Judgment:
V. Ramkumar, J.
1. The interesting question for judicial resolution in this case is as to whether the suicide of an employee owing to depressive neurosis consequent on an employment injury sustained by him would furnish a cause of action for his dependents to make a claim for dependents' benefits under Section 52 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to 'the Act' for Short).
2. In this appeal filed under Section 82(2) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, the Employees State Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to 'the Corporation' for short), which was the first opposite party before the Employees' Insurance Court, Palakkad (hereinafter referred to 'the E.I. Court' for short), challenges the order dated 17-5-2005 of the E. I. Court in I.C. 84 of 2003.
3. The following are the questions of law formulated in the memoradum of Appeal filed by the Corporation:
i) Whether the El Court is justified in ordering death benefits to the legal heirs of the deceased who committed suicide while taking rest at home in pursuance of an injury sustained to him ?
ii) Committing suicide being an illegal and forbidden act the legal heirs whether entitled to get death benefits alleging suicide as an employment injury.
iii) In the absence of medical evidence to substantiate the mental condition of the deceased employee who admittedly committed suicide while taking rest at home can be construed as an employment injury under the ESI Act?
iv) Whether the finding based on conjunctures and surmises is sustainable in law?
v) Whether the EI Court has correctly followed the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Francis De Costd's cases reported in 1996 (2) KLT 799?
4. I heard Advocate Sri.Sandesh, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/Corporation, Adv. Sri. Ashok Shenoi, the learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Advocate Sri. K. Anand, the learned Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent/employer.
ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT/E.S.I.CORPORATION
5. Assailing the impugned order passed by the E.I. Court, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/Corporation made the following submissions beforeme.:
The order passed by the E. I. Court on the footing that the suicide committed by Appunni was as a result of neurotic depression is not supported by any medical evidence in that behalf. AW2 the Doctor who treated Appunni from the Outpatient Section of the District Hospital, Palakkad has not stated that Appunni was suffering from any acute neurotic depression consequent on the Employment injury. In the absence of any medical evidence to the effect that Appunni was suffering from anxiety neurosis consequent on the injury sustained by him and the said morbid condition drove him to commit suicide, the E.I. Court was not entitled to hold that the death of Appunni had a causal connection With the employment injury. AW2 the doctor has only stated that the injury to Appunni might have caused depression resulting in suicide and that there are occasions when such patients show anxiety neurosis. From such evidence alone it was not permissible for the E.I. Court to record such a finding, especially when the act of committing suicide is an illegal act prohibited by law. Moreover, the injury sustained by Appunni was not serious enough to drive him to commit suicide. The decisions relied on by the applicants are to be confined to the particular facts situation available in those cases.
JUDICIAL RESOLUTION
6. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the above submissions made on behalf of the E.S.I. Corporation.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
7. The facts leading to the impugned order can be summarised as follows:
A. Appunni who was aged 42 was employed as a helper in the factory of M/s. Sivasakthi Engineering and Fabricators at Poolampara, Walayar Post, Palakkad. He was an insured employee getting a daily wages of Rs. 92.40. He was residing in a thatched house at Attapallam, Pampampallam Post in Pudussery East Village.
B. On 26-12-2002 at about 11.30 am. while Appunni was cleaning the mold used for casting, the heavy iron lever slipped and fell down on his right leg causing a crush injury involving a fracture of the 4th meta tarsel.
C. The employer submitted Ext 131 accident report dated 26-12-2002 to the Inspector of Factories and the Kanjikode local office of the E.S.I. Corporation as provided under Rule 123 of the Kerala Factories Rules, 1957 and Regulation 68 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, respectively.
