Hariharan Nair, J.
1. Both these appeals are filed by the insurer, the New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Madras. The challenge is with regard to the fastening of liability on the appellant with regard to the compensation due to two workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. Respondents 1 to 4 are the claimants. They filed application under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act claiming compensation for the death of two sons of the 1st respondent in an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment under the present 5th respondent on March 15, 1995. The two sons, Babu and Ashok Kumar were employed under the 5th respondent at the factory site at Kaiporikara. While hoisting an iron beam to the 5th floor of the building under construction the beam fell down resulting in eventual death of the two victims on the same day.
3. The fatal accident and the fact that the 5th respondent was the employer are not under challenge in these appeals. The feet that there was an insurance policy valid at the time of the accident is also not disputed. The contention of the appellant is only that the insurer has no liability in so far as the conditions contemplated in Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act are not applicable here;
4. We have heard both sides at length. In the nature of the contentions raised, only two questions arise for consideration. They are (i) Whether the liability of the 5th respondent has to be taken up by the appellant? and (ii) whether the quantum of compensation fixed in the case is proper and correct?
5. In the nature of the 1st contention and in the absence of plea against existence of valid insurance policy issued to the 5th respondent, we may directly go to Section 14(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923:
'14. Insolvency of employer:- (1) Where any employer has entered into a contract with any insurer in respect of any liability under this Act to any workman, then in the event of the employer becoming insolvent or making a composition or scheme of arrangement with his creditors or, if the employer is a company, in the event of the company having commenced to be wound up, the rights of the employer against the insurers as respects that liability shall, notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force relating to insolvency or the winding up of the companies, be transferred to and vest in the workman, and upon any such transfer the insurers shall have the rights and remedies and be subject to the same liabilities as if they were the employer, so, however, that the insurers shall not be under any greater liability to the workman than they would have been under the employer.'
The claimants or the 5th respondent has no case that the contingency of insolvency mentioned in the aforesaid Section arises here. At the same time, it is argued by the claimants that the mentioning of the contingency of insolvency in the Section is only to specify the nature of rights of the workman that will be available against the insurer and the latter's rights against the workman, and that even in its absence, the normal liability of an insurer under the policy will still be applicable.
6. As regards the scope of Section 14 aforementioned there has been some conflict between the various High Courts. It is necessary to briefly refer to the same here. In United India Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Machinery . 1986 ACJ 1079 and in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prem Bair and Ors. 1987 ACJ 278 the liability of the insurer was upheld by the Madhya Pradesh & Karnataka High Courts albeit the contingencies mentioned in Section 14 were not available therein. The same was the position declared in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gangadharan 1986 KLT 1034 and in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alphonsa 1988 (1) KLT 661. On the other hand, the decision in Charag Chemicals Industries v. R.G. Ganeshan 1981 ACJ 532 and United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Joseph Mariani and Anr. 1979 ACJ 349 strike a contrary note. It was found therein that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner will not, in the absence of fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in Section 14 which will necessarily include insolvency of the insurer, be justified in fastening liability on the insured.
It was specifically held that except in cases where the conditions laid down in Section 14(1) are duly satisfied, the Commissioner for Workmen's compensation will have no jurisdiction to issue any direction to the insurer to deposit into his Court the amount of compensation payable by the employer to the dependent of the deceased employee.
7. A Full Bench of this Court dealt with this question elaborately in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Vasudevan (1989 (1) KLT 366 and answered the question against the insurer; but it is pointed out during arguments in the present case that, that decision has no application in the present case in so far as the fatal accident involved herein did not arise from any motor accident and as such the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act providing for different criterion with regard to liability of the insurer as available in Vasudevan's case (supra) is not applicable here. We have, therefore, to consider the question in detail based on the facts of the present case.
8. It is necessary to survey the provisions in the Workmen's Compensation Act to understand the nature of liability of the employer and the extent to which he can be indemnified by the insurer. The employer's liability to pay compensation in case of personal injury caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment arises under Section 3 of the Act. As to what is the amount of compensation payable in respect of the injury sustained by the workman is mentioned in Section 4 of the Act read with Schedule IV. That immediate payment is contemplated, is clear from Section 4A of the Act. It is clear from the above provisions that expeditious payment of compensation amount to the workman or his legal heirs, is the purpose sought to be achieved by the Act. It is a social security measure and the contemplated result can be best achieved through the insurer.
9. As regards Section 14 quoted in para 5 above a reading thereof makes it clear that it provides for transferring and vesting in the workman the rights and remedies which an employer may have against the insurer under a contract of insurance for the benefit of such workman in the event of such employer becoming insolvent or making a compositionor scheme of arrangement with his creditors or,if the employer is a company, in the event ofthe company having commenced to be woundup. It is specifically provided that this is sonotwithstanding anything in any law for thetime being in force relating to insolvency or thewinding up of companies.
10. The need for such a provision may be examined. Under the insolvency law when a person becomes insolvent or the winding up of a company has commenced, all the rights and remedies of such person or company enforceable against a third party under a contract will stand transferred to and vest in the Official Receiver or official assignee in the one case and official liquidator in the other. The provision in Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act appears to have been drafted only to overcome the possibility of such untoward consequences affecting the life of the employer company thereby proving detrimental to the interests of workman. Such a beneficial provision cannot at all be construed as taking away the right of the insured-employer to obtain indemnity under a contract of insurance, especially when enabling provision is included therefor in Section 19 of the Act. We, therefore, are of the view that Section 14 does not enable the insurance company to negate its liability under the contract of insurance issued by it specifically agreeing to cover the employer's liability to a workman under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
11. There is yet another reason why Section 14 should be construed in the above manner. In industrial law, interpretation should be given in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution in favour of the labour. The benefit of reasonable doubt on law and facts, if there be such doubt, must go in such cases in favour of the weaker section, namely, the labour. If we give an interpretation to Section 14 against the liability of the insurer, the result will be that the beneficiary-labour might find it difficult to recover the amounts from the employer directly thereby defeating the very scheme of the Act. That such an interpretation is necessary is clear from the decision in K.C.P.E. Association, Madras v. K.C.P. Ltd. (1978-I-LLJ-322)(SC). Since Workmen's Compensation Act is a labour welfare oriented legislation, the benefit thereof should always go to the beneficiary in case of doubt and this is yet another reason why Section 14 should be given an interpretation as above.
12. It is true that the claim made by the workman relating to the incident involved in Vasudevan 's case (supra) is related to a motor accident. The claimant therein preferred to approach the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for relief avoiding the MACT and that was how the question of applicability of Section 14 arose in Vasudevan's case. Nevertheless, a perusal of the said decision shows that the scope and ambit relating to applicability of Section 14 has been considered independently and in extension therein and that the decision against the insurer rendered in that case, that is, affirming his liability to indemnify the insured, did not proceed from the provisions available in the Motor Vehicles Act alone. We are in respectful agreement with the principles laid down by the Full Bench in the aforesaid case. We therefore find that while dealing with claims under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is empowered, irrespective of whether the claim arose out of a Motor Accident or not, to direct the insurer to pay the compensation even in contingencies other than those contemplated in Section 14 of the Act, provided the policy does not exclude liability for claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is well settled that the insurer also will come within the scope of 'any person' contemplated in Section 19 of the Act and thus within the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. The finding in the impugned award that the appellant is liable to pay the compensation claimed in this case is, therefore confirmed.
13. We now come to the second question, that is, with regard to the quantum of liability. A perusal of the impugned decision shows that compensation was allowed invoking the amended provisions in the Workmen's Compensation Act. This is clearly erroneous in so far as the date of accident involved in the case is March 16, 1995. It has been finally decided in United India Insurance Co. Ltd, v. Alavi (1998-II-LLJ-896) (Ker-FB) that as regards the accidents which occurred before September 15, 1995, the provisions of the pre-amended Act alone will have to be applied.
14. The compensation payable to the claimants is therefore, to be refixed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner applying the provisions in the Act as it stood before the amendment.
15. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order in part and remand the cases to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for fixing the quantum of liability bearing in mind the principles aforementioned. The parties are directed to appear before the Commissioner on August 20, 1999.
16. The appeals are disposed of as above.