Mohammed, J.
1. In this writ appeal filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act the respondents raised a preliminary point that this appeal is not maintainable for the reason that the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge in sum and substance is an order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution. Before examining the appeal on merits we would prefer to adjudicate this preliminary issue at the outset.
2. The basic facts required for the present purpose are stated hereunder :
The appellants are tenants in respect of the 'buildings' sought to be evicted by the respondents-landlords in a proceeding under Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). These 'buildings' are actually rooms forming part of a larger building owned by the landlord. The Rent Control Court after enquiry ordered eviction on the ground of reconstruction under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. The Rent Control Appellate Authority in appeal under Section 18 of the Act found that the ground of reconstruction was bona fide and accordingly the eviction order was upheld. The Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the revision petition filed by the tenants under Section 20 of the Act directed the landlord to obtain necessary sanction from the Alappuzha Development Authority before the orders are put in execution and also fresh licence or renewal of the licence as per the order dated 29th June, 1994. Subsequently the landlord filed Eviction Petition before the Execution Court -Munsiff's Court, Alappuzha which was allowed. Thereafter a revision was filed by the tenants before the Additional District Judge, Alappuzha and that was allowed as per the order dated 14-8-1995. As against the said order, the landlord filed a writ petition O.P. No. 14665 of 1995. The landlord also filed O.P. No. 14213 of 1995 as against the rejection of the application for renewal of construction by the Alappuzha Municipality. The learned single Judge after hearing both these petitions dismissed O.P. No. 14665 of 1995 and allowed O.P. No. 14213 of 1995 as per judgment dated 13th March, 1997. Since the judgment delivered by this Court in O.P. No. 14665 of 1995 was under Article 227 of the Constitution, the landlord did not file a writ appeal. However, the said judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1270 of 1998. The Supreme Court by judgment dated 20-2-1998 (Ext.P2) allowed substitution of the legal heirs of the original landlord who died pendente lite and set aside the judgment in O.P. No. 14665 of 1995 and restored the order passed by the executing Court. Subsequently the legal heirs of the deceased landlord filed application for restoration of execution petition before the Rent Controller (Principal Munsiff) and it was allowed as per the order dated 6-8-1998 (Ext.P3) and posted the case for delivery of the property. As against that order the tenants filed revision, R.C.R.P. No. 2 of 1998 under Section 14 of the Act. The said revision was also dismissed by the order dated 15-9-1998 (Ext.P5). Being dissatisfied with the said orders (Exts.P3 and P5) the tenants filed the writ petition O.P. No. 19363 of 1998. The learned single Judge by the order dated 27th November, 1998 dismissed the said writ petition. It is against the said judgment this writ appeal has been filed,
3. Section 14 of the Act is as follows :
'14. Execution of orders--
Every order made under Section 11 (or Section 12) or Section 13 or Section 19 or Section 33 and every order passed on appeal under Section 18 or on revision under Section 20 shall, after the expiry of the time allowed therein be executed by the Munsiff or if there are more than one Munsiff -- by the principal Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as if it were a decree passed by him :
Provided that an order passed in execution under this section shall not be subject to an appeal but shall be subject to revision by the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie against the decisions of the said Munsiff.'
From the above provision it is evident that an order for eviction of the tenant passed under Section 11 shall be executed by the Munsiff or the principal Munsiff, as the case may be, having jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as if it were a decree passed by him. No appeal is provided against the order passed under Section 14 but such order shall be subject to revision by the Courts to which the appeals ordinarily lie against the decisions of the said Munsiff. In the present case, Exts.P3 and P5 orders were passed by the principal Munsiff and the District Judge respectively under Section 14 of the Act. The question that requires to be examined in this context is whether those Courts will come within the meaning of 'Civil Courts'. It is not brought to our notice that the expression 'Civil Court' has been specifically defined in any Act or the Code. However the Code of Civil Procedure in its preamble indicates that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature, in other words the Courts which have jurisdiction to deal with the civil disputes and rights pertaining to property and persons. Generally speaking Courts constituted for deciding purely civil questions between the persons seeking their civil rights should be considered to be Civil Courts though they may be constituted by special statutes like the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. What is referred to in Section 14 is the Munsiff or principal Munsiff having jurisdiction over the area and he is conferred with the power to execute the orders of eviction as it were a decree passed by him. The revisional Court is the District Court to which appeals ordinarily lie against the decisions of the Munsiff. That being so, we have no hesitation to hold that the Courts which passed Exts.P3 and P5 orders under Section 14 of the Act are coming within the meaning of the 'Civil Courts'.
4. A Division Bench of this Court in Nalla Koya v. Administrator, Union Territories of Laccadives, 1968 Ker LT 60, held to the effect that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a Civil Court. Placing reliance on this decision, another Division Bench of this Court in Ramachandran Nair v. Krishna Pillai, 1991 (2) Ker LT 162, came to the conclusion that the District Court under Section 20 of the Act is a Civil Court in the hierarchy of Courts and the order of the District Court being the decision of a Civil Court cannot be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. The following observation of the Division Bench in Union of India v. Vijaya Mohini Mills, 1992 (1) Ker LT 404, is quite apposite in the present context.
'Learned single Judge dismissed the Original Petition on merits. But he did not specify whether the Original Petition was entertained under Article 226 or only under Article 227 of the Constitution. We may assume that learned single Judge would not have exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 since a writ of certiorari is not maintainable in respect of a judgment or order passed by a Civil Court.'
(See also Ouseph Vareed v. Mercy, 1968 Ker LT 683).
In view of the above settled position it can safely be said that Exts.P3 and P5 orders passed by the Civil Courts are not liable to be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. However, learned Counsel for the appellants pointed out that the writ petition had been specifically filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging Exts.P3 and P5 orders. The counsel therefore argues that the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge shall be treated to be the one passed in exercise of power under Article 226 in which case the present appeal is maintainable. In support of this plea the counsel has relied on the following observation of the Supreme Court in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 1272 at 1320:
'In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226.'
Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Manghalbhai v. Dr. Radhyshyam, AIR 1993 SC 806. The following observation contained in paragraph 6 of the judgment is brought to our notice.
'The learned single Judge in his impugned judgment dated 11-12-1987 nowhere mentioned that he was exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge examining the matter on merit and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller as well as the Resident Deputy Collector on the ground that the aforesaid judgments were perverse. The findings of the Rent Controller and Resident Deputy Collector were set aside on the question of habitual defaulter as well as on the ground of bona fide need. Thus in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition and the judgment of the learned single Judge leaves no manner of doubt that it was an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and in that view of the matter the Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable before the High Court.'
6. In Umaji Keshao Meshram's case (supra), the question that came up for decision before the Supreme Court is this : 'Whether an appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court to a Division Bench of two Judges of that High Court from the judgment of a single Judge of that High Court in a petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India'. The following observations contained in paragraphs 101 and 102 of the judgment are quite relevant in the present context.
'101. Consequently, where a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is according to the rules of a particular High Court heard by a single Judge, on intra Court appeal will He from that judgment if such a right of appeal is provided in the charter of that High Court, whether such Charter be Letters Patent or a Statute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court gives in such a case a right of intra-Court appeal and, therefore, the decision of a single Judge of that High Court given in a petition under Article 226 would be appealable to a Division Bench of that High Court.
102. It is equally well-settled in law that a proceeding under Article 226 is not an original proceeding.'
Therefore it further held that an intra Court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition under Article 227 by reason of such appeal being expressly barred by clause 15 of the Letters Patent of that High Court. This decision of the Supreme Court was distinguished by a Division Bench of this Court in Ramachandran Nair v. Krishna Pillai, 1991 (2) Ker LT 162, and held thus :
'In Umaji Keshao Meshram's case, AIR 1986 SC 1272, the Supreme Court explained the difference between a proceeding under Article 226 and the one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. A proceeding under Article 226 is an original proceeding and when it concerns civil rights, it is an original civil proceeding and an appeal would lie provided the concerned statute or charter provides for such an appeal. A proceeding under Article 227, on the other hand, is not an original proceeding and an intra-Court appeal does not lie against the decision of a learned single Judge given in a petition under Article 227. The present is a case governed by the provisions of the Kerala High Court Act. Section 5 of the Act provides for appeals from judgments or orders of single Judge. Section 5 states that an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges from certain judgments or orders of single Judge. Clause (i) takes in judgment or order of a single Judge in the exercise of original jurisdiction. Clause (ii) deals with judgment in the case of appellate jurisdiction in respect of decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by a subordinate Court. Clause (iii) deals with judgment of a single Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a subordinate Court, if the Judge who passed such judgment certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal. According to learned Counsel for the appellant, Clause (i) is attracted in the instant case. The question therefore is whether the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge, which is a judgment under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is a judgment in the exercise of original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has clearly held that a proceeding under Article 227 is not an original proceeding. It is a proceeding which invokes the jurisdiction of supervisory or superintendence and cannot be treated as original jurisdiction. Hence it is clear that the proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, such as the one in the instant case is not an original proceeding and no appeal lies against such a judgment under S. 5 of the Kerala High Court Act.'
The above observation of the Division Bench is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case.
7. In Manghalbhai's case, AIR 1993 SC 806 (supra), the Supreme Court was considering an eviction case under C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. In that case the Deputy Collector and Rent Controller, Gondia decided all the grounds against the landlord and dismissed the application by his order dated 13-9-1985. The Resident Deputy Collector, Bhandara dismissed the appeal by the order dated 31-3-1986. Then the landlord filed the writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court. There is no discussion in that case whether the original authority as well as the appellate authority are coming within the scope of Civil Courts. If those authorities are actually Civil Courts then proceeding under Article 226 cannot be invoked. Therefore, it appears that those authorities were treated as Tribunals and the orders passed by them are liable to be challenged under Article 226. Further, we have no reason to invoke the principles of fairness and justice as laid down therein in the facts of the present case. The Rent Conirol Court and the Appellate Authority in the present case concurrently ordered eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) and the appellate authority passed the order on 7-3-1994 and the same has been confirmed by the High Court on 29-6-1994. Due to the protracted litigation so far the buildings were not surrendered even though the executing Court ordered delivery as early as on (sic).
8. The learned single Judge did not say that the impugned orders are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. After discussing the case on merits the original petition was dismissed by the learned Judge. That does not mean the impugned judgment is passed under Article 226. As observed by the Division Bench of this Court in Vijaya Mohini Mill's case, 1992 (1) Ker LT 404 (supra), we may assume that the learned single Judge would not have exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 since a writ of certiorari is not maintainable in respect of a judgment or order passed by the Civil Court. Therefore, it can be safely said that the learned single Judge has passed the impugned judgment only in exercise of power available under Article 227. The Division Bench in the above decision further observed thus :
'If the judgment under challenge in this appeal was passed in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no appeal would lie therefrom before a Division Bench under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (vide Arumugham Chettiar v. Joseph, 1961 Ker LT 823). In Umaji v. Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 1272, Supreme Court held that no appeal would lie against a single Judge's order or judgment passed inexercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Supreme Court considered in the said case the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The reasoning is that since jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory in nature the resultant order cannot be treated as the product of exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court. It will be pertinent to point out that similar was the reasoning which weighed with the Division Bench of this Court in Arumugham Chettiar's case. So the position can be held as well settled now.'
In view of the above proposition laid down by Thomas, J. (as the learned Judge then was) on behalf of the Division Bench, we cannot countenance the plea advanced by the appellants in this case.
9. Generally speaking, we have considerable reserve as to the entertainment of writ petition in exercise of power under Article 227 without applying proper care and caution. Though the power of superintendence is available to this Court under Article 227, it has to be exercised sparingly. The following observation of Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193, is relevant, in this context,
'Though this Court has a right to interfere with decisions of Courts and Tribunals under its power of superintendence, it appears to me that that right must be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases.'
The power under Article 227 shall not be used for not attaining the finality of litigation between the parties. If it is done so, it may work against public policy. At any rate this Court cannot allow an appeal against the orders passed by the Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution.
10. In view of what is said above, as against the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge, a writ appeal under Section 5 of the High. Court Act is not maintainable. Thus the objection raised by the respondents is upheld.
In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.