D. Appunni who was rushed to the ESI. Dispensary, Kanjikode was referred to the District Hospital, Palakkad where he was admitted as an inpatient and treated for the injury from 28-12-2002. AW2 (Dr.C. Mohanan) who was the Civil Surgeon in the District Hospital, Palakkad has deposed that since X-ray to the right foot of Appunni showed fracture of 4th meta tarsel his leg was put in plaster of paris cast, that he was advised rest for five weeks, that the injury sustained by Appunni was a grievous injury, that there are occasions when certain patients show anxiety neurosis, that such patients may be more anxious and may have depression in which case they may feel morbidity and that the injury to Appunni might have caused depression resulting in suicide. Appunni was discharged from the General Hospital, Palakkad on 7-1-2003 as evidenced by ExtA2 discharge certificate which states that Appunni was put on plaster of paris cast on 30-12-2002 and he was advised to continue rest for four weeks with further advise for review after four weeks in the Orthopedics Section
E. Leela, the widow of Appunni was examined as A.W. 1. In her examination-in-chief in the form of proof affidavit she stated as follows with regard to the post - occurrence conduct of her husband:
After sustaining the injury and until he breathed his fast on 17-1 -2003, her husband had to depend on others for sustenance and for following his ordinary pursuits. He was the breadwinner of the family consisting of herself and her two minor children. The income which he was getting from the factory was the only source of their livelihood. After the injury, her husband was very restless. The treatment did not seem to give him any relief for the injury. He was, therefore growing more and more agitated. He was always remorseful and was concerned about the future, He started entertaining a feeling that he had become a patient dependent on others. Added to that, the feeling of financial difficulty made him more depressed and he was in a pensive mood as to how he could maintain the family. He had a feeling that he would not recover from the serious injury sustained by him, and that his future had become bleak. The mental turmoil arising out of the above feeling drove her husband to end his life by committing suicide.F. Ext A3 is the F.I.R. registered under the caption 'unnatural death' by the Walayar Police on the strength of the first information statement given by one Asokan who is a cousin of Appunni. The said the statement inter alia reads as follows.:
Appunni was residing along with his wife leela and two minor children in a thatched house situated on the south-eastern side of the house of Asokan, the first informant, at Attapallam, Pampampallam Post, in Puthussery East Village. He was employed in Sivasakthi Company at Pulampara About one month ago consequent on an iron lever falling on his right leg Appunni sustained an injury while at work in the factory. He was undergoing treatment in the hospital He was having financial difficulties. Inspite of his poverty, Appunni was not in the habit of asking others for help. On account of the dejection due to financial stringency Appunni hanged himself on a rope tied on the girder of his thatched house at 11.30 a.m. on 17-1-2003 at a time when his wife Leela was not at home. Seeing his body writhing on the rope his nephew Rajesh raised a hue and cry. People came running and unfastened the rope which was around the neck of Appunni and rushed him to the Government Hospital Palakkad from where the Doctor after examining him pronounced him dead.G. Column 16 of ExtA4 inquest report prepared by the Sub Inspector of Police, Walayar reads as follows:
(The opinion of the witnesses questioned at the time of inquest was that since Appunni was unable to go to work due to the fall of the iron lever on his leg and the consequent injury ta his leg and also since he had no other source of livelihood, on account of the mental depression due to the financial difficulties, at about 11.30 a.m. on 17-1-2003 at a time when there was nobody else in his house at Pampampallam, Appunni committed suicide by hanging on the girder of his house.
H. ExtA5 is the post-mortem certificate dated 17-1-2003 which has confirmed the death of Appunni by hanging.
I. On 30-8-2003 a lawyer notice was sent on behalf of the widow and minor children of Appunni to the E.S.I. Corporation as well as to the employer. ExtB4 is the reply dated 18-12-2003 from the E. SJ. Corporation to the Advocate of the applicants and ExtA9 is the reply letter dated 17-9-2003 from the employer to the applicants' Advocate.
J. Since the dependent benefits claimed in the lawyer notice was denied on 22-12-2003, the applicants who are the 35 year old widow (Leela), 9 year old minor son (Anil Prasad) and 5 year old minor daughter (Archana) filed I.C. 84 of 2003 before the EJ. Court under Sections 75 - 77 of the Act claiming dependent benefit under Section 52 of the Act.
