ORDER
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. Tenant is the revision petitioner. Eviction was sought for under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of Act 2 of 1965. Rent Control Court dismissed the petition holding that there is no bona fides in the plea. However, benefit of the second proviso was denied to the tenant. On appeal by landlord the Appellate Authority found that the plea of the landlord is bonafide and held that the tenant had not established both the ingredients of the second proviso to Section 11(3). The appeal was allowed and the tenant was directed to put the landlord in possession.
2. Petition schedule building is an out house with a separate entrance. Landlord along with his wife was residing in the main building situated in the same compound. Original tenant died. Now the present tenant is conducting a money lending business by name 'City Finance'. Monthly rent of the building is Rs. 75/-. Landlord was away in Bombay in connection with the employment. He retired from service in 1982 and he is occupying the main building along with his wife. Landlord bonafide needs the building for the purpose of conducting an agency business. The business involves storage, display and sale of multi volumes of valuable books. Ever since 1983 the wife of the landlord has been in contact with various publishers and book companies for agency and terms and conditions have been agreed upon. Due to want of proper place of business for display of books, storing them etc. she is denied of the privilege of conducting and developing the business. The building bearing number 36/510 is the petition schedule building, which as we have already indicated, is an out house. The building bearing No. 36/509 is the main building in which landlord and his wife are residing. Landlord had highlighted the advantage in using the tenanted premises, which was very near to the place of their residence and in the same compound. The land in which the two buildings are situated is having an extent of 60 cents out of which 23 cents of land which is having road frontage of Canon Shed road which was sold by the landlord. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition on the ground that landlord has not shown any special reasons why the premises in which the landlord and his wife are occupying is not sufficient for their requirement. The Appellate Authority however allowed the appeal holding that the landlord has shown sufficient reason for not using his residential premises and that the tenant has not discharged the burden under the second proviso to Section 11(3).
3. Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sri T.P. Kelu Nambiar submitted that the entire complexion in the area has been changed due to subsequent events. Counsel filed I.A.No 1677 of 2003 along with an affidavit underlying the subsequent events. Reference was also made to paragraph 9 of the Memorandum of Revision as well. After narrating the position in 1994, it is stated that, in the year 2003 there is a vast further change in the situation and in the events at the instance of the landlord. The property on which the original building stood, has an extent of 60 cents. A twelve storeyed building was constructed by the Southern Investments in the name and style of S.I. Ambar Park. The building faces the Cannon Shed Road. Ambar Park is surrounded in all the four sides by huge compound walls and the entry to the building is from the Canon Shed Road. Though a narrow pathway is constructed to reach the present building from the Market Road, the said pathway is not being used by anybody since it is not motorable. First respondent herein - the landlord had been occupying five flats in the new building of which, according to the petitioner, he has already sold two. Still he is in occupation of three apartments. Counsel submitted that eviction was sought for in 1987 on the basis of the lie of the old building, the nearness of the petition schedule building to the old building and the direct access to the petition schedule building etc. The entire situation has now been changed and the old building is not in existence and a new building has come up which has no features of the old building. Counsel submitted that the above factors are of considerable importance to decide the issue. Counsel also submitted wife of the landlord is 79 years old and it is difficult to conceive that at this stage she should would start a business. Counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256) and wanted this court to examine the subsequent events, Counsel appearing for the landlord submitted that this court need only examine the position that existed on the date of filing of the petition for eviction. Reference was made to the decisions of the apex court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604) and G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin and Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 610). Counsel submitted landlord shall not be penalised due to change of circumstances. Counsel submitted subsequent developments in the area are made use of by tenants as well and that cannot be the basis for considering the application.
4. The plea of the landlord that the subsequent events need not be looked into cannot be accepted. We are of the view that the tenant is not instrumental for the fall out of the subsequent events. Changes were effected at the instance of the landlord. In a given case such events could change the need projected by the landlord. Three Judges bench of the Apex Court in Hasmat Raj v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103) held that the ground of personal requirement must continue to exist till final determination of the case. The Appellate Authority must therefore take cognizance of the subsequent events. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770) the Apex Court held as follows:
'It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact op the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.'
Building in which landlord was staying has been demolished. Nearness of the tenanted building to that premises and its advantages were highlighted by the landlord as 'special reasons' for defeating the plea under the first proviso to Section 11(3). Drastic changes were taken place not due to the delay or slowness of the legal system but at the volition of the landlord. Courts could always take note of the subsequent events which are purely of law or founded on facts. Procedure to be followed for bringing in subsequent events by making proper amendment of the pleadings has been highlighted by the apex court in the decision in Om Prakash Gupta's case, supra (2002) 2 SCC 256). We may extract the relevant portion of the judgment for easy reference.
'The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decrees in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders this court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be blinked at. The court may in such cases bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated for it would promote substantial justice provided that there is absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances.'
Subsequent event could be brought to the knowledge of the Rent Control Court, Appellate Authority and even before this court so that the court could mould the relief to do complete justice between the parties and also could shorten the litigation. But the court should at the threshold when the subsequent events are brought to its knowledge examine whether those events have any fundamental impact on the main issue and if not addressed would cause serious prejudice to the parties either to the landlord or to the tenant. Subsequent events could be brought in by the tenant as well as the landlord since Rent Laws are neither pro-landlord or pro-tenant. But court should be guarded that its process are not abused or taken undue advantage of or misused or used as a medium to delay the rights of parties.
5. In the facts of the case we are convinced that subsequent events have got considerable relevance not only to test the bona fides of the landlord under Section 11(3) but also on the question as to whether the tenant is entitled to get the benefit of the first proviso to Section 11(3). But the events projected have to be established in factual material. We therefore express no opinion on the merits of the issue. So far as the second proviso to Section 11(3) is concerned, tenant has failed to establish the ingredients. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, no further probe so far as the second proviso to Section 11(3) is concerned is necessary and the finding rendered on the said proviso is declared final. We are therefore inclined to remand the matter back to the Rent Control Court to examine the 'subsequent events' to test the bona fides under Section 11(3) and to decide the plea under the first proviso to Section 11(3). Rent Control Court would give an opportunity to both sides to amend the pleadings, adduce evidence and pass final orders in accordance with law within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Rent which is being paid by the tenant is considerably low. Considering the development that has taken place we are inclined to fix the rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month tentatively. Tenant would pay rent at the abovesaid rate from 1.11.2003 onwards subject to the rights of parties approaching the civil court for fixation of fair rent, if so advised. The revision is allowed as above.