A.S. Venkatachala Moorthy, J.
1. The petitioner is a partnership firm. It was assessed to income-tax for the first time for the assessment year 1974-75 granting registration to it under Section 185 of the Income-tax Act by order dated March 6, 1975. Subsequently, assessments were completed for the years 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78 and the firm was allowed continuation of registration up to the assessment year 1980-81. For the purpose of considering the issue that is involved in this original petition, it is not necessary to mention the entire factual details. Suffice it to say, that the petitioner filed return for 1978-79 and the assessment for the said year was pending. At that stage, the petitioner filed a petition before the Settlement Commission to have the case settled in terms of Section 245C of the Income-tax Act. The Settlement Commission by order dated January 25, 1991, cancelled the registration given to the petitioner for the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77 under the provisions of Section 184(7) of the Act. However, in the said order the Settlement Commission granted immunity from prosecution to the petitioner-firm and held that no penalty need be imposed under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. The above facts are admitted by both the parties.
2. The point that is now taken by the petitioner is that the return filed for the year 1978-79 is for the period ending on March 31, 1979, and that cancellation of registration under Section 186 of the Act can be made only within a period of eight years from March 31, 1979, i.e., on or before March 31, 1987. This is made clear in the first proviso to Section 186(1) of the Income-tax Act. Hence, the contention is that the order passed by the Settlement Commission in the year 1991 long after which is the last date, viz., March 31, 1987, cancelling the registration is one without any authority, power or jurisdiction.
3. The contention of the Department is that Chapter XIX-A of the Income-tax Act is in the nature of a self-contained Chapter and the applications filed under Section 245C will be disposed of as per the provisions of that Chapter and the Settlement Commission is not in any way bound by the other provisions of the Act, in particular Section 186 of the Act. It is further submitted that the amendment by way of the Finance Act, 1987, was introduced with effect from June 1, 1987, only for the purpose of removing a doubt in this regard.
4. The point for consideration in this original petition is as to what are the powers of the Settlement Commission in the sense that whether it can cancel a registration even after a long period of eight years, i.e., calculating eight years from the date of ending of the assessment year concerned(here in this case, March 31, 1987). Or, in other words, to put it straight and direct whether the words occurring in Section 245D(8) 'for removal of doubts' would refer to and qualify both first part of the said section as well as the second part or whether they will apply only to the first part. If the answer is that they apply to both the parts, then the petitioner has to fail.
5. Section 245D(8) of the Income-tax Act reads :
'For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in Section 153 shall apply to any order passed under Sub-section (4) or to any order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation required to be made by the Assessing Officer in pursuance of any directions contained in such order passed by the Settlement Commission and nothing contained in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 186 shall apply to the cancellation of the registration of a firm required to be made in pursuance of any such directions as aforesaid.'
6. Admittedly, this was introduced only on June 1, 1987, i.e., long after the last date, according to the petitioner, viz., March 31, 1987. By a reading of this section, viz., Section 245D(8), for the purpose of this case, three aspects have to be taken note of. Firstly, in Section 245D(8), after mentioning about the first part/clause and while referring to the second one, the word 'and' is used. Secondly, if the intention of the Legislature is to separate and delink the second part/clause, then they would have very well dealt with the second part/clause by a separate sentence1 or a separate paragraph as Section 245D(9). Thirdly, while construing the provisions of the Act, if the words are plain and there is no ambiguity, then, the courts have to go by the meaning conveyed under the provisions of the Act. Of course, learned counsel for the petitioner places before this court the notes on clauses and submitted that there is nothing to indicate that the amendment was introduced only for the purpose of removal of doubts. It has to be pointed out, the deliberations before Parliament while passing the Finance Bill has not been placed before this court for consideration, for the same might throw some light In this situation, this court has to proceed only on the basis that the words 'for removal of doubts' would apply to both parts/clauses in the said Sub-section.
7. In this view of the matter, there are no merits in the original petition and the same is hereby dismissed.