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Association of Registration Plates Manufacturers of India Vs. Union of India (Uoi) - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectConstitution
CourtKerala High Court
Decided On
Case NumberO.P. Nos. 31103 and 31643 etc. of 2002
Judge
Reported in2003(1)KLT895
ActsConstitution of India - Articles 14 and 226
AppellantAssociation of Registration Plates Manufacturers of India
RespondentUnion of India (Uoi)
Appellant Advocate K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv.,; Suren Kumar Uppal,; C.A. Ma
Respondent Advocate T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Sr. Adv.,; P.S. Sreedharan Pillai, S.C.G.S.C.,;
Cases Referred and Sreekumar v. High Court of Kerala
Excerpt:
constitution - policy decision - articles 14 and 226 of constitution of india - award of contract whether it is by private party or by public body or state is essentially commercial transaction - state can choose own method to arrive at decision - state not prohibited from giving contracts for supply of security plates in favour of more than one agency and for different regions - state bound to adhere to norms laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. - code of civil procedure, 1908.[c.a. no. 5/1908]. order 9, rule 4: [v.k. bali, cj, kurian koseph & k. balakrishnan nair, jj] restoration of petition for enhancement of maintenance dismissed for default held, application under order 9, rule 4 c.p.c., is not maintainable. reason being while exercising powers under.....m. ramachandran, j. 1. o.p. no. 31103 of 2002, which is the leading case among the group, has been filed by the association of registration plates manufacturers of india, a society registered under the societies registration act. respondents initially were the union of india, the state and the transport commissioner, thiruvananthapuram. additionally 4th and 5th respondents also had been impleaded. in view of the urgency expressed by the parties, and especially the government, the original petitions were given a priority in the matter of hearing. senior counsel sri k. radhakrishnan appeared for the petitioner, on instructions. the learned advocate general represented the state government. i had also opportunity to hear sri. p.s. sreedharan pillai, senior central government standing counsel.....
Judgment:

M. Ramachandran, J.

1. O.P. No. 31103 of 2002, which is the leading case among the group, has been filed by the Association of Registration Plates Manufacturers of India, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Respondents initially were the Union of India, the State and the Transport Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram. Additionally 4th and 5th respondents also had been impleaded. In view of the urgency expressed by the parties, and especially the Government, the Original Petitions were given a priority in the matter of hearing. Senior Counsel Sri K. Radhakrishnan appeared for the petitioner, on instructions. The learned Advocate General represented the State Government. I had also opportunity to hear Sri. P.S. Sreedharan Pillai, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the Union of India. Sri. T.P. Kelu Nambiar. Senior Advocate, appeared for the additional 5th respondent. Sri. C.A. Majced appeared for the petitioner in O.P. No. 31643 of 2002 and adopted the arguments highlighted by the petitioner in the earlier Original Petition. O.P. No. 31808 of 2002, filed by Sri. V. Abdul Rehiman, was concerning the grant of adequate time for presentation of his tender in response to the notification made by the State Government, but had not referred to any other issues. The Thrissur Mandalam Autorikshaw Owners Association were the petitioners in O.P. No. 26059 of 2002, the challenge was about the amendment brought to Rule 50 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). No challenge, however, were urged about the follow up action that had been taken by the State Government in implementation of the Rules.

2. As the pleadings are complete in O.P. No. 31103 of 2002, advertence is made to the facts and the law as has been placed before me in connection with the above Original Petition.

3. As per Notification G.S.R. No. 221 (E) dated 28.3.2001 followed by notificationsS.O. No. 814 (E) dated 22.8.2001, S.O. No. 1041(E) dated 16.10.2001 and S.O. No.499 (E) dated 9.5.2002, read with Rule 50 of the Rules, the Government of India hadmade known its proposals to introduce what is known as 'High Security RegistrationPlates' with effect from 28.2.2003. It may be necessary, at this juncture, only tonotice that previously the effective date for such introduction had been fixed as July2001, and it had been extended from time to time coming to face practical difficultiesin implementation of the programme and coordination with the States required. It wasdue to this reason that an intermediate decision was taken to bring a first phase changeof yellow number plates for commercial vehicles and a white plate for the others. Ithas now been made mandatory that not only those registered after 28.2.2003 but allexisting vehicles registered before the date also should have such security plates withina period of two years from the above said date. In view of the amendments sobrought to the Rules, to which reference would shortly be made, the Government ofKerala by G.O. Rt. 197/2002 dated 8.7.2002 had decided to implement the project ofproviding High Security Registration Plates through selection of an implementing agency,but on Build, Own and Operate (BOO) basis. Ext. P7 tender had been issued by theGovernment in this context on 25.9.2002. It referred to the general conditions ofcontract for implementation of High Security Registration Plates Project, visualised inaccordance with Rule 50 of the Rules.

4. Substantially, these steps are under challenge in these proceedings. The last date for submission of the tenders had been notified as 31.10.2002, but by interim orders passed, further proceedings have been directed to be kept under suspension.

5. The objective leading to the introduction of High Security Registration Plateswere given manifestation for the first time, by the Central Motor Vehicles (1stAmendment) Rules, 2001, The spade works thereafter too were done at the behestof the Central Government. Rule 50 had been substituted and the amendment, so far asit is relevant, is to the following effect:

'(8) in Rule 50-

(a) for Sub-rule (1), the following sub- rule shall be substituted, namely,

(1) On or after commencement of this rule, the registration mark referred to in Sub-section (6)of Section 41 shall be displayed both at the front and at the rear of all motor vehicles clearlyand legibly in the form of security licence plate of the following specifications, namely:-

(i) the plate shall be a solid unit made on 1.0 mm aluminium conforming to DIN 1745/DIN 1783 or ISO 7591. Border edges and corners of the plate shall be rounded to avoidinjuries to the extent of approx. 10 mm and the plates must have an embossed border. The plate shall be suitable for hot stamping and reflective sheet has to be guaranteed for imperishable nature for minimum five years. The fast colouring of legend and border to be done by hot stamping.

(ii) the plate should bear the letters 'IND' in blue colour on the extreme left center of the plate. The fetter should be one fourth of the size of letters mentioned in Rule 51 and should be buried into the foil or applied by hot stamping and should be integral part of the plate;

(iii) each plate shall be protected against counterfeiting by applying chromium-based hologram, applied by hot stamping. Stickers and adhesive labels are not permitted. The plate shall bear a permanent consecutive identification number of minimum seven digits, to be laser brandedinto the reflective sheeting and hot stamping film shall bear a verification inscription;

(iv) apart from the registration marks on the front and rear, the third registration mark inthe form of self destructive type, chromium based hologram sticker shall be affixed onthe left-hand top side of the windshield of the vehicle. The registration details suchas registration number, registering authority, etc. shall be printed on the sticker. Thethird registration mark shall be issued by the registering authorities/approved dealersof the license plates manufacturer along with the regular registration marks, andthereafter if such sticker is destroyed it shall be issued by the license plate manufacturer or his dealer;

(v) the plate shall be fastened with non-removable/nonreusable snap lock fitting system on rear of the vehicle at the premises of the registering authority;

The licence plates with all the above specifications and the specified registrations for a vehicle shall be issued by the registering authority or approved the license plates manufacturers or their dealers. The Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi or any of the agency authorised by the Central Government shall approve the license plates manufacturers to the above specification.'

Following this, in exercise of power under Sub-section (3) of Section 109 of the Motor Vehicles Act, S.O. 814 (E) had been issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways on 22.8.2001, This was to make and specify standards. Paragraph 4 of Ext. P4 might be relevant for the purpose of this case and is extracted therein as below:

'4. A manufacturer or supplied of new high security registration plates shall comply with the following specifications, namely:-

(i) The manufacturer or supplier shall have a certificate from the Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi or any one of the testing agencies authorised by the Central Government under Rule 126 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

(ii) The registration plate shall conform to the specifications spell out in Rule 50 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989; and shall conform to DIN 1745/1783 or ISO 7591, as updated from time to time. The Registration Plate has to be guaranteed for impermissible nature of a minimum of five years.

(iii) The background colour of the letters in the High Security Registration Plates shall be the same as per the colour scheme prescribed in the Notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways No. G.S.Rule 221 (E) dated 28.3.2001 namely in black colour on yellow background in case of transport vehicles and in black colour on white background in other cases. The letters of registration mark shall be in English and the figures shall be in Arabic numerals, and the letters and numerals shall be embossed and hot stamped.

