1. This is an appeal filed by the Revenue and is directed against the order dt. 18th Feb., 2003, passed by the CIT(A), Belgaum, in the matter of assessment under Section 143(3) of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), for the asst. yr. 2001-2002.
(i) The order of the learned CIT(A) is opposed to law and facts of the case.
(ii) The CIT(A) erred in holding that the assessee is eligible for relief under Section 89(1) on the amount received under the.
Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) as reduced by the exempted income under Section 10(10C) of the Act.
(iii) The learned CIT(A) erred in giving a finding that the amount received by assessee under VRS remaining after the exempted income under Section 10(10C) is compensation covered within the meaning of Section 17(3)(i) of the Act and Rule 21A(1)(c) of the Rules.
(iv) The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the VRS amount received by assessee, reduced by the exempted income under Section 10(10C) constituted compensation received for surrender of the right of the assessee for continuing in employment that would have earned the assessee income from "salary".
(v) The learned CIT(A) erred in applying the ratios of decisions of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the cases of CIT v. J. Visalakshi (1994) 206 ITR 531 (Mad), and others referred to in the order for giving a finding that the VRS amount after exemption under Section 10(10C) received by the assessee is the compensation to be treated as profit in lieu of salary under Section 17(3)(i) of the Act and eligible for relief under Section 89(1) r/w Rule 21A(1)(c) of the Rules.
(vi) The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the amount received by the assessee from the VRS after the exemption under Section 10(10C) is the compensation received on termination of service: (vii) The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the amount received by assessee under the VRS after exemption under Section 10(10C) since chargeable to tax as profit in lieu of salary under Section 17(3)(i) shall be eligible for relief under Section 89(1).
(viii) The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the provisions of Section 89(1) r/w Section 17(3) and Rule 21A are beneficial provisions and need to be interpreted liberally so as to grant the benefits to the assessee.
(ix) For these and other grounds that may be urged at the time of hearing, the order of the learned CIT(A) may be set aside and that of the order of the AO be restored.
However, effectively solitary grievance of the Revenue is that the CIT(A) erred in holding that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the assessee was eligible for relief under Section 89(1) of the Act. All the points raised as grounds of appeal, extracted above, are, in substance, only arguments in support of this grievance.
Accordingly, all the grounds of appeal taken by the appellant are being considered together for disposal.
3. Briefly, the material facts. The assessee was in employment of Union Bank of India, and, in the relevant previous year, the assessee received a sum of Rs. 7,50,592 as an ex gratia amount (i.e., VRS compensation) on account of leaving employment with the aforesaid Union Bank of India under Voluntary Retirement Scheme. While filing the income-tax return, the assessee claimed, inter alia, exemption of ex gratia amount to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000, under Section 10(10C) of the Act, and also relief under Section 89(1) in respect of ex gratia amount received in excess of Rs. 5,00,000. The assessee's claim was that the exemption for ex gratia amount received as VRS compensation was available upto Rs. 5,00,000 only, the balance amount was subject to normal taxability which, inter alia, meant admissibility of relief under Section 89(1), if otherwise eligible. It was further pleaded that the requirements of Section 89(1) as also Rules 21A and 21AA were fully satisfied in his case. The AO was, however, not impressed and he rejected the claim by observing as follows: "In this case, the assessee has opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the Bank and the ex gratia amount received will qualify for exemption under Section 10(10C) of the Act upto Rs. 5,00,000.
Rule 21A states that the relief under Section 89 is to be allowed after bifurcating the total salary paid in arrears or advance to the previous three years. Rule 21A does not say that relief under Section 89 is to be allowed after allowing the exemption available.
Section 10(10C), an exemption section which has clearly prescribed the amount qualify for exemption. The proviso to Section 10(10C) also specifically clarifies that where exemption has been allowed to an employee under this clause for any other assessment year. Hence, the assessee's plea that relief under Section 89 is to be allowed bifurcating the balance amount to the previous three years after allowing the exemption under Section 10(10C) is not acceptable." The assessee's claim for relief under Section 89(1) was thus declined by the AO. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) who reversed the action of the AO by observing as follows: "I have carefully considered the submissions of the counsel of the appellant and also the reasons given by the AO to deny the relief under Section 89(1) to the appellant. I find that there is enough force in the argument of the appellant that he is entitled for relief under Section 89(1). Section 10(10C) speaks about the total exemption from income-tax of the compensation received upto Rs. 5 lakhs. The balance of amount if any, over and above the exemption limit of Rs. 5 lakhs is taxable in the hands of the appellant as profit in lieu of salary under Section 17(3). Since this amount is to be taxed under the head "salary", the same is also entitled for all relief/deductions available for computation of income under that head. There is nothing either in Section 10(10C) or in Section 89(1) that make them mutually exclusive. They are two independent sections and as contended by the appellants' counsel that none of them are worded in such a fashion as to deprive the benefit of the other section. The provisions contained in Section 10(10C) and Section 89(1) of the IT Act are quite independent from each other and there is no overlapping in this regard.
5.1 In the case of CIT v. Visalakshi (1994) 206 ITR 531 (Mad), it was held that "the question as to whether the assessee is entitled to relief under Section 89(1) would depend upon the interpretation to be placed on the words 'termination of his employment occurring in Sub-section (3)(i) of Section 17 of the IT Act. That being so, we are of the view that there is no Justification to confine the meaning of the word 'termination' only to the case of other voluntary retirement or superannuation, as per the stand taken by the Department. It must be borne in mind that Section 89(1) r/w Section 17(3) of the IT Act are beneficial clauses intended to grant certain benefits to employees or persons in service. Therefore, if the meaning of the word 'termination' is confined to cases of voluntary retirement or superannuation only, the object of the clause will not be fully achieved....
It may also be pointed out that if ex gratia amount received by the assessee by reason of his resignation from employment is not held as falling under Clause (3) of Section 17 of the Act, it cannot also be construed as income amenable to assessment to income-tax because it is not the amount earned or paid for the service rendered, and as such it will be only a capital receipt." 5.2 The Madras High Court has also followed the said decision in the case of CTT v. M. Raman (2000) 245 ITR 856 (Mad). In view of the above decisions, I am of the considered opinion that the appellant is entitled to relief under Section 89(1) in respect of the balance amount of compensation received on voluntary retirement from service over and above .Rs, 5 lakhs exempt under Section 10(10C). Though the amount received by the appellant at the time of voluntary retirement under the VRS cannot be treated as arrears of salary or advance salary but it is surely in the nature of compensation received for surrendering the right of continuing in service, which partakes the character of salary to the appellant, Further, the provisions of Rule 21A(1)(c) clearly cover the cases of compensation which is eligible for relief under Section 89(1) of the IT Act, 1961. Rule 21A(1)(c) provides as follows: 'Where the payment is in the nature of compensation received by the assessee from his employer or former employer at or in connection with the termination of his employment after continuous service for not less than three years and where the unexpired portion of his term of employment is also not less than three years in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (4).' 5.3 It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. (P) Ltd. (1970) 77 ITR 518 (SC), that if the language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a provision. It is for the legislature to step in and remove the absurdity. On the other hand, if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted. If two views are possible, the view favourable to the assessee must be accepted while construing the provisions of a taxing statute. In the case of the appellant, I am of the considered opinion that Section 10(10C) and relief under Section 89(1) are both available. As regards applicability of proviso to Section 10(10C), relied upon by the AO, is concerned, the same prohibits the assessee in claiming the similar exemption in subsequent or any other assessment years.
In other words, the assessee can claim exemption under Section 10(10C) only once in his life time and no one can claim the same exemption on receipt of compensation or otherwise in future.
Accordingly, in my opinion, the AO is not justified in denying the relief under Section 89(1) of the IT Act to the appellant. The AO is directed to compute the total income of the appellant by allowing appropriate relief under Section 89(1) of the IT Act, 1961." Revenue is aggrieved of the aforesaid order of the CIT(A) and is in appeal before us.
4. Shri Manish Bahuguna, learned Departmental Representative, strongly relied upon the order of the AO and submitted that the judgments of Hon'ble Madras High Court, which were relied upon by the CIT(A) were based on entirely different sets of facts and law existing prior to introduction of Voluntary Retirement Scheme in the year 1987. It was submitted that "these cases Were unique and isolated incidences of income and facts of assessee's case differ from it" and that "the provisions contained in Section 10(10C) and the present voluntary retirement scheme were not dealt with by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the above decisions". It is thus submitted that the ratio of the decisions relied upon by the CIT(A) is not applicable to the assessee's case. It is also submitted that the intent of legislature also appears to be that of providing the assessee with deduction from tax liability arising out of VRS amount for one assessment year only as evident from the second proviso to Section 10(10C) and 'giving relief under Section 89(1) involves spread-over of the VRS amount to three assessment years with a consequential tax relief. According to the learned Departmental Representative, this tax relief is besides what has been given on account of exemption under Section 10(10C) and, therefore, it goes against the said provision. Learned Departmental Representative also relied upon the Board's instructions contained in letter F. No.174/5/2001-ITA, dt. 23rd April, 2001 addressed to the Chief CIT (Karnataka & Goa) wherein it is clarified by the Board that the VRS amount received by an assessee in excess of Rs. 5,00,000 is not eligible for relief under Section 89(1) as distributing the VRS amount in more than one year is not permissible as per the existing provisions. It was then pointed out that Rule 21A, which is the rule setting out the application of relief under Section 89(1), prescribes five situations wherein relief under Section 89(1) can be granted, namely : (a) when the salary is received in advance or in arrears; (b) in case of gratuity receipts; (c) in case of commutation of pension; (d) in case of compensation received on termination of service; and (e) in any other case when the CBDT so decides. It was further pointed out that admittedly the case before us, (a), (b), (c) and (e) above are not applicable which leaves us with only Clause (d) above which pertains to "compensation received on termination" of service. Learned Departmental Representative further submits that the amount received under the VRS is a total composite packet under a scheme of voluntary separation and not termination of service by the employer unilaterally. Under VRS, there is no element of coercion or compulsion on the part of the employer for the voluntary retirement of the assessee from his employment, and an option is given to the assessee to make up his mind to accept or reject the offer of voluntary retirement on certain terms.
According to the learned Departmental Representative, even the eligibility arena of the VRS in Rule 2BA speaks only for 'voluntary retirement' or 'voluntary separation' for exemption under Section 10(10C) and the word 'termination' does not find place in Rule 2BA. It was thus submitted that since none of the situations prescribed in Rule 21A(1) is applicable, the amount received under VRS is not eligible for relief under Section 89(1) of the Act. Learned Departmental Representative thus strongly supported the stand of the AO, and urged us to vacate the order of the CIT(A), 5. On the other hand, Shri Shrikrishan Kelkar, learned counsel for the assessee, made equally elaborate arguments in support of the conclusions arrived at by the CIT(A). It was pointed out that the assessee received certain ex gratia payment from Union Bank of India, in terms of the voluntary retirement scheme framed by the bank. It was further pointed out that the amount so received, except to the extent exempt under Section 10(10C), is admittedly taxable under Section 17(3) as profits in lieu of salary. Section 17(3) defines profits in lieu of salary to include 'the amount of any compensation due to or received by an assessee form his employer or former employer at or in connection with the termination of employment'. Once it is not in dispute that the amount in question is taxable as 'profit in lieu of salary' under Section 17(3), it is eligible for relief under Section 89(1) just as much as any other amount is eligible for that relief, and it makes no difference whether or not the aforesaid amount is received under the VRS scheme or whether it has been granted partial exemption under Section 10(10C). It is also submitted that Section 10(10C) clearly states that ".....or termination of service in accordance with any scheme/schemes of voluntary retirement...." which demonstrates that the schemes of voluntary retirement envisage termination. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent had sought voluntary retirement in accordance with the VRS scheme framed by the bank, which results in 'termination of employment', and, therefore, it could not be said that the ex gratia was not received on account of termination of employment.
It was also submitted that Section 10(10) and Section 89 are two independent sections, and that in an case Section 89(1) does not grant any exemption but reduces the percentage rate at which tax is charged.
It was then pointed out that taxation at lower rate has distinct connotations than connotations of the expression 'exemption'. In this view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, merely because Section 10(10C) lays down that "where exemption has been allowed to an employee under this clause for any assessment year, no exemption thereunder shall be allowed to him in relation to any other assessment year", benefit of Section 89(1) cannot be declined to the assessee, and that there is no element .of exemption being sought from the income while claiming relief under Section 89(1). As regards the letter issued by the CBDT addressed to the Chief CIT (Karnataka & Goa), learned counsel submitted that it does not have the binding force of the circulars issued under Section 119 of the Act. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Ors. (2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC), wherein it is held that "every clarificatory note or press release issued by the CBDT does not have the statutory force like the circulars". Learned counsel for the assessee placed his reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. E.D. Sheppard (1963) 48 ITR 235 (SC) in support of the proposition that even the cases of voluntary separation are covered by the scope and connotations of the expression "termination".
Learned counsel for the assessee also placed his reliance on the judgments of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the cases of CIT v. J.Vishalakhshi (supra) and CIT v. M. Raman (surpa) and of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. S.N. Chadha (2001) 249 ITR 31 (Del), in support of merits of availability of benefit under Section 89(1) in the case of ex gratia received on voluntary compensation. It was submitted that these judgments hold good even in the present context, and that there are no judicial precedents available to the contrary of the propositions laid down by these judgments. References were also made for, and reliance placed on, the judgments in the cases of Sundaram Motors (P) Ltd. v. Ameerjan (1985) 152 ITR 64 (SC) and Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. CIT (1990) 183 ITR 1 (SC). It was also submitted that it is well settled principle of interpretation that where more than one views are possible, the view beneficial to the assessee should be adopted. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Dhiren Chemical Industries. On the strength of these submissions, learned counsel for the assessee urged us to confirm the order of the CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter. As a somewhat half-hearted alternate plea, it was argued that now that the CBDT itself has taken a stand, vide Circular No.200/79/2000-ITA(1), dt. 23rd Jan., 2001, that the payment of VRS compensation of banking sector is a capital expenditure, the entire VRS receipt is to be taken as a capital receipt beyond the purview of taxation. However, no further arguments were made on these lines, and learned counsel concluded by urging us to confirm the order of the CIT(A). In rejoinder, learned Departmental Representative, in substance, reiterated his submissions summed up earlier in this order.
6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned representatives and to the notes filed by them. We have also carefully perused the material before us and duly considered the factual matrix of the case as also the applicable legal position.
7. We find that under Section 89(1) of the IT Act, where, by reason of, inter alia, an assessee's having received in any one financial year a payment which, "under the provisions of Clause (3) of Section 17 is a profit in lieu of salary", his income is "assessed at a rate higher than that at which it would otherwise have been assessed, the AO shall, on an application made to him in this behalf, grant such relief as may be prescribed". A plain reading of this provision makes it clear that it is sufficient for the eligibility of relief under Section 89(1) that : --the assesses has received a payment which, under the provisions of Section 17(3), constitutes 'profit in lieu of salary'; and --as a result of assessee's having received the aforesaid 'profit in lieu of salary' his income is assessed at a rate higher than the rate at which it would otherwise have been assessed, Let us now examine the case before us on the above criterion laid down under the Statute. As far as the amount being in the nature of 'profit in lieu of salary' is concerned, it is not even in dispute that the VRS compensation received is taxed by the Revenue as a 'profit in lieu of salary' because in the impugned assessment order, the AO himself has taxed it so. Under Section 17(3)(i) 'profit in lieu of salary' includes, inter alia, the following receipts by an assessee : (i) the amount of any compensation due to or received by an assessee from his employer or former employer at, or in connection with, termination of his employment or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto : ' The aforesaid provisions of Section 17(3)(i) are in pan materia with the provisions of Expln. 2(i) to Section 7 of the IT Act, 1922, which provided as follows: For the purpose of this section, 'profits in lieu of salary' includes : (i) the amount of any compensation due to or received by an assessee from his employer or former employer at, or in connection with, the termination of his employment; whether solely as compensation for loss of employment or for any other consideration.
It is thus clear that barring the deletion of words "whether solely as compensation for loss of employment or for any other consideration" and insertion of words "or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto", which have no material bearing in the present context, the provisions of Expln. 2(i) to Section 7 in 1922 Act and provisions of Section 17(3)(i) of the 1961 Act are similar in effect.
8. In the case of CIT v. E.D. Sheppard (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of Expln. 2(i) to Section 7 in 1922 Act, were examining the proposition whether the scope of expression 'compensation' is confined to "compensation which is payable or compellable at law". Their Lordships had, by majority opinion, rejected this proposition, and approved Hon'ble High Court's observation that "...the expression 'compensation for loss of employment' used in Expln.
2 to Section 7 refers to any payment made, whether under a legal liability or voluntarily, to compensate as a solatium for the loss of employment suffered by the employee". Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the considered opinion that what one has to look to the nature of receipt in the hands of the assessee "irrespective of any considerations as to what was actuating in the mind of the other party". In this view of the matter, we are unable to approve the stand of the Revenue that the payment under VRS cannot be termed as compensation for 'termination of service', as also was the expression used in Expln. 2 to Section 7 in 1922 Act. In the case of CIT v. Visalakshi (supra), Hon'ble Madras High Court has observed that "the question whether the assessee is entitled to relief under Section 89(1) would depend on the interpretation to be placed on the words "termination of employment" occurring in Sub-clause (3)(i) of Section 17 of the Act" and that "it is necessary to bear in mind that termination of service can take place either by dismissal or by compulsory retirement or on attaining superannuation": In this background their Lordships then expressed the view that "there is no justification to confine the meaning of the word "termination" only to the cases of either voluntary retirement or superannuation, as is the stand taken by the Department". Their Lordships then held that the ex gratia amount received by the assessee even on his resignation constitutes 'compensation on termination of service' and is eligible for relief under Section 89(1)". In the case of CIT v. M. Raman (supra), Hon'ble Madras High Court again followed this principle and, referring to the same, added that "the said principle rendered by this Court in the case of resignation would equally apply to the case of voluntary retirement from service". That being so, there is no reason for us not to hold that the amount received by an employee, under voluntary retirement scheme, is nothing but a 'compensation on termination of service' for the purposes of the IT Act. In the hierarchical judicial system that we have, better wisdom of the Court below has to yield to higher wisdom of the Court above and, therefore, once an authority higher than this Tribunal has expressed an opinion on that issue, we have to respectfully follow the same, Such a High Court being a non-jurisdictional High Court does not alter the position as laid down by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the matter of CIT v. Godavan Devi Saraf (1978) 113 ITR 589 (Bom). Respectfully following these legal precedents, we hold that the amount received on VRS settlement is also, for the purposes of Section 17(3) of the Act, constitutes compensation for 'termination of service'. There is also no dispute about the factual position that as a result of assessee's having received the aforesaid 'profit in lieu of salary' his income is assessed at a rate higher than the rate at which it would otherwise have been assessed. It is also not in dispute that under Rule 21A(1)(c) of the IT Rules "where the payment is in the nature of compensation received by the assessee from his employer or former employer at or in connection with the termination of his employment after continuous service for not less than three years and where the unexpired portion of his term of employment is also not less than three years in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (4)". On these facts, in our considered view, the conditions laid down under Section 89(1) are satisfied and, from this point of view, the assessee is eligible for relief. Let us now examine the impact of exemption under Section 10(10C) and the restrictions for further relief placed therein.
9. There is No. dispute about the admissibility of exemption upto an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs, out of the sum received by the assessee under the VRS, under Section 10(10C). It provides that any amount received by an employee of any company at the time of his voluntary retirement, in accordance with the scheme of voluntary retirement, to the extent such amount does not exceed Rs. 5 lakhs. The objection taken by the Revenue relates to second proviso to this section which provides as follows: "Provided further that where exemption has been allowed to an employee under this clause for any assessment year, no exemption thereunder shall be allowed to him in relation to any other assessment year." In our considered view, the implication of this proviso is only that in case an assessee is allowed an exemption under Section 10(10C) in one assessment year, such an assessee is not entitled to exemption under Section 10(-10C) in any other assessment year. In other words, the benefit under Section 10(10C) is a one time benefit. In their wisdom, legislature has used the expression "no exemption thereunder shall be allowed... in relation to any other assessment year", and the word 'thereunder' unambiguously refers to Section 10(10C). As a matter of fact, it is difficult for us to comprehend as to what is the relevance of this proviso for the purpose of relief under Section 89(1). Section 10(10C) and Section 89(1) are two different sections and the reference is specifically for Section 10(10C). In any case, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, Section 89(1) does not grant an exemption.
The distinction between an 'exemption' and a 'relief cannot be ignored or just washed away. Even if these restrictions be said to be desirable for proper working of the section and in harmony with the intent of legislature, as is strenuously argued by the learned senior Departmental Representative, it is not open to us to supply the casus omissus. In the case of Tata Tea Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2003) 78 TTJ (Cal) 646 : (2003) 87ITD 351 (Cal), to which one of us was a party, it was observed that "casus omissus, which broadly refers to the principle that a matter which has not been provided in the statute but should have been there, cannot be supplied by us, as, to do so will be clearly beyond the call and scope of our duty which is only to interpret the law as it exists". As Rowlatt, J. has said, in Cape Brady Syndicate v.IRC 1 KB 64, "In a taxing statute, one has to look merely at what is clearly said; there is no room for any intendment...". The temptation of resorting to a rather creative process of an aggressive interpretation of statutes, which allows us to read between the lines, therefore, must be resisted. Even as we say so, we are also of the view that, in any event, there is nothing between the lines to justify such an interpretation either. The only effect of exemption under Section 10(10C) is that to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000, as is specified in Section 10(10C), VRS compensation, received by the assessee does not form part of the total income, but once the balance amount is exigible to tax under Section 17(3), all other consequences under the Act, including eligibility to relief under Section 89(1), follows. We, therefore, reject Revenue's contention that in view of the contents of, and intent of, second proviso to Section 10(10C), relief under Section 89(1) is not admissible. One of the points made by the learned Departmental Representative is that Hon'ble Madras High Court's judgment are not relevant because they did not take into account the provisions of Section 10(10C) but then it proceeds on the fallacy that exemption under Section 10(10C) has any relevance for the purpose of relief under Section 89(1). We, therefore, reject this plea also. As for learned Departmental, Representative's reliance on the CBDT communication, we hardly need to state that law is trite that a circular, even under Section 119, cannot be thrust upon the assessee.
The assessee can derive advantage from a circular but it does not bind the assessee in any way nor can it impose any taxability on the assessee. The assessee is entitled to ignore a circular if its terms are beyond the provisions of the Act. It is only a benevolent circular which is binding, and that too on the Revenue. If authority is needed, the same is contained in numerous judicial precedents including judgments of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Smt. K.Bhoomiamma v. CTT (1992) 194 ITR 723 (Kar), of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of CTT v. Ramchandra Poddar Charitable Trust (1987) 164 ITR 666 (Cal), As the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in the case of Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. CIT (supra), Board cannot pre-empt a judicial interpretation of scope and ambit of a provision of the Act by issuing a circular on the subject, It is also well settled in law that Tribunal is not bound to take judicial notice of the circulars, issued by the Board, as is held in the case of Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v.CIT (1987) 163 ITR 659 (Kar), by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court.
10. For the detailed reasons set out above, we are of the considered view that the assessee was indeed eligible for relief under Section 89(1) and merely because the assessee was allowed exemption under Section 10(10C), this relief could not have been declined to the assessee. Accordingly, we approve the conclusions arrived at by the CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter.