Judgment:
K. Narayana Kurup, J.
1. The defendant in a suit for declaration and consequential injunction is the appellant in this Second Appeal. The plaintiff purchased a pump-set from the defendant-Corporation on hire-purchase basis after executing an agreement on 25-3-1971. As per the terms of the hire-purchase agreement the plaintiff had to remit an amount of Rs. 2,131.70 in 10 equal half yearly instalments. When the plaintiff defaulted the payment of instalments, a final seizure notice was issued to him on 14-5-1974 and finally the pump-set was seized. After adjusting the proceeds of the sale towards the amount due to the defendant the hire-purchase agreement was terminated on 26-2-1983 and the plaintiff was called upon to remit the balance amount of Rs. 2,756.30 with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 13-4-1976. When a demand was made by the defendant for the balance amount due to it, the plaintiff instituted the instant suit for a declaration and consequential injunction.
2. The definite case of the plaintiff is that no amount is liable to be recovered under Ext. B1 agreement entered into between the parties by resort to Revenue Recovery Act, since the claim is barred by limitation. However, the appellant-defendant pleaded that the plaintiff is a defaulter and hence he is liable to pay the defaulted amount and penal interest.
3. The trial Court on an appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the case decreed the suit on the ground that 'the Amount Due' under Clause 14 of the hire-purchase agreement do not take in those sums the enforcement of the right to recover which has been barred by the law of limitation.Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court the appellant preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on the ground that the debt has been barred by limitation and hence cannot be recovered by resorting to revenue recovery proceedings.
4. The only question to be considered in this Second Appeal is whether the Courts below were right in holding that the Revenue Recovery proceedings could be taken to enforce the demand which is barred by limitation. This question is no longer res-integra as it is squarely covered by the decision reported in. A. K. Nanu v. State of Kerala, (1987) 2 Ker LT 921. The question as to whether the debt barred by limitation can be recovered by invoking provisions of Revenue Recovery Act came up for consideration before this Court in the aforesaid case wherein it was held as follows :
'In the absence of a provision creating a substantive right to recover time-barred debts, the Act providing for summary recovery does not avail once the period prescribed for recovery under the Limitation Act has expired. The Act only provides for easy recovery and not recovery at any time. Time is necessarily limited, unless of course the legislature, provides to the contrary. The section does, not create new liabilities or confer new rights, but merely creates a summary procedure for enforcing existing fragilities.'
5. From a perusal of the aforesaid decision, it becomes clear that the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act can be invoked only for enforcing the existing liabilities. The debt barred by limitation cannot be said to be an existing liability which can be recovered by invoking the provisions of Revenue Recovery Act. Since the claim of the appellant is barred by limitation the trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit and the same was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. No doubt learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Kerala Fisheries Corporation v. P.S. John, (1996) 1 Ker LT 814, wherein it was ruled that the right of the creditor to recover the amount due by resorting to the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act continues notwithstanding the fact that his right of recovery through a civil Court stands barred by limitation. Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the dictum laid down therein, I doubt very much whether that decision will have the effect of interferingwith the transactions that had taken place on the basis of the earlier decision, viz. (1987) 2 Ker LT 921, which was the law that was applicable as on the date of execution of agreement, viz. 25-3-1971. In this connection, it will be worthwhile reminding ourselves the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the need for certainty as to law. In the above view of the matter, the appellant cannot have any benefit out of the Full Bench decision referred to above. That apart, I am not told whether the appellant is a notified institution under Section 71 of the Act. At any rate, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.