Kurian Joseph, J.
1. The best person to dispute a signature is the signatory himself. But when signatory himself disputes a signature affixed years back, is it reasonable, rather prudent to obtain sample signature after informing the person the purpose and subject the same to expert study Yet another interesting feature of the instant case is the challenge by the State on the validity of a regulation framed with its approval.
2. The original petition is at the instance of the State. There is a challenge against Regulation 37 of the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal Regulations, 1966 framed under Section 4(4) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' with the previous sanction of the Government. Regulation 37 reads as follows :
'The Tribunal may, in any proceedings, issue a Commission for the examination, or interrogatories, or otherwise, of any person or for examining the accounts or records of any person resident within the State. Provisions of order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and of the Civil Rules of Practice as far as practicable shall apply to the application form to be issued and return of Commissions.'
According to the State, the said provision is inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act, since the parent Act does not authorise issue of commissions. The relevant Section 53 of the Act reads as follows :
'An assessing authority or an appellate or revising authority (including the Appellate Tribunal) shall, for the purposes of this Act, have all the powers conferred on a court by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely,--
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation ; and
(b) compelling the production of any documents.'
3. Learned Government Pleader contends that the power under Section 4(4) of the Act is only to frame regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act and since the Act does not contemplate the Tribunal issuing a Commission under the Regulations, framed though with the previous sanction of the Government, it is inconsistent and hence to be declared so.
4. The issue relates to the assessment in respect of the year 1986-87 on the second respondent, hereinafter referred to as the assessee. It is his case that he has no connection with the business of two firms, namely, Hevia Combines and Jaimond Traders. The assessee disputed the genuineness of a document dated December 7, 1987 allegedly written by the assessee admitting to have run both the abovementioned business concerns. According to the department, the assessee did not in so many words at the pre-assessment stage dispute the genuineness of the document and hence it was not open to him to take up this issue at the second appeal stage before the Tribunal and exhibit P2 reply from the assessee is relied on. I am afraid that contention may not be fully correct. In exhibit P2 at paragraph 12 the assessee has referred to the issue as follows :
'You have referred a letter dated December 7, 1987 in para (5) of your grounds, but I have not written any such letter. I have signed some papers in the office while I have been in the office. I seriously (words are missing in the photocopy) in a paper unknowingly left there by me or this letter is concocted one.'
Thus it cannot be said that the assessee did not have such a case on the genuineness of the letter. True, the assessee did not dispute the signature as such on the said letter.
5. Be that as it may, the assesses filed an application before the Tribunal as I.P. No. 84 of 2001 in T.A. No. 78 of 2001. The Tribunal was also of the view that since the assessee had disputed the genuineness of the abovementioned documents, the assessing authority should not have by themselves decided the authenticity by comparing the signatures ; it should have been left it to an expert body. By exhibit P3 order dated May 22, 2001 it was ordered to refer the issue for the opinion of a handwriting expert. Both the assessee and the State were required to furnish a panel of names of handwriting experts. Thereafter the case was taken up by the Tribunal on June 22, 2001. Though the original document dated December 7, 1987 was produced as directed by the Tribunal, the State did not furnish any list of experts. (One cannot normally expect the State to furnish a list of experts within a period of one month, going by the style of functioning of the bureaucracy!). The assessee furnished the list and from which the Tribunal appointed as per exhibit P4 order R.P. Singh and Company, Delhi as the expert. The original document along with 'specimen signatures' of the assessee were forwarded to the expert. It is seen from the proceedings that the specimen signatures were taken by the Tribunal on June 23, 2001. The expert forwarded his opinion as per exhibit P5 report concluding that the disputed document is a forged one, not executed by the assessee. Since the expert was not keeping well to travel to give evidence before the Tribunal, on application exhibit P6 order was issued to examine the expert by a Commission. One Mr. M.T. George, Advocate of the Supreme Court was appointed as the Advocate Commission and on examination exhibit P7 deposition was forwarded to the Tribunal. The expert deposed in terms of exhibit P5 report. That is in September, 2001. It is at that stage, the State took up the challenge before this Court against the entire proceedings, from exhibits P3 to P7 of the Tribunal including a challenge against the very statutory provision.
6. The Tribunal is a seat of justice and a judicial body with jurisdiction to render justice. The Tribunal exercises judicial functions and the powers exercised by them are almost the same as those exercised by courts of justice, specially in matters of procedure. That is the reason the apex Court as early as in 1967 in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1494 held that even the Registrar of Co-operative Societies while exercising his dispute resolution power is not merely possessing trappings of a court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses' on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. Section 53 of the Act confers on the Tribunal all the powers conferred on a court by the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the two enumerated aspects (1) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation and (2) compelling the production of any document. The State has no demur on the said provision and it is conceded that the Tribunal is clothed with powers to summon and examine a person and also examination of any document. The objection is on the power of the Tribunal on examining the same by Commission on the basis of the provisions of Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure. One fails to understand as to how there could be a grievance for the State on this aspect. If the power of the Tribunal is conceded for the purpose of summoning and examining a person or document, then it is only a matter of procedure as to how the examination is done and that procedure is laid down in Regulation 37 empowering the Tribunal to conduct the examination even by a Commission. I do not think that there is any inconsistency. I also do not think any prejudice as such would be caused to the State. It would not in any way affect the cause of justice. Unless the Tribunals are given such powers, it will not be practicable for them to effectively function. Some times such a process saves time and money too. As held by M.P. Menon, J. in Cheru Ouseph v. Kunhipathumma 1981 KLT 495, in procedural matters 'all powers which are not specifically denied by the statute or the statutory rules, should be vouchsafed to a Tribunal so that it may effectively exercise its judicial function'. This view was affirmed by a recent division Bench decision of this Court in Jacob Varkey v. Idukki District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2001 (2) KLT 77 viewed from this angle even in the absence of Regulation 37 the Tribunal could have regulated its procedure of examination of a witness on oath by issuing a Commission. Hence Regulation 37 is perfectly legal, valid and consistent with Section 53 of the parent Act.
8. But the problem does not end there. The State has taken a contention that the dispute on the signature is in a letter dated December 7, 1987, but the sample signatures were taken on June 23, 2001 and an expert was requested to compare the disputed signature of 1987 with the sample signature of 2001. It is contended that the signatures of the assessee which are contemporaneous were available in the files and any comparison of the disputed signature should have been with admitted contemporaneous were signatures. I see force in the contention. Going through the report of the expert as contained in exhibit P5 and his deposition exhibit P7, I find that the entire conclusions on the genuineness of the document have been arrived at by comparing the disputed signature with that of the sample signatures. As already observed above, the sample signatures are of 2001 whereas the disputed signatures are of 1987. It needs no elaboration to note that in such circumstances, the genuineness of the document at the hands of the expert was not tested in a fair, proper and reasonable manner. It may be seen that the specimen signatures of the assessee who himself disputes his signature affixed in 1987 are taken in 2001 knowing fully well that it is for the purpose of comparing with the disputed signature. It is not as if other signatures are not available on the records of the assessee, and that too taken contemporaneously. If such signatures affixed by the assessee in the normal course of correspondence are available, certainly the genuineness of the disputed signature should have been tested only against those signatures and not against the sample signatures taken for the purpose of comparison.
9. In that view of the matter, I sustain exhibit P3, quash exhibits P4, P5, P6 and P7 and remand the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration in the lines indicated above. As the matter is thus remitted to the Tribunal and since the State has taken the contention that it could not furnish the list of experts, I make it clear that it will be open to the State also to furnish the list of experts in the matter. If the State chooses to do so, it may furnish the list within a period of one month from today. The State shall also furnish the signatures and all the documents available in the records contemporaneous as far as possible of the assessee affixed in the normal course of the communication for the purpose of deciding the genuineness of the disputed document dated December 7, 1987. This shall also be done within the said period. Thereafter the Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders in the matter as expeditiously as possible.
Original petition is allowed as above.
Order on C.M.P. No. 48960 of 2001 in O.P. No. 30060 of 2001(C) dismissed.