M. Airmaidi, J.
1. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, No. 33 of 1976, thereinafter Act) was, enacted to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, for regulating the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. It was made applicable to the State of Gujarat and came into force at once. The definitions of the various terms and expressions used in the Act are found in S. 2 of the Act. Section 3 mandates that no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land, in excess of the ceiling limit, in the territories to which the Act applies on and from the commencement of the Act unless otherwise provided. The expression ,ceiling limit' means the ceiling limit specified in S. 4. Section 4 read with Schedule 1 indicates for every person the ceiling limit in an urban agglomeration depending on the category of the agglomeration. Section 6(l) enjoins upon every person who held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit on or after the 17th day of February, 1975 and before the commencement of the Act and every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at such commencement, to file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, extent, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by him and also lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. Section 7 deals with cases where vacant land held by a person is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more competent authorities. Section 8,. which is relevant for our purpose, may now be, set out:-
(1) On the basis of the statement filed under S. 6 and after such inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make the competent authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who hag filed the statement under S. 6.
(2) Every statement prepared under subsection (1) shall contain the following-particulars, namely:
(i) The name and address of the person;
(ii) the particulars of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by such person;
(iii) the particulars of the vacant lands which such person desires to retain within the ceiling limit;
(iv) the particulars of the right, title or interest of the person in the vacant land; and
(v) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) The draft statement shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft, statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof.
(4) The competent authority shall duly consider any objection received, within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or within such further period as may be specified by the competent authority for any good and sufficient reason, from the person on whom a copy of the draft statement has been served under that sub-section and the competent authority shall, after giving the objector a reasonable. opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it deems fit.'
Section 9 stipulates that after the disposal of the objections, if any, received under subsection (4) of S. 8, the competent authority shall, after making such alterations as are necessary in the draft statement in accordance with the orders passed on the objections, determine the vacant land held by the person concerned in excess of the ceiling limit and serve a copy of such statement on the person concerned. Section enjoins upon the competent authority to cause a notification to be published for the information of the general public giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the piling limit and stating that such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government and the claims of all persons interested, there in May be made, giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land. Under sub-section (2) the competent authority has to consider the claims of persons interested in the vacant land, determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. Sub-section (3) of S. 10 may now be reproduced :-
'10. (3) At any time after the publication of the notification under sub-see. (1), the competent authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.'
Upon the land being vested in the State Government, sub-see. (5) entitles the competent authority to order any person in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or its duly authorised officer within thirty days of the service of the notice. Subsection (6) empowers the State Government or the concerned authorised officer to-use force, if necessary, to obtain possession of the vacant land from the person refusing or failing to comply with an order made under sub-section (5). Section 11 provides for the payment of amount for vacant land acquired under S. 10 of the Act. Sections 23 and 24 indicate how the vacant lands so acquired would have to be disposed of by the State Government.
2. It is, therefore, clear from the scheme of the provisions of Ss. 6 to 11 of the Act that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit must file a statement giving particulars thereof before the competent authority. While doing so, he may specify the vacant lands within the ceiling limit, which he would like to retain. On the basis of such statement the, competent authority has, to prepare a draft statement containing certain particulars including those in respect of the vacant lands he desires to retain within the ceiling limit. The draft statement so prepared must then be served on the person concerned and the competent authority, if any, must consider his objections, before finalizing the same. After the draft statement is finalized in accordance with the orders passed on the objections and a final statement is prepared and served on the concerned party, the competent authority is required to state the excess vacant land held by the person concerned by issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette. The notification would indicate the excess vacant land to be acquired by the State Government and call upon persons interested therein to lodge their claims stating the nature of their interest in such lands. Thereafter the competent authority is expected to issue another notification declaring that the excess vacant land shall with effect from the specified date be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and thereupon such land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The competent authority may then take possession of such land. Compensation has to be paid for the lands so acquired as provided by S. 11 and thereafter such land may be disposed of as indicated by Ss. 23 and 24 of the Act. We may now read S. 20 which runs as under :
'20. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this chapter, -
(a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that having regard to the location of such land. the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter;
(b) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter;
Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing.
(2) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption under Cal. (a) or Cal. (b) of sub-section (1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for the State Government to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of this-chapter shall apply accordingly.'
In the backdrop of the scheme of the Act indicated above, two questions arise for determination, namely, (I) whether the State Government is bound to give a personal hearing to the person concerned or his agent, i.e., a right of audience, before rejecting an exemption application made under S. 20(l)(a) of the Act; and (ii) whether the State Government must decide the application made under S. 20(l)(a) of the Act before the draft statement is prepared under S. 8(l) of the Act?
3. Precisely the same two questions came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of N. H. Bat and D. S. Acadia, JJ., in Normalize Manila Dashy v. State of Gujarat, 1984 (1) 25 Gum LR 322 : (AIR 1985 Gum 47). On the first question the Court observed as under (at p. 49) :-
'It is well said that in a complex spectrum of facts like the one required to be examined by the Government for the purpose of exercising its power under S. 20(l)(a) which powers, are not absolute powers, but are powers coupled with a duty, the Government must have proper presentation of materials before it. More often than not if such a complex issue is taken on hand by the Government exporter, incorrect or improper decision is likely to arise. It is, therefore, in the fitness of the things that the Government should ordinarily hear the applicant if the Government is prima facie and ex prate inclined to take a view that the exemption was not to be granted. If an applicant has specifically sought, for an opportunity to, present the case personally or through an agent in a situation like the one arising under S. 20(l)(a) of the Act, it is all the more necessary for the State Government to hearth applicant.'