(iv) To protect against counterfeiting, a chromium based hologram of the size of 20 mm x 20 mm is to be applied by hot stamping on the top left-hand corner of the plate in both front and rear plates. The hologram shall contain Ashoka emblem with 'Bharat Sarkar' and 'Government of India' on each side, on left and right side respectively on Ashbka emblem vertically, as specified in the sketch, as given in the Annexure annexed to this Order.

(v) The permanent identification number of minium 7 digits is to be laser branded into the reflective sheeting on the bottom left-hand side of the registration plate with the numeral size being 2.5 mm.

(vi) The hot stamping film to be applied on the letters/numerals of the license number shall bear the inscription 'INDIA'.

(vii) The third registration plate in the form of a self destructive type chromium based hologram sticker shall be of the size of 100 mm x 60mm is to be affixed on the inner side of left hand corner of windshield of the vehicle. The details on the sticker shall be (i) name of registering authority, (ii) registration number of the vehicle, (iii) laser branded permanent identification number, (iv) engine number and (v) chassis number of the vehicle. On the bottom of the right corner of the sticker, the chromium based hologram shall be applied but of a smaller size of 10mm x 10mm. In the said sticker the registration number of the vehicle shall be in the centre with a letter size of 10 mm in height. The name of registering authority would be on top part of sticker in letter size of 5mm. While laser branded permanent identification number, then engine number followed by chassis number shall come in the bottom left side of the sticker with numeral size being 2.5 mm in each case. A depiction of the sticker is given in the sketch as specified in the Annexure annexed to this order.

(viii) The registration plate fitted in. the rear of the vehicle shall be fastened with non removable/non-reusable snap lock system. For that sake of better security, at least two such snap locks shall be fitted.

(ix) No high security plate shall be affixed outside the premises of the registering authority.

(x) The manufacturer or the vendor selected by the State Transport Department for supply of such registration plates may be for the State as a whole or for any region of the State.

(xi) The registration plate wilt be supplied to the motor vehicle owners by the vendor against the authorisation by the Road Transport Officer or any officer designated for the purpose by the State Transport Department.

(xii) The replacement for any existing registration plate may be made by the concerned transport authority only after ensuring that the old plate has been surrendered and destroyed.

(xiii) A proper record of the registration plates issued by the manufacturer or the vendor, authorised by the State Government, should be maintained on a daily basis, and got tallied periodically with the records of the Transport Office.

(xiv) Periodic audit shall be carried out by concerned testing agency to ensure compliance of the requirements of the high security registration plate.'

6. By Ext. P5 (S.O. 1041 (E) dated 16.10.2001) the order was amended. This related to contain minor details, which may not be necessary to be looked into at this juncture, as the attempt was to effectively implement the avowed objective. It was thereafter that the respective States had stepped in, as authorised above. In the Original Petition, the challenge is seen to have been made about the validity of Ext. P4 order. The justification of the imposition of certain conditions in Ext. P7 tender notice, however, is the real issue of grievance highlighted. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel had contended with his attack about Ext. P7 alone and it has to be presumed that the objection as against the validity of Ext. P4 is not being pursued.

7. Under Rule (1)(v) it would have been possible for the Registering Authority to issue the, licence plates, or entrust the work to manufacturers/dealers. The Kerala Government had opted the latter course. As referred to earlier, Ext. P7 invitation for submission of tenders, now under challenge, was issued in this background. What is essentially required to be considered is, therefore, the attack about the justifiability of the prequalifications that have been insisted by Ext. P7, for participation in the tender. I have to bear in mind the law that has been laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court as also this, Court, in the matter of jurisdiction of the courts which might justify entry and interference to the realms of contracts and tendering of works.

8. As observed by the Supreme Court in Air India v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. ((2000) 2 SCC 617), the award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere, to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though such decision may not be amenable to judicial review, the courtcan examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. This is because the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Again in Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal v. Union of India (AIR 2002 SC 2766) the Court held that 'this Court is normally reluctant to intervene in matters of entering into contracts by the Government, but if the same is found to be unreasonable, arbitrary, mala fide or is in disregard of mandatory procedure it will not hesitate to nullify or rectify such actions.'

