Gokulakrishnan, C. J.
1. This special civil application is to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ directing the State Government to cancel S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act Notification dt. Keith March 1983 and also to quash S. 6 of the said Land Acquisition Act Notification and also for directing the State Government not to proceed further with the impugned notifications or take any other action in that a air. There is an alternative prayer for issuing a writ or direction directing respondent No. 1 to refer the matter to the District Court, Surat under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for deciding the proportion of the compensation payable to the petitioners. The short facts of this case are that s. 4(1) Notification was issued in respect of the land, in question in this special civil application and other lands on 16-3-1983. Before the issuance of the said Notification the petitioner No. 1 herein entered into a Banakhat with Shri Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel, who is the original owner of this land for the purpose of purchasing the same. The land in dispute bears Survey No. 706 at the village Ichapore admeasuring 3 acres 12 gunthas (7000 sq. ft.). On 18-2-1983, the said Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney in favour of the petitioner No. 1. On 25-8-1983, the petitioner No. 1, on behalf of Kalidas Gopalbhal, filed special civil application No. 2035/83 challenging s. 4 Notification for acquisition. Considering the premature nature of the special civil application the petitioner No. 1 himself, on 26-4-1983, withdrew the said petition. On 3-5-1983 the petitioner No. 1, as the power of attorney holder of the deceased Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel, entered into an agreement of sale in respect of the suit properties with the petitioner No. 2 herein, Subsequent to this agreement S. 6 Notification came into force on 19-9-1983 and subsequently s. 9 Notification came into force on 29-9-1983 in respect of the suit land. Petitioner No.1 herein, in the capacity of power of attorney holder of deceased Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel, along with twenty other petitioners filed special civil application No. 5018 of 1983, challenging acquisition of land in dispute and the said petition has been admitted and it is on the final hearing board This as on date. After the death of the petitioner No. 1, Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel, who was represented by the power of attorney holder Dhirajbhal Thakorebhai Patel, i.e. the petitioner No. 1 herein, the widow and the heirs of Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel, on And Dec. 1988 made it clear before this Court that they were not proceeding with the special civil application No. 5018 of 1983 and as such they were deleted from the main petition. The petitioner No. 2 herein filed civil application No. 2066 of 1988 in special civil application No. 5018 of 1983 praying for impleading himself as the party in the main special civil application. The said application was dismissed by this Court by an order dt. And Dec. 1988. After all these proceedings, the petitioners have come forward with this main special civil application for the reliefs which are extracted in para supra. In this connection we can also mention the fact of the petitioner No. 2 filing Civil Suit regarding the threatened possession of the suit land in view of the land acquisition proceedings made for the benefit of the acquiring body, at Surat Court and he had also prayed for injunction restraining the respondents therein from taking possession of their land. The 2nd Joint Civil Judge (J.D.), Surat, by his order dt. 25-1-1989 rejected the application Exhibit 5. On 25-1-1989 the petitioners have filed the present special civil application.
