G. Sivarajan, J.
1. Though the petitioners in all these cases are different the question which arises for consideration is common, viz., the validity of the provision of Section 14A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act') as introduced with effect from April 1,1998 by the Kerala Finance Act, 1998 (Act No. 14 of 1998). The Deputy Commissioner of the respective Districts has passed orders suspending the registration of the petitioners both under the KGST Act and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 on the ground that petitioners had caused obstruction in the matter of conduct of inspection/search by the Sales Tax Department as provided in Section 28(4) of the KGST Act as also under Section 9(2) of the CST Act read with Section 14A of the Act. The impugned orders are passed under Section 14A of the Act as introduced by the Act No. 14 of 1998 in the Act as also under Section 9(2) of the CST Act read with Section 14A of the Act. Petitioners in all these cases have taken the contention that the reason for suspension of their registration under two enactments mentioned above is that the petitioners had caused obstruction to the conduct of inspection by the Intelligence Officer (Sales Tax Department). It is an admitted position as seen from the orders under challenge that, the obstruction was mainly from the members of the merchant union and their men. Of course it is stated that the petitioners had also obstructed and that the petitioners did not co-operate with the Intelligence Officers for continuing their inspection and in the matter of preparation of shop inspection report, etc. It is on that ground the Intelligence Department could not conduct a proper enquiry and record the details of the stock kept in the petitioners' business premises and consequently there occurred escapement of turnover, etc. The registration of the petitioners were suspended. In some cases registration under the KGST Act was suspended for one year and under the CST Act suspended for six months. It so happened, in all these cases, this Court stayed the suspension orders as early as in 1999 and in the last case in 2001 and the petitioners are conducting their business without any break. It has also come out that subsequently no such instances have occurred and that the merchant union were also co-operating with the Department in the matter of collection of sales tax due from the dealers. It also come out that the system of conducting mass raid, etc., have been given a go-by and the compounding system introduced had also dispensed with the requirement of conducting inspection.
2. Dr. K.B. Mohammed Kutty, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these cases contended that Section 14A of the Act is really an inroad into the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their business and that the provision does not contain any safeguards to the petitioners. Various other serious objections were also raised by the counsel in regard to the provision of Section 14A with reference to various decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. The learned Counsel also submits that on the facts of these cases no suspension could have been effected. According to him, there is no materials to show that the petitioners had in fact caused any obstructions to the conduct of any inspection. Counsel further submits that even going by the mahazar prepared in the inspection it is seen that the inspecting party had verified the books of account and had signed it. The counsel also point out various infirmities in regard to the findings in the impugned order and submitted that there is no satisfactory material to show that the petitioners were in fact responsible for the obstruction if any. The counsel also point out that in some other cases the department charge sheeted some of the dealers and that in the criminal proceedings (C.C. No. 10427 of 1999 of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tirur and C.C. No. 670 of 1999 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate. Tirur) they were acquitted. The counsel, in short, submitted that even assuming that the provisions of Section 14A is held to be valid no circumstances existed for suspending the licence in these cases.
3. Sri Raju Joseph, learned Special Government Pleader (Taxes) appearing for the respondents was also heard. He submits that there is categoric finding in the impugned orders to the effect that apart from the members of the merchant union and their men some of the partners of the petitioners' firm are also involved in such obstruction and also removed the accounts book, etc., with the help of members of the merchant union. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is stated that the impugned orders are justified. The Special Government Pleader further submitted that Section 14A introduced as an ancillary measure only to ensure proper collection of the tax legitimately due to the Government. He further submits with reference to various decisions of the Supreme Court the provision of the Section 14A of the Act is absolutely necessary for the effective administration of the sales tax law and to prevent obstruction to the conduct of inspection by the officers of the Sales Tax Department as contemplated under Section 28 of the Act.
4. I have considered the rival submissions. I am of the view that it is not necessary to go into the question of validity of Section 14A of the Act in all these cases. In view of the fact that the impugned orders in the first four cases are passed as early as in 1999 and in view of the fact that this Court had stayed the said orders and the subsequent developments pointed out earlier, viz., the relationship between the department has become cordial and co-operative. I am of the view that it is unnecessary to adjudicate on the question of sustainability of the impugned orders. In the facts and circumstances of these cases I am of the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustained. I accordingly, quash those orders. In view of the fact that impugned orders are quashed in the circumstances stated above, it is unnecessary for me to decide the question regarding the validity of Section 14A of the Act in these cases. The said question is left open.
The Original Petitions are disposed of as above.
Order on C.M.P. No. 12047 of 2001 in O.P. No. 7347 of 2001 (Y) dismissed.