9. Even though these cases and also the other judgments cited at the Bar, referred to public interest as the paramount consideration, the facts that are involved in the present Writ Petitions appear to be substantially different from what is generally meant by the term 'public interest' and at best it could be considered as a derivative of the term. In the matter of inviting tenders, in respect of this contract, the State occupies a unique position. Principally and practically it is sitting as an arbiter overseeing implementation of a project. None of its funds are expended in the process. Ultimately, the issue boils down about the price a citizen has to pay to a manufacturer, who is conferred with exclusive right of supplying an article to him as an agent of the State. There is no distribution of Government largesse or State's resources. As a matter of fact, in the process, the Government comes as a beneficiary, since a fixed percentage of the charges collected from an individual as cost goes to the Government's coffers in the name of 'royalty'. Thus, the Government stands transposed to the position of a trustee and guardian which simultaneously imposes a duty on them to ensure that in the process a citizen is not fleeced by an entrepreneur who might have only profit motives. The nature of the duty, the role the Government has to play, the approach hitherto made for discharging the duty and the advantages and disadvantages that might be there, by the presence of the Government etc., therefore are points which have come to the forefront. The examination really concerns as to how far the State Government has attempted to discharge the trust that has been reposed on it by the Central Government, who have refrained from staking a claim for a cut of the spoils. The facts of the cases require this Court to exert a lot more to examine and pronounce upon matters than the accepted parameters in examining the conditions of tender. I have to bear in mind the ultimate objective of the scheme, the impact it might have on the common man and the bona fides that are to be there, including presence of transparency that is expected in such matters. If there is any indication to show that the attempt was to make a gain, even by the Government, at the cost of general public, interference may be justified. In other words, being a beneficiary of the situation and who stands to corner a sizable revenue, it may also have to be further examined as to whether the Government was able to show a clean hand via-a-vis the arrangements culminating in Ext. P7 proceedings, Thus, the scope of enquiry would also be about the efforts made to safeguard the interest of general public as distinct from the term 'public interest' as is generally understood.

10. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner lie in a narrow field. The notice inviting tenders, which is seen to have been published by the Government in news papers on 6.10.2002, is alleged as one issued without bona fides. The argument is that conditions have been incorporated in Ext. P7 with only one tenderer (or cartel of tenderers) in mind and the phraseology of the notice are so carefully formulated so that no other person will be able to respond even. The further argument is that such incorporation of conditions are alien to the objectives sought by the amended rules, and it has also been embedded by the State so as to give a monopoly. According to the petitioner, in fact the suggestions and observations of the Government of India for streamlining the process of selection, and to make it more competitive and democratic have been abjectly ignored. At once, the question may arise whether this court may be able to look into these matters, even if the Original Petition could be entertained. The answer of Sri. Radhakrishnan is with reference to the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation ((2001) 8 SCC 491). Relying on an earlier decision in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M. & N. Publications Ltd. ((1993) 1 SCC 445), the Court observed as following:

'Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Homes, that courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measures of freedom of 'play in the joints' to the executive.'

He points out that 'it has been held by the Supreme Court in the very same judgment that a public authority should not have unfettered discretion and in respect of contracts which have commercial element even though some extra discretion is to be conceded as available to such authorities, they are bound to follow the norms recognized by courts while dealing with public property. This requirement is necessary to avoid unreasonable and arbitrary decisions being taken by public authorities whose actions are amenable to judicial review. Therefore, merely because the authority has certain elbow room available for use of discretion in accepting offer in contracts, the same will have to be circumscribed within the four corners of the requirements of law, especially Article 14 of the Constitution.'

