Radhakrishnan, J.
1. The question that has come up for consideration before us is as to whether an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge rendered under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Appeal was preferred against the judgment in L.A.A. 101 of 1990 under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act along with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 899 days in filing the appeal. When the delay petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench, Bench expressed doubt as to whether the appeal itself would be maintainable.
3. According to the learned Judges, Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not provide a further appeal to the Division Bench against the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge. It was stated, Section 54 provides only one appeal to the High Court and a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Since several second appeals are pending before the Division Bench it was felt that the matter requires an authoritative pronouncement by a Full Bench. Accordingly, the matter was placed before the Full Bench.
4. Appellant was the second claimant in L. A. R. No. 90 of 1983. Judgment was delivered by the Principal Sub Judge, Alleppey on 11-3-1988. Against the said judgment and decree claimant preferred appeal before this Court as L. A. A. 101 of 1990 under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Appeal was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 21-1-1992. Against the said judgment claimant filed A. F. A. 109 of 1994 under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act along with a petition for condonation of delay.
5. Counsel for the appellant Sri D. Krishna Prasad contended that appeal is maintainable under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act before a Bench of two Judges. According to him, award of the Land Acquisition Court is a 'decree' within the meaning of Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and that an appeal would lie before the High Court under Section 54 of the Act. According to counsel, since the appeal was heard by a single Judge as per Section 3(13)(b) of the High Court Act, a further appeal would lie to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of Kerala High Court Act, 1958.
6. Learned Judges who referred the matter felt that since the appeal is a creature of the statute the maintainability or otherwise of the appeal should be considered within the framework of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which confers an appeal to the High Court and further appeal to the Supreme Court. Learned Judges stressed the words 'such appeal' as well as the words 'decree of the High Court passed on such appeal aforesaid'. Reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in S. A. Indutries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup, AIR 1965 SC 1442, Learned Judges also referred to an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 16632 to 16668 of 1982 and to the decision of the Madras High Court in Manavikraman Tirumalpadi v. Collectorof Nilgiris, AIR 1919 Mad 626. Learned Judges disagreed with the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293, where the Court took the view that appeal before a Bench of two Judges would lie under Letters Patent.
7. In order to examine this question it is necessary to understand the meaning and scope of Sections 54 and 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vis-a-vis Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, we may extract Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act for easy reference.
'Appeals in proceedings before Court--
Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any decree of the High Court passed on 'such appeal as aforesaid' an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV thereof.'
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is an enabling provision enacted to confer right of appeal initially to the 'High Court' and then to the 'Supreme Court' against order of the Land Acquisition Court. Enabling words are to be construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right. The provision has also made it imperative using a non-obstante clause with a view to give an overriding impact on the powers of any other enactment. Under the above mentioned provision the appeal is provided to the 'High Court' and not to a single Judge or to a Division Bench of the High Court. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act emphasises the forum to which the appeal is provided, that is, to the 'High Court' and further appeal to the 'Supreme Court'. Once the matter is seized before the High Court by way of an appeal the manner in which that appeal has to be disposed of is to be decided by the 'High Court' as per rules and procedure for disposing of appeals by the High Court unless it is otherwise barred.
8. The provision regulating the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court is enumerated in the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. High Courts in India are superior courts of record which owe their existence to the Constitution of India. Under Article 214 of the Constitution of India, there shall be a High Court for each State and every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Articles 216 - 224 provide for the Constitution and organisation of High Court. Articles 225 - 228 deal with the general powers and jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction and powers of High Courts which were in existence on the date on which the Constitution came into force are preserved by Article 225 subject to the conditions specified therein. Article 230 states that Parliament may by law extend the jurisdiction of a High Court to, or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court from any Union Territory. Clause (2) of that Article states that where the High Court of a State exercises jurisdiction in relation to a Union Territory, nothing in the Constitution shall be construed as empowering the legislature of the State to increase, restrict or abolish that jurisdiction. The general powers and jurisdiction of the High Court are found in the above mentioned Articles. Therefore State Legislature or the Union Legislature would not be competent to pass a law to curtail or modify the limit of such jurisdiction and powers as defined in the body of the Constitution.
9. High Courts have got inherent and plenary powers. As held by the Supreme Court in M. V. Elizabeth v. Harwan investment and Trading, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 : (AIR 1993 SC 1014), 'Under appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the Court. High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to determine their own powers'. In this connection it is profitable to refer to a passage from the Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 10, paragraph 713 :
'Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court, unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular Court.'
10. The Kerala High Court Act, 1958 was enacted to make provisions regulating the business and the exercise of the powers of the High Court in the State of Kerala. High Court of Kerala also in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India, Section 122 of the C. P. C. and all other powers enabling in this behalf published the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971. The Kerala High Court Act and the Rules framed thereunder regulate the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court.
11. The Kerala High Court Act has been enacted by the State Legislature in exercise of its powers conferred under Entry 3 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 225 of the Constitution of India. 'Administration of Justice' is an item which was originally included in Entry 3 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule' which enables the State Legislature to make law for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court in relation to the administration of justice. By the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1976 the expression 'administration of justice' has been transferred from Entry 3 List II to the concurrent list and inserted as Entry IIA in List III of the Seventh Schedule. The constitutional validity of Kerala High Court Act, 1958 came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Commr. Quilon Municipality, 1960 Ker LT 1091 : (AIR 1961 Ker 96) (FB). The same question came up for consideration before another Full Bench in Kochupennu Kochikka v. Kochikka Kunhipennu, 1961 Ker LT 275 : (AIR 1961 Ker 226) (FB). That Full Bench also held as follows (at p. 231 of AIR):
'The enactment of a law to regulate the practice and procedure in the High Court will certainly fall within the residual power of the State Legislature. Prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of the British Indian High Courts was regulated by the rules framed by the respective High Courts by virtue of the powers granted by the Letters Patent pertaining to such courts. This rule making power of the High Courts was preserved by Section 223 of Government of India Act, 1935. So far as the State High Courts were concerned, the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of such Courts was regulated by the statutes passed by the sovereign legislature of the respective States. Article 225 of the Constitution provided for the continuance of these rules and statutes until other statutory provisions are made by the appropriate legislature. The Article runs as follows :-- 'Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on the legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.' This Article makes it clear that provisions regulating the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court and of the powers of the Judges thereof either sitting alone or in Division Courts have a direct bearing on the administration of justice which is made a State subject by its inclusion in item 3 of List 2. It will therefore be within the competence of the State legislature to enact a law governing those mattes.'
Therefore the Kerala High Court Act 1958 regulates the business and exercise of powers of High Court in the State of Kerala and therefore regulate the practice and procedure of the High Court. Section 3 of the Kerala High Court Act states the powers of High Court in relation to certain matters which are to be exercised by a single Judge. Section 3(13)(b) says that an appeal from original decree or order in any suit or other proceeding, where the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit or other proceeding does not exceed one lakh rupees are to be heard by a single Judge. Therefore in accordance with the above mentioned Section 3(13)(b), the land acquisition appeal, L. A. A. No. 101 of 1990, was heard by a single Judge. As per Section 5(ii) of the High Court Act, 1958 a judgment of a learned single Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction as mentioned above would lie to a Bench of two Judges. Therefore going by Section 3(13)(b) read with Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges unless otherwise specifically barred.
12. The question that falls for consideration therefore is as to whether Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act has, in any way, curtailed or taken away the power of appeal provided to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act or gave finality to the judgment and decision of a single Judge of the High Court exercising powers under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.
13. The right of appeal has always been regarded as a valuable and substantial right. A provision of law which confers, extends or regulates the right of appeal would be liberally construed with the object, if possible, of maintaining the right. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act has conferred a right of appeal on an aggrieved party to the High Court against the award passed by Land Acquisition Court. Legislature can also take away or curtail the right of appeal. Legislature can also make provisions to make a decision on appeal final, enacting a finality clause. Supreme Court in S. A. Industries (P) Ltd. v. S. B. Sarup, AIR 1965 SC 1442, while dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act held as follows : (para 11 of AIR) :
'A statute may give a right of appeal from an order of a Tribunal or a Court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 an appeal under Section 39 of the Act will be heard by a single Judge. Any judgment made by the single Judge in the said appeal will, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that Court, If the order made by a single Judge is a judgment and if the appropriate legislature has, expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a single Judge under Clause (10) of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the single Judge to the High Court.'
14. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Har Dial Shah v. Secretary of State, AIR 1923 Lahore 275 considered the scope of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Clause (10) of the Letters Patent and took the view that right of appeal to a Bench of two Judges is not impliedly barred by Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said view was accepted by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Collector of Dacca v. Gholam Kuddus, AIR 1936 Cal 688. A Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in Narayanadas Daga v. Ganpatrao, AIR 1944 Nag 284 considered the scope of Section 54 and held that appeal under the Letters Patent lies from the decision of a single Judge to a Division bench of the High Court. A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Siri Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Punjab 221, took the view that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not contain any prohibition against filing of a second appeal. Identical question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293. After examining various case laws on the point the Full Bench took the view that there is no conflict between the provisions of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act and Clause (10) of the Letters Patent of the High Court. The Court took the view that there is no bar in maintaining the letters of Patent Appeal in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.
15. In this connection reference may also be made to certain statutes which confer right of appeal, as well as to regulate the right of appeal either making a decision final or restrict number of appeals. A Full Bench of this Court in Fr. Abraham Mathews v. Ittan Pillai, 1981 Ker LT 260 : (AIR 1981 Ker 129) has considered the question as to whether an appeal would lie to a Division Bench against the decision of a single Judge in a civil miscellaneous appeal. Contention was raised that the provisions in Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 is a special or local law in force and that therefore sub-section (2) of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not take away the right of appeal under Section 5(ii) of that Act. Interpreting Sections 100A and 104, C. P. C., the Full Bench expressed the view that appeals preferred under Section 104 of the Code are appeals from orders, and very often, from interlocutory orders, and in most of the cases where such appeals are preferred, the concerned suit itself would be pending. A further appeal from the decision of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench would therefore contribute to delay in final disposal of the suit or the main action. The learned Judges felt that the intention of the amending provisions was to restrict further right of appeal so that there will not be further delay in the disposal of the suit. Same is the view taken by the Division Bench in Damodaran v. Sankaran, 1985 Ker LT 153. We are of the view that the position in the instant case is different since no proceeding is pending before the Land Acquisition Court.
16. There may be situation where statute itself specifically restricts further appeals. In this connection it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 SC 256. In that case, Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act expressly prohibited a second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) except an appeal to the Supreme Court. There is, therefore, clear indication inherent in Sub-section (2) that expression 'second appeal' does not mean an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, the Legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders. The right of appeal against other orders is expressly taken away.
17: There are also cases where there is no specific bar in the statute regarding the right of second appeal. Interpreting Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Municipal Corporation v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37 held that an appeal against the decision of a learned single Judge would lie under Clause (10) of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench. So also a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shanti Devi v. G. M. Haryana Roadways, AIR 1972 P & H 65, took the same view. The maintainability of the appeal under the Letters of Patent were also upheld by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Srinivas v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, (1990) 3 Andh LT (SN) 3.
18. Supreme Court in South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S. B. Sarup Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1442 held that no appeal would lie under Clause (10) Letters of Patent in a proceeding under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Delhi Rent Control Court allowed a second appeal to the High Court under Section 39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 43 says as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under that Act, shall be final. In that case, Delhi Rent Control Act itself gave finality to the appeal decided by the High Court exercising powers under Section 39 read with S. 43 of that Act, so that an appeal under Letters Patent would not lie. Decision taken by a single Judge of the High Court under the Delhi Rent Control Act as well as a decision taken by a Division Bench in the Letters of Patent are independent proceedings, and not a continuation of the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act. In other words, a statute which confers right of appeal can also restrict further appeal by incorporating a finality clause with the result no further appeal would lie under any other enactment including Letters Patent.
19. The Supreme Court in Vanita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai, AIR 1998 SC 424 considered the scope of Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act vis-a-vis Letters of Patent. Section 6(3) specifically says that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under that section. In that context, the Supreme Court took the view that the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was right. However, since the Bombay High Court was exercising original jurisdiction, the Court took the view that appeal would lie. The Supreme Court in that case observed as follows: 'It is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excludes appeals under Letters Patent. No such bar is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Act.'
20. Learned Judges who referred this matter to the Full Bench relied on an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Baljit Singh v. State of Haryana, (Civil Appeals Nos. 1663 to 1668 of 1982). The same was referred to by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293. We did not have the advantage of going through that unreported judgment. As we see from the Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court the Baljit Singh's case, was decided on concession of parties. We are also of the view on the basis of the various principles laid down by the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore, the decision in Manavikraman Tirumalpadi v. Collector of Nilgiris, AIR 1919 Mad. 626 is not correctly decided. In any view, in that case, the Madras High Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable mainly on the ground that the decision of the High Court in appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is not a judgment. That reasoning cannot hold good in view of the amendment of Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. We are also of the view that that decision is of no assistance to determine the question involved in this appeal.
21. The principle that is deducible from the above mentioned decisions is that unless there is express or implied bar curtailing the right of appeal, the Court should always uphold the right of appeal. As held by the Supreme Court in C. I. T., A. P. v. Ashoka Engg. Co., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 754 : (AIR 1993 SC 858), it is an equally well-settled proposition of law that, if there is a provision, conferring a right of appeal, it should be read in a reasonable, practical and liberal manner. In Salimuddin Ahammed v. Rahim Sheik, AIR 1926 Cal 1113, it was pointed out that in a matter which relates to the curtailment of the right of appeal, if there is slightest doubt in one's mind, the benefit of that doubt should go to the party who seeks to appeal.
22. In view of the above mentioned circumstances, we are of the view that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not curtail a right of appeal to a Bench of two Judges provided under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, nor has it made the decision of a single Judge of the High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 3(13)(b) of the Kerala High Court Act, final.
23. We, therefore, hold that the appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge rendered under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits on the delay petition as well as with regard to the admissibility of the appeal.