Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. An extent of 0,2820 Hectares (around 70 cents) of land in Cherthala North Village in Cherthala Taluk of Alappuzha District was declared by the Board of Revenue as needed for a public purpose, to wit, the construction of a go-down for the writ petitioner, the Kerala State Warehousing Corporation, The notification under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the 'Kerala Act', was published on 12,6,1982 as evidenced by ExtP1 award dated 27.5.1985, passed under Section 11 of the Kerala Act. On reference, the Court passed Ext.P4 award on LAR No, 10/8 7 on 20,1,1992 on the question of apportionment and on the claim for enhancement of compensation. On appeal by the claimants, this Court further enhanced the compensation as per Ext,P5 decree dated 16,12,2002, of which, Ext,R16 (a) is the judgment The proceedings for execution commenced in 2005.
2. This writ petition is filed on 18.6.2008 on the ground that on 27,5.2008/the petitioner was intimated from the Collector, Alappuzha that it has to deposit an amount of Rs. 15 lakhs towards enhanced compensation. Pleading that apart from Ext.P2 calling for deposit of the amount covered by the award of the Collector, it had no notice or information of the proceedings before the reference Court or of the appeal before this Court and claiming that it was a necessary party to those proceedings, but was not given the opportunity of being heard, the petitioner challenges the award passed by the reference Court and seeks a declaration that is a 'person interested' in terms of Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, meaning thereby the Land Acquisition Act, 1994 (as amended by Act 68 of 1984), hereinafter, the 'LA Act', It also seeks a declaration that the award of the reference Court, having been issued without hearing, is not sustainable,
3. The contesting respondents, through counter affidavit contend, among other things, the admitted receipt of Ext.P2 and the fact that the petitioner even deposited amounts pursuant to that communication reveals that it had knowledge of LAR 10/87; that the matter was contested by the State, also by placing on records documents B1 to B3 and the evidence of DW1 and that the reference Court relied on documentary evidence Al to A4 and the depositions of PWs.1 to 5 to render the award by it. It is also contended that the State of Kerala was a party to the reference and the petitioner corporation is owned by the State of Kerala. It is farther pleaded that the petitioner was not made party to the LA appeal before this Court because it was not a party to the proceedings in the reference Court, It is contended that the judgment of the reference Court which alone is sought to be quashed, has merged in the appellate decree passed by this Court, which is not under challenge. It is also contended that the award is passed on merit after meticulously considering all facts and law in force and does not call for interference. It is also pleaded that the petitioner's effort is virtually, to have a writ issued against Ext.P5 decree passed by the Division Bench of this Court
4. Adv. Sri Majnu Komath, on behalf of the petitioner, argued that under Section 20 of the LA Act the Court is duty bound to serve notice on all parties interested in the objection, thereby meaning, interested in the objection to the compensation fixed by the Collector and hence, since the acquisition of land was for the purpose of the petitioner, obliging it to pay the compensation, it is a person interested in the determination of the objections to the land value fixed by the Collector. It is accordingly argued that the reference Court having passed the award without issuing such notice to the petitioner, the said decision is liable to be struck down. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of Kerala 1995(2) KLT 683, hereinafter - SAIL - wherein, this Court held that a corporation owned or controlled by the State is a person interested for the purpose of Section 3(b) of the LA Act in relation to an acquisition made for its purpose and would hence be entitled to notice under Section 20 of that Act, The said precedent was also relied on to argue that such a person interested, who is aggrieved by the award passed without notice to it is entitled to invoice the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, Reliance was also placed on U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parish ad v. Gyan Devi : (1995) 2 SCC 326, hereinafter - Gyan Devi, laying down that a local authority, which is aggrieved by the deprivation of opportunity under Section 50(2) of the IA Act would be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, Agra Development Authority v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2001)2 SCC 646 was relied on to state that where land was acquired at the cost of a local development authority, it would be mandatory for the acquisition authority to issue notice to such local authority and to give it an opportunity to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation amounts. The said decision was also quoted to state that even if the local authority, as the interested person, had participated in meetings of Government and Collector- that would not be sufficient compliance of Section 50, Learned Counsel further referred to an unreported decision of this Court rendered on 18.5.2005 in W.P(C). 8652/ 05, wherein, following the aforesaid decisions, the award passed by the reference Court was set aside on ground that the requisitioning authority, for whose purpose the land was being acquired, was not heard by the reference Court.
