P.K. Shamsuddin, J.
1. The accused in Sessions Case No. 19 of 1985 on the file of the Court of Sessions, Manjeri is the appellant in this Criminal Appeal.
2. The accused was charged for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307, I.P.C. and convicted under Sections 302 and 324, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 324, I.P.C. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
3. The prosecution case may be summarised as follows : The accused was living in a hut with his wife, Annie, and their six month's old baby by name Abymon. The paternal grandfather of the accused was also living with them, A few days before the occurrence the accused had some urinal complaint and he underwent treatment for that in the Nilambur hospital. After discharge, the accused stopped going for daily labour and there were frequent quarrels between the accused and his wife P.W. 2 regarding this. On 16-6-1984 at about 9 A.M. the accused and his wife PW. 2 quarrelled on the same subject and the accused who got enraged took, out a sickle and inflicted a cut on the chest of the infant who was lying on the floor at that time. When Annie protested, the accused inflicted cuts on her also with the sickle as a result of which she also sustained injuries. Hearing the hue and cry, PW. 1 and other neighbours came to the scene of occurrence. They took PW. 2 to hospital. She was admitted there. PW. 1 went to the Nilambur Police Station and gave Ext.P1 First Information Statement, which was recorded by PW. 10 the Sub Inspector of Police. PW. 10 conducted investigation and held inquest on the dead body of the child between 3.30 p.m. and 5 p.m. on the same day. Ext.P2 is the inquest report prepared by him. He also recovered MO.1 sickle and MO. 2 clothes worn by the child. Thereafter he sent the dead body of the child for postmortem. PW. 7 conducted autopsy and Ext. P3 is the postmortem certificate issued by him. PW. 7 also treated PW. 2. Ext.P4 is the wound certificate issued by him in respect of the injuries found on the body of PW. 2. The accused was arrested on the same day at 5.30 p.m. The material objects were sent for chemical examination and Ext.P5 is the report of Chemical Examiner. Ext.P5 report indicated the presence of human blood on the material objects. PW. 9, the Village Assistant prepared site plan Ext.P6. PW. 11 the Circle Inspector of Police, verified the investigation conducted by PW. 10 and laid charge before the Judicial Magistrate of Second Class, Nilambur, who committed the accused to stand trial before the Court of Sessions, Mangeri.
4. On accused pleading not guilty to the charge, Prosecution examined PWs. 1 to 11 and marked Exts. 1 to 6 and MOs. 1 to 3. In his statement under Section 313 of the Criminal PC. the accused generally denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and stated that he was suffering from insanity and did not know what happened. On his behalf DW. 1 the Superintendent, Mental Hospital, Calicut was examined and D1 to D3 were marked.
5. There cannot be any dispute that the child Abymon died as a result of the injuries sustained by him which were described in Ext.P3 postmortem certificate. The postmortem finding as revealed in Ext.P3 is that the child sustained an incised wound 5 cm in length and 2 1/2 cm in width lying across over the centre part of chest lying in between two nipples more towards left side, the right side of the wound was blunt and the wound has cut the sternum, the 5th rib of the left side and entered into thoracic cavity injuring pericardian and cutting the heart. PW. 7 who issued postmortem certificate opined that the child died as a result of injury to heart and cardiac arrest. Ext.P4 is the wound certificate issued by, PW. 7 in regard to the injuries found on the body of PW. 2. It shows that she sustained three injuries; an incised wound 10 cm in length 1/2 cm width and 2 cm depth extending from inter degital area of ring and middle finger up to the wrist joint on its anterior aspect, an incised wound 5 cm in length 1/2 cm in width and scalp deep over the left side of forehead lying anterior positively and ah incised wound 2 cm in length 1/4 cm width and 1/2 cm depth lying vertically over the vertex part of head. PW. 7 the Doctor who examined PW. 2 deposed that at the time of examination PW. 2 stated that the injuries were sustained as a result of cuts inflicted by her husband. PW. 7 deposed that injuries found on the body of PW. 2 could be caused by MO.1, as alleged by the prosecution.
