase 'all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India' occurring in art. 12 of the Constitution of India is required to be properly explained and understood. Local or other authorities may be 'State' within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution. But that does not mean that these authorities are either State Government and/or Central Government. There is a distinction between 'State' and the Government. This distinction has been lost sight of by the learned District Judge.
5. Government is defined in Section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as under: -
'(23) 'Government' or 'the Government shall include both the Central Government and any State Government.'
Section 32 of the Bombay Civil Courts, Act, 1869 inter alia provides that no subordinate court other than the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) and no Court of Small Causes shall receive or register any suit in which the Government or any officer of the Government in his official capacity is a party. Such suits are required to be entertained and decided only by the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.). If one reads S. 32 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 it is evident that by this provision the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) is not excluded as far as the suits against local authorities are concerned. Lt should also be noted that over and above the local and other authorities there may be institutions or corporate bodies which may be failing within the definition of 'State' occur ring in art. 12 of the Constitution of India. This point is now very well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Sabhajit Tewari v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1329 and in the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghu vanshi, reported in A] R 1975 SC 1331.
6. Simply because an authority is 'State' within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution, it does not become Government. The learned, District Judge was clearly wrong in holding that the Panchayat would be Government. There is a vital difference between Government and local authority. Both may be, and in fact are, 'State' within the meaning of art. 12 of the Constitution of India. But therefore they are not synonymous or identically same. As far as their legal identity is concerned both are separate legal entities.
7. In fact the local authority is defined in S. 3(26) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which reads as under: -
'(26). 'Local Authority' - 'local authority' shall mean a municipal corporation, municipality, local board, body of port trustees or commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted, by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund;'
In view of the definition of the local authority, it has got to be held that Panchayat is local authority. Panchayat is an authority which is entrusted by the Government with the control and management of 'municipal or local fund'. Again these functions entrusted to the local authorities are subject to the supervision and control of the Government. 'Panchayat', 'State Government' and 'Central Government' are separate legal entities. The provisions enacted by Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 for filing suits against the State Government and Central Government are not applicable to panchayats. In view of the aforesaid position, the decision rendered by the learned District Judge that the Civil Judge (Junior Division) had no jurisdiction to try the suit is erroneous and the same cannot be sustained.
8. The provisions of S. 15 of the Civil Procedure Code requires that the suit should be filed in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it and in, view of the provisions of S. 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act 1869, the suit could have been and should have been filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) only.
9. In view of the aforesaid position, the finding arrived at 'by the learned District Judge that the Joint Civil Judge (J.D.) had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass order below Exh. 5 is required to be quashed and set aside and the same is hereby quashed and set aside.
10. As far as the merits of the matter is concerned, the decision rendered by the learned District Judge is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. Learned counsel for the petitioners requests that reasons may not be given for not interfering with the decision rendered by the learned District Judge in this respect. Therefore, I refrain from articulating the reasons for confirming the decision rendered by the learned District Judge on merits.
11. In above view of the matter, revision application is required to be rejected. Subject to the clarification and direction that the finding arrived at by the learned District Judge as regards the jurisdiction of Civil Judge (J.D.) to entertain the suit is unsustainable and the same is hereby quashed and set aside, the revision application is rejected. Rule discharged accordingly.
12. Order accordingly.