2. Mr. B. S. Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are the interested parties and as such the special civil application is maintainable; that the petitioners as interested parties have locus standi to question the acquisition proceedings; that inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings are subject matter of the special civil application No. 5018/83 which is on the final hearing board, the present petition by the petitioners cannot be thrown out on the narrow ground of locus standi; and that when this Court is considering the validity of the acquisition in the main special civil application, this petition has to be admitted. Mr. B. S. Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners alternatively prayed that this Court must direct the respondent No.1 to refer the matter to the District Court under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for the apportionment of the compensation. The facts narrated above will clearly reveal the anxiety of the petitioners herein at this belated stage to some how thwart the land acquisition proceedings. The lands are being acquired for a public purpose to benefit the respondent No. 3 herein. When the respondent No. 3 is actively negotiating with the petitioners in the main special civil application No. 5018 / 83 and has succeeded in settling the matter by dropping their claims from the array of petitioners in the main special civil application, the petitioners tried their best to intrude in the main special civil application by filing civil application No. 2066/88, to get themselves impleaded as petitioners in special civil application No. 5018/83, and that has been rejected by the Bench of this Court as early as 2nd Dec. 1988. Further, there is an order by this Court deleting the heirs of Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel from the array of petitioners since they had expressed their willingness to get themselves deleted from the special civil application No. 5018/ 83, From the facts it is clear that the petitioner No. 1 had executed the Banakhat as early as 11-11-1982 for the purpose of purchasing the land survey No.706 from Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel. An irrevocable Power of Attorney was executed in favour of the petitioner No.1 by Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel and it is this petitioner No. 1, as the power of attorney holder, executed the agreement in favour of the petitioner No. 2 for the sale of the suit land on 3-5-1983. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner No. 1 knowingly and willingly entered into an agreement for sale with the petitioner No. 2 on behalf of Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel and hence the petitioner No. 2 cannot any more press his claim for enforcing the Banakhat dt. 11 -11- 1982 in his favour. The right to purchase the suit land has devolved upon the petitioner Nobel on 3-5-1983, i.e. subsequent to the S. 4(1) Notification. Agreement to sell cannot, in the eye of law, create any interest in the immoveable property sought to be purchased. In spite of the fact that the S. 6 Notification was of the year 1983 no action was taken by either of these petitioners to agitate the genuineness of the land acquisition proceedings taken by the respondents uptill the year 1988.
3. Even though it is not necessary for us to consider as to the interestedness of the petitioners in questioning the main land acquisition proceedings, on the facts and circumstances of this case, for the completion of the record, we may usefully refer to the contentions raised by the petitioners herein through their learned counsel Mr. B. S. Patel. S. 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, defines 'person interested' and reads as follows:
'(b) the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land.'
The objections under S. 5A have to be made by the person interested within 30 days from the date of publication of the Notification. For the purpose of this Section, a person who shall be deemed to be interested in land would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the lands were acquired under this Act. In this connection we can usefully refer to S. 5A of the Land Acquisition Act which reads as follows:
'5-A. Hearing of Objections:----
(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under s. 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the Notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary (either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under s. 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government). The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final.
(3) for the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act.'
4. s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act deals with issue of notice to persons interested and reads as follows:
'Notice to persons interested :- (1) The Collector then cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him.
(2) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed, and shall require all persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, and their objections (if any) to the measurements made under S. 8. The Collector may in any case require such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent.
(3) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside or have agents authorised to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is situate.
(4) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere, and has no such agent, the notice shall be sent to him by post in a letter addressed to him at his last known residence, address or place of business and registered under Ss. 28 and 29 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 shall be substituted.'
5. Reading the above said Sections, an interesting question that arises is as to whether a person, who will be ultimately interested in getting the compensation, is also an interested person to object the acquisition of the land. In AIR 1982 Punjab 519, in the case of Radhey Sham Gupta v. State of Haryana a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court dealing with the right to file the petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings by those purchasers who have purchased the land after the s. 4 Notification, the Bench held (Para 6):
'Now it is undeniable that the petitioners by virtue of being the purchasers of the land are entitled to and in any case can claim to be interested in the compensation of the acquired land. They, therefore, fall clearly within the ambit of S. 3(B) and on principle it would not be easy to hold that a person interested in the compensation is lacking in locus standi to challenge the acquisition. Again the ground that the petitioner cannot maintain the writ petition because they are merely the purchasers of the land after the issuance of the notification under s. 4 stands well negatived by the binding precedent in Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee. Bhatinda, AIR 1970 SC 802. Therein also some of the petitioners had purchased the land more than three years after the issuance of the notification under s. 4. Nevertheless their Lordships upheld their right to assail the acquisition.'
