Judgment:
ORDER
1. The petitioner Vijaya Bank claimed that it had interest as mortgagee in the land bearing survey No. 189 of Rajkot admeasuring 4 acres and 18 gunthas belonging to M/s. Narotamdas Dharamshi Maniar. The land-holders had filled in necessary form as required under the provisions of sub-section (1), S. 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 in the proceedings before the Competent Authority; After necessary enquiry the Competent Authority held against the land-holder and served a statement under S. 9 of the Act upon him on Nov. 23, 1983. Thereafter a notification under S. 10(1) of the Act was issued. At this stage the Bank preferred its claim before the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority, as per its order dated Nov. 27, 1984, held that the claim preferred by the Bank wag without substance inasmuch as the Bank was never permitted by the authorities to make finance to the firm, of M/s. Narotamdas Dharamshi Maniar for any other purpose except agriculture. The petitioner felt aggrieved by this order and hence preferred an appeal under S. 33 of the Act. The Appellate Authority returned the appeal memo on the ground that since the original order passed by the Competent Authority was not appealed against the appeal was not maintainable. This order is challenged by the petitioner herein.
2. Section 10 of the Act provides for acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Under S. 10(1) the Competent Authority is required to issue a notification giving particulars of the vacant land held by the respective person in excess of the ceiling limit. The Competent Authority is also required to state that such vacant land is required to be acquired by the Government and the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interest in such land. The notification contained the aforesaid details as required to be published in the official Gazette of the State Government. Thereafter if any claims are made they are required to be considered as provided for under the provisions of S. 10(2) of the Act. Section 10(2) of the Act reads as follows:
' 10(2). After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit.'
There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioner-Bank preferred its claim after issuance of the notification by the Competent Authority under the provisions of S. 10(1) of the Act. Thereafter, under the provisions of S. 10(2) of the Act the Competent Authority determined the claim made by the petitioner-Bank. The Competent Authority held that the claim made by the petitioner-Bank was not tenable. Thus it is clear that the order passed by the Competent Authority is under the provisions of S. 10(2) of the Act.
3. Section 33 of the Act provides for appeal against the order made by the Competent Authority under the Act. All orders passed by the Competent Authority except the orders passed under S. 11 and orders under sub-s. (1) of S. 30 are made appealable under the provisions of S. 33 of the Act. In the instant case, as seen hereinabove, the order sought to be appealed against by the petitioner-Bank is an order passed by the Competent Authority under the provisions of S. 10(2) of the' Act. This is an appealable order. Even so, the appellate authority has declined to entertain the appeal on the ground that the petitioner-Bank had not preferred an appeal against the original order, meaning thereby, against the finding that the original land-owner is holding the land in excess of 'the ceiling limit. This is an, obvious error. Persons like the petitioner Bank could never have preferred appeal against the order passed under S. 9. Persons like the petitioner Bank have to prefer their claim only after the proceedings have reached the stage of S. 10(1) of the Act. Such persons are supposed to prefer their claim only after issuance of notification under S. 10(1) of the Act. Therefore, by the very nature of the scheme of the Act, such persons like the petitioner-Bank who claim interest in the, land sought to be acquired by the State, and so declared under the provisions of S. 10(1) of the Act, could not have preferred appeal against the original order.
4. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the scope of appeal against an order passed under S. 10(2) of the Act would be limited. In such an appeal, the appellant who feels aggrieved by the decision of the Competent authority will have very limited scope, the appellate authority will have the powers to examine the questions which could have been urged before the Competent Authority under the provisions of S. 10(2) of the Act. Under the provisions of S. 10(2) of the Act the Competent Authority is required to determine 'the nature and extent of such claim'. Similarly, the Appellate Authority also shall have the power to determine the nature and extent of such claims as might have been preferred by any person interested in such vacant land and who might have lodged their claim pursuant to the notification under S. 10(1) of the Act. Thus the scope of appeal would be limited, as indicated hereinabove. But it is not correct to say that no appeal lies at the instance of a person who might have lodged claim under the provisions of S. 10 of the Act, and who has not preferred appeal against the original order passed (or call it final statement) under Section 9 of the Act.
5. In the result the petition is allowed. The order dated Oct. 13, 1985 passed by the appellate authority which is produced at annexure-A to the petition is quashed and set aside. The Appellate Authority is directed to entertain the appeal and decide the same in accordance with law. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.
6. Petition allowed.