D.J. Jagannadha Raju, J.
1. This is an appeal by the claimants who are the parents of the deceased Dr. K.P. Mohammed Ashraf, who died in an accident which took place at 1.30 p.m. on 1.1.1979 in front of the Karuna Hospital, Cheruvannoor. The appellants filed M.AC. No. 940 of 1980 which was originally numbered as O.P. No. 183 of 1979 on the file of the District Court, Kozhikode. In the O.P. the claimants claimed a compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- for the death of their son. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode, by its judgment dated 28.6.1984 dismissed the O.P. on the ground that the accident took place as a result of rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle by the deceased and that it was a clear case of motor cycle coming and dashing against the bus, which was on its right side of the road. The Tribunal held that the petitioners failed to prove negligence on the part of the bus driver, the second respondent. Aggrieved by the dismissal of O.P. the present appeal is filed.
2. In this appeal Mr. T.H. Abdul Aziz, counsel appearing for the claimant-appellants, contends that the judgment of the Tribunal is wholly unjustified. The accident took place in the middle of the road and it is a clear case of the bus, KLZ 6364, driven by the second respondent at great speed and in a negligent manner, coming and dashing against the motor cycle of the deceased who was coming in the opposite direction. There is no acceptable reason to doubt the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 who are eye-witnesses to the accident. While PW 3 saw the accident while he was on the road, PW 4 who is a passenger in the offending bus saw the accident while he was sitting in the front portion of the bus to the left of the driver of the bus. The Tribunal went wrong in placing reliance on interested evidence of R.W1, the driver, and the evidence of RW 2, the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, who prepared Exh. R-2 inquest report long after the accident took place. The decision of the Tribunal is mostly based upon the inquest report and no reasons are given for discarding the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and preferring the recitals in the inquest report. Mr. Aziz further contends that it is clear from the evidence that the accident took place in the course of the bus overtaking another bus and after hitting the motor cycle it dragged the motor cycle and the injured to some distance. The skid mark of 8 metres length clearly indicates that the bus was travelling at a terrible speed. He contends that at the most it can be said that the driver of the motor cycle, the deceased, is guilty of contributory negligence for the accident. Under no circumstances, can it be said that he is solely responsible for the accident. Mr. Aziz argues that this is a case where res ipsa loquitur applies, and there is a presumption in favour of negligence on the part of the bus driver. As a last argument Mr. Aziz urges the court to appreciate the evidence in a sympathetic manner and on humanitarian considerations as the deceased, a young promising doctor, aged 26 years, died in the accident.
3. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the bus owner and the driver, contends that PWs 3 and 4 are trumped up eye-witnesses procured by the uncle of the deceased doctor. Their evidence was rightly discarded by the Tribunal. The evidence of PWs 3 and 4 does not indicate in which portion of the road the accident and the impact took place and how it took place. The evidence on record clearly indicates that the motor cycle driven by the deceased came at great speed and on its wrong side and violently dashed against the bus, which was travelling on its right side. The theory of the accident taking place while the bus was overtaking another bus is demolished by the circumstantial evidence and the position of the bus and the motor cycle. The physical features noticed at the time of inquest are consistent with the case of the motor cycle coming and dashing against the bus. They are not consistent with the case of bus going to the wrong side of the road and dashing against the motor cycle. The existence of skid mark of 8 metres length only proves that the driver applied brakes and took precautions to avoid the accident. But in spite of the care and caution exercised by the bus driver the deceased came on his motor cycle and dashed against the bus in a violent manner and met his death. The damage caused to the bus itself shows that it is a case of the motor cycle coming and dashing against the bus violently. The deceased alone is responsible for the accident. The evidence of RWs 1 and 2 completely demolishes the theory of the bus going and dashing against the motor cycle and then dragging the motor cycle and the deceased. The injuries found on the deceased are not consistent with the case of injuries caused by dragging. The evidence of RWs 1 and 2 appears to be truthful and is fully supported by Exh. R-2 and the circumstantial evidence. The very fact that the driver of the bus was acquitted in the criminal case lends support to the theory that the driver of the bus is not at fault. He further contends that in thiscase there is absolutely no scope for invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
4. Mr. S. Parameswaran, appearing for the insurance company, the third respondent, contends that in this case no appeal lies against the order of the Tribunal because the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. He contends that under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act an appeal would lie only when the Tribunal passed an award. He contends that on the facts of this case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application. That doctrine can be invoked only where injuries are caused by first causing the injuries to the inanimate objects and then accident taking place. Here the case is that of the motor cycle coming at a high speed, going to its wrong side, and dashing against the bus. At the worst it can only be said that there is contributory negligence on the part of the bus driver. Under no circumstances on the basis of the evidence available in this case can it be said that the accident was the direct result of the negligence of the bus driver. Mr. Parameswaran contends that the Tribunal correctly appreciated the evidence on record. PWs 3 and 4 appear to be trumped up eye-witnesses and the Tribunal's conclusion that the deceased alone is responsible for the accident is perfectly correct.
5. On the basis of the rival contentions, the following points arise for determination:
(1) Whether an appeal does not lie in the present case as the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition and as the Tribunal did not pass an award?
(2) Whether the accident took place as a result of rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle by the deceased or whether it took place as a result of rash and negligent driving of the bus KLZ 6364 by the second respondent, the bus driver; or, whether it is the result of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased and the second respondent?
(3) Whether PWs 3 and 4 are real eyewitnesses to the accident or whether they are trumped up eye-witnesses procured by the uncle of the deceased?
(4) Whether the circumstantial evidence in Exhs. R-l and R-2 and the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 prove the case set up by respondent Nos. 1 and 2? and,
(5) Are the claimants entitled to any compensation and, if so, to what amount?
POINT NO. 1
6. The argument of Mr. S. Parameswaran, counsel for the third respondent, that by reason of the language of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, no appeal would lie against an order dismissing a M.V.O.P. appears to be attractive, but we are not convinced about it. Section 110-D is in two parts. Sub-section (1) states that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may within 90 days from the date of the award prefer an appeal to the High Court. A person whose claim petition is dismissed is certainly an aggrieved party. The word used in the section is 'award' and not 'judgment'. An award granting compensation is an instance of court passing an award for a certain sum. The order dismissing an O.P. amounts to an award, where no sum or nil sum is granted. It is true under Sub-section (2) an appeal will not lie if the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 2,000/-. Where the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 2,000/- only a revision would lie under Article 227 of the Constitution. This very question was considered by a Full Bench of this court in Ponnamma Pillai v. Nambi 1981 ACJ 475 (Kerala), to which one of us is a party. The Full Bench observed as follows in paragraphs 10 and 11:
(10) After holding the inquiry directed to be held, the Claims Tribunal decides the claim. The Claims Tribunal is by Section 110-B enabled to quantify the amount of compensation and make an enforceable award (decision) where it finds that the applicant is entitled to compensation. In case where the Claims Tribunal finds that the applicant is not entitled to compensation, it makes an award (decision) holding so. That its decision in either of the cases mentioned above is an award is clear from Section 110-B of the Act which provides for recovery of money in cases 'where any money is due from any person under an award' suggesting thereby that under all awards money may not be due to the applicant.
(11) In the backdrop of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs we hold that a decision of the Claims Tribunal dismissing an application filed under Section 110-A of the Act at any stage of the inquiry held under Section 110-B of the Act and for whatsoever reasons, is an award under Section 110-B thereof and that consequently, Section 110-D of the Act is attracted to such a decision....
The Full Bench decision is a complete answer to the argument of the learned counsel for the third respondent. We hold point No. 1 against the third respondent.
POINT NOS. 2 TO 4
7. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal postulated only two issues as indicated in paragraph 5 of the judgment and it did not determine the various other points that arise for consideration in the O.P. But in the course of the discussion on issue No. 1, the Tribunal has clearly considered all aspects. The main evidence regarding the circumstances in which the accident took place is provided by the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 who are examined on behalf of the claimants, and RWs 1 and 2, the driver of the bus and the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, who conducted the inquest. It would be proper to reappreciate the evidence afresh, to decide the controversy involved in this appeal. The evidence of PW1 only establishes that the deceased, Dr. Mohammed Ashraf, was a young doctor aged 26 years, he got the first rank in the college, and he had a promising career ahead of him. The witness claims that his son used to give Rs. 2,000/- per month to his mother for spending for the family. There is no precise evidence as to whether he was actually running a Nursing Home, or whether he was working in a Nursing Home and what exactly was his income. PW 2, Dr. Abdul Salam, speaks about the deceased being an efficient doctor and the deceased was getting Rs. 100/- to Rs. 150/- per day from consultation work and he was getting about Rs. 1,000/- per month from the hospital. He claims that he and Dr. Mohammed Ashraf were running Modern Hospital at Badagara. The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 is not at all useful to decide the question as to how the accident took place.
8. PW 3, Moideen Koya, claims that at the time of the accident he was working as the driver for a doctor in Koyas Hospital, Cheruvannoor, and that the accident took place near Karuna Hospital, Cheruvannoor. He claims that he saw the accident from a distance of 15 feet. He describes as to how the accident took place in the following terms:
M.M.T. College (bus) came from Feroke side to Calicut side. It came by overtaking another vehicle in an uncontrollable speed. Deceased came from Calicut side to Feroke side. M.M.T. bus while overtaking hit on Mohammed Ashraf s motor bike. I was 15 ft. away. Came in a careless manner. The incident was due to overtaking another bus....Motor cycle came in usual medium speed.
From a reading of his chief-examination, it is quite clear that he does not mention in which portion of the road the accident took place and in what manner the accident took place. The only thing he states is that the bus came at an uncontrollable speed and that the accident took place while the bus was overtaking another bus. If his statement is to be accepted as truthful, the bus should have come to the extreme wrong side of the road in the process of overtaking the other bus, and the accident should have happened on the eastern side of the road. Unfortunately, in the present case, we find that the accident took place on the western half of the road, and the bus was found on its right side of the road. In the cross-examination, this witness stands exposed. He states in cross-examination as follows:
The incident was while overtaking. The only reason for the accident was due to the overspeed of the M.M.T. bus and attempt to overtake the other bus. I saw clearly the motor bike hit on which part of the bus; struck on the right side of the front portion of the bus, below the light. There is no tar road vacant on the right of the M.M.T. bus. It was on the extreme east. Bus which was overtaken had driven off without stopping.
If his evidence in the cross-examination is to be accepted, we should find the bus on the extreme eastern portion of the road, but, unfortunately, in the present case, the bus and the motor cycle are found in the western half of the road. The witness admits that he never spoke about this incident to anybody. He claims that he mentioned this incident to Dr. Koya. He claims that the deceased doctor's uncle Mohammed Kutty enquired from him and then he was requested to give evidence. There is one interesting indication in his evidence to indicate that he is not the real eyewitness to the accident and that he went there soon after the accident. That is revealed by his statement 'I went after 5 or 10 minutes after seeing this'. He claims that he did not think it necessary to inform the police about the incident and he admits that police did not examine him. It was clearly suggested to him that he did not see the incident.
9. The failure of PW 3 to indicate the place of impact and the manner in which the accident took place and in which portion of the road the accident took place clearly shows that he could not have witnessed the accident. Obviously, he is a person who went there a few minutes after the accident took place. His theory of accident taking place in the process of the bus overtaking another bus is disproved by the fact that the bus and the motor cycle were found in the western half of the road, which is the right side for the bus. His claim that the bus was on the extreme east is totally disproved by the position of the vehicles. The Tribunal is justified in rejecting the evidence of PW 3 as unreliable and not truthful.
10. PW 4 claims to be a professional document writer and he claims that he was travelling in the bus at the time of the accident. In the very brief chief-examination, he claims that he saw the death of Dr. Mohammed Ashraf in the accident, and that he was in the bus which hit him. He claims that it was in a very high speed to overtake another bus, when it reached Karuna Hospital. The doctor was going on motor cycle and both collided together. The bus was running in some speed. I was to the left of the driver in the bus. The very statement that the bus was running in some speed demolishes his earlier theory of the bus going at high speed to overtake another bus. He does not also mention in which portion of the road the impact took place and how the impact took place. He does not even mention whether the bus was going on its right side or whether it went to the wrong side. He does not also mention whether the motor cycle was going on its correct side or it was going on wrong side of the road. In the cross-examination this witness stands exposed. He claims that the bus stopped 50 ft. away after collision. The bus pushed away the motor cycle and the doctor. If this statement is correct there will be signs of damage caused by dragging of the motor cycle, and there will be injuries on the deceased which are caused by dragging. In the present case RW2 did not find any signs of dragging nor were any injuries found on the deceased which indicate that they were caused due to dragging. The motor cycle also did not have any damage caused by dragging. Then the witness stated that the bus was going through the eastern side before it stopped. If this statement is true, the bus should be found on the wrong side of the road. But, unfortunately, we find that the bus was found on the western side of the road, which is the right side for it. He admits that the police did not question him. He did not bother to go and report the matter to the police. He claims that the uncle of the deceased doctor approached him and requested him to give evidence. He further states that the uncle of the deceased doctor did not ask him as to how the accident took place. He claims that he only told the uncle that he saw the hitting. As against the unsatisfactory evidence of PWs 3 and 4, we find that the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent is very cogent and convincing. RW2 who was working as Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police at the relevant time, and who conducted preliminary investigation and the inquest in this case clearly deposed that Exh. R-2 is the inquest report and the scene mahazar is described in columns 7 and 8 of the inquest report. As detailed therein, the place of occurrence is 2.55 metres from the western tar end of the road, and the width of the tar road is 6.55 metres. This clearly indicates that the impact took place on the western side of the road, which is the right side for the bus which was proceeding from South to North. The motor cycle was lying beneath the bumper and number plate. Near that was the dead body. From the front right wheel of the bus to the eastern tar road end the distance measured is 3.88 metres. This clearly indicates that the bus has not crossed the mid-line of the road and it did not come even a cm. to the right of the mid-line. It was totally on the right side of the road. From the left front wheel to the western tar end, a distance of 1.5 metres, was measured. This evidence totally demolishes the theory of the accident taking place in the process of the bus overtaking another bus because if overtaking is involved, the bus has necessarily to come beyond the mid-line, when the total width of the road is only 6.55 metres. The witness clearly admitted in cross-examination that there was a skid mark of 8 metres in length and the dead body was lying after the skid marks. The motor cycle and the dead body were lying underneath the bumper. The number plate is in the centre of the bus. The place where dead body is lying is the place of occurrence. The physical features described by this witness, RW 2, clinchingly establish that the driver of the bus took the precaution and applied the brakes. But in spite of it, the motor cycle came and dashed against the bus. Obviously the motor cycle came to the wrong side of the road and dashed against it. As can be seen from a perusal of inquest report the huge bend caused to the bumper and the radiator grill of the bus clearly indicates that the motor cycle was coming at great speed and dashed against the bus in a most violent manner. The inquest report does not indicate any signs of the motor cycle and the deceased being dragged after the impact. This destroys the evidence of PWs 3 and 4.
11. We shall now consider the evidence of RW 1, the second respondent, driver of the bus. He clearly deposed that as the bus was climbing the slope, it was going slowly, and that he was going on his left, which is the western part of the road. The motor cycle came from the opposite side. It had climbed the slope and started descending. It fell into a pit in the road and swerved to its right side. It hit against the centre of the front bumper. The witness claims that he stopped the bus. On seeing the motor cycle coming he slowed down. By then it came and hit the bus. He categorically asserts that the vehicle has not moved forward after the impact. The rider of the motor cycle fell down there itself. The motor cycle and the rider lay where they had fallen under the front bumper. The road is quite wide there, and at that time there were no other vehicles or people at the spot. He deposed that in the prosecution filed against him, he was acquitted as evidenced by Exh. R-l. He claims that immediately after the accident he left the scene of occurrence. In the cross-examination, the witness stated that he saw the motor cycle at a distance of 20 yards. He assessed the speed and realised that it was at high speed. The motor cycle came through the centre of the road, towards the right side of the bus. In the ordinary course, the motor cycle could go through by the right side. Only because it fell into a pit and suddenly came towards its right side, the accident occurred. According to him the bus stopped after the motor cycle came and hit it. After that the bus and the motor cycle were lying there only. He categorically denies his going at an extremely high speed and hitting against the motor cycle, when it was coming at a moderate speed.
12. Considering the details found in Exh. R-2 inquest report and considering the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 it is quite clear that the accident took place on the western side of the road, that is the wrong side for the motor cycle and the right side for the bus. The fact that there are no signs of dragging and the fact that the dead body was at the end of the skid marks is a clear indication that by applying the brakes, the bus came to a halt, and in spite of the bus coming to a halt, the motor cycle came and dashed against it. The nature of damage caused to the bus indicates that it is a case of motor cycle coming at great speed and dashing against the bus and it is not a case of the bus going and dashing against the moving motor cycle. The theory of accident taking place in the process of the bus overtaking another bus is not at all true. If that theory is true, the bus should have been found in the eastern half of the road. The place of impact should also be in the eastern half of the road.
13. PWs 3 and 4 do not appear to be real eye-witnesses of the accident for several reasons: (1) the theory given by them is disproved by the circumstantial evidence and the position of the vehicles and the place of impact; (2) they were not examined by the police and they never spoke about the accident earlier. Their names do not find place in the police records; (3) it looks as if these two witnesses have been trumped up as eyewitnesses by the uncle of the deceased who has not come into the witness box. Therefore, we hold on point No. 3 that PWs 3 and 4 are not real eye-witnesses and that they are trumped up eye-witnesses. The Tribunal rightly rejected their evidence.
14. For the various reasons given above, we hold on point No. 4 that the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 appears to be truthful and the version given by RW 1 is more probable. Perhaps the accident took place because of the motor cycle coming at great speed fell into a pit in the road and suddenly swerved to its right side and thus came to the wrong side and dashed against the bus. We hold on point No. 4 that the circumstantial evidence and Exhs. R-l and R-2 lend support to the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 and the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 proves the case set up by respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
15. In view of our conclusions on point Nos. 3 and 4, we hold that the accident took place solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle by the deceased and that the accident is not due to any rash and negligent driving of the bus by the second respondent. The second respondent is in no way responsible for the accident. He is not even guilty of contributory negligence for this accident.
16. Though the appellants' counsel has invited the court to apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur to this case, we find on the facts that there is absolutely no scope for invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We are thankful to Mr. Parameswaran who made a thorough study of the case and enlightened us as to how in a case of this nature, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked. He has taken us through pages 73 to 80 in the book Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 10th Edn. He has also taken us through the decision of the Supreme Court in Syad Akbar v. State of Kamataka 1980 ACJ 38 (SC). This decision deals elaborately with the maxim res ipsa loquitur and its applicability in India and as to how far this doctrine, res ipsa loquitur, fits in with the conceptual pattern of the Indian Evidence Act. After examining the evidence on record, we find that there is absolutely no scope for applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts of this case. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to discuss in detail the numerous decisions brought to our notice by Mr. S. Parameswaran.
POINT NO. 5
17. Though the appellants' counsel requested the court to consider the facts of the case in a sympathetic and humanitarian manner, considering the fact that a young doctor with promising career ahead of him died in the accident, he did not provide us any legal basis by which this court could help the dependants of the deceased. The accident took place on 1.1.1979 long before Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was introduced into the statute book. Section 92-A was introduced by Act 47 of 1982 and it came into force on 1.10.1982. Under this section the principle of no fault liability was introduced. According to Sub-section (2) a fixed sum of Rs. 15,000/- is payable as compensation in the case of death, even without proof of negligence. Dealing with Section 92-A, a Division Bench of this court in Krishna Pillai v. Jalal Ahamed 1989 ACJ 991 (Kerala), laid down that no fault liability can be recognised and compensation awarded under Section 92-A, even if no formal application is filed for granting compensation under Section 92-A. The Division Bench observed at page 992 as follows:. In other words, it creates a no fault liability to the extent indicated above. This is clear from Sub-section (3) which states that the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person....
Then dealing with Sub-section (2) the court observed as follows:.Sub-section (2) quantifies the claim, that is, Rs. 15,000/- in the case of death and Rs. 7,500/- in the case of permanent disablement. There is nothing in Section 92-A which would indicate that the owner can be ordered to pay compensation only on a claim application to be filed by the claimant.
After dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 92-A in conjunction with Section 110-A, the court observed in para 7, p. 993 as follows:.To hold that the liability can be recognised only in cases where formal application is filed will go against the salutary purpose of the provision. It is necessary for the claimant to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal so as to enable the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 92-A. If the Tribunal for some reason or other fails to take into consideration this aspect, parties could bring this to the notice of the Tribunal in order to enable the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction. Where, however, the Tribunal fails to exercise its jurisdiction, it is open to the appellate court to pass appropriate order. We see no reason to reject the claim for compensation under Section 92-A.
This decision clearly establishes that even in cases where no formal application is made for granting the benefit under Section 92-A, it is open to the Tribunal or the appellate court before which a matter is pending to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 92-A and award the compensation in accordance with Section 92-A. The further question is whether Section 92-A can be given retrospective effect. As pointed out earlier, it came into statute book on 1.10.1982. The accident in the present case took place on 1.1.1979. A Division Bench of this court had occasion to consider this question in Vilasini v. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. 1988 ACJ 755 (Kerala). After considering the objects and reasons of the Amending Act and the purpose sought to be achieved by introducing Section 92-A, the court dealt with the question as to whether Section 92-A has to be given retrospective effect or not from para 7 onwards. The court took into consideration a single Judge decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Narendra Singh v. Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. 1987 ACJ 790 (Rajasthan), which held that Section 92-A is in the spirit of social welfare legislation and should be interpreted beneficially in favour of the claimant and in such a matter the technicalities of law should not be allowed to have any upper hand and to obliterate the beneficial and social justice orientations of the enactment. The Division Bench disagreed with the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Mani Gupta v. Mohammad Ibrahim 1985 ACJ 476 (Allahabad) and the single Judge decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Yashoda Kumari v. Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corpn. 1984 ACJ 716(Rajasthan), but agreed with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Shantabai S. Dhume 1987 ACJ 198 (Bombay) and came to the conclusion that as indicated by the Bombay decision Section 92-A is to be applied to all pending cases irrespective of the date on which the accident occurred, as the Amendment Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to give benefits to all victims who were involved in the accident due to no fault basis and to remove the mischief that people suffered the accident had to face, being sometimes unable to prove the negligence or rashness of the driver or owner of the vehicle. The court gave its final conclusion in para 17 at p. 759 in the following terms:
(17) Bearing in mind that Section 92-A is a social welfare legislation intended to remove the difficulties faced by the victims to establish the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle, we are inclined to hold that the provisions contained in Section 92-A are applicable to the pending proceedings also.
The Division Bench preferred to follow the Bombay decision ignoring the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and the single Judge decision of the Rajasthan High Court. In that decision the Division Bench was dealing with a case where the accident took place on 29.5.1982, that is before the amendment. We respectfully follow the Division Bench decision of this court in Vilasini v. K.S.R.T.C. 1988 ACJ 755 (Kerala) and hold that in the present appeal the benefit of Section 92-A can be granted, though the accident took place on 1.1.1979. As the present proceeding is a pending proceeding, the appellants are entitled to the advantage of Section 92-A Following the decision of this court in Krishna Pillai v. Jalal Ahamed 1989 ACJ 991 (Kerala), we hold that no separate application is necessary for invoking the aid of Section 92-A. In this view of the matter, we hold on point No. 5 that the claimant-appellants are entitled to compensation on the basis of no fault liability as per Section 92-A.
18. In the result the appeal is allowed in part. There shall be an award granting compensation of Rs. 15,000/- under Section 92-A against the respondents. The liability is joint and several. The appellant-claimants are entitled to 12 per cent interest from the date of the O.P., that is 30.6.1979, to the date of payment.