The averments in the said application are as follows:
Appunni who was the husband of the first applicant and father of applicants 2 and 3 was employed as a worker with the 2nd opposite party namely M/s. Sivasakthi Engineering and Fabricators, Poolampara, Walayar in Palakkad District. The 2nd opposite party is covered under the Act. Appunni was an insured person having his Code No. as 54-5327-56. On 26-12-2002 at 11 am while Appunni was attending to his work in the factory of the 2nd opposite party, he sustained a grievous crush injury to his right foot. The above injury was sustained consequent on the slipping of the lever while Appunni was doing casting work. He was immediately taken to the E.S.I. Dispensary, Kanjikode and was subsequently referred to the District Hospital, Palakkad where he was admitted as an inpatient for two weeks from 28-12-2002. The injury was so severe in nature that he had to depend on others even for his ordinary pursuits. His condition never improved until his death on 17-1 -2003. Deceased Appunni was the sole bread winner of the family. He had no other source of income except his wages from the employment as helper in the said factory The injury and the consequential financial stringency had started disturbing the mind of Appunni and he began whispering every now and then that his future was break and doomed. The injury had induced a condition of acute anxiety neurosis in Appunni. While in a sudden acute neurotic depression he put an end to his life on 17-1-2003. The root and decisive cause of his death was the injury. But for the accident and the injury sustained by Appunni he would not have put an end to his life. The unfortunate event was the result of the mental ailment which he developed out of the injury and the traumatic disorder that was caused during the course of and out of his employment under the 2nd opposite party. Appunni was on leave after the employment injury until his death. He was aged 42 years at the time of his death and was drawing wages at the rate of Rs. 92.40 per day in his capacity as a helper. The applicants being the only legal heirs of Appunni are entitled to the death benefits. The applicants' request for death benefit was not entertained by the opposite parties. Ext A8 lawyer notice dated 30-8-2003 was neither replied nor was the claim settled by the first opposite party Corporation. The 2nd opposite party/employer replied that the E.S.I. Corporation is responsible to satisfy the claim. The applicants have no other alternative except to raise a dispute under the Act. Hence, the application.K. The E.SJ. Corporation which was the first opposite party filed a written statement contending inter alia as follows.:
Except to the extent expressly admitted hereunder all other allegations and averments in the application are denied. Deceased Appunni holding insurance No. 1731941 was an employee of M/s. Sivasakthi Engineering and Fabricators, He was employed there as a Helper and was covered under the Scheme. The employer had submitted ExtB1 accident report dated 26-12-2002 reporting an accident met with by the above employee at 11.30 hours on 26-12-2002. The cause of accident was the falling of a lever used for mould casting on the right leg of Appunni resulting in a crush injury leading to the fracture of the 4th meta tarsel of the right leg. He was admitted in the E.S.I. Hospital, Palakkad on 27-12-2002 and discharged on 7-1-2003 with an advice to take rest for five weeks. The injured person committed suicide on 17-1-2003 . After the accident the deceased was under treatment and he availed of the medical benefits from the E.S.I. Hospital, Palakkad from 27-12-2002 to 7-1-2003. The death by suicide committed by the employee is not attributable to his employment injury. As far as the claim for death benefit is concerned, a personal injury caused to an employee by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment are the common conditions for claiming dependent benefit under Section 2(8) of the E.S.I. Act. No death benefit is payable by this Corporation and no compensation is payable by the employer for a death caused not during the course of employment The course of employment denotes the time during which the employee was under the control and command of the employer. This principle has been laid down in E.S.I.C. v. Francis D'Costa 1996 (2) KLT 799 (SC). There was no willful neglect by this Corporation in denying the benefits eligible for the deceased employee. There was no hardship for the deceased employee to receive benefits from this opposite party. It is agonizing that the insured person committed suicide after an employment injury. But medical aid which was essential for the insured person was given to him at the proper time. He was entitled to receive sickness benefit which was not denied by the Corporation. Free medical aid and the necessary benefits provided to the deceased actually reduced the intensity of the financial stringency. Hence, the claim of the applicants that the E.S.I. Corporation is liable to compensate for the death of the employee is not tenable. After the death of the inured person a sum sum of Rs. 2.500/-towards funeral expenses was paid on 31-1-2003. The injury was treated as an employment injury and the first applicant was requested to submit the claim along with indemnity bond and surety bond (since she was not the nominee) for payment of Temporary Disablement Benefit from 27-12-2002 to 17-1-2003 as per Ext. A1 letter dated 19-12-2003. But she did not turn up. There is no cause of action for filing the present application. ExtB4 is the repry sent on 18-12-2003 to Ext A8 lawyer notice. Hence, the application may be dismissed with costs.L. The 2nd opposite party filed a counter statement contending inter alia that the injury sustained by the employee is not grievous enough to induce him to commit suicide, that the statutory benefits to which the deceased employee was eligible towards gratuity, bonus, leave salary etc. were already given, that the employer was not liable to satisfy the claim, if tenable, and that it was for the first opposite party/Corporation which was to satisfy the claim if the same was maintainable.
