P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge (Coram: A. P. Ravani, J.) dt. Nov. 23, 1988 passed in special civil application No. 5662 of 1988. The Special Civil Application is for directing the respondents to pay the amount of reward at the rate of 10% of the recoverable amount from the Company as per Annexure 'L' to the special civil application with interest and declaring the action of the respondents regarding non-payment of reward to the petitioner as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and illegal. There is a further prayer for declaring the order of respondent No. 2 bearing No. 3599 dt. Nov. 21,1987, Annexure 'N' to the special civil application, as null and void and declaring the same as unconstitutional, illegal and fabricated on non-existing and irrelevant grounds.
2. The Short facts of the case for the purpose of disposal of this Letters patent Appeal are that the appellant seems to have given information to the Municipal Corporation, Baroda, by letter dt. 10-10-85, Annexure 'E' to the special civil application, regarding the octroi evasion. In this letter the appellant has stated that Mrs. Gujarat Communications and Electronics Ltd. at G.I.D.C. Makarpura, Baroda has evaded octroi duty and that he will furnish all information and he is entitled to get the reward for the same. In this letter the appellant has stated that he will be giving more details on demand if asked in person. Ultimately the Municipal Corporation had not granted any award to the appellant herein alleging that it had not benefited by any information given by the appellant herein. In. the letter dt. 21-11-87, Annexure 'N' to the petition, the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (R), Baroda has stated as follows:
'As per your information we have not got any material imported by the Company without payment of octroi. Therefore, your application to get reward is hereby filed. Please note.'
3. Aggrieved by such an order, the appellant had come forward with special civil application No. 5662 of 1988. In his application he has made allegations against the officers concerned regarding their lethargy in detecting the real culprit who had evaded octroi and has also stated that there is a definite evasion of octroi by the Company against which he had given information and that the recovery of certain amounts as stated in Annexure 'L' is made which will entitle the petitioner to the reward as per the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act and the resolutions passed by the Municipal Corporation.
4. The learned single Judge rejected the special civil application on the ground that the claim in the special civil application is in the nature of money claim and such relief cannot be granted by way of petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned Judge has also stated that the averments made by the appellant herein are disputed questions of fact and they cannot be resolved by resorting to the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution as for resolving the same evidence has to be recorded. The learned Judge has also finally held that the appellant had, in respect of the same cause of action, filed special civil application No. 3776 of 1988 and had withdrawn the same unconditionally. The said order is at Annexure 'W' to the petition. The learned single Judge held that the appellant is not entitled to file the present special civil application. Aggrieved by the said order, this letters patent appeal has been filed.
5. Mr. K. B. Pande, the party in person, argued the case himself and alleged that there is colourable exercise of power by the authority concerned in rejecting his claim and that he has made out a case for the purpose of getting reward and also established that there is octroi evasion by the company concerned. For the purpose of colourable exercise of power Mr. Pan referred to the submission made by the Octroi Superintendent as early as in the year 1987. We are not on the point as to how this submission came into the possession of the appellant herein. Without going into that aspect of the case if we examine this document which is at Annexure 'S' to the petition, it is clear that the communication states that Gujarat Communications and Electronics Ltd. has paid octroi duty on 'No Bill' basis whenever the material is imported and has filed 'E' form stating that the material is to be dispatched to the Government of India etc. This submission also states that in the opinion of the Octroi Superintendent there was no question of octroi evasion and as such the demand of reward made by Mr. Pan was without substance. Mr. Pan also pointed out Annexure 'J' to the petition which is a submission made by the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (R) to the Municipal Commissioner. In this submission also a specific averment has been made to the effect that the application of Mr. Pan for payment of reward is to be rejected and filed. An explanation has been given as to how, even if there is evasion, the octroi has to be recovered. In the opinion of the authority concerned, permission can be granted to initiate legal proceedings if the Company does not pay the remaining amount of octroi in time. Mr. Pan also read Annexure 'K' to the petition in order to spell out that there is colourable exercise of power regarding octroi evasion made by the Company i.e. Gujarat Communications and Electronics Ltd. Reading all these submissions which are interdepartmental in nature, we have not been able to spell out that there is a clear admission on the part of the Municipal Corporation that some evasion has been found by the information given by Mr. Pande. Even assuming that the appellant is claiming certain reward, on the averments he has put forward in his petition, these are all disputed questions of fact which have to be decided after evidence, both documentary and oral. Without that it is impossible to arrive at a conclusion that there is it clearcut case made out by the appellant regarding octroi evasion and that such evasion has been brought to the notice of the authorities concerned by the appellant himself.
6. Mr. Pande, also points out Annexure 'O' to the petition wherein the Octroi Superintendent has referred to payment of reward at 10%. This is a note prepared by the Octroi Superintendent on the application of demand made by the appellant. In the last para of this note it is stated:
'But if 10% of the amount is to be paid as a reward to this person in tills case of No Bill then the applicant will demand reward in the case of G.C.E.L. also. Therefore, your honour is requested to finalise this issue after primary discussion with the applicant.'
From this the appellant wants to spell out that there is it clear admission on the part of the authorities concerned regarding payment of reward and on this admission this case can be decided by this Court instead of driving the party to file a civil suit. We are afraid, we are not able to appreciate this argument. The mere fact that a reference is made with regard to the payment of reward in case of 'No Bill', it Cannot be construed that there is an admission on the part of the Municipal Corporation accepting the contention of the appellant herein. Mr. Pande also states that in view of this submission and also the averments made in his petition regarding the mala fides of the authorities concerned in rejecting his claim for reward, the Court must come to the conclusion that there is truth in the case of the appellant herein and that inasmuch as the respondents have not come forward with any reply to controvert the averments and allegations made by the appellant herein in his special civil application, it has to be construed that they have accepted the same. Even this argument does not appeal to us since the allegations against the authorities cannot, on the facts and circumstances of the case, be considered as proved. We are at the admission stage and the learned single Judge has already applied his mind and found that there are several disputed questions of fact which cannot be resolved in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Hence we are not accepting the argument of the appellant that since no counter has been filed the Court has to come to the conclusion that tile mala fide alleged by him is proved.
7. In support of his contention, Mr. Pande has cited several decisions : A I R 1986 SC 872 (Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India) deals with the case where notice was issued for demolition of the construction. In that case it has been stated that where mala fides are alleged it is necessary that the person against whom such allegations are made should come forward with an answer refuting or denying such allegations. It has also been held that otherwise such allegations remain unrebutted and the Court would in such a case be constrained to accept the allegations so remain unrebutted and unanswered on the test of probability. That is a case in which regular mala fides were alleged against the authority in issuing it notice for demolition of the building. In the present case the appellant wants to get reward alleging certain mala fides on the part of the officers concerned in not investigating evasion of octroi so as to deprive the appellant from getting reward. The question of evasion of octroi and the action of the officers in not investigating the matter and the right on tile part of the appellant to get reward are all questions which have to be proved by proper oral and documentary evidence. From the submissions made by the appellant In person and the averments made by him in his petition, it is clear that they are all factual aspects which have to be discussed and decided in a properly framed suit. Therefore, AIR 1986 SC 872 has no relevance to the facts of the present case. AIR 1973 SC 157 (R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra) deals with admissibility of documents secured unauthorisedly. We have already stated that we are pot going into this question since the matter can be decided even without finding fault with the appellant as to how he got into possession of these documents. Hence this decision has no relevance for the disposal of the present case. AIR 1986 Bom 412 (Asha Goel v. LIC of India) deals with the Insurance Act. That is a case in which fraud is alleged regarding the submission of the medical certificate and ultimately finding out that fraud has been perpetrated. The special and clear facts on record made the Court to interfere in a petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution. As we have discussed in para sugars in this case it is not so. In this case the factual aspects of the case have to be discussed and proved by the appellant herein. 1986 Guj LH 235 (Ambica mills v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.) is a case where the Court considered the discretionary power of the High Court. It says that the High Court has power to entertain such matters where theme are certain disputed questions of fact also but that does not mean the High Court is bound to entertain such a petition when it finds that such questions cannot be resolved unless there is elaborate inquiry and findings as regards the averments and allegations made by the party concerned. In AIR 1974 SC 2105 (Babubhai v. Mandrel) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the power of the High Court to go into disputed questions of fact. In that case the Supreme Court has clearly stated (at pp. 2110-2111 of A I R):
'The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Art. 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Art. 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. If, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect.'
On all fours this decision will apply to the facts of this case. As discussed by us in para supra complex questions of fact are involved in this case and as such regular civil suit has to be filed for determining the real questions in dispute. The facts clearly establish that nothing is admitted by either parties.
8. We have also heard the contention of Mr. Desai for the respondents bringing to our notice the disposal of a previous special civil application. Mr. Desai states that in view of the withdrawal of the previous special civil application, the present special civil application filed by the appellant cannot be entertained. The learned single Judge has also adverted to this aspect of the case and he has dismissed the petition, apart from other things, on the ground of withdrawal of the previous petition without any reservation. In this connection Mr. Desai brings to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 88 (Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A. Tribunal). In the said decision the Supreme Court has categorically held that the petitioner, after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Art. 226 without the permission to institute a, fresh petition, cannot file a fresh writ petition in respect of the same cause of action in the High Court. As far as special civil application No. 3776 of 1988 is concerned, the prayer in that petition is practically the same as made in the present special civil application No. 5662 of 1988. Mr. Pande submits that subsequent to the withdrawal of the previous petition he came into possession of certain more details and particulars and as such he has come forward with the present special civil application. Simply because a party gets some more particulars regarding the cause of action for which he had already litigated in the Court of law, he cannot be permitted to agitate the same once over again if he has not reserved the right to file fresh suit or petition while withdrawing the previon one. In special civil application No. 3776/88 this Court has passed order as under:
'The petitioner seeks leave to withdraw this petition. Permission granted. Petition disposed of as withdrawn.'
9. In view of this we are afraid that the appellant cannot file a fresh special civil application as he has done in this case.
10. Mr. Pande, the party in person, brought to our notice the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act and also various correspondence wherein there is reference for rewarding those persons who are able to give information regarding tax evasion such as octroi etc. We are not advertises to this aspect of the case since the main contention regarding the prayer made by the appellant herein can be established only by producing proper oral and documentary evidence. If such is the case, the proper course open to the appellant will be to file a civil suit for necessary relief and he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to resolve such disputed and complicated questions of fact. The learned single Judge has, therefore, correctly adverted to this aspect of the case and also the question of withdrawal of special civil application No. 3776/88 without reserving right to file fresh petition and has dismissed the special civil application. We are at the letters patent stage. The learned single Judge after applying his mind has come to the conclusion that the proper remedy will be to file a civil suit. Sitting in Letters Patent Appeal we do not find any infirmity or irregularity in the order passed by the learned single Judge.
11. For the reasons stated by us in a foregoing paras and also for the reasons stated by the learned single Judge, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.
12. After we dictated this judgment, Mr. Ronnie, the party in person, prays to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do, not find any substantial question of law of a general importance requiring decision of Supreme Court is involved in this case to grant leave under Art. 134A of the Constitution. Hence the prayer to grant leave is refused.
13. Appeal dismissed.