In taking this view, reliance was placed on, the observations of the Supreme Court in Raja Restaurant v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1982 SC 1550 wherein the Supreme Court held that before refusing to renew a license or cancel or revoke it, the concerned party must be given an opportunity to represent his case. Quoting the following passage from the decision of the Madhya Prudish High Court in the case of Nandkishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1982 Madh Pra 33 with approval (at p. 36) :
'6. The power of exemption has the effect of restoring the applicability of the general law by taking away the exemption to it created by the special law. Accordingly, the power to claim exemption is a valuable right. Whereunder the provisions of an Act an authority is empowered to grant exemption and a person has a right to claim it on fulfilment of statutory conditions, the authority is bound to hear him and pass a speaking order giving reasons in support of its finding that he is not entitled to the exemption.'
This Court concluded in paragraph 5 as under :
'The outcome will be that the Government will afford a reasonable opportunity, of audience to all these petitioners then decide their applications afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act.'
While taking this view, the Court was perhaps unaware of the earlier observations of this Court in Special Civil Appln. No.5296 of 1982 made on January 1983 by a division Bench consisting of M. P. Thakkar,C.J. (as he then was) and R.J Shah, J., to the effect:-
'The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that he was not granted any personal hearing before the petitioners' application for exemption under S. 20 was disposed of. Section 20 does not contemplate affording an opportunity of personal hearing.'
4. When Special Civil Appln. No. 1986 came up for admission before Ravani J., on Ernst August 1986, our learned brother passed the following order having regard to the apparent conflict between the decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Appln. No. 5296 of 1982 and the subsequent decision rendered in Nirmalaben's case, (AIR 1985 Guj 47)
'It is clear that the attention of the Division Bench (N. H. Bhatt and B. S. Kapadia, JJ.) which rendered the Decision in the case of Nirmalaben (supra) was not drawn to the earlier unreported decision of the High Court.
There is clear conflict' between these, two decisions. Hence the conflict is required to be resolved. In above view of the matter, the judgment rendered by the Division Bench (N. H. Bhatt and B. S. Kapadia, JJ.) in the case of Nirmalaben v. State of Gujarat reported in 1984 (1) 25 Guj LR 322 : (AIR 1985 Guj 47) is required to be reconsidered by a larger bench. The office is directed to place the matter before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate orders.'
5. As far as the second contention is concerned, the Division Bench of this Court in Nirmalaben case answered the gain's as under (at p. 48) :-
'2. Chapter III of the Act containing Ss. 3 to 24 deals with ceiling on vacant lands, The scheme of the Act is too well-known to call for any repeated elaboration.. It is truism to state: that other stringent provisions of, the Chapter III of the Act are subject to. S. 20 of ,the Act which begins with a non obstante clause. This means that the declaration about the land being surplus can be made only after ,the on application under S. 20 of is taken. The overall Consideration of the provisions of Chapter -III pre-supposes that the full effect will be given to all the provisions so that a coherent system of working out the problem is evolved. If a declaration under Ss. 8(l) and 8(3) proceeds one way or the other, decision of an application for exemption, it will be tantamount to putting a cart before a horse and if the application (covered under that declaration) would ultimately come to be granted and it will be a meaningless exercise, that is why we say that after filing of a statement under S. 6 of the Act, if a citizen applies for exemption under S. 20 of the Act, it is the duty of the Government to deal with that application first and then proceed to resort to Ss. 8(l) and 8(3) of the, Act.'
When Special Civil Appln. No. 2220 of 1986 came up for admission before Ravani J., on 20th August 1986, our learned brother after reproducing the observations from Nirmalaben's decision extracted above, proceeded to observe as under -
I 'With utmost respect, I regret my inability to agree with the decision arrived at by the Division Bench in the aforesaid cases. Section 20 of the Act will be applicable only in cases where it is either admitted or conclusively held that person applying for exemption under S. 20 of the Act, holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. This is clear from the following words 'where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit'. These words are to be found in both the clauses, that is (a) and (b) of S. 20(l) of the Act. Therefore, the pre-condition for applicability of S. 20 is that the ~ person applying for exemption should be holding land in excess of ceiling limit. The question as to whether a person holds the land in excess of ceiling limit should be decided first If that is not done, then the question as to whether a person actually holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit or not will remain open. A very situation may arise where the Government may grant exemption under S. 20 of the Act and ultimately the Competent Authority may come to 'the conclusion that the person who exemption is not holding the land in of ceiling limit. Therefore, 'unless the question as to whether a land in excess of ceiling limit first, the question regarding the applicability of S. 20 of the Act cannot arise and therefore cannot be decided. In above (view) of the matter, the aforesaid decision of Division Bench requires reconsideration.
In the above view of the matter, it is obvious that the petitioner has raised a point which requires consideration. Therefore, the matter is required to be Admitted.'
6. It is manifest from the above that Ravani J., felt that the decision of this Court in Nirmalaben's case, (AIR 1985 Guj 47) on the question of grant of audience to the applicant seeking exemption Under S. 20(l), of the Act and the need to freeze the proceedings after the statement under S. 6 of the Act is filed until the exemption application is disposed of in accordance with law requires reconsideration for reasons stated in the orders by which both the writ petitions came to be referred to a larger bench. That is how both the aforesaid petitions are before us. By consent of the learned advocates appearing for the contesting parties in both the petitions we have heard the petitions together and we now proceed to dispose them of by this common judgment.
7. However, before we proceed to deal with the contentions arising in these two petitions, we may answer the preliminary contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioners regarding the competence of -this Court to reconsider the view of this Court on the two points duly settled in Nirmalaben's case, (AIR 1985 Guj 47). It was submitted that a batch of writ petitions were disposed of by the common judgment rendered in Nirmalaben's case and the State of Gujarat had carried the matter in appeal t6 the Supreme Court. Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal bearing Nos. 5762-78 of 1984 (Civil) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court on 2nd August 1987 and they were disposed of by a common order which reads as under:-
' The special leave petitions are dismissed.'
It appears that from a subsequent decision of 10th August 1987 rendered in another group of writ petitions based on Nirmalaben's case, the State of Gujarat sought Special Leave to Appeal bearing Nos. 1662-75 of 1988 (Civil) which were dismissed by the Supreme Court by the following order :
'The special leave petitions are dismissed subject to the observation that when the matter goes before the State Government for a fresh disposal the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Nirmalaben Manilal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, 1984 (1) 25 Guj LR 322 : (AIR 1985 Guj 47) should be the basis for disposal.'
Xerox copies of both the above-referred orders passed by the Supreme Court were made available to us. It was, therefore, argued that since the Supreme Court had refused to entertain the Special Leave Petition to Appeal filed by the State of Gujarat against this Court's decision in Nirmalaben's case, the order of this Court must be taken to have merged in the order of the Supreme Court and hence this Court cannot reconsider the same. This submission must be stated to be rejected for the simple reason that the refusal to entertain an application for special leave to appeal is not akin to a considered decision of the Supreme Court on merits in appeal. There can be no doubt that if a special leave petition is dismissed after giving reasons in support of the order, such a decision rendered by the Supreme Court is one attracting Art. 141 of the Constitution and becomes binding on all Courts. See Union of India v. All India Services Pensioners' Association, AIR 1988 SC 501. However, the same cannot be said when the Supreme Court dismisses special leave petitions in limine without assigning any reasons whatsoever. This position in law is well settled by three decisions of the Supreme Court reported in the cases of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of Cochin Port Trust, AIR 1 978 SC 1283; Ahmedabad Mfg. &Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1981 SC'960 and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 SC 1780. In the last mentioned case, Eradi J., after referring to the first mentioned case observed in paragraph, 6 as under
'But neither on the principle of resjudicata nor on any principle of public policy analogous thereto, would the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition operate to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding namely, the writ proceeding before the High Court merely on the basis of an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided by this Court at least by implication. It is not correct or safe to extend the principle of resjudicata or constructive resjudicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guesswork.'
The learned Judge then proceeded in paragraph 8 to state :
'It is not the policy of this Court to entertain special leave petitions and grant leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution save in those cases where some substantial question of law of general or public importance is involved or there is manifest injustice resulting from the impugned order or judgment. The dismissal of a special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order does not therefore justify any inference that by necessary implication the contentions raised in the special leave petition on the merits of the case have been rejected by this Court.'
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the dismissal of special leave petitions by the Supreme Court by the two orders quoted above cannot debar this Court from considering the questions afresh. We are equally not impressed by the argument that, the subsequent order of the Supreme Court containing the observation that when the matter goes before the State Government for a fresh disposal, the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Nirmalaben's case should be the basis for disposal makes the order a speaking order and merges the decision of Nirmalaben in the decision of the Supreme Court. We, therefore overrule the preliminary contention.
8.We may now deal with the first point, namely, the question whether the State Government is under an obligation to grant an audience or personal hearing before passing an order under S. 20(l) of the Act adverse together party seeking an exemption.Now Courts of law have developed the, principles of natural justice with a view to devicing a procedural technique as an essential element of the administrative justice system to ensure that Government officers as well as statutory or quasi-judicial bodies abide by a fair procedure while dealing with the rights and interests of citizens. While the scope and extent of the doctrine cannot be put in a straitjacket formula and its application must necessarily depend on the nature of power or jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, its requirements would have their operation as implied mandatory requirements, non-observance whereof would invalidate the decision. In a developing country like ours vast discretionary /administrative powers are invested in the State and its officers touching the rights and interests of citizens and it is but fair that before any decision is taken adversely affecting such rights and interests, the concerned citizen is heard through a procedural technique which is fair so that his point of view is appreciated by the authority charged with the duty to take a decision in that behalf. That is why it is said that the principles of natural justice though procedural in nature are of fundamental importance and not merely secondary since they make administrative decisions which would otherwise appear to be drastic acceptable. Administrative authorities, therefore, often consider the introduction of this doctrine and insistence to its strict adherence by Courts as time-consuming without realising that the time taken is well spent firstly because the citizen goes with the feeling that he was able to place his point of view before the authority and secondly because it ultimately adds to the quality of the decision and provides an insulation against the decision being branded as arbitrary or the product of non-application of mind. A decision taken after giving the concerned party an opportunity of being heard is always more acceptable than. a decision rendered without hearing the concerned party, however well-merited it may be.