M. On the side of the applicants, the first applicant who is the widow of deceased Appunni was examined as AW1 and Dr. C. Mohanan who was the Civil Surgeon who treated Appunni from the outpatient section of the District Hospital, Palakkad was examined as AW2 and ExtsAl to All was got marked. On the side of the E.S.I. Corporation and the employer no witness was examined. ExtsBl to B4 were got marked on the side of the E.S.I. Corporation.
N. The E.I. Court as per order dated 17-5-2005 held that the accident sustained by deceased Appunni on 26-12-2002 was the root cause for his committing suicide and that the death of the employee had a direct causal connection with the employment injury on 26-12-2002 and, therefore, the applicants who are his dependents are entitled to the dependents' benefit under Section 52 of the E.S.lAct. It is the said order which is assailed in this appeal filed by the E.S.I. Corporation.
JUDICIAL RATIOCINATION
8. The employment injury sustained Appunni on 26-12-2002 and his hospitalisation till 7-1-2003 and his act of committing suicide on 17-1 -2003 are all admitted. The only dispute is whether the act of committing suicide on 17-1 -2003 could be treated as a direct consequence of the employment injury sustained on 26-12-2002. In other words, if the employment injury of Appunni could be treated as the causa sine qua non (acause without which the effect would not have been caused) for the suicide committed by him, then it is not open to the appellant corporation to contend that the suicide would amount to a novas actus interveniens (new act intervening) so as to break the chain of causation.
9. It is true that AW2 the doctor has only stated that certain patients show anxiety neurosis on such occasions and such patients may have depression leading to a feeling of morbidity and that the injury of Appunni might have caused depression resulting in suicide. But then, the Doctor has definitely stated that his injury was a grievous injury. This doctor had examined Appunni only from the out-patient department and Appunni was in the hospital for a short duration of less than 2 weeks. It was on the 10th day of his discharge that he committed suicide, it must be borne in mind that Appunni was not a 'very important person' (VIP) so as to expect frequent visits by medical experts including psychiatrists to evaluate the state of his body and mind during the post-traumatic phase of his life. He came from a thatched hut to which he returned after discharge from the hospital. The paltry amount which he was getting from his job as helper in the factory was the only source of his livelihood. He was immobilized consequent on the employment injury. His anxiety, concern and apprehensions are matters which can be imagined, if we were to place ourselves in the position of Appunni. It is quiet natural that in the peculiar situation, Appunni began to engender a feeling that he had become worthless and there was nobody to look after his family. His wife was unemployed. His children were of tender age incapable of shouldering the domestic burdens. The injury and the consequent hospitalisation of Appunni must have certainly cast a gloom in him and his family. The gravity of the bodily injury need not necessarily be a factor which may impel a person to end his life. It is the sensitivity of the particular individual which may be relevant and that is always variable. Different persons react differently to a given situation of stress. There can be no hard and fast rule to evaluate the human responses in such situations. It is not for Courts to prioritise human responses and sensitivities in such situations. Neither the employer nor the E.S.I. Corporation has a case that it was some other extraneous reason which prompted Appunni to commit suicide or that it was part of a design to secure death benefits to his family. It is poor solace to say that medical benefits were being extended to him during the period of leave. The mental turmoil which Appunni must have undergone driving him to the extreme step of ending his life is something which his marital partner alone would know. The period was too short even for a family doctor (if there was one) to guage the post-traumatic state of mind of Appunni.
10. One may be tempted to ask whether poverty is a sin. But when the darkness of despair starts slowly eclipsing the mind of the sole bread-winner of a family on account of the unexpected accident and the resultant unemployment and blockage of earnings, nobody can predict the manifestation of his emotional outburst. A person may even loose his mental equilibrium. There can be so many causes for a person to commit suicide. It is pertinent to note in this context that neither the appellant Corporation nor the employer has any other reason to be attributed for Appunni committing suicide. The following observations made by the Appex Court in P. Rathinam v. Union of India AIR 1994 SCW 1764 are apposite in this connection:
15. We may now note the reasons given by the Bombay High Court in Shripati's case 1987 Cri.LJ. 743 (supra) for striking down the section as violation of Article 21. These reasons are basically three; (1) Article 21 has conferred a positive right to live which carries with it the negative right not to live. In this connection it has been first stated that the fundamental rights are to be read together as held in RC. Cooper v. Union of India : AIR 1970 SC 1318. Mention was then made of freedom of speech and expression, as to which it was observed that the same includes freedom not to speak and to remain silent. Similarly, about the freedom of business and occupation, it was stated that it includes freedom not to do business. (2) Notice was then taken of the various causes which lead people to commit suicide. These being mental diseases and imbalances, unbearable physical ailments, affliction by socially dreaded diseases, decrepit physical condition disabling the person from taking normal care of his body and performing the normal chores, the loss of all senses or of desire fear the pleasures of any of the senses, extremely cruel or unbearable conditions of like making it painful to live a sense of shame or disgrace or a need to defend one's honour or a sheet loss of interest in life or disenchantment with it, or a sense of fulfillment of the purpose for which one was born with nothing more left to do or to be achieved and a genuine urge to quit the world at the proper moment (3) The Bench thereafter stated that in our country different forms of suicide are known. These being-. Johars (mass suicides or self immolation) of ladies from the royal houses to avoid being dishonoured by the enemies; Sati (self-immolation by the widow on the brning pure of her deceased husband); Samadhi (termination of one's life by self-restraint on breathing); Prayopaveshan (starving unto death); and Atmarpana (self-sacrifice). It was also observed that the saints and savants, social, political and religious leaders have immolated themselves in the past and do so even today by one method or the other and society has not only not disapproved of the practice but has eulogised and commemorated the practitioners. It may be pointed out that the Bench made a distinction between 'suicide' and 'mercy killing', so also between suicide and aiding or abetting the same'.
xxx xxx
69. The causes of suicides are many and varying in as much as some owe their origin to sentiments of exasperation, frustration and revolution; some are the result of feeling of burden, torture, and sadness. Some are caused by loss of employment reverse of fortune, misery due to illness, family trouble and thwarted love. Sometimes killing is in opposition to society and sometimes in opposition to society and sometimes in opposition to particular persons. This happens when the person committing suicide nurses a feeling of unjust treatment, maltreatment and cruelty. (See The 'Causes of Suicide' by Maurice Halbwacks (Translated by Harold Goldblatt). The Bombay judgment has mentioned many causes in paragraph 12 of its judgment which have been noted in paragraph 15 above. The same may not be repeated.
A man's spouse may be the immediate person who may be able to decode his feelings.
11. Leela, the wife of Appunni has stated in the application filed before the E.I. Court that her husband was having acute anxiety neurosis pursuant to the injures and that it was in a fit of neurotic depression that he put an end to his life. She has further pleaded that he used to whisper every now and then that his future was bleak and doomed. It is pertinent to note in this connection that in the written statement filed by the appellant Corporation there is no specific denial of the above averments. Even if it could be said that the provisions of Order VIII CPC have not been expressly made applicable in respect of an application under Sections 75 - 77 of the Act, the proceedings before the E. I. Court are governed by the Kerala Employees Insurance Court Rules, 1958. Rule 13 of the said Rules reads as follows.:
13. Application.:
1. Every proceeding under Section 75 shall be instituted by the presentation of an application to the Court
2. Every such application shall be verified in the same manner as a pleading in a Civil Court and shall be accompanied by two copies thereof.
