C.N. Ramachandran Nair, J.
1. Petitioner is challenging Ext.P13 order issued by the respondent, by which property tax exemption claimed under Section 235 and vacancy remission claimed under Section 239 of the Kerala Municipalities Act 1994 hereinafter called the 'Act' are declined. I have heard counsel appearing for the petitioner and standing counsel Smt, A.G. Aneetha appearing for the respondent.
2. Petitioner who is a trust constructed a four storied building within Corporation of Kochi for providing accommodation to ladies in their old age. Occupancy certificate was issued on 18.4.1994. The building consists often rooms in each of the four floors out of which 34 rooms are available for accommodation and balance rooms for use as Kitchen, Office, Dr's room, etc. The Corporation treated each floor of the building as a separate building and accordingly gave four numbers to it. The petitioner claimed property tax exemption under Section 235(1)(c) and (i) of the Act and in the alternative claimed vacancy remission under Section 239 of the Act for the period the building or part of it remained vacant. Since claim of exemption from property tax was on the ground that the petitioner is a charitable institution and is providing low cost accommodation to distributes, this Court called for a detailed report from the Corporation. Eventhough a report is not seen in the file, counsel submitted that a report prepared by the Revenue Inspector containing all facts was furnished in Court and a copy was furnished in Court for my perusal. Petitioner also filed various documents including a certificate obtained from Income-tax Department in support of their contention that the petitioner is a charitable institution.
3. Since exemption is claimed under Section 235(1)(c) and (i) of the Act those provisions are to be referred to and for easy reference the sub-sections are extracted hereunder:
235. Exemption:
(1) The following buildings and lands shall be exempt from the property tax: (a)....
(c) Choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and choultries where the rent charged for the occupation is used exclusively for charitable purpose.
(i) public building and places used for charitable purposes of sheltering the distributes or animals.
Explanation: The exemption granted under the section shall not extent to buildings and lands for which rent is realised by the owners thereof and to residential quarters attached to schools and colleges not being hostels or residential quarters attached to hospitals, dispensaries and libraries.
Even though petitioner claims that the building in question is a choultry because rent collected at the rate of Rs. 500 per head per month is moderate and rent collected is used for charitable purposes, standing counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of this Court in Aliya Arabic College v. Kasaragod Municipality 1998 (2) KLT 11 and contended that Choultry in Malayalam means 'Sathram', which covers building given free of rent or at very moderate rate of rent. According to her, through inspection, the information obtained by the Corporation is that the monthly rent charged per head is Rs. 2000/- which by no standard can be called low or moderate. Even assuming that petitioner's claim that rent collected is only Rs. 500/- per head per month is accepted, still it cannot be said to be very low or moderate to call the building a choultry is the case of the respondent. I do not think there is any need to consider what exactly is the rent collected by the petitioner, because 1 am of the view that building by itself cannot be called a choultry which in Malayalam means Sathram. Apart from the meaning assigned to this word in the decision above referred, the provision in the Act enacted in Malayalam uses the word Sathram and the corresponding word used in the translated version for Sathram is Choultry. A choultry or Sathram is not a place of regular residence and is only a place provided for temporary accommodation for guests travelling public, pilgrims etc. What the petitioner provides is permanent accommodation to fairly affluent old aged ladies for regular accommodation and they can live there as long as they want or until they die. The class of people who come obviously are old aged ladies who do not have children or dependants or who do not want to live with them but want to live independently and in the company of similar people. A building providing accommodation to aged people on long term basis cannot be called a Choultry at all. Therefore irrespective of whether petitioner is charging Rs. 2000/- per head as found by the Corporation or Rs. 500 per head per month as claimed by the petitioner, the building is not entitled to exemption under Section 235(1)(c) of the Act as the building cannot be called a Choultry at all. Apart from this, petitioner also does not satisfy the conditions in the second limb of Section 235(1) of the Act which provides for exemption only if rent charged is applied for charitable purposes. Since charitable purpose is not defined in the Act, the question to be considered is what is the meaning that should be assigned to 'charitable purpose'. Counsel for the petitioner relying on Ext. P19 constitution of the trust containing its objects and Ext.P18 certificate of exemption issued by the Income-tax Department contended that petitioner is engaged in charitable purpose and its income is not shared by any of the trustees and is applied for the purposes for which the trust is formed. Of course the objects of the petitioner trust include education, social welfare, well-being of women and children, etc. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that charitable purpose has limited meaning under the Act and merely because the petitioner's objects fall within the definition of charitable purpose as defined under Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, petitioner is not entitled for property tax exemption under Section 235 of the Act. She has also relied on the definition of 'charitable purpose' contained in the previous Act that is Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, which in Section 101 defined charitable purpose as including relief of the poor, education and medical relief. Reference is also made to the definition of charitable purpose as contained in Section 3(1)(b) of the Building Tax Act 1975 which includes only relief of poor and free medical relief within its object after providing for separate exemption under same Section for education, and religious purposes and for factories and workshops. On going through the objects of the petitioner as contained in the trust deed, I feel certificate of exemption issued by the Income tax Department under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the petitioner is engaged in 'advancement of object to general public utility' which is also an item falling within the definition of charitable purpose for the purpose of the Income-tax Act. Even though charitable purpose is not defined under the Act, it is clear from the provisions contained in the previous statute substituted by the present Act and in the similar legislation, namely, Kerala Building Tax Act, I do not think an extended meaning covering all activities of public utility is covered by the term 'charitable purpose' used in the Act. Apart from this, the explanation to Section 235 (1) provides that exemption shall not be granted to buildings let out on rent by owners and it is provided in the said Explanation that even residential quarters attached to schools and colleges shall not be entitled to exemption even if rent is not collected from such building. It is therefore obvious that exemption from property tax in respect of building is subject to restrictions and limitations and the criteria is whether there is collection of rent or not. A very important aspect is that exemption is with respect to the nature of use to which the building is put. In other words, building owned by charitable institutions are not entitled to exemption even if the entire income from buildingis used for charitable purpose as understood under the Income-tax Act. Only such of the buildings which are used for the purposes referred to in various sub-sections of Section 235 Only are entitled to exemption. Probably the definition for charitable purpose is dispensed with under the Act because charitable purposes for which exemption from property tax is provided are contained in Section 235(1)(i) of the Act, which are sheltering of distributes, and sheltering of animals. In other words, only two charitable purposes, use of which entitles a building for exemption from property tax are sheltering of distributes and animals. By no stretch of imagination the guests living in the petitioner's building paying normal rent and charges for food in addition to the same who are obviously affluent people can be called distributes. It is to be noted that charitable purpose use of which qualifies a building for exemption is use as Choultry. In this context, the decision referred to by counsel for the petitioner in Attukal Bhagavathy Temple Trust v. Corporation of Thiruvanantha-puram 2001 (1) KLT 108 is squarely applicable to, the facts of this case. Even the Devaswom which claimed exemption from property tax for the Auditorium attached to the temple in terms of Section 235(1)(c) and (i) of the Act was held to be not entitled to exemption. I am of the view that the building in question owned by the petitioner is neither a choultry nor the use of it's income by the petitioner for charitable purpose understood under the Income-tax Act to qualify the building for property tax exemption under Section 235(1)(c) of the Act. In view of foregoing observations and findings I hold that petitioner is not entitled to exemption from property tax in respect of hostel run by them.
4. The next question raised for consideration is disallowance of vacancy remission for the building. While counsel for the petitioner submitted that most of the last several years the building became virtually vacant as it has a few occupants, counsel for the respondent relying on the report of the Revenue Inspector submitted that some portion of each floor was under occupation and so much so, vacancy remission was rightly declined. Admittedly the building has four numbers and each floor is treated as a separate unit. On the face of it there is only one building complex consisting of common facilities like, Kitchen, Dr.'s room, etc., and residential rooms for the inmates. However, separate number given to each floor of the building may help the petitioner to avail rebate of tax under Section 239 of the Act. The floor which contains a Kitchen, Dr.'s room and common facility is certainly always on use as long as at least one inmate is there and so much so the said floor is not entitled to any vacancy remission under Section 239 of the Act. However, if no room in any other floor is occupied by anybody for any half year or for full year, petitioner is entitled to vacancy remission of property tax for that floor for such period. Even though Section 239 (3)(a) provides for advance intimation of vacancy for claiming vacancy remission in the like manner as is provided in the Motor Vehicles Tax Act for tax exemption, I do not think petitioner should be declined vacancy remission on this ground for more than one reason. In the first place, claim of the petitioner that it was entitled to exemption under Section 235(1)(c) and (i) of the Act stands concluded only by this decision of this Court now and during the pendency of the O.P. there was stay against recovery proceedings. In the second place, petitioner though not entitled to exemption is a public trust and there is nothing to doubt it's accounts. In other words, respondent can safely follow the occupancy register and the accounts of the petitioner to verify during any period any floor of the building remained vacant for any half year or full year and consider vacancy remission. In the circumstances, respondent is directed to verify the occupancy register and accounts maintained by the petitioner and based on the same grant vacancy remission for any floor of the building, if the same remained vacant for any half year or full year till date. However, so far as claim for vacancy remission for future is concerned, petitioner is directed to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 239(3)(a) of the Act that is furnishing of advance intimation.
O.P. is disposed of as above.