K.A. Mohamed Shafi, J.
1. These appeals are preferred against the judgments passed by the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kottayam in LAR Nos. 115, 103, 81. 117, 79 and 119/1993 respectively. All these references were made before the lower Court under Section 28-A(3) of the Land Acquisition Act. The lower Court answered all the references in the negative against the respective claimants. Hence the claimants have preferred these appeals before this Court challenging the respective judgments.
2. Since common questions are involved in these appeals, these appeals are heard and disposed of by this common judgment.
3. In LAR 115/93, 24.06 Ares of dry land comprised in Sy. No. 566/4 of Velloor Village was acquired as per the notification issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 17-7-1973 for the purpose of Kerala Newsprint Project. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at the rate of Rs. 50/- per cent.
4. In LAR 103/93, 1.82 Ares of dry land belonging to the claimant comprised in Sy. No. 261/7-B of Mulakkulam village was acquired for the same purpose as per the notification dated 9-12-1975 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at the rate of Rs. 200/- per cent by the award dated 20-6-1977.
5. In LAR 81/93, 10 cents of dry land comprised in Sy. No. 550/1-B of Velloor Village was acquired for the same purpose as per the notification dated 17-7-1973 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at the rate of Rs. 102/-per cent by award dated 15-9-1975.
6. In LAR No. 117/93, 13.618 cents of dry land comprised in Sy. No. 266/4A & 4B, of Mulakulam Village was acquired for the same purpose as per the notification dated 9-12-1975 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at the rate of Rs. 135/- per cent by award dated 26-5-1977.
7. In LAR 79/93, 8.325 cents of dry land comprised in Sy. No. 540/8 of Velloor Village was acquired for the same purpose as per the notification dated 27-6-1972 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at the rate of Rs. 149/-per cent.
8. In LAR 119/93, 10.40 Ares of dry land comprised in Sy. No 276/1 of Mulakulam Village was acquired for the same purpose as per the notification dated 9-12-1975 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at the rate of Rs. 173/- per cent as per the award dated 8-11-1977.
9. In none of these cases the respective claimant has moved before the Land Acquisition Officer for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act before the Court for adjudication of their claim for enhanced compensation.
10. On the basis of the judgment passed by the lower Court in LAR 88/85, dated 18-10-88, the claimant in LAR 115/93 filed an application dated 6-4-1989 before the Land Acquisition Officer for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the application. The matter was taken up before this Court in O.P. 5195/ 90 and as per the direction of this Court to the Land Acquisition Officer to reconsider the application, it was considered and rejected by order dated 20-7-1993. Hence the claimant filed petition dated 17-9-1993 under Section 28-A(3) of the Land Acquisition Act to refer the matter to the lower Court.
11. In LAR 103/93 the claimant filed an application on 26-12-1989 before the Land Acquisition Officer for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the LA Act on the basis of the judgment passed by the lower Court in LAR 67/86, dated 22-3-1989. The Land Acquisition Officer did not consider the application. So the claimant approached this Court in O.P. 11790/90 and this Court directed the land Acquisition Officer to consider the application. After enquiry the Land Acquisition Officer rejected the application by order dated 3-6-1993.
12. In LAR 81/93, the claimant filed an application before the Land Acquisition Officer for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the LA Act on the basis of the judgment passed by the lower Court in LAR 89/85, dated 18-10-1988. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the application. The matter was taken up before this Court in O.P. 7554/89 and this Court directed the Land Acquisition Officer to reconsider the petition. After reconsideration the claim was rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer by order dated 3-6-1993.
13. In LAR 117/93, the claimant filed an application under Section 28-A of the I.A. Act before the Land Acquisition Officer to re-determine the compensation on 1-1-1990 on the basis of the award passed by the lower Court in LAR 67/86 on 22-3-1989. Though the claim was dismissed by the Land Acquisition Officer, as per the direction of this Court in O.P. 11139/90 to reconsider the application, the Land Acquisition Officer again considered the application and rejected the same by order dated 16-8-1993.
14. In LAR 79/93, the claimant filed an application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act before the Land Acquisition Officer on 17-8-1988 on the basis of the judgment passed by the lower Court in LAR 18/86, dated 30-11-1987. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the petition. The matter was taken up before this Court in O.P. 8272/89. This Court directed the Land Acquisition Officer to reconsider the application. The L.A. Officer reconsidered and rejected the claim by award dated 8-6-1993.
15. In LAR 119/93, on the basis of the judgment passed by the lower Court in LAR 67/86, dated 22-3-1989 the claimant filed an application on 26-12-1989 before the Land Acquisition Officer to re-determine the compensation under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the claim. Hence, the matter was taken up before this Court in O.P. 1139/90 and this Court directed the L.A. Officer to reconsider the application. The Land Acquisition Officer reconsidered and rejected the claim by order dated 16-8-1993.
16. The appellants-claimants in all these cases moved the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to the lower Court under Section 28-A(3) of the L.A. Act. Therefore, these references were registered by the lower Court.
17. The lower Court found that the provisions of Section 28-A of the L.A. Act has no application in these cases since the properties acquired from the claimants and the properties involved in the judgments on the basis of which the claimants have sought re-determination of the compensation for the properties acquired from them, are not acquired by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act.
18. In these appeals the appellants have raised several contentions in order to establish their contention that their application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act is proper, Legal and valid and the rejection of that claim by the Land Acquisition Officer as well as the reference Court is not sustainable under law.
19. As already noted all the above appeals have arisen out of the applications filed by the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the respective awards passed by the lower Court relied upon by them under Section 29-A of the L.A. Act.
20. Section 28-A of the L.A. Act is introduced as per Act 68/1984 with effect from 24-9-1984 which reads as follows :
'28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court :-- (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court :
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1). conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.
21. Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A lays down that in the case of an award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer the reference Court allowed the claimant therein any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11, the persons interested in all other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) and who are aggrieved by the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer may notwithstanding the fact that they had not made an application to the L.A. Officer under Section 18 file a written application to the L.A. Officer within three months from the date of the award of the Court requiring that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. Therefore, under Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, lands should be acquired by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the person aggrieved by the award should move the Land Acquisition Officer to re-determine the compensation payable to him within three months from the date of the award passed by the Court enhancing the compensation relied upon by him.
22. Section 18 of the L.A. Act deals with reference to Court which reads as follows :
18. Reference to Court :-- (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may. by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken : Provided that every such application shall be made,--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, Sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.'
It is clear from proviso: (a) to Section 18(2) of the Act that the application should be made, if the person making the application to the L.A. Officer under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 was present or represented before the L.A. Officer at the time when the award was passed, within six seeks from the date of the award passed by the L.A. Officer. Proviso (b) to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 stipulates that in other cases written application to the L.A. Officer should be made within six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice from the L.A. Officer under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of award passed by the L.A. Officer whichever period shall first expire.
23. The counsel for the appellants submitted that the question whether the application for reference to the Court is barred under the provisos to Section 18(2) and the proviso to Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act has to be decided by the Land Acquisition Officer and once the Land Acquisition Officer found the claim is not barred by time and referred the matter for adjudication to the reference Court under Section 18 or 28-A of the L.A. Act, the reference Court is bound to consider the matter on merits and to answer the reference and the reference Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate or determine whether the application for reference filed by the claimant under Section 18 or 28-A(3) before the Land Acquisition Officer or for re-determination of the amount of compensation under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act is barred by time or not.
24. The above contention raised by the appellants is not sustainable since it has been authoritatively pronounced by the Supreme Court that the observance of the conditions laid down under Section 18 of the L.A. Act is a condition precedent to the Collector's power of reference and the Court is bound to go into the question whether the reference under Section 18 was within time. In the decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 404 (Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra) the Supreme Court has observed as follows :
'The power of the Collector to make a reference under Section 18 is thus circumscribed by the conditions laid down therein, and one condition is the condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso.
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It must accordingly be held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to Section 18, Sub-sec. (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector.
26. From these considerations, it follows that the Court functioning under the Act being a tribunal of special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under Section 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference.
xxxxxx xxx xxx It follows that it is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in Section 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the Court and, therefore, the Court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference.'
25. Even though the above judgment rendered by the Supreme Court is concerned with Section 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act corresponding to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the same is applicable to this case coming under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the contention that in view of the fact that the Land Acquisition Officer has entertained the application under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the amount of compensation filed by the appellants, the reference Court has no jurisdiction to consider whether those applications filed by the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer were within the period of limitation or whether they were barred by time as well as the applications filed by the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to the Court under Section 28-A(3) of the L.A. Act are barred by time or not, is not sustainable.
26. Therefore, I find that the reference Court has got jurisdiction to determine whether the application filed under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act before the L.A. Officer for re-determination of the compensation is barred by time or not and also to determine whether the application filed by the claimant before the L.A. Officer under Section 28-A(3) of the L.A. Act to refer the matter to the Court for determination is also barred by limitation or not.
27. Even though there was some difference of opinion with regard to the computation of three months period of limitation for filing application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act, in the decision in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, AIR 1995 SC 2259, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the application for re-determination under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act need not be filed within three months from the first award made by the Court and the person moving the application is entitled to the relief under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act if the application is filed within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which re-determination of the compensation is sought by him. In that case the Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court reported in Babu Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689 : (1995 AIR SCW 65) and Union of India v. Karnail Singh, (1995) 2 SCC 728 holding that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first award made on a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1995 SC 2259 is followed by another Bench of three Judges in the decision in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Land Acquisition Collector, (1996) 6 SCC 746 : (AIR 1997 SC 1915).
28. In State of Tripura v. Roopchand Das, (2003) 1 SCC 421 : (2002 AIR SCW 4859) the Supreme Court has held that when more than one award is passed by the reference Court under Section 18 on different dates in respect of lands covered by the same notification the period of limitation can be computed from the date of the latest award on the basis of which re-determination was sought instead of the date of the earliest award.
29. Though the correctness of the dictum laid down in the decision reported in AIR 1995 SC 2259 was canvassed before the Constitution Bench in the decision in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, AIR 2002 SC 3240, the Constitution Bench refrained from considering that aspect by holding that it does not arise in the case on hand and it was not referred to the Constitution Bench. Therefore, the period of limitation in preferring application under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act starts from the latest award passed by the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act in respect of the land covered under the same notification relied upon by the applicant.
30. In all these cases before me, the Land Acquisition Officer found that the application is filed by the claimants before him for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the Act are well within the time stipulated under the Act since the applications were filed within the stipulated time of 90 days from the date of the judgments relied upon by the appellants after excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment. That finding of the L.A. Officer was not disputed by the State before the reference Court. Therefore, the finding entered by the Land Acquisition Officer that the applications filed under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act are well within the period of limitation and as such those applications are maintainable under law which is not challenged by the State and not disturbed by the reference Court, has to be upheld.
31. The reference Court rejected the claim made by the appellants for re-determination of the compensation on the ground that the lands belonging to the appellants and the lands involved in the judgments relied upon by them for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act were acquired not by the same notification as stipulated in Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act and the lands were acquired as per different notifications. The contention of the appellants is that the lands involved in these cases were acquired for the same purpose for the Velloor Newsprint Project issued on the same date though not under the same notification. Therefore, they vehemently contended that they are entitled to the benefits conferred under the provisions of Section 28-A of the L.A. Act for re-determination of the compensation payable to them.
32. The Govt. Pleader vehemently argued that it is specifically provided under Section 38-A(1) of the L.A. Act that that provision will apply only to acquisition of lands by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act. Therefore, unless and until the lands are acquired by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act, the claimants cannot claim any benefit under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act on the basis of the award passed by the Court. In support of this contention the Govt. Pleader relied upon a decision of the single Judge of the Maharashtra High Court in Anjebhau v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Mah LJ 1414 which was found favour with the reference Court. In that decision it was held that even in cases two different notification in respect of lands in the same village are issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act on the same day and published in the same gazette and if reference under Section 18 is made only in respect of the land covered by one of the notifications, the benefit under Section 28-A is not available to the claimants whose lands were covered by the other notification.
33. The counsel for the appellants submitted that the benefit conferred upon the claimants who could not seek reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act against the award passed by the L.A. Officer cannot be deprived of by making such a rigid and narrow interpretation of the clause 'covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act' occurring in Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act and in view of the fact that Section 28-A is incorporated in the Act by the legislature to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar land for the persons who were unable to take advantage of Section 18 of the L.A. Act due to lack of knowledge, poverty or other reasons and the beneficial provisions of Section 28-A should be interpreted liberally in favour of the beneficiaries so as to take in such claimants also.
34. In the decision in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, AIR 1995 SC 2259 already referred to above, the Supreme Court has observed as follows (para 9) :
Section 28-A, is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18, of the Act. In relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction Which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.'
35. Even though it cannot be, disputed that a beneficent legislation should be construed in favour of the beneficiary to advance the object of legislation, that fact will not benefit the appellants in these cases. Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the L.A. Act specifically lays down that the benefit of that provision will be available only to those persons whose properties are acquired by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act. Two different notifications in respect of acquisition of land for the same purpose may be issued due to various considerations or reasons. Merely because of the fact that the notifications were issued on the same date for the same purpose, it cannot be deemed or construed that the acquisition of land was by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. Under the circumstances the provisions of Section 28-A(1) of the Act cannot be stretched to include lands acquired by different notifications issued on the same date for the same purpose. By its wisdom the legislature thought it fit to extend the benefit of Section 28-A of the L.A. Act only to persons whose properties are acquired by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and not by similar notifications or different notifications issued on the same day. Under the circumstances even by adopting the concept of construing beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiaries in order to advance the object of legislation, it is not possible to accept the contention of the appellants that the lands acquired under different notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act on the same date for the same purpose will come within the ambit of Section 28-A(1) of the LA. Act. Therefore, the lower Court rightly held that the appellants are not entitled to the benefit conferred under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act since the lands belonging to them and involved in the respective judgments relied upon by them were not acquired by the same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act.
36. In LAR 103/1993 and LAR 115/93 the lower Court found that the applications for reference to the Court filed before the L.A. Officer under Section 28-A(3) of the L.A. Act were filed beyond the period of six weeks; as provided under proviso (a) to Section 18(2) of the L.A. Act and therefore, the reference is barred by time. Sub-section (3) to Section 28-A provides that any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may be written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18. Proviso (a) to Section 18(2) stipulates that the application for reference should be made if the person making the application was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made the award, within six weeks from the date of the award.
37. It is not disputed that the claimants in LAR 103/93 and LAR 115/93 were represented by their counsel before the L.A. Officer in the proceedings under Section 28-A of the Act. Therefore, the application for. reference under Section 28-A(3) should have been filed within six weeks from the date of award passed by the L.A. Officer. The awards were passed by the L.A. Officer on 3-6-1993 and 20-7-1993 in these cases and the applications for reference were filed by the claimants before the L.A. Officer on 31-7-1993 and 18-9-1993 respectively, clearly after six weeks of the date of the respective awards. Though it is stated in those applications dated 31-7-1993 and 18-9-1993 that they received the notice of the award only on 20-7-1993 and 16-8-1993 respectively, that statement will not help them in view of the proviso (a) to Section 18(2) of the L.A. Act since in the proceedings they were represented by counsel before the L.A. Officer. Therefore, the lower Court is justified in finding that the reference made under Section 28-A(3) of the L.A. Act in LAR 103/93 and LAR 115/1993 is barred by time.
38. The lower Court has rejected the claim made by the claimant in LAR 81/93 on the ground that the judgment in LAR 89/85 relied upon by the claimant for claiming re-determination of the compensation is not produced before the Court. It is only on production of the judgment the Court can find out whether the claim under Section 28-A was made within the period of limitation or not. It is also pertinent to note that the claimant can claim re-determination of the compensation only as awarded in LAR 89/85 relied upon by him by providing that the property acquired from him is similar to the property involved in that judgment. Without producing that basic document in Court any other evidence adduced by him before the Court will be of no avail. Therefore, the lower Court rightly rejected the claim made by the claimant in LAR 81/93 since no claim under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act is sustainable without establishing that in the reference under Section 18 the Court has enhanced the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 in respect of the property acquired by the same notification under Section 4(1) and that property is similar to the property acquired from the applicant.
39. In LAR 117/93 the lower Court has found that the application made by the claimant therein under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act for re-determination of the compensation on the basis of the award passed by the lower Court in LAR 67/86 on 22-3-1989 is barred by time being beyond three months from the date of passing of the award. It is seen that even though it is stated in the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in the application filed under Section 28-A of the L.A. Act that the application was filed by the claimant on 1-1-1990 is rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer as per the order dated 28-2-1990 and that order was challenged by the claimant before this Court in O.P. 11139/90. But the Land Acquisition Officer has clearly stated in the order passed by him rejecting the claim for re-determination of the compensation that the application under Section 28-A(1) is filed within the stipulated time of 90 days from the date of the judgment in LAR 67/86 excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment. In spite of the fact that the respondent State has not challenged that finding of the Land Acquisition Officer that the application under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act was preferred by the claimant within the time stipulated under law the lower Court by finding that the claimant has not satisfied that the application was preferred within the time provided under the proviso to Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act, on the ground that the copy of the award in LAR 67/86 produced before the Court was applied for and obtained subsequent to the reference made to the Court, found that the reference is incompetent. In view of the fact that the appellant had produced copy of the award in LAR 67/86 before the Land Acquisition Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer found that the application was filed within time and that finding is not challenged by the State, the lower Court is not justified in finding that the application filed under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act in LAR 117/93 cannot be entertained as barred by time.
40. In some of the cases the lower Court has found that in case the applications preferred by the appellants are found sustainable, the respective appellants are entitled to certain amount by way of additional compensation and in certain other cases the lower Court found that the claimants therein, have not adduced satisfactory evidence in support of their claim for re-determination of the compensation.
41. In view of my finding that the appellants in these cases are not entitled to re-determination of the compensation for the lands acquired from them under Section 28-A(1) of the L.A. Act since the acquisition of their lands and the lands acquired in the respective judgments relied upon by them for re-determination of the compensation were not by the same notification issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, the above question whether the appellants are entitled to any amount by way of enhanced compensation in these cases need not be considered.
In view of what is stated above, the judgments passed by the lower Court impugned in these appeals are confirmed and the appeals are dismissed.