This decision, no doubt, states that a person who has purchased the land after the issuance of the notification has a right to question the acquisition proceedings. As far as the present case is concerned, no right has accrued to the petitioners in the properties since there is only an agreement of sale. A Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mohammad Akil Khan v. Premraj Jawanmal Surana, reported in AIR 1972 Bom 217, has held as follows:
'A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale, of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. When the seller and buyer are both willing to perform their respective parts of the contract but the specific performance of the contract has become impossible by the unexpected interference by the State in acquiring the property, the buyer will be entitled to recover from the seller any purchase money properly paid together with interest and also earnest with interest and to that extent he would have had under S. 55(6)(b) of T.P. Act a charge on the land. However, as the land is no more available to the parties as the State has acquired it and by deciding its compensation has converted the property into a sum certain, the buyer would be entitled to claim from the compensation amount, which represents the converted form, of property, his purchase money and earnest together with interest. It is in this sense that the buyer whose contract is frustrated has a claim or share in the compensation which becomes payable to the owner of the property by reason of the acquisition thereof S. 3(b) does not require that a person for being interested, must have an interest in the compensation which has become payable on account of the acquisition of the land. Under the definition of S. 3(b) such buyer would be undoubtedly a person interested as he can claim the amount advanced by him together with interest from the land and in the absence of the land, from the money which represents the converted value of that land. When s. 9 calls upon all person to put in claims to compensation for all interests in such land, an interest of the type held by buyer is also intended to be covered. There need not be a transfer of immoveable property in favour of a person before he could be described as a person entitled to claim for an interest in the land. The language of s. 9(1)(l) of the Land Acquisition Act appears to be broad enough to include Interest and claim for charge on land which would amount to an interest in the land for the purpose of s. 9(1).
However such buyer who has only contracted to purchase the property and whose contract is frustrated cannot claim any share in the solarium payable under sub-section (2) of s. 23. His interest is a limited interest as indicated by S. 55(6)(b) of the Top. Act to the extent of a definite amount as what is acquired is the land and not the interest of such claimant separately as such. This right is a limited one to recover a sum certain and nothing beyond. This right which arises as a result of the compulsory acquisition cannot be considered to be an interest in the land which is acquired as such by the State. Fifteen per cent, solarium payable under sub-section (2) of s. 23 represents the payment for compulsory acquisition of land and as there is no compulsory acquisition of the interest of buyer at all he cannot resort to the provisions of sub-section (2) of s. 23 for claiming any additional amount.'
Reading this decision, it is clear that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties and that it does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property. It is also clear from this decision that the person who has an agreement to purchase, has undoubtedly a right to claim his amount of advance from the compensation amount, but he cannot be considered to have an interest in the land which is acquired as such by the State, Hence, this decision is not an authority to spell out that the person like the petitioner who has only an agreement to purchase can have right to question the acquisition proceedings as such. In yet another decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 866 in the case of Gen. Govt. Servants Coop. Housing Society v. Wahab Uddin, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the locus stencil of a person to question the land acquisition proceedings who has purchased a property in an auction sale by the Government under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. In this case, the party concerned had purchased in the auction, the property in question by depositing the entire sale consideration. No doubt he was not able to get possession due to litigation started by the persons in possession of plot. The Supreme Court held that the fact that he did not get possession till acquisition due to litigation started by the person in possession of plot is immaterial and that the purchaser in auction has locus stencil to maintain the writ petition. Even in this Supreme Court case we find that there was an auction and the person concerned purchased the property by depositing the entire sale consideration. In the present case, we have only an agreement to sell which will not confer any right on the immovable property.
6. In the case of Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas, reported in AIR 1968 SC 366, the Supreme Court has held that it is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition, a person should claim an interest in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. Continuing further the Supreme Court observed (para 10):
'It seems to us that Paramsukhdas is a 'person interested' within S. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an interest in compensation. But before he can be made a party in a reference it has to be seen whether he comes within S. 20(b) and S. 21 of the Act.'
In this case also the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the right of the person to agitate for the compensation before the District Court. In that context the above said observation was made by the Supreme Court. Hence, we do not think that this case is an authority for holding that a person, who holds an agreement for purchase, is a person interested in questioning the land acquisition proceedings.
7. Inasmuch as we are not entering into this field of locus stencil and as to the definition of 'person interested' in relation to the petitioners herein to agitate the land acquisition proceedings, we thought it fit to dispose off this special civil application at this admission stage on the ground of laches on the part of the petitioners herein.
8. The facts narrated above will clearly reveal as to how the petitioners are trying to scuttle the land acquisition proceedings which have reached the stage of award and in respect of certain portions of the land, by taking possession of the same. The facts of the case reveal that the petitioner No. 1 who has originally entered into an agreement for purchasing the land in question, has withdrawn the special civil application filed by Kalidas Gopalbhai Patel through him along with others questioning the land acquisition proceedings. The petitioners cannot be said to be persons who are ignorant of the land acquisition proceedings including that of S. CA enquiry. In spite of the fact that they are aware of such proceedings, no objections were raised by them as provided under S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. A Full Bench of this High Court in a decision in the case of Shri Sanojan Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. Surajben, reported in 1985 Guj LH 1118 (AIR 1986 Guj 118 at pp. 130-31) has held:
'An objector has to file his objections within 30 days of the issuance of the notification under s. 4 and cannot file his objections beyond that time and if he files them beyond time, there would be no power with the Collector to entertain such objections and to proceed to decide the same as per S. 5-A(2) of the Act. Such time-barred objections have to be treated to be non est and have to be consigned to the record room without being processed or processed with. It is, therefore, obvious, in the light of the aforesaid statutory scheme that the objector is not entitled to be heard as of right in respect of objections filed after the expiry of period of 30 days after the date of issuance of notification u/S 4. Consequently, the latter question as to under what stay circumstances, the objector can be heard objections filed beyond 30 days cannot survive.'
The above said decision clearly spells out the futility of the objections made by the petitioners in this special civil application after an inordinate and extraordinary delay of several years. The facts of this case clearly reveal that s. 4 Notification was made as early as on 16-3-1983. The present Special Civil Application is filed as late as 1988. Objection under S. 5-A has not also been made by the petitioners. In such circumstances, we can usefully refer to the decision in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2077, wherein the Supreme Court held (para 11):
'A valid notification under s. 4 is a sine quanon for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under s. 4 and the declaration under S. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners.'
The said decision and also the decision in the case of Sanojan Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Surajben, reported in 1985 Guj LH 1118 : (AIR 1986 Guj 118) (FB), squarely apply to the facts of this case and accordingly, this Special Civil Application is dismissed on the ground of lashes and delay on the part of the petitioners herein.
9. As regards the alternative prayer to the effect that the Land Acquisition Officer be directed to refer the matter to the District Court, Surat under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is open to the petitioners to put in necessary application before the Land Acquisition Officer for the said purpose and such application will be considered by the Land Acquisition Officer on merits.
10. For the foregoing reasons, the Special Civil Application is dismissed, with no order as to costs. Notice is discharged. Interim stay granted is vacated.
11. Mr. Farooq Memon on behalf of Mr. B. S. Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, states that this order may be stayed for a period of two weeks in order to enable the petitioners to take up the matter to the Supreme Court. Alternatively, he prays that at least the respondents may be restrained from putting up any further construction on the disputed land for a period of two weeks.
12. We have clearly held in this judgment that the petitioners are playing obstructive tactics as if they have stepped into the shoes of those persons, who have walked out from the array of petitioners in the main Special Civil Application No. 5018 of 1983. In those circumstances, it will be against our observations if we stay the operation of this order any further. Taking into consideration the alternative request made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, we direct the respondent No. 3 acquiring body not to put up any construction or carry out any construction operation for a period of 10 days from this date. The prayer for stay of this order is rejected.
13. Application dismissed.