11. Sri. Radhakrishnan submits that even though the above observation had been with reference to acceptance of contract, it will be appropriate, at the earlier stages as well. Especially, if the authority has a duty to oversee that unreasonableness and arbitrariness is avoided, and transparency in the dealings are ensured, the care to be invested should be of very high order. Elaborating, he invited my attention to the Central Government's order. A manufacturer of security registration plates was onlyrequired to comply with specifications in paragraph 4 Ext. P4 order. He is to possessa 'Type Approval Certificate' from the test agencies authorised by the CentralGovernment. The registration plate is to conform to the specifications. Security hadbeen ensured by insisting that the plate was to be affixed in the premises of theregistering authority following the formalities. The plates were to be supplied by thevendor against the authorisation by the officer concerned and replacement also wasto be appropriately monitored. He submits that the essential features emerging fromthe rules was that supply of standard and acceptable products was to be ensured andthey were to be installed under the close scrutiny of the officers of the State. Ifviewed in this background, and volume and nature of the work involved, he submitsthat perhaps the insistence of financial stability might be relevant. But a host ofconditions, stipulated in Ext. P7, were wholly alien, with no relationship with the objectivessought, and incorporated so as to corner the contract in favour of one person asagainst the possible competitors, He especially drew my attention to paragraph 15 of Ext. P7, where eligibility of bidder had been specified. Paragraph 1.5.3. provided thatthe bidder or the promoter should have sufficient experience in the field of RegistrationPlates and should be working in at least five countries for Registration Plates havingsecurity features worldwide or in minimum five such projects. Paragraph 1.5.6 requiresthat the bidder should have a minimum annual turnover equivalent to Indian Rupees 50crores in the immediately preceding last year and at least 15% of this turnover mustbe from the Registration Plate business which was to be supported by authenticateddocuments. He claimed that as of now already one of the members of the Associationhad obtained 'Type Approval Certificate', referred to in paragraph 1.5.7 and severalpersons had submitted applications and they were in the pipe line being processed bythe authorities and the stipulation in paragraph 1.5.3 as also 1.5.6 effectively saw to itthat the doors were shut down against their face for all time to come. This is becauseof the condition of the tender that one should be prequalified by having his feet in fivedifferent countries. Only if the hurdle is crossed, the other envelopes relating to bidswere to be opened at all. This operated as a restrictive clause, and effectivelydiscouraged competition, and the members of the petitioner-Association had no chanceeven to compete, in spite of their ability to execute the contract.

12. The learned senior counsel also points out that Ext.P7 had been loaded with advantages in favour of the tenderer, who according to him had been predetermined and the proceedings were empty formalities if not an eye wash. Such a person, who won the contract, was entitled for exclusive business, rights for a minimum period of 15 years and the contract could have been extended for further periods. It was also indicated that automatic fluctuating price were claimable on the ruling price of rupee against U.S. dollar which according to him would have ended in a tremendous loss and expenditure, in so far as consumer was concerned. He observed that the attempt to safeguard the interest of the State was halfhearted and the conditions incorporatedin the tender forms had no teeth to effectively bite, if a contingency arose. He was referring paragraph 4.1. The reservation of the Government for a revision of price or terms as and when such plates were manufactured with indigenous technology had not appropriately been incorporated. The period of 15 years was absolutely disadvantages to the interest of the State and the consumer. He concluded by saying that by prescribing conditions, which had no sanctity or relevance, persons who might have otherwise been able to compete have been forcibly warded off, and mala fides was per se evident, since only a handpicked cartel has been permitted to enter the arena. It did not serve public interest, nor was it in the interest of general public who were ultimately destined to shoulder the responsibility. By incorporating restrictive clauses, there was likelihood of a heavy burden being shunted on to the general public, while simultaneously the Government and the contractor automatically were ensured of having huge gains out of the process. He, therefore, urged that all further proceedings pursuant to Ext. P7 was to be interdicted. Mr. Upal, counsel appearing for the 4th respondent, supported him and led me through the exhibits.

13. The learned Advocate General who appeared for the State, emphatically denied the allegations of mala fides or any under hand dealings. According to him, Ext. P7 was a piece of carefully worded, and exceptionally well drafted document. It is submitted with reference to decided cases of the Supreme Court that even if this Court found that there was any error in the tender notice, it was not necessary for this Court to interfere in the matter, as the only point to be looked into was whether the proposal was mooted with public interest as the guiding factor. He referred to the requirement for the high security plates as highlighted in the counter affidavit that had been filed. According to the Advocate General, extra efforts had been taken to identify the most suitable person to supply the plates expeditiously and uninterruptedly, who had the right credentials in respect of a transaction which would have run to several crores. Paragraphs 1.5.3 and 1,5.7, and the period of contract, according to him, were thus to secure the most advantageous offers and for no other purpose.

14. Sri. T.P. Kelu Nambiar, counsel appearing for the additional respondents, also submitted that there was nothing irregular in fixing the qualifications at high levels for an intending tenderer and the stringent stipulations in fact showed that the Government was only interested in the best talents to come to the scene. With reference to the stipulations in paragraph 1.5.3, it had been pointed out that the requirement of experience spreading over at least five countries, was intended to emphasize that only person with a good excellent track records participated in the tender. With reference to decided cases of this Court, (Prathapan v. Registrar of High Court of Kerala, 1984 KLT 625) and Sreekumar v. High Court of Kerala (1995 (2) KLT 88)) it is urged that it would have been possible for setting standards so as to identify the best talents and others were automatically to be shut out, as it was never accepted that a person who satisfied only minimum qualification had a right to be considered.Mr. Nambiar was of the opinion that even if such a clause was not there in Ext. P7, it had been shown that one of the tenderers had outstanding experience by dealing globally in the matter of supplying security number plates, he was entitled to a preference. Borrowing the facts supplied by the Advocate General, he points out that already four persons had responded to Ext. P7 and it was sufficient indications to show that there were persons who possessed the prescribed requirements. According to him, a person who had neither experience nor background can have no cause to complain. It had been pointed out that the members of the petitioner had not responded to the tender notice and this alone was sufficient to reject the Original Petition, as they had no right to challenge the wordings or stipulations of a tender, by comfortably sitting outside the ring.

15. A statement had been filed by the Senior Central Government Standing Counsel and I think it may not be necessary for me to advert to the contentions urged therein seriously. The attempt was to justify the issuance of Ext. P4 order, in answer to the contentions urged in the Original Petition that they have no statutory backing. As the petitioners have not thought it profitable to proceed on with such contentions at all, it has to be presumed that the validity of Ext. P4 is not under any serious challenge. The Central Government had refrained from expressing any views about the allegedly offending conditions that had been incorporated in Ext. P7.

16. I am inclined to accept the case of the petitioner that Ext. P7 has unnecessary restricted the participation of persons, by prescribing conditions which are restrictive, and never permitted by the Rules and the orders of the Central Government, issued under Section 109 of the Act. In this context, it would be worthwhile for me to refer to some more materials that have been made available. Along with the counter affidavit filed by the Central Government, reference is made to guidelines which have been issued on 6.3,2002. This is produced as Ext. P3(a). It is highly relevant to note that the guidelines do not prescribe any stringent conditions for prequalification as are incorporated in Ext. P7. With duo deference to the rules, it is stated that the bidder must be a vendor/manufacturer/supplier in possession of a valid certificate from the approved testing agencies. The tender document therefore according to the Circular was to mandatorily insist to furnish the details regarding the manufacturing facility available/planned and the net work envisaged for supply and distribution. It was permissible to call for details about the experience/capability of his collaborator to the satisfaction of the State authorities. The stipulation ends there. Perhaps this clause, which emphasise satisfaction of the State authorities about the experience/capability might have payed the way for incorporation of the conditions like 1.5.3 and 1.5.6. in Ext. P7.

17. It is evident that after the publication of Ext. P7, the Central Government had been appraised of the extra ordinary conditions that found a place in the tender notice.As a matter of fact, it appears that the petitioner had done quite a lot of spadework in the matter. He refers to the proceedings of the Rajya Sabha dated 29.11.2001. This is Ext. P9. The Minister for Road Transport and Highways has answered a question addressed to him, which may be relevant. The question is:

'Will the Minister of Road Transport and Highways be pleased to state: the details of the countries (where) holographic vehicle number plates have been made mandatory.'

The answer is :

'As per information available, such countries are Armenia, Columbia, Congo, Curacao, Ethopia, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Mali, Malta, Oman, Palestine, Srilanka, Tanzania, Urugay, Zambia, etc.'

But, subsequently it had come out that the name of Japan had erroneously been included. Along with the reply affidavit, the petitioner has produced Ext. P24 series to show that the submissions as above were without full comprehension.

18. Also relevant is the circumstance that noticing the conditions in the tender, without naming the State, by official memorandum dated 6.11.2002 (Ext. P25) (of course after the last date for submission of tender, referred to in Ext. P7), the Government of India had observed, vide paragraph 6, as following:

'It was brought to our notice that some conditions in a tender floated by State did not appear to provide a level playing field. The Ministry then wrote to the concerned State to reconsider the matter so that the conditions do not appear predetermined to favour any bidder.'

The office memorandum concluded by stating as following:

'Therefore, the prevailing view was that in order to ensure fair competition, the respective State Governments should invite tenders where all type approved vendors would have the opportunity to participate.'

By a comparison, this is extremely a reasonable view. When the rules provided that a manufacturer should have type approval, to say that he should have experience in five countries; that 15% of his revenue should have come from such business and the like appears to be too lop-sided, justifying the criticism that a gimmick and a set up was being made whereunder a predetermined person alone was the winner. The materials produced do indicate that the type approval is a process which involves time and the standards are stringent and ordinary plate manufacturers could not have the resources for manufacturing plates without investing large funds and employing sophisticated machinery and materials. This automatically elevated the players to the requirement of possessing minimum standards of expertise and resources. As pointed out by the learned standing Counsel, the Central Government had prescribed the broad parameters and had relegated to the States the execution of work. There was nothing special about the State of Kerala, for them to insist that a manufacturer selected by them,should be a global player. Freedom of movement in the territory of India is unrestricted and nothing prevents vehicles from other States to enter Kerala or the Kerala vehicles to go to the other States. Therefore, a special expertise, as has been attempted to be carved out by way of Ext. P7, in respect of Kerala Contractor by itself was sufficient to smell rat and create doubts about genuineness of the thought process, which had preceded preparation of such documents incorporating expensive conditions. Neither the argument of the learned Advocate General nor the dexterity of Mr. Kelu Nambiar is found sufficient to cover the gaping puncture effectively inflicted by Sri. Radhakrishnan. I find that the conditions highlighted by the petitioners in Ext. P7 are incorporated without adequate justification, and only to ward off possible competition from others. They have no rationale with the real objectives of the project.

19. It may also be relevant that a State is not prohibited from giving contracts for supply of security plates in favour of more than one agency and for different regions. This position can become workable, but ensuring the quality of the approved plates by the specified agency. When standards of the plates were so streamlined by adequate certification, the security was to be further ensured to be brought about because of the intervention of the officers of the State. The necessity for introducing global players and world standards for a contractor who was to get a contract in Kerala appears to be rather out of place. As coming from Ext. P9, the countries where such security plates were in use do not appear to be the developed countries or in any way comparable to India and the idea can only be Utopian if not to hoodwink innocents. The petitioners cannot be blamed for suspecting bona fides of the State which apparently has been blinded by the dazzle and poise of global players.

20. From what is prosecuted, I feel that the introduction of High Security Platos may be useful for detecting crimes, but have little role in curbing crimes. The name itself appears to be a misnomer. However, it is not for this Court to express doubts about the policy decision taken by the Government.

21. I am not impressed by the technical arguments raised by the respondents about the adequacy, relevance or inadequacy of the prayers in the Writ Petition. A realistic approach has come as a necessity when the facts are presented. The presence of competitive tenders alone comes directly to the benefit of the general public. Higher the price, higher will be the royalty that might be gained by the State and such bias cannot be ruled out as chance for imposing a levy might be attractive. It is pointed out that in a short period, there will be spurt in the number of persons who can attain capability of manufacturing such plates and to confine the rights in favour of a global player for 15 years, at the rates quoted by him, appears to be suicidal and detrimental to the interest of multitude of the progeny for whom the State really should stand. Technology is progressing and prices are most likely to fall. Stipulations in Ext. P7 and those specifically highlighted by the petitioner, does not appear to be congenial to thebetter interest of the public as had been made out, and evidently competition is stifled, which is the cardinal point now presented.

22. In this view, I have to hold that the conditions in Ext. P7, especially paragraphs 1.5.3 and 1.5.6 work in a manner to bring on a restriction about competitiveness which was never contemplated by the rules and also by the Central Government. The Central Government's view and advice stand ignored. Likewise, the exclusive contract for 15 years indeed require a rethinking as it glares you, since the attraction of the project is there only for the first three or four years. In fact, scanning through Ext. P7, especially in the matter of selection of the manufacturer/distributor, the public interest is given little attention, and it requires a thorough redrafting. In their over enthusiasm the State Government by design or otherwise have lost the real perspectives and is proceeding on an erroneous tangent, which may ultimately lead to unnecessary loss to the general public, and from which the State would find itself difficult to get extricated.

23. I, therefore, direct that further steps pursuant to Ext. P7 are to be dropped. Taking note of the requirement of the rules, fresh tenders are to be drafted and offers invited ensuring participation of persons who are qualified as per the rules and also by prescribing general standards which are reasonable, and capable of looking after the project effectively.

24. O.P. No. 31103 of 2002 will thus stand allowed to this extent. In view of the observations that have been made, I do not think that further orders are to be passed in O.P. Nos. 31643 and 31808 of 2002 and the observations will be equally applicable to them and in effect they stand allowed. However, O.P. No. 26059 of 2002 will stand dismissed, as the points highlighted have not been substantiated.


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