5. Per contra. Adv. Dr. V.N. Sankerjee argued on behalf of the contesting respondents that Ext,P2 communication issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Managing Director of the petitioner corporation refers to L.A.R. 10/87 of the Sub Court, Cherthala and therefore, the petitioner cannot feign Ignorance of the pendency of that reference. He pointed out that communication referred only to Section 32 of the Kerala Act which dealt with only apportionment and not a reference on the question of enhancement, a public authority cannot justifiably turn round at this distant point of time to contend that they were ignorant that LAR 10/87 referred to in ExtP2 included a reference on the question of the quantum of compensation, It was further argued that in Gyan Devi, the five Judge Bench of the Apex Court had categorically stated that matters which stand finally concluded will, however, not be re-opened applying the law laid in that decision. He, accordingly, contended that the said judgment having been issued by the Apex Court only on 20,10,1994, that could not be a ground for interfering with ExtP4 award issued by the reference Court much earlier, on 20.1,1992, Learned Counsel further pointed out that barring a superfluous statement in ground B of the writ petition that 'if without affording an opportunity to the person who has to bear the acquisition cost land value is increased by leaps and bounds, then necessarily it would be in violation of the principles of natural justice' there is really no plea, on facts, in the writ petition, demonstrating that the land value fixed by the reference Court or by this Court in appeal is contrary to facts and evidence, to treat it as an unjust decision calling for the interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. The expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition. This inclusive definition in Section 3(b) was held by this Court in SAIL to be one which should get a wide and literal construction. That judgment was rendered after noticing Gyan Devi. Section 20 of the LA Act, read with that definition, has made it obligatory on the Court to which a reference is made in terms of Sections 18 and 19 of that Act, to cause notice to all persons interested in the objection. Section 50(2) of the LA Act provides that in any proceedings held before a Collector or Court in cases where the provisions of that Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or any company, the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. That right carries with it the right to he given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference Court as to the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will he taken up. In the event of denial of that right conferred under Section 50(2) on account of failure to serve notice the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoiced. Such jurisdiction can he invoked even in cases where grounds for judicial review exist even when notice was served on the local authority. In terms of these findings, it was laid down in Gyan Devi, that the local authority or company is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference Court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose the enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. In the event of enhancement of the compensation by the reference Court, if the Government does not file an appeal, the local authority can file an appeal against the award of the reference Court after obtaining leave of the High Court. It was further laid down that in an appeal by the person having interest in the land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court., the local authority/ company should be impleaded as a party and it would be entitled to be served notice on that appeal. In that judgment delivered on 20,10,1994, it was further ordered that the matters which stand finally concluded will however, not be re-opened.
7. Gyan Devi lays down that the local authority/company is a proper party to the reference proceedings and also the proceedings before the Collector. It is entitled to file an appeal in cases where the State Government does not file appeal. It is a proper party to appeals filed by claimants for enhancement of compensation. Holding that the company for which the acquisition is made is a proper party and a person interested, for the purpose of being heard in relation to a reference and appeal thereon, the SAIL and Gyan Devi lay down that a local authority or company would be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to seek judicial review. Yet when the matter falls for consideration as to whether the award ought to be set aside under Article 226 or 227, on grounds referable to the propositions of law noticed above, it is not as if this Court should inevitably set aside the award of the reference Court. In exercise of its visitorial jurisdiction, merely on the ground of failure of that Court to hear the local authority/company at whose cost the acquisition was made. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction none is available to correct unless a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned by an error which is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings, including one issued in utter disregard with the provisions of law. The power to issue such orders in the nature of writ of certiorari or in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. See Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chander Rai : (2003) 6 SCC 675.
8. Gyan Devi was decided on 20,10,1994, categorically stating that matters which stand finally concluded wilt however, not be re-opened applying the law laid in that decision. In the case in hand, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and that by the reference Court were made before the aforesaid judgment, Ext.P4 LAR award being on 20,1,1992 continuing to recall that Gyan Devi was rendered directing that matters which stand finally concluded will, however, not be re-opened applying the law laid in that decision, it needs to be noticed that the claimants' appeal to this Court against the award of the reference Court was filed in 1993, that is before Gyan Devi was decided on 20,10,1994, though Ext.P5 appellate award by this Court in the Land Acquisition Appeal was on 16.12.2002, long after Gyan Devi.
9. There is one more aspect that gains attention in the consideration of the question as to whether exercise of the visitorial jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 is necessary in the case in hand. The acquisition was following a notification under Section 4(1) of the Kerala Act issued on 12.6.1982 while the LA Act became applicable to the State of Kerala only with effect from 24.9.1984 by virtue of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984. The Kerala Act though contains the inclusive definition for the term 'person interested' in Section 2(2) thereof which though not in pan materia with Section 3(b) of the LA Act but may be even wider; there is no provision in the Kerala Act similar to Section 50 of the LA Act which obliges notice and hearing of the requisitioning authority. Part VII of the Kerala Act deals with acquisition of land for companies. Section 44 provides an agreement to be entered into between the Government and the company, which, among other things, obliges the company to agree for the payment to the Government of the cost of the acquisition. These provisions tend to indicate that statutorily, under the Kerala Act, the company for which acquisition is made may not have any expressly spelt out right to notice and participation before the reference court or to appeal against the award of the reference court. Bearing in mind that the decision in SAIL and Gyan Devi are fundamentally footed on the judicial urge to ensure that real justice has to be done between the person whose land is being acquired and the person at whose cost it is acquired, I would immediately recall Section 59 of the Kerala Act which provides that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Kerala Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Kerala Act. This would take me to Section 99 of the CPC, which provides that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. Following the amendment of 1976, that Section carries a proviso that nothing therein shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. The nature of the findings and directions in Gyan Devi essentially give the company/ authority for which the acquisition is made, only the status of a proper party. I say this not only because the term 'proper party' is used in that judgment but also because Their Lordships thought it fit to hold that such company/authority the right to appeal to the High Court against the award of the reference court, only with leave of the High Court. These statutory situations and what emerges from the noted precedents would show that in the case in hand, even if I proceed to consider the contentions in this writ petition at par with grounds available for a statutory first appeal under the LA Act or under the CPC there is nothing to be interfered with, as can be seen from the discussions herein below.
10. As noticed, the total extent of land acquired is 28.02 Acres (about 70 cents) in Cherthala North Village. Ext.P4 shows that the reference Court considered the objections of the State Government contending that the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer is fair and adequate, The reference Court took into consideration the evidence of one of the claimants, PW1, on behalf of the claimants, who spoke about the different land marks and the importance of the locality. It noticed that the witness cited by the State had admitted that the acquired property is situated on the northern side of the iron bridge and the National Highway is at a distance of 100 meters from the acquired properly and that there is a tarred road on the eastern side of the acquired property and Alappuzha-Cherthala Canal is on the eastern side and the road on the eastern side leads to the National Highway, from there it leads to the private bus stand. He had also admitted that the National Highway is situated on the southern side of the entire property of which, the acquired property forms part and there are institutions such as Regional office and branch office of Dhanalakshmi Bank, situated on the southern side of the acquired property and important business concerns are situated on the western side of the road and on the eastern side there is a taxi stand and other shops and through the Cherthala canal, water transportation facilities are available. Such evidence of DW1 was taken along with documents reflecting the land value of different other sites in the locality. The purchasers or vendors under those documents were also examined. DW3 Commissioner who prepared Ext All report in a civil case in relation to one of the properties covered by Ext.B1 sale deed was to the effect that the transaction relied on by the Land Acquisition Officer to fix the compensation related to a property lying away from the acquired land and lay nearly 2 feet lower than the road level. On the basis of these materials, the reference Court enhanced the compensation,
11. The Division Bench of this Court further enhanced the compensation after adverting to the material documents and holding that the valuation reflected by Ext. All document cannot be discarded having regard to the met that the said transaction was before the notification and therefore, the amounts ought to be fixed at Rs. 10,000/- per Are. The State was heard by this Court in that appeal.
12. Having noticed that the aforesaid findings have been rendered by the reference Court and by this Court in appeal after adverting to and considering the materials and after having heard the learned Counsel on behalf of the State Government also, it needs to be immediately noticed that even in the writ petition, the petitioner corporation does not state that the land value fixed by the reference Court or by this Court is unjust and unreasonable or is exorbitant in reality. As noticed earlier, on scanning the pleadings, all that I find is a statement in ground B that 'if without affording an opportunity to the person who has to bear the acquisition cost land value is increased by leaps and bounds, then necessarily it would be in violation of the principles of natural justice'. Even before me, it was not pointed out on any count that the land value as determined is unreasonable.
13. Its learned Counsel candidly stated that the real heart burn for the petitioner corporation is the fact that the statutory add-ons such as solatium and interest would have mounted by this time. But such statutory entitlements cannot be prevented since they are part of the legislative conferment on the claimants under the LA Act on which the gaze of Article 300A, read with the equality principle enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution continuously falls. That cannot be deprived by judicial order. In support of this are the decisions of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 21 and Patel Joitaram Kalidas v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer : (2007) 2 SCC 341.
14. For the aforesaid reasons,, this Court does not find it necessary to extend its visitorial jurisdiction to set aside the impugned award.
In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.