9. That brings us to the question regarding the scope and extent of the doctrine since the requirements of the principles of natural justice in the context of the law with which we are concerned have not been embodied in the Act or the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') made in exercise of power conferred by S. 46 of the Act. It is well settled that even if the statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules spelling out the need to hear the party whose rights and interests are likely to be affected, the requirement to follow the fair procedure before taking a decision must be read in the statute unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. Since the Act and the Rules do not give any contra-indication, it follows that before the state Government decides on the holder's request for exemption, it must follow the rule of alteram parten. Even the learned Government Pleader did not argue that the principles of natural justice have no application but his limited contention was that it was not necessary to grant an audience to every party seeking exemption. Now, the application of the rules of natural justice must necessarily depend to a large extent on the nature of jurisdiction conferred, the constitution of the body required to decide the character and the rights and interests to be affected, the purpose for which the power is conferred and exercised, the effect of the exercise of power, etc.
10. Under the provisions of the Act, the State Government has the legal authority to determine the question of grant of exemption - rejection of the application would have certain obvious consequences and to the extent to which it has that duty to perform, it has, we think, the duty to act fairly towards the party seeking exemption. When we say it has a duty to act fairly, we mean that the State Government must give a 'hearing' to the party before rejecting the application for exemption. Ordinarily the use of the expression 'hearing' may connote an oral hearing but it is now well settled that, statutory authority acting in an administrative capacity decides its own procedure in regard to a fair hearing and may, having regard to the nature of the inquiry, decide for itself whether to deal with the application by giving an oral hearing or merely- on written material, provided the concerned party has been informed in advance of the material gathered or placed before the authority and the concerned party has had an opportunity to controvert the same. Recent statutes have imposed upon departments of the State Government or its officers the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds including those which have civil consequences as in the present case and this duty has to be discharged fairly, that is to say, without bias and after affording the concerned party an opportunity of being heard in the matter. This condition which is superimposed on the function to be discharged by the State Government may be made by keeping in mind not merely the character of the power but also the consequence of the exercise of that power. It must be realised that the Act was enacted to prevent the concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few and to curb speculation and profiteering therein. Its objective was to bring about an equitable distribution of such lands to subserve the common good. With that in view, the Legislature mandated that no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which the Act applies. A detailed procedure is laid down in Ss. 6 to 10 for the acquisition of excess vacant lands and Ss. 23 and 24 indicate how such lands shall be dealt with. Exemption from the application of those provisions can be granted in public interest or to avoid undue hardship. Therefore, the underlying idea is to secure excess vacant lands from the landholders and deal with the same to subserve the common good. Section 20 is, therefore, an exception to this objective of the enactment. It is in this background that we must consider the scope and extent of the hearing to be given to the applicant before a decision adverse to him is taken.
11. As pointed out earlier, the Act and the Rules are silent on the nature of hearing to be given to an applicant before his exemption application is deed. The principles of natural justice differ from tribunal to tribunal depending on the nature of the power to be , exercised, the consequences of the decision, etc., as already indicated earlier. There can be no hard and fast requirement that in all cases a personal hearing or to use the words of the Division Bench, an 'audience' must be given to the concerned party. That would depend on a variety of factors which go in the decision making, Where an administrative body is empowered to decide, it may, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, decide on the nature of hearing to be given to the concerned party. What is essential is that it must follow a fair procedure and not condemn a party unheard. Subba Rao J., (as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court in M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC671 observed in paragraph 10 as under :-
'It is no doubt a principle of natural justice that a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot make any decision adverse to a party without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegations against him.... The said opportunity need not necessarily be by personal hearing. It can be by written representation. Whether the said opportunity should be by written representation or by personal hearing depends upon, the facts of each case and ordinarily it is in the discretion of the tribunal.'
12. In Union of India v. Jyoti'Prakash, AIR 1971 SC 1093, the Supreme Court while dealing with Art. 217(3) of the Constitution of India which empowers the President to decide the question of birth-date, the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of the judgment said as under :
'Article 217(3) does not guarantee a right of personal hearing. In a proceeding of a judicial nature, the basic rules of natural justice must be followed. The respondent was on that account entitled to make a representation. But it is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice that personal hearing must he. likely to be affected by the order.'
13. In a recent decision, K. I.Sheperd v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 686, the Supreme Court while dealing with a scheme of amalgamation whereunder some employees were intended to be excluded from absorption, pointed out that the framing of the scheme under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act (10 of 1949) was an executive activity and hence it was necessary to abide by the rules of natural justice before excluding the names of certain employees from absorption in the bank to which merger took place. Dealing with the contention that the scheme-making process being an executive activity or alternately an administrative matter it was incumbent on the authorities to follow the rules of natural justice, the Supreme Court after referring to English and Indian cases observed as under in paragraph 12 of the judgment :
'On the basis of these authorities it must be held that even when a State agency acts administratively, rules of natural justice would Apply. As stated, natural justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly affected by proposed administrative acts, decisions or proceedings be given adequate notice of what is proposed so that they may be in a position (a) to make representations on their own behalf; (b) or to appear at a hearing or enquiry (if one is held); and (c) effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case (if any) they have to meet.'
Proceeding further, the Supreme Court pointed out that the principle of natural justice had various facets and acting fairly was one of them. Their Lordships then proceeded to observe as under in paragraph 15 of . the judgment :
. 'Fair play is a part of the public policy and is a guarantee for justice to citizens. In our system of Rule of Law every social agency conferred with power is required to act, fairly so-that social action would be just and there would be furtherance of the well-being of citizens. The rules of natural justice have developed with the growth of civilisation and the content thereof is of ten. considered as, a proper measure of the level of civilisation .and Rule of Law prevailing in the community. Man within the social frame has struggled for centuries to bring ~into the community the concept of fairness -and it has taken scores of years for the rules of natural justice to conceptually enter into the field of social activities.'
It, therefore, follows that even where a State agency is required to act administratively, it is bound to abide by the basic requirements of rule of natural justice.
14. It is, therefore, manifest from the above decisions that even quasi-judicial tribunals are not Unclear an obligation to give a personal hearing, much less administrative authorities which are not essentially dealing with a exercising power such as the one conferred by S. of the Act. Nandkishore's case, (AIR 1982 Madh Pra 33) supra), the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, after pointing out that the power to exempt carries with it an obligation to exercise that power in a fair manner, that is, by affording a hearing to the party claiming exemption before the same is refused, did not go so far as to state that the party has a right of audience, that is, to be heard personally before the rejection of the application. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Court observed as under :
'Having regard to the object which the provisions placed in S. 20(l)(b) of the Act have to achieve and also having regard to the serious consequences which will ensue in case the claim for exemption is rejected without hearing the claimant, it has to be held that the claimant has to be heard before refusal of his claim for exemption, so that he may show that there will be undue hardship to him in case exemption is not granted. Section 20(l)(b) of the Act does not negate natural justice and in absence of express exclusion of the rule of audit alteram partem, it is fair, indeed fundamental, that the person claiming exemption should not be prejudiced by action without opportunity to show the contrary.'
It is in this. context that the observations made in paragraph 6 of the judgment relied on by this Court in Nirmalaben's case, (AIR 1985 Guj 47) have to be appreciated. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, all that the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court stated was that where under the provisions of the Act power to grant exemption is conferred on an authority and a party has a right to claim it on fulfilment of various conditions, 'the authority is bound 'to hear' him and pass a speaking order giving reasons in support of its finding that he is not entitled to the exemption'. This hearing need not be a personal hearing in all cases but it must be left to the discretion of the authority to decide for itself in each case whether the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the points involved, etc., would warrant a personal hearing before making the-decision. As pointed out by Subba Rao J., in the case of M. P. Industries case, (AIR 1966 SC 671) (supra), the question falls within he realm of the tribunal's discretion whether the opportunity to be heard should be by a written representation or by personal hearing depending upon the facts of each case. Therefore, the question whether the opportunity of hearing should be by calling for a written representation to matters likely to be used against a party or by personal, hearing must depend on the facts of each case and must be left to the discretion of the concerned authority, It may be that when in doubt, the authority would be well advised to offer a personal hearing but that is a rule of prudence again left to the concerned authority to apply, if need be.
15. In view of the above discussion, we are clearly of the opinion that it is for the State Government while dealing with an application under S. 20(l) of the Act to decide, having regard to the facts and circumstances of, each case, whether a personal hearing or an- opportunity to file a written representation to the matters likely to be used against the applicant should be given before disposing of the exemption application on merits against the concerned party, unless the application is ex facie not maintainable in law. We do not subscribe to the argument that in each case the party seeking exemption is entitled to an audience or personal hearing before. his application is decided against him. We do not read the observations in Nirmalaben's ;case, (AIR 1985 Guj 47) to lay down a rule of universal application that in all cases arising under S. 20(l) of the Act regardless of the' nature of the dispute, the State Government is bound to give a personal hearing to the applicant before rejecting his application. A careful reading of the observations made by the Court in paragraph 3 of the judgment would show that the emphasis of the Court was on the complex nature of the issues to be tackled by the Government while exercising power or performing duty under S. 20(l) of the Act. That is why, after speaking about the complex nature of the issues likely to arise before the State Government, the Division Bench of this Court proceeded to observe (at p. 49) :
'It is, therefore, in the fitness of the things that the Government should ordinarily hear the applicant if the Government is prima facie and ex party inclined to take a view that the exemption was not to be granted.'
The words ordinarily hear the applicant go to show that the Court did not intend to lay down any hard and fast rule of universal application that in all cases for exemption under S. 20(1), the State Government was under an obligation to give an audience to the concerned party before rejecting his application. It also becomes obvious from the observation in paragraph5 of the judgment - 'The outcome will be that the Government will afford a reasonable opportunity of audience to all these petitioners and then decide their applications afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act'. That the right of audience was confined to 'these petitioners' and not to all applicants invoking S. 20(1) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this Court in Nirmalaben's case did not lay down any rule of general application that in all cases arising under S. 20(l) of the Act, personal hearing must be afforded regardless of the nature of the case. If that was the intention of the Court, we respectfully disagree. We think that it must be left to the discretion of the authority, that is, the State Government, to decide for itself in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances'' and the complexity 'or otherwise of the issues arising therein, whether or not to give a personal hearing to the concerned applicant before refusing exemption claimed by him.
16. We now proceed to consider whether in all cases where an exemption application under S. 20(l) of the Act is pending, the competent authority must stay its hands on receipt of a statement under S. 6 of the Act till the exemption application is disposed of one way or the other by the State Government. Now, as pointed out earlier, S. 3 of the Act debars a person from holding vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit except as otherwise provided. Section 6 enjoins upon every person holding vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit to file a statement before the competent authority specifying the location, extent, value, etc., of all vacant lands held by him. He must also specify the vacant land within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. Rule 3 of the Rules prescribes the Form (Form 1) for the statement to be filed by the holder of vacant lands. This form is divided in two parts Part A entitled 'Abstract of the total vacant land held by a person' and Part B entitled 'Statement under sub-section (1) of S. 6 of the Act'. Column 9 in Part A requires the applicant to state if any exemption from the ceiling limit is claimed or sought to any vacant land held by him under either S. 19 or S. 20 of the Act and if so, to give details thereof. Column 12 of Part B requires the applicant to state whether any land in respect of which exemption has been sought under S. 20 of the Act, Column is included in Annexure A which requires particulars of all vacant lands to be given and if so, whether particulars of such lands have been furnished in Annexure G. Annexure G requires the applicant to furnish particulars of land for exemption has been sought under S. 20 of the Act. Column 16 requires the applicant to state the particulars of land which he desires to retain and the particulars of land which he proposes to surrender as, per Annexure I ' Annexure I is divided in two sections, the first dealing with land desired to be retained and the second, regarding land proposed to be surrendered. The statement has to be filed in the prescribed manner only, by those holding in excess of the ceiling limit at the relevant time and not every holder of vacant land. It becomes obvious that the person submitting the statement to the competent authority must specify the vacant land which he desires to retain and lands in respect whereof he has applied for exemption. After the statement in the prescribed form is received by the competent authority, the latter bound to prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who filed the statement. Rule 5 requires that the draft statement to be prepared under S. 8(l) shall be in Form III. The draft statement must contain certain particulars including particulars in respect of vacant lands in Part D thereof which such person desires to retain. After the draft statement is so prepared, it is required to be served on the person concerned in the manner prescribed by Rule 5(2) inviting objections if any, thereto. Such objections must be filed within thirty days or the extended period. from the date of receipt of the draft statement prepared under S. 8(l). This is the first stage when S. 8(3) gives the person concerned an opportunity to object to anything mentioned in the draft statement. On receipt of the objection within the time allowed, the competent authority is expected by S. 8(4) to decide the objection, if any, after giving the objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard and then pass appropriate orders. Such an order of the competent authority is appealable under S. 33 and is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under S. 34 of the Act. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the petitioners that if the objections raised under S. 8(3) are decided and orders are passed under S. 8(4) before the exemption application made under S. 20(l) is finalised, the concerned party, the objector, will be driven to an appeal if the decision of the competent authority is adverse to him. It was, therefore, emphasised that even if we are inclined to think that the proceedings can proceed up to the S. 8(3) stage, the same should not be allowed to proceed beyond that stage till the exemption application is disposed of. We see force in this submission but we are not inclined to think that any hard and fast rule of general application can be laid down that in all cases where an application for exemption is pending, under S. 20(l), everything must grind to a halt regardless of the nature of the objection raised, if the objection relates to the vacant lands in respect of which exemption is claimed and the nature of objection is such that the decision on the exemption application would influence the decision of the competent authority on the objection, it would be necessary to stop at the S. 8(3) stage rather than decide the objection against the objector and drive the party to an appeal. If on the other hand the objection has no relation to the lands in respect of which exemption is sought under S. 20(l), there is no reason why the competent authority should not proceed to deal with and dispose of the objection. The competent authority will, therefore, have to decide in each case in which an exemption application is pending whether or not to proceed beyond the S. 8(3) stage. We, however, do not see any reason why the proceedings cannot continue up to the S. 8(3) stage and why in all cases regardless of the nature of the objection and its relation to the land in respect of which exemption is claimed, the proceedings cannot proceed beyond the S. 8(3) stage.
17. After the competent authority has disposed of the objections, the draft statement has to be altered in accordance with the orders passed on the objections. Section 9 then requires a copy of the final statement to be served on the person concerned. Section 10(1) next requires that as soon as may be thereafter, the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant lands held by the concerned person in excess of the ceiling limit to be published in the Official Gazette specifying that such vacant lands are to be acquired by the State Government and requiring all persons interested in such vacant lands to make their claims giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such lands. Rule 6 of the Rules sets out the manner of publication of the notification containing particulars of the vacant lands. Section 10(2) states that the competent authority shall consider claims received in pursuance of the notification and determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders in that behalf as , deemed. fit, After such claims are disposed of, the competent authority is empowered by S. 10(3) to issue a further notification in the Official Gazette declaring that the excess vacant lands set out in the notification under S. 10(l) shall, with effect from such date as is specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and thereupon such lands shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the specified date. Section 11 provides for the payment of compensation to persons interested in such lands. It was, therefore, argued, and we think rightly, that if the acquisition process is allowed to be completed before the exemption application under S. 20(l) is disposed of and if the lands in respect of which exemption is claimed stand acquired and vest in the State Government, it would cause an anomalous position if the State Government ultimately decides to grant exemption in respect of -the, said lands. We agree with the learned advocates for the petitioners that such a situation cannot be allowed and it, would, therefore, be in the fitness of things that the proceed beyond the S. 10(2) stage if the' exemption application has not been disposed of by then. If the process is not arrested at the end of S. 10(2) stage and is allowed to proceed up to S. 10(3) stage, a difficult and tricky situation may arise in that, on the one hand the acquisition of the excess lands would be completed and the lands would vest in the State Government absolutely free from all encumbrances whereas on the other hand the State Government may grant exemption in respect of the very same lands from the application of the provisions of Chapter III (Ss. 3 to 24) of the, Act. Such a situation can best be avoided by arresting the process at the end of S. 10(2) stage. Even the learned Government Pleader fairly conceded that if the exemption application is not disposed of by then, it would not be permissible for the competent authority to proceed beyond the S. 10(2) stage.