6. The prosecution relied on the evidence of PWs. 1 to 5 to prove that the injuries on the child and PW. 2 were caused by the accused. PW. 1 deposed that the house of his sister is situated near the residence of accused and he went to his sister's house at 9 a.m. on the date of occurrence. He is familiar with the accused and his wife. He heard a hue and cry from the house of accused and thereupon he rushed to the scene. He saw the accused inflicting injuries en the child Abymon with MO. 1. His wife PW. 2 attempted to interfere. Then she was also attacked. He disarmed the accused. The child died out of the injuries sustained by trim. He went to the Nilanibur Police Station and gave Ext.P1 statement.
7. PW. 2 is the wife of the accused and also the injured. She deposed that she was married to the accused on 7-2-1983 and they lived together along with her father-in-law for 6 months and thereafter they shifted their residence to a property belonging to her father-in-law. Some time prior to the occurrence the accused was hospitalised due to some urinary complaint. After discharge he did not go for work and on the date of occurrence they had a quarrel on that count. During the course of the quarrel the accused picked up MO 1 sickle belonging to them and inflicted a cut on the chest of child. She identified MO 1 as the weapon used by the accused for attacking the child. When she tried to interfere, he attacked her also and she sustained injuries on her left palm, head and also on her leg. The neighbours came and she was taken to the hospital at Nilambur. She identified MO 2 as the clothes worn by the child.
8. PW. 3 is also a neighbour. He deposed that he heard a wordy quarrel at the house of accused and went to the scene and saw blood was oozing out from the head of PW. 2. PW. 2 was holding the child in her hand. He found MO 1 in the hand of the accused. PW. 4 is also a neighbour. He deposed that he saw PW. 2 was holding the child and blood was oozing from the head of PW. 2. Since he refused to subscribe to his version to the police that he saw the accused inflicting injuries on the child and PW. 2, he was treated as hostile and was cross-examined with reference to his earlier version to the police. He admitted having made such statement to the police. PW. 5 is also a neighbour and he also deposed that he saw the accused inflicting cuts on the child and PW. 2 with chopper, which he identified as No. 1. We do not find any reason for them to give false evidence implicating the accused in the crime. Their evidence regarding the incident appears to be quite natural and probable.
9. No doubt PW. 2 is the injured and an interested witness, but that fact only warns us to be cautious in scrutinising her evidence. We have carefully scrutinised her evidence and found no reason to reject the same. Her evidence regarding the incident was fully corroborated by PWs. 1 and 3 to 5 who are independent witnesses. In the circumstances, we hold that the accused caused injuries to the child and PW. 2 and the child died as a result of the injury so caused and PW. 2 sustained injuries, described in Ext.P4 as a result of the attack.
10. The more serious contention raised by the counsel for the appellant is that the accused was suffering from insanity at the time when the occurrence took place and was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. In other words, the counsel pressed into service exception contained in Section 84 of the Penal Code. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant relied on Ext.D3 case sheet of the accused maintained in the Mental Hospital, Calicut and also the evidence of DW.1Dr. Santhakumar, the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Calicut. He also relied on some of the statements of PWs. 1, 3, 4 and 5 in the course of the cross-examination. DW. 1 deposed that the records maintained in the hospital indicate that the accused was admitted in the hospital on 2-4-1985 and discharged on 5-8-1985. He was treated by another doctor. He also added that Ext.D3 the case sheet reveals that about 3 years ago the accused was suffering from manic depressive psychosis. However, the doctor who treated the accused was not cited or examined as a witness and his evidence was not available to the court. The accused was arrested on 16-6-1984. He was admitted in the mental hospital only on 2-4-1985, that is 10 months after the date of occurrence. As indicated above PW.2 was definite that after her marriage with the accused till he was arrested, the accused had not suffered any mental derangement or insanity. We have carefully considered her evidence on this aspect, and are unable to find any reason to hold that she was not speaking the truth. The evidence of PW. 10 the investigating officer, also clearly shows that there was no indication whatsoever in the conduct of the accused to indicate that the accused was of unsound mind at the time when the offences were committed. According to him, the conduct of the accused was normal till he was sent to the Mental Hospital about 10 months after the occurrence.
11. It is settled law that the provision contained in Section 84 IPC being an exception, the burden is on the defence to establish insanity in view of the provisions contained in Section 105 of the Evidence Act, However, it is not absolutely necessary that the defence must put forward specifically a contention of insanity. The circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence may indicate that the person must have been suffering from insanity and in such a case, the accused is entitled to get the benefit of doubt. The burden which rests on the accused is however not higher than that which rests upon a party in a civil litigation. To put in other words that the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances do not exist by placing materials before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of such circumstances so probable that prudent man would act upon them. The materials placed before the court may not sometimes be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act. However, it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or the other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself, either actus reus or mens rea If it raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court whether the accused had the mens rea required for the offence, accused would be entitled to the benefit of doubt. In such an event, prosecution must be taken to have failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Behaviour antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event may be relevant in finding the mental condition at the time of the event, but not those remote in time. If it comes to the notice of the investigating officer that the accused had a previous history of insanity, it is the duty of the investigating officer to investigate the mental condition of the accused and place the material before the court. (See Kuttappan v. State of Kerala 1986 Ker L.T 364 : 1986 Cri LJ 271).
12. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla : [1961]3SCR583 the Supreme Court considered the question and quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Court of Appeal in England in Henry Perry in 14 Cri App Re. 48 (at p. 46 of Cri LJ)
Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. To establish insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party is labouring under such defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act which he is committing - that is, the physical nature and quality as distinguished, from the moral - or, if he does know the nature and quality of the act he is committing, that he does not know that he is doing wrong....
13. In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat : 1964CriLJ472 the Supreme Court again considered the nature of evidence that is required to establish insanity and said : (at p. 478 of Cri LJ)
When a plea of legal insanity is set up, the court has to consider whether at the time of Commission of the offence the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law, The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed. Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Penal Code can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime.
14. This decision has been explained and affirmed in Bhikari v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 1966CriLJ63 . The Court said (at p. 64 of Cri LJ):
There is no doubt that the burden of proving an offence is always on the prosecution and that it never shifts. It would, therefore, be correct to say that intention, when it is an essential ingredient of an offence, has also to be established by the prosecution. But the state of mind of a person can ordinarily only be inferred from circumstances. Thus if a person deliberately strikes another with a deadly weapon, which according to the common experience of mankind is likely to cause an injury and sometimes even a fatal injury depending upon the quality of the weapon and the part of the body on which it is struck, it would be reasonable to infer that what the accused did was accompanied by the intention to cause a kind of injury which in fact resulted from the act. In such a case the prosecution must be deemed to have discharged the burden which rested upon it to estabish an essential ingredient of the offence, namely the intention of the accused in inflicting a blow with a deadly weapon. Section 84 of the Penal Code can no doubt be invoked by a person for nullifying the evidence adduced by the prosecution by establishing that he was at the relevant time incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Now it is not for the prosecution to establish that a person who strikes another with a deadly weapon was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or knowing that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Everyone is presumed to know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly everyone is also presumed to know the law. These are not facts which the prosecution has to establish.
15. A Division Bench of this Court considered the question elaborately in State of Kerala v. Ravi 1978 Ker LT 177 : 1978 Cri LJ NOC 182. Kader, J. who spoke for the Division Bench, said:
A court of law is concerned only with the legal insanity and not with the medical insanity. There is clear distinction between the two. An accused person may be suffering from some form of insanity in the sense in which the term is used by medical men, but may not be suffering from unsoundness of mind as contemplated under Section 84 IPC. There can be no legal insanity unless cognitive faculties of the mind are, as a result of unsoundness of mind, so completely impaired as to render the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law. According to medical science, insanity is another name or term for mental abnormality due to various causes and existing in various degrees, and even uncontrollable impulse driving a man to kill or wound comes within its scope. It is not every form of insanity or madness that is recognised by law as a sufficient excuse, to earn exemption under Section 84 IPC.
16. This Court referred to authoritative pronouncement of the English Common Law of Insanity by the Privy Council in Daniel McNaugnten's case (1843) 10 Cl Fin 300 : 8 ER 718, in the answers of the 15 Judges which subsequently came to be known as McNaughten's Rules and held that Section 84 IPC in substance is the same as that laid down by the House of Lords in the McNaughten's case.
17. It is true that the rules formulated in the McNaughten's case have been attacked by the medical profession and also by certain lawyers. The doctrine of uncontrollable or irresistible impulse and impulsive insanity has never been accepted as a valid defence coming within the purview of Section 84 IPC. As pointed out in Ravi's case 1978 Ker LJ 178 : (1978 Cri LJ NOC 182) (supra), every crime is committed under an impulse; and the great object of the criminal law is to compel or induce persons to control or resist these impulses and under the Indian Law, an accused person is not . entitled to exemption from criminal responsibility on the mere ground of loss of power of self-control at the time of the commission of the offence unless it was attributable to unsoundness of mind satisfying the requirements under Section 84 IPC.
18. The learned Counsel very much relied on the evidence of PW. 4 in the cross-examination suggesting that a few years ago the accused had suffered some mental derangement and his father was also suffering from mental derangement. PW. 4 has shown a definite tendency to help the accused. He did not subscribe to his earlier version to police and was treated as hostile and cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor and then he had to admit that he stated to the police as was recorded in the case diary. PW, 5 is also a hostile witness, We are satisfied that he was also trying to help the accused when he made statement suggesting mental derangement to the accused. In the course of cross examination PW. 1 also deposed that sometime before the occurrence PW. 1 destroyed the plantation, that members of the accused's family were suffering from unsoundness of mind and the father of ,the accused was an in-patient in the mental hospital, Kozhikode. He however denied the suggestion of the defence that the accused exhibited advanced stage of insanity at the time when the crime was committed and that he and others attempted to tie the accused. In his chief examination also he said that on the date of occurrence the accused did not display any sign of mental abnormality. Nor are we impressed by the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that since there is evidence to show that the accused developed mental derangement about 10 months after occurrence and for that reason trial had to be postponed, in all probability he committed the act without knowing the nature of the act especially in view of the positive evidence furnished by PW. 2 negativing such suggestion. It is only on 2-4-85 he developed some symptoms of abnormal behaviour and immediately he was admitted in the mental hospital. The evidence of DW. 1 and Ext. D3 case sheet are. not sufficient to come to the conclusion that on the date of occurrence the accused was suffering from manic depressive psychosis. There is also no basis for the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that PW. 10 did not make enquiry into the mental condition of the accused and that vitiates the entire prosecution case. PW. 10 was not told by any witness that a few years prior to the occurrence accused had been admitted in the mental hospital. The conduct of the accused after the incident Was normal and in the circumstances we are not in a position to find fault with PW. 10 for not directing investigation on this aspect. PW. 10 also negatived suggestion attributing unsoundness of mind to the accused at the time of commission of offence.
19. The learned Counsel for the appellant raised a contention that there was no apparent motive for the accused to attack PW. 2 and the child and this is a strong circumstance that he must have been suffering from some mental abnormality or derangement. The evidence of PW.2 would show that there used to be quarrel between the accused and PW. 2 and on the date of occurrence also PW. 2 found fault with the conduct of accused in not going for work and this resulted in a quarrel between the accused and PW. 2 and infuriated by the conduct of PW. 2 in questioning him for not going for work, he attacked the child and PW. 2. Therefore it cannot be said that the act of accused is without any motive. It may also be pointed that the mere fact that no motive has been proved for the commission of the murder or the fact that the accused made no attempt to run away from the scene or that the accused behaved in a strange manner subsequent to the commission of the offences would not indicate that he did not have the necessary mens rea. (See State of Kerala v. Ravi 1978 Ker LT 177 : 1978 Cri LJ NOC 182 and S.W. Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra : 1972CriLJ1523 , In re: Govindaramani AIR 1965 Mad. 283 : 1965 (2) Cri LJ 44 and in re Subrahmanian : AIR1964Mad526 .
20. Foregoing discussion would show that the accused is not entitled to protection under Section 84 IPC. The child died as a result of the injuries inflicted by the accused and PW. 2 sustained injuries mentioned in Ext.P4 wound certificate. In the instant case there is clear evidence to show that the accused never liked his wife's indictment for not going for work and the accused reacted in the manner as attributed to him in the instant case. This cannot be considered as a totally strange act. The evidence shows that accused was responsible for the injuries. The injury was inflicted on the chest, a vital part of the body of 6 months' old child and the injury caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of child. Therefore the conviction entered and sentence awarded on the accused for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC are correct and no interference is called for in that respect. The lower court also found the accused guilty under Section 324 of the IPC for causing injuries on P.W. 2. The sentence awarded is only of rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 324 and this sentence was ordered to run concurrently with imprisonment for life. We do not find any reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence entered under Section 324 IPC also.
In the result, Criminal Appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed.