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S. Mohankumar Vs. Rajagopal and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectElection
CourtKerala High Court
Decided On
Case NumberC.R.P. No. 1942 of 1997
Judge
Reported inAIR2000Ker176
ActsKerala Municipalities Act, 1994 - Sections 90(1); Kerala Rationing Order, 1966; Constitution of India - Article 299
AppellantS. Mohankumar
RespondentRajagopal and ors.
Appellant Advocate T.R. Ramachandran Nair, Adv.
Respondent Advocate P. Sukumaran Nair (Sr.),; G. Unnikrishnan,; Thottathil B
DispositionRevision allowed
Cases ReferredRanjeet Singh v. Harmohinder Singh Pradhan
Excerpt:
.....high court act, 1959. - x1(d) agreement clearly specify a 'contract with the government' under which work is being done by him for the government in the matter of distribution of rationed articles. 'work' here means works contract in favour of the government and the like and not to any little services expected to be done in favour of the government under any particular agreement......singular is used no distinction with the plural appears to have been intended. 'work' here means works contract in favour of the government and the like and not to any little services expected to be done in favour of the government under any particular agreement. i am therefore of the view that the dictum in somnath rath's case aforementioned can safely be extended to the case in hand, though the term used in section 90(1)(g) is work and not works. the answer therefore is that by executing ext.x1(d) the revision petitioner has not taken up any work to be done for the government. he is not therefore disqualified for that reason.16. the next point in controversy is as to whether ext.x1(d) reveals a subsisting contract between the present revision petitioner and the government. no doubt,.....
Judgment:

M.R. Hariharan Nair, J.

1. In the election as Councillorof Ward No. 29 of the Trivandrum Corporation, the petitioner was a contestant along with respondents 1 to 3. The petitioner was declared as the successful candidate by a margin of 60 votes as against the first respondent. Respondents 2 and 3 got only far less number of votes. The first respondent filed O.P. (Election) No. 18 of 1995 before the Munsiffs Court, Trivandrum alleging that the petitioner was not entitled to contest in view of the provisions of Section 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act as he was an authorised ration dealer and as such under a contractual liability with the Government and working for the Government. The Munsiffs Court/after trial, found that there was no merit in the contention that the revision petitioner was under a contractual liability with the Government and that he was, however, working for the Government and on that premise set aside the election.

2. The revision petitioner took up the matter to the District Court, by way of Election Appeal No. 12 of 1996. The first respondent filed a cross appeal therein. These were heard together. The District Court not only dismissed the present revision petitioner's appeal, but also found that the cross appeal had merit and that the revision petitioner's election was liable to be invalidated also because he was under a contractual liability in connection with the dealership as authorised ration dealer.

3. The revision petitioner challenged the said finding by filing O.P. No. 6074 of 1997 and also through the present revision before this Court. At that time the question as to whether a revision against the finding of the District Court in election matters under the Kerala Municipalities Act would lie was res integra. The question was decided in C.R.P. No. 1190 of 1997 and connected cases by a Division Bench on 20-8-1999. It was found that Revision was the remedy. Thereupon, the revision petitioner withdrew O.P. No. 6074 of 1997 and continued the present civil revision petition. As directed in the decision of the Division Bench, all parties were heard by me.

4. Section 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act provides that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as a Councillor of a Municipality if he is interested in subsisting contract made with or any work being done for the Government or Municipality. It will be useful to quote the relevantprovision herein.

'90. Disqualification of candidates :

(1) A person shall be disqualified in thefollowing circumstances for being chosen asand for being a Councillor of a Municipalityif he

x x x x (g) is interested in subsisting contract made with, or any work being done for the Government or Municipality concerned except as a shareholder (other than a Director) in a company or except as permitted by rules made under this Act.'

5. The fact that the petitioner had executed Ext.X1(d) agreement in favour of the Government in connection with ARD Licence No. 301 of the Trivandrum Corporation is not disputed by the revision petitioner. It is, however, contended that it is not a 'contract with the Government' and that what is to be done by the dealer under the agreement is only a service and not a work for the Government. According to the learned Counsel for the first respondent, the terms of Ext. X1(d) agreement clearly specify a 'contract with the Government' under which work is being done by him for the Government in the matter of distribution of rationed articles.

6. The points in controversy, therefore are :

(i) Whether the execution of the agreement marked in this case as Ext.X1(d) amounts to a contract made with the Government; and

(ii) Whether while discharging the functions as an authorised retail ration dealer the revision petitioner is doing any 'work for the Government' for the purposes of Section 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act.

7. During arguments, counsel on both sides relied heavily on case law in support of their respective contentions. For the sake of brevity only the important among them are referred to hereunder.

8. The term 'work' is not defined in the Kerala Municipalities Act. The first question that would arise therefore is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of the word in the context in which it is used in the statute. It is only when the ordinary meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for someother possible meaning of the word. To do work for the Government ordinarily means carrying on any task, job or activity for the Government for a consideration received from the Government. In distribution of ration articles no such work for the Government Is involved.

9. An analogous provision is available in Section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act which also deals with disqualification of candidate albeit for election to the House of the People. But there the reference is to 'works' instead of to 'work' as found in Section 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act. Since decision given under Section 9-A aforementioned as also under Section 7(d) of the same Act, as it stood before the amendment in 1966 are referred to, it is necessary to quote here those provisions also before considering the applicability of those decisions.

Section 7(d) -- Before amendment in 1966 :

'A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State-

x x x x x (d) if, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account, he has any share or interest in a contract for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by the appropriate Government.'

Section 9-A -- After amendment in 1966 :

'A person shall be disqualified if and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to or for the execution of any works undertaken by that Government.'

10. As far as contracts for execution of works is concerned there appears to be little difference between the two provisions and hence the decisions under both the above provisions can be considered here as far as that aspect is concerned.

11. Ram Raj Tewari v. Vijaiya Laxmi, AIR 1986 All 325, went into the question whether retail vending of liquor under licence obtained from the Government as per an agreement is a 'contract for execution of works'for the purposes of Section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act. It was found that the answer was in the negative.

12. Whether a licensee under the Public Distribution System in Orissa can be taken as doing 'works' came up for consideration in Somnath Rath v. Bikram K. Arukh, 1999 (8) Supreme 169 : (AIR 1999 SC 3417). It was found that the reference in Section 9-A of the Act is used to projects, schemes, plants, such as building works, irrigation works, defence work etc., and that the distribution of articles through the Public Distribution System under an agreement executed with the Government will not come under 'works'.

13. In Dewan Joynal Abederi v. Abdul Wazed, 1988 (Supp) SCC 580, the Supreme Court found that the collection of toll at a Ferry as per an agreement with the Government was only a service and not doing 'works for the Government'. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the first respondent that there is a difference between 'works' and 'work'. It is therefore necessary to go into the question of 'work'.

14. Work can refer to a different situations. In the Chamber's 20th Dictionary. 'work' is taken to mean an effort directed to an end; employment; the product of work; anything made or done; doings; the result of action; workmanship etc. In the Merriam Webster's Dictionary, 'work' is referred to mean employment; task, something produced through mental effort or physical labour etc. In the Oxford Dictionary, work is referred to mean labour; toil; effort; drudgery; travail; exertion; industry; employment; business; occupation; vocation; calling; profession; trade; livelihood; job; post; position; situation etc.

15. From a reading of Ext.X1(d) agreement executed by the revision petitioner on 16-1-1995 in favour of the Governor of Kerala, what is evident is that the revision petitioner, as Authorised Retail Distributor, is to receive rationed articles from wholesale distributor. Food Corporation of India etc., store it in the depot specified in the agreement and sell the same to the holders of ration documents at prices specified by the Government and subject to restrictions and conditions mentioned in the agreement. In a very broad sense it may amount to work; but in a more appropriate sense what is expected is a distribution service for the Government. 'Work' in Section 90(1)(g) does notappear to have been used in a very broad sense. Though the singular is used no distinction with the plural appears to have been intended. 'Work' here means works contract in favour of the Government and the like and not to any little services expected to be done in favour of the Government under any particular agreement. I am therefore of the view that the dictum in Somnath Rath's Case aforementioned can safely be extended to the case in hand, though the term used in Section 90(1)(g) is work and not works. The answer therefore is that by executing Ext.X1(d) the revision petitioner has not taken up any work to be done for the Government. He is not therefore disqualified for that reason.

16. The next point in controversy is as to whether Ext.X1(d) reveals a subsisting contract between the present revision petitioner and the Government. No doubt, this agreement was executed on 16-1-1995 between the Governor of Kerala (referred to as the Government) on the one part and the revision petitioner on the other. It is signed by the revision petitioner and the City Rationing Officer. Merely because the Governor has not signed in the agreement, it cannot be said that it is not an agreement with the Governor; but, nevertheless, there are certain other aspects which indicate that Ext.X1 (d) cannot be taken as a contract with the Government.

17. Ext. X1(d) is executed in accordance with the provisions in the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966. Clause 45(1) of the said Rationing Order provides that for the purpose of distributing rationed articles, the District Supply Officer may, by order, 'appoint' authorised retail distributors. Under Clause 45(2), application for 'appointment' as authorised retail distributor shall be made to the District Supply Officer in the prescribed form. It provides that if the authorised retail distributor is incapable of running the ration business owing to old age or sickness any legal heir nominated by him and in the case of death of an authorised retail distributor, any of the legal heirs of the deceased nominated jointly by all the other legal heirs shall be appointed by the District Supply Officer as a temporary authorised retail distributor. What is obvious from the above provisions is that the dealer has to carry on the ration business; that he can even nominate a successor, who has to takeover the business in case the original dealer became incapable to carry on the business and that what the District Supply Officer does in the matter is to make an 'appointment' of a person authorising him to do the business. Clause 45(8) gives the District Collector the authority to vary, suspend or cancel the appointment and a revision to the Government is also provided for in Clause 71. Under Clause 49, the authorised retail distributor can sell rationed articles only during the prescribed hours and at the prices fixed by the Civil Supplies Department for each item of rationed article from time to time and he shall not realise any price or any charges in excess of what is fixed by the Department. There is nothing in Clause 45 aforementioned or in the other provisions of the Kerala Rationing Order which would indicate that the dealer is a contractor. If it is a contract, the revisional power also would not have been there as in Clause 71.

18. The decision in State of Haryana v. Lal Chand, AIR 1984 SC 1326, is authority for the proposition that Article 299 of the Constitution which directs execution of a contract with the Government to be in the name of the Governor or the President, as the case may be, will apply to a contract made in exercise of the executive power of the Union or the State and not to contracts as stipulated under the different statutes. It was specifically found therein that Article 299(1) has no application to a case where a particular statutory authority as distinguished from the Union or the States enters into a contract which is statutory in nature. Such a contract, even though it is for securing the interests of the Union or the States, is not a contract which has been entered into by or on behalf of the Union or the State in exercise of its executive powers. The agreement entered into by a person under the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules was therefore held to be not a contract under Article 299 of the Constitution.

19. In the present case, what Clause 45(6) of the Kerala Rationing Order requires is an agreement executed with the Taluk Supply Officer in the prescribed form. No doubt, the form of agreement prescribed by the Commissioner vide Notification No. (CS) A4-13743/79 dated 9-5-79 and published in the Kerala Gazette dated 26-6-1979 mentions the Governor as a party to the agreement, though the Rule in fact requires only the execution of an agreement with the Taluk Supply Officer. Actually Ext.X1(d) is signed by the City Rationing Officer who is the counter part of the Taluk Supply Officer within the Corporation areas. Merely because the Governor's name is mentioned in the Form, Ext.X1(d) cannot be taken as a contract under Article 299 which will come within the sweep of Clause 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Rationing Order. As between the provisions in the statutory order and the form prescribed by the designated authority, certainly the former has to prevail. Ext.X1 (d) is therefore only an agreement executed with the City Rationing Officer and not a 'contract with Government' for the purposes of Section 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994.

20. A similar question was gone into by the Patna High Court in Deo Chandra Jha v. Ramchandra Mishra, AIR 1964 Pat 111. It was found that agreement in favour of the Government executed for getting licence for stocking and distributing foodgrains is not a contract with the Government attracting disqualification under Section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Again in Ranjeet Singh v. Harmohinder Singh Pradhan, (1999) 4 JT(SC) 478: (AIR 1999SC 1960), the Supreme Court found that carrying on of a liquor shop as per a licence obtained pursuant to an agreement with the Government is not performance of a contract with the Government for the purpose of Section 9-A of the Representation of the People Act.

21. The revision petitioner has produced before this Court a certified copy of the Fax message issued by the State Election Commission to all the Returning Officers on 22-8-1995, wherein he has also clarified that ration shop dealers will not be disqualified for contesting election to the local bodies. It is true that the said communication does not have any binding effect as far as the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is concerned. Nevertheless, the said document certainly indicates that the finding arrived at by this Court as above is not contrary to the opinion of the State Election Commission who is normally the final authority in election matters.

22. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the learned District Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that Ext.X1(d)I reveals a contract with the Government and | also that the revision petitioner has agreed to do 'work for the Government' thereunder. What actually is revealed by Ext.X1(d) is only that the Revision Petitioner has executed an agreement with the City Rationing Officer as required in Clause 45(6) of the Kerala Rationing Order as a condition precedent for his being appointed as an Authorised Retail Dealer duly licensed to sell rationed articles. Such an agreement does not come within the purview of Section 90(1)(g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act. In view of this finding, the revision petitioner is entitled to succeed. The impugned orders are set aside and it is found that the revision petitioner's election as Councilion from Ward No 29 is not liable to De disturbed as is sought in the election petition filed by the first respondent.

The revision is allowed and O.P. (Election) 18/1995 is dismissed.


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