K. Narayana Kurup, J.
1. The appellant claims that he was appointed as an Accountant under the second respondent Church and upon his being denied employment he moved the first respondent Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act') against the alleged termination of his service. According to him, the Church is a 'commercial establishment' as defined under Section 2(4) of the Act and that his service was terminated without conducting any enquiry and without assigning any reason as enjoined under the Act and hence per se illegal. The 2nd respondent Church contended inter alia that it is neither a shop nor a commercial establishment as defined under the Act nor the provisions of the Act are not attracted to them and hence the appeal itself is not maintainable under the Act. The maintainability of the appeal was heard as a preliminary issue and the first respondent as per Ext.P1 order upheld the preliminary objection that the Church is not an establishment as defined under the Act and in that view dismissed the appeal and Ex.P1 order was under challenge before this Court in O.P. 3272/1987 out of which this Writ Appeal arises. The learned single Judge after analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and after scrutiny of the case law on the subject held that the first respondent Appellate Authority was justified in accepting the preliminary objection that the Church is not a 'commercial establishment' under the Act. The Writ Petition having been dismissed, the appellant has moved this Writ Appeal.
2. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, we are not persuaded to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge upholding Ext.P1 order accepting the preliminary objection. On a plain reading of the definition of 'commercial establishment' and 'shop' under Section 2(4) and (15) of the Act, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the 2nd respondent Church is either a shop or a commercial establishment. The Apex Court in V. Sasidharan v. Peter and Karunakar (1984- II-LLJ-385) (SC) has held that: It is trite that, traditionally, lawyers do not carry on the trade or business nor do they render service to 'customers'. The context as well as the phraseology of the definition in Section 2(15) is in apposite in the case of a lawyer's office or the office of a firm of lawyers. Further, on an analysis of the provisions of the Act, the Court held that it is not a 'commercial establishment' either. In like vein, this Court in the decision reported in Ramanathan v. State of Kerala, 1991 (1) KLT 89 held that office of a Chartered Accountant cannot be regarded as a 'commercial establishment' or 'shop' where services are rendered. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court and this Court will apply with equal force to the facts of the present case where we are concerned with the traditional profession of theology, others being law and medicine, will be stranger than fiction to hold that the devout who goes to the Church is a 'customer' and Church is a commercial establishment or shop where 'services are rendered'. The words 'services are rendered occurring in Section 2(15) of the Act cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the words in the clause viz. 'any premises where trade or business is carried on' and 'used in connection with such trade or business'. Adverting to the definition clause of 'commercial establishment' in Section 2(4) of the Act and other cognate provisions of the Act viz Chapter I-A of the Act providing for registration of establishments, Chapter II for employment of children and women and Chapter IV for wages, Chapter V for employment of children and women and Chapter VI for health and safety measures, the Supreme Court held that the expression 'commercial establishment' cannot take within its fold professional offices vide V. Sasidharan v. Peter and Karunakar, (supra). On the same analogy, the Church also cannot be treated as a 'commercial establishment' as defined under the Act. Therefore, on a plain reading of the various provisions of the Act and in the light of the law categorically laid down by the Apex Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the Church is neither a 'shop' nor a 'commercial establishment' as defined under the Act. We agree with the reasoning of the learned single Judge and hold that the first respondent was justified in accepting the preliminary objection that the Church is not a 'commercial establishment'. The Writ Appeal is accordingly dismissed.