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Molayakkarukath Puthiyapurayil Mammoo and ors. Vs. Chulliyodan Paduvan Velappil Abdu and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectConstitution
CourtKerala High Court
Decided On
Case NumberO.P. No. 5170 of 1990-M
Judge
Reported in1991CriLJ2531
ActsKerala Police Act, 1961 - Sections 27; ;Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 151 - Order 39, Rule 2A; ;Constitution of India - Article 226
AppellantMolayakkarukath Puthiyapurayil Mammoo and ors.
RespondentChulliyodan Paduvan Velappil Abdu and ors.
Appellant Advocate M.A. Manhu, Adv.
Respondent Advocate R. Rajasekharan Pillai, Adv. (for Nos. 1 to 4) and; A.N. Rajan Babu, Govt. Pleader (for No. 5)
Cases ReferredD.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar
Excerpt:
.....did not exercise his power erroneously in passing ext. if that be so interference from respondents 1 to 4 are clearly illegal and the interim order of the munsiff's court will have to be enforced. p4 from time to time the petitioners legitimate right to get the appropriate order in the munsiff's court will also be defeated......erroneously in passing ext. p4 order.4. but it is seen that the order ext. p4 is extended from time to time. such an order passed under section 27 is temporary in nature and is intended to prevent or suppress riot or grave disturbance of the peace. that order cannot be extended from time to time mechanically without adverting to the necessity for the same for preventing grave disturbance of peace. the supreme court has considered the vice of issuing repeated ordinance in d.c. wadhwa v. state of bihar, 1987 (1) scc 378 : (air 1987 sc 579) and it was held that the ordinance cannot be repromulgated successively. therefore, if the magistrate extends the order from time to time without notice and without examining the question whether facts cry for an extension, the continuance of the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

K.A. Nayar, J.

1. The original petition is filed for a direction to respondents 5 and 6 to afford protection to the lives of the petitioners and the properties of Ainul Huda Madrassa of Padappengad Muslim Jumath from the threat of respondents 1 to 4 and also to quash Ext. P4 order of the District Collector, Cannanore passed Under Section 27 of the Kerala Police Act. The petitioners are the President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Jumath Committee. The said committee was unanimously elected according to the petitioner on 21-3-1990 and they took charge on 1-4-1990. The committee is constituted under the bye-law of the society. It runs a Madrassa and is also incharge of administration of the Society. I am concerned with this petition only the Madrassa and its administration. According to the petitioner for the past several years the Madrassa was following the syllabus prescribed by Samastha Kerala Muslim Vidyabyasa Board and the Madrassa was teaching its students syllabus prescribed by the Board. While so on 14-5-1990 respondents 1 to 4 and their men trespassed into the Madrassa and intimidated the teachers appointed by the petitioners and obstructed them from teaching. At that time, on the basis of the petitioner's complaint to the police, the police called the respondents 1 to 4 and their men and warned them not to enter in the building or trespass into the property. On a second occasion on 28-5-1990 respondents 1 to 4 tried to trespass the property but there was no trouble caused and no further report has been made to the police. But stating that respondents 1 to 4 and their men are indulging in illegal activities and committing trespass the petitioners approached the Munsiff's Court, Thaliparamba by way of O.S. 131/1990 to restrain respondents 1 to 4 and their men from entering into the property and trespassing to create trouble to the petitioners in running the Madrassa. There was an interim application, I.A. 960/ 1990 for temporary injunction against respondents from trespassing into the property. That was ordered on 2-6-1990 by the Munsiff's Court. This matter was reported to the police as well. In violation of the injunction order respondents 1 to 4 trespassed into the Madrassa and assaulted the members of the teaching staff. That was on 4-6-1990. The petitioner immediately reported the matter to the 5th respondent and sought police protection. Ext.P3 is the request for police protection. The police also registered a crime against respondents 1 to 4. Thus it will be seen that whenever the matter was brought to the notice to the police officers action was taken by the police officers on the specific incident reported to them. But that was not sufficient. By Ext. P3 the petitioner wanted to extend police protection to see that the injunction order of the Munsiff's Court is not violated. Petitioner also requested to prevent unlawful obstruction caused by respondents 1 to 4 and their men. Since it is found that there is a fight between two factions popularly known as E.K. Aboobacker Musaliar Group and A.P. Aboobacker Musaliar Group, the police wanted proper safeguard in the matter. A police picket is posted near the Madrassa to prevent breach of peace. That was subsequent to 4-6-1990 when there was an open clash using bricks, sticks etc. by the two factions. The situation became worse subsequent to the above incident as stated in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents No. 5. It is stated that any attempt by any group to open the Madrassa will lead to violent clashes and grave disturbance of the peace at Padappengad. If the Madrassa is left in the hands of any group there is likelihood of grave disturbance of the public peace. Hence the District Magistrate will have to be approached. It is thereafter the District Magistrate passed an order Under Section 27 of the Kerala Police Act. In the order of the District Magistrate dated 8-8-1990 it is stated that he is satisfied from the report of the Superintendent of Police, Cannanore dated 7-6-1990 that a grave disturbance of peace is likely to take place at Pedappengad in Kooveri village between persons belonging to two groups of Muslim Community falling within the Taliparamba Police Station limit and further in order to prevent disturbance and breach of peace, it is necessary to exclude all persons from and to prohibit entry to all persons to the said Madrassa. He passed an order Under Section 27 excluding all persons from the building and prohibiting entry to the said building for a period of 14 days from 8-6-1990. This was extended subsequently and still in operation and it is submitted by the Government Pleader that it is extended up to 16-8-1990. It is in the above circumstances the writ petition is filed for police protection.

2. The petitioners have already approached the Munsiff's Court by way of O.S. No. 131/1990 and interim injunction has been obtained and if the petitioners want protection to implement the said order it is for them to approach that court for appropriate relief under Order 39, Rule 2A and Section 151 of the Civil P.C. That court has adequate power to give protection and enforce its order with police aid if needed. The Division Bench of this Court held that the suit is an alternative remedy and another Division Bench of this Court also held in Kunhahammad Haji v. State of Kerala, 1990 Ker LT 930 that if the petitioner already availed an alternative remedy then the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution will not be available to him. Therefore having availed an alternative remedy the petitioner cannot avail remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence I decline jurisdiction to give direction to respondents 5 and 6 to enforce the interim order.

3. The next question is whether Ext. P4 is vitiated by any illegality or irregularity. Under Section 27 of the Act in order to prevent any grave disturbance of peace the District Magistrate can temporarily direct to close an establishment and also exclude any person on such terms and conditions as District Magistrate deems fit. The petitioner referred to the decision reported in N. Chellappan v. The District Collector and Additional Magistrate (Independent) Kozhikode, ILR 1970 (1) Ker 146 to show that the order is vitiated for improper exercise of power. But in that case there was no reason to apprehend any breach of peace. There was also no situation