18. It was argued by the learned advocates for the petitioners that under S. 6 as well as S. 8(2)of the act, a person filing the statement is entitled to specify the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. It was submitted that unless the exemption application is disposed of, it would not be possible for the concerned party to express his desire -as regards the retention of any vacant land falling within the ceiling limit. In this connection our attention was also invited to Form I of the Rules, Column 16 in Part B whereof requires the person furnishing the statement to give the particulars of the land which he desires to retain in the manner provided by Annexure I. That indeed is true. It is however, obvious on a plain reading of S.6(1) that the choice in regard to the retention of any vacant land falling within the ceiling limit has to be made while filing the statement under S. 6(1) of the Act. It is nobody's case that once exemption application is filed under S. 20(l), even the requirement of filing a statement under S. 6(1) must be arrested. Unless a statement under S. 6(l) is filed, it would not be possible to as certain the extent of the excess land held by such person. The draft statement to be prepared by the competent authority has to be based on the statement filed under S. 6. Therefore, when the draft statement is prepared under S. 8(l), it is necessary that it should contain the particulars set out in S. 8(2) which includes particulars in regard to vacant lands which such person desires to retain Within the ceiling limit. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission that if the process goes beyond S. 8(1) stage, the concerned party would be unnecessarily required to go through the gamut of filing objections to the draft statement. Besides,the draft statement prepared under S. 8(1) read with Rule 5 and Form III of the Rules makes it clear that it, is provisional in nature and has to be finalised only after the objections received under S. 8(3) are disposed of. A somewhat similar argument was advanced before Mehrotra J., of the Allahabad High, Court in Beni Prasad v. District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1982 All 103. Dealing with the said argument the learned Judge proceeded to observe as under (at p. 105):-
'There is nothing in the Act which can be said to lay down that if the choice is not expressed under S. 6(1) of the Act then such choice regarding the vacant land to be retained and the vacant land. to be surrendered cannot be exercised at the subsequent stage when the objections under S. 8(3) to the draft statement are filed. The very fact that the person concerned is called upon to file his objection under S. 8(3) of the Act leads to the inference that it is open to the person concerned at that stage to express his choice so that instead -of the land proposed to be taken as surplus land, some other land of the and. In my view this interpretation is also reinforced by Part 'F' of Form III which has been prescribed under S. 5 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules 1976. The heading in Part F of this form is 'Particulars of the extent (in hectares and square metres) and identity of the lands to be surrendered (as provisionally assessed)'. The use of the word 'provisionally' in the said heading is significant. It clearly means that whatever has been stated in the draft statement is provisional and is subject to the, objections of the person concerned.'
We are in respectful agreement with this view since it is obvious from the scheme of Ss. 6 to 10 that till the draft statement is finalised after the objections are finally disposed of, i would be open to the competent authority to alter or vary the same. If the concerned party therefore, desires to alter its choice regarding the vacant land within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain, he can do so till the draft statement is finalised. We have already pointed out earlier that if the objection to be filed under S. 8(3) is one which has a direct bearing on the exemption application filed under S. 20(l) and if the disposal of the exemption application is likely -to influence the decision on the objection, it would be open to the competent authority to stop a the S. 8(3) stage if the facts and circumstances so demand. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in this submission made by, the learned advocate for the petitioners.
19. Now S. 20 of the Act begins with the non obstante clause - 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter' and empowers the State Government to exempt excess vacant land from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act. Clauses (a) and of sub-section (1) of S. 20 can, therefore, be invoked by a person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. Exemptions from the provisions of Chapter III can be granted in public interest or to avoid undue hardship likely to be caused to the holder of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. It is obvious from the plain language of Clauses (a) and (b) of S. 20(1) that the person applying must be the holder of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. There can arise no need to apply for exemption if the applicant does not hold land in excess of the ceiling limit. It is also necessary to realise that an application for exemption can be made at any stage of the proceedings before the acquisition of excess land is completed and vesting in the State Government takes place. The scheme of Chapter III also shows that only persons holding vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit are required by S. 6 to file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the vacant lands held by him. It is on the basis of the statement filed under S. 6 that the competent authority has to prepare a draft statement under S. 8(l) albeit after such inquiry as he deems fit to, make. It is, therefore, obvious that these provisions apply to persons holding vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit. The failure to file a statement under S. 6 is punishable under S. 38 of the Act. It, therefore, follows that all those who apply under S. 20(l) would be holders of vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit. Since S. 20(l) does not prescribe any time limit for making an application for exemption, it follows that such an application can be made at any stage before the lands are acquired and vest in the State Government. may also arise where recourse may be had to S. to delay completion. of the process leading to the acquisition of excess lands by making an application for exemption at a belated stage. But all these difficulties can be avoided if only the State Government ,on receipt of an application under S. 20(1) proceeds to dispose it of pro without loss of time. We do not see any reason why an application under s. 20(l) should consume a lot of time for disposal. But the question is, whether it would be correct to arrest the proceedings at the S. 8(l) stage merely because the State Government has for some reason or the other failed to dispose of the exemption application under S. 20(l) with despatch? Here the argument was that unless the outcome of the exemption application is known, the holder of lands would not be able to express his desire which parcel of land he would like to retain within the ceiling limit, which we have already disposed of earlier. We have pointed out earlier that the holder of excess lands is required to make his choice which land he would like to retain within the ceiling limit at the time when he files the statement in the prescribed form under S. 6 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Rules. While filing this form, he has also to state whether he has applied for exemption under S. 20 and to give particulars of the lands in respect of which exemption is sought. In Nirmalaben's case (AIR 1985 Guj 47) the observations in this behalf which we have extracted earlier are found in paragraph 2 only. After referring to the non obstante clause in S. 20 of the Act, the Division Bench has observed that the declaration about the lands being surplus can only be made after the decision on the application under S. 20 of the Act is taken. The Court then proceeds to add that the overall consideration of the provisions of Chapter III presupposes that the full effect will be given to all the provisions so that a coherent system of working out the problem is evolved. In its opinion 'If a declaration under Ss. 8(l) and 8(3) proceeds one way or the other, decision of an application for exemption, it will be tantamount to putting a cart before a horse'. Elaboration in this behalf is that if the application is ultimately granted, it will be a meaningless exercise to proceed beyond the filing of the statement under S. 6 of the Act. Since the reasons given by the Division Bench in this behalf are very brief, it is difficult to apppreciate the premise on which the Division Bench, came to the conclusion that it would not be-proper to proceed beyond the S. 6 stage if an application for exemption is filed and is pending under S. 20(l) of the Act. The Division Bench has failed to appreciate that the draft statement to be prepared under S. 8(l) containing the particulars mentioned in S. 8(2) must be based on the statement filed by the concerned person under S. 6 and is only provisional in nature and can be finalised only after the disposal of the objections, if any, filed by the person concerned. It is at that stage that the competent authority must apply its mind whether the objections can be disposed of not withstanding the pendency of the exemption application. If the pendency of the exemption application is likely to influence the decision of the competent authority on the objections raised by the concerned party, the competent authority may in its wisdom decide to arrest the proceedings at that stage and await the decision of the State Government on the exemption application. If the objection has no relevance whatsoever to the lands in respect of which exemption is claimed under S. 20(l), we fail to understand why the competent authority should not proceed to dispose of the objection.Therefore, as stated earlier, we do not see any objection to proceeding up to the S. 8(3) stage as that is not likely to adversely affect the rights of the concerned person. It is only when the competent authority reaches the S. 8(3) stage and receives objections and is required to decide them that it must apply its mind to the question whether it should proceed to pass an order under S. 8(4) notwithstanding the pendency of the exemption application. We are, therefore, not impressed by the argument that if the proceedings are allowed to go beyond the stage, it would tantamount to putting a efore a horse or that it would render exercise meaningless if ultimately .emption is granted under S. 20(l) of the Act. It is indeed true, as pointed out earlier, that it should be the endeavour of the State Government to dispose of the application under S. 20(l) at an early date but we are not inclined to the view that merely because an application for exemption is pending, the entire process beyond the S. 6 stage should grind to a halt till such application is decided. In our view, ordinarily the process can be carried up to the S. 8(3) stage and at that stage the competent authority must apply its mind whether having regard to the nature of the objections it would be desirable to pass an order adverse to the objection under S. 8(4) notwithstanding the pendency of the exemption application. If the objection has no relevance to the lands in respect of which exemption is sought, we see no reason why the competent authority should not proceed further up to the S. 10(2) stage. For the above reasons we are afraid we cannot subscribe to the view expressed in paragraph 2 of Nirmalaben's case.
20. Before we part. we would like to state that even though in law it is open to the competent authority to proceed up to the S. 8(3) stage initially and then decide in each case whether it is permissible to proceed further up to the S. 10(2) stage, we must emphasise that,it should be the endeavour of the State Government to dispose of an exemption application made under S. 20(l) promptly and without loss of time. If an application for exemption is made immediately after the statement is filed under S. 6 and before the draft statement is prepared under S. 8(l), the effort of the State Government should be to dispose of the application made under S. 20(l) as early as possible and preferably before the objections are disposed of under S. 8(4) of the Act unless the delay is on account of want of co-operation from the concerned party. If the exemption application is, however, belatedly made with a view to stalling the proceedings that would be a different matter but even in such cases there is no reason why the disposal of the exemption application should not be prompt. In our view, the State Government should instruct its officers who are empowered to deal with the exemption applications made under S. 20(l) of the Act to dispose of such application within a prescribed time-frame say six months so that proceedings under Ss. 8 to 10 of the Act are not held up at any stage. We need not emphasise the need for early disposal of the exemption applications any more.
21. We have answered the two points referred to us as above. The two petitions will now be placed before the learned single Judge dealing with such cases for further orders in accordance with law.
22. Order accordingly.