3. An application under Section 77 shall be presented in form I shall be duly stamped in accordance with these rules, and shall contain the following particulars:
i) the name of the Court in which the application is brought;
ii) the full name including the father's name description including age, occupation and place of residence of the applicant;
iii) the full name including the father's name description including age, occupation and place of residence of She opposite part so far as they can be ascertained
iv) where the applicant or the opposite party is a minor or a person of unsound mind, a statement to that effect and the full name, age, occupation and address of his or her next friend or guardian;
v) the facts constituting the cause of action and the date when it arose: vi) the facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction;
vii) the particulars giving the address within the jurisdiction of the Court at which notice or summons may be served on the applicant; and.
viii) the relief which the applicant claims
4. The courtmay summarily reject an application if it is not in accordance with Sub-rule (2).
Rule 22 of the said Rules reads as follows:
1. The opposite party may, and, if so required by the Court shall at or before the first hearing or within such time as the Court may permit present a written statement of his defence along with the documents on which he relies and an accurate list thereof in form 2.
2. Every such written statement shall be verified in the same manner as a pleading in a Civil Court and shall be accompanied by two copies thereof
3) In every written statement submitted under Sub-rule (1) the opposite party shall deal specifically with each allegation of fact alleged by the applicant, of which he admits or does not admit or denies the truth. The written statement must also contain all matters which show that the application is not maintainable and all such grounds of defence as, if not raised, would be likely to take the applicant by surprise or would raise issue of fact not arising out of the application as for instance, fraud undue influence or coercion, release, payment, performance or facts showing illegality of the transaction.
Thus, going by Sub-rule 3 of Rule 22 every written statement is expected to specifically deal with each and every allegation of fact made in the application. When there is no specific denial in the written statement of the aforementioned allegation made by the applicants in the application, the court can presume that those allegations are admitted.
12. Leela, the widow of deceased Appunni was examined as A.W.I. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of her chief examination in the form of proof affidavit she made specific mention of the state of despondency and post-traumatic depression of her husband. AW1 was not cross-examined with regard to the same. Thus, apart from the testimony of Aws 1 and 2, going by the law of pleadings also, it can safely be taken that Appunni committed suicide as a result of the acute anxiety neurosis consequent on the employment injury. If so, notwithstanding the fact that suicide is a unilateral and self imposed killing of oneself and notwithstanding the further fact that such self killing is outside the employment premises, the law will presume the death as one which took place in the course of employment. This is because of the 'but-for' test of causation which means that if the result would not have happened but for a certain event, then that event is the cause. (Vide Cork v. Kerby Maclean Ltd. (1952) 2 All. E.R. 402, 406-407 and per Denning L.J. in Macrae v. Swindells (1954), W.LR. 597.
13. The contention that since Appunni committed suicide which is an offence, his dependents are not entitled to make a claim for his service benefit cannot be accepted. While an attempt to commit suicide is an offence punishable under Section 309 IPC, when once the attempt is accomplished and the person dies such suicidal death cannot amount to an offence. There is no provision in the E.S.I. Act corresponding to Section 3(i)(b) of the Workmens' Compensation Act, 1923 whereby certain unlawful acts on the part of the employee would disentitle him to claim compensation from his employer. Even the said provision which exonerates the employer from the liability to compensate the employee sustaining an injury while on duty and in the course of his employment as a result of his own negligence or willful disobedience or disregard of the Regulations intended to ensure his safety, applies only to cases of injuries sustained by the employee and not to cases in which the injuries so sustained results in the death of the employee. (Vide Lingam Seetha Ramaiah v. Bijjam Bramaramba 1969 ACJ 227). Hence, the contention on behalf of the E.S.I. Corporation that since suicide is an unlawful act the provisions of dependents benefit under the Act are not attracted in the case of suicidal death cannot be accepted.
14. In many other countries attempt to commit suicide is regarded more as a manifestation of the diseased condition of the mind deserving treatment and care rather than visiting the person concerned with punishment. If suicide is the manifestation of a diseased mind, then a doubt may arise whether death due to such a disease can be considered as an employment injury. No doubt, mental disease is not an occupational disease figuring in the Third Schedule read with Section 52A of the Act. But still, the E.S.I. Corporation or the employer concerned can be made liable for death benefit in the event of death occurring as a result of various diseases not listed as 'occupational disease' in the Act or in the Workmens' Compensation Act. (Vide Srimathi Laxmibai v. Port Trust, Bombay : 1954 ILLJ 614, Madras State Electricty Board v. Ambazhathingal Ithachutti Umma : 1966 II LLJ 12. Deyshi Bhanji Khona v. Mary Burno and Anr. 1984 III LLJ 70, United India Insurance Co. v. C.S. Gopalafcrishnan and Anr. : 1989 II LLJ. 30, Amubibi v. The Nagri Mills Co. Ltd. : 1976 A.C.J. 507, Mrs. Tejubai and Ors. v. The General Manager, W. Rly. Bombay and Ors. 1983 Lab I.C. 119, Zubeda Bano and Ors. v. The Divisional Controller, Maharashtra State Road Transport corporation, Nagpur and Ors. 1990 Lab I.C 1781, Hindustan Steel Construction Ltd. v. Nuraisha Khatoon 1992 II LLN. 250). Thus, compensation will be payable if there is some causal connection between the death and the employment and if the employment constitutes a contributory cause or accelerates the death or if death be due to disease coupled with employment, then the dependents of the deceased would be entitled to claim compensation. In other words, death need not be a direct result of the injury if it could be shown that the injury accelerated or aggravated the pre-existing disease which the employee was suffering from or that the employment injury had Contributed to the death on account of the disease. To put it differently, if accidental injury suffered in the course of employment was the proximate cause of the employees death, the previous physical condition of the employee may not be of much significance.
15. In Pigney v. Pointer's Transport Services Limited (1957) 1 W.LR. 1121 the employee had sustained head injuries as a result of an accident in the course of his employment under the defendants. Three months later the employee instituted proceedings against the defendants alleging that the accident was caused through their negligence. However, before the trial of the case the employee committed suicide on 15-1-1957 as a result of neurosis induced by the injuries. His widow continued the above action but under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846-1908 besides the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1934. It was held that it was not against public policy to allow the widow of an employee who committed suicide to prosecute a statutory cause of action under the Fatal Accidents Act and that the damage which the employee sustained and which his widow inherited was directly traceable to the negligent act of the defendants and was not due to the operation of independent causes. It was held that consequent on the employment injury the employee was suffering from acute depressive neurosis which made him feel that life had become intolerable to him and driving him to commit suicide by hanging. There the suicide was after 18 months of sustaining the employment injury.
16. In Corr (Administratrix of Corr deceased) v. I. B.C. Vehicles Limited (2008) 2 All. ER 943, the House of Lords had to consider whether the chain of causation between the employment injury and death was broken by the suicide of the employee and whether the suicide was a foreseeable event. The claimant's husband was badly injured in a factory accident in June 1996 on the premises of his employer. Thereafter the employee suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and severe depression. On 23-5-2002 while suffering from an episode of severe depression the employee committed suicide by jumping from the top of a mufti-storey car park. It was held that but for the occupational injury the employee would not have suffered mental depression and that his conduct of taking his own life could not be said to fall outside the scope of the duty which the employer had owed him. In Venugopal v. Paulson 2008 (4) KLT 920 a Division Bench of this Court held that the legal representatives of the victim of a road traffic accident who had committed suicide due to the mental depression developed consequent on the injuries sustained by him in the accident, were entitled to claim compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998.
CONCLUSION
The result of the foregoing discussion is that there appears no reason for this Court to disagree with the conclusion reached by the E. I. Court that the suicide committed by Appunni had the requisite causal connection with the employment injury sustained by him from the premises of the factory where he was employed and that his legal representatives were entitled to claim the dependent benefits. The said finding is a pure finding of fact which does not involve any question of law, much less, any substantial question of law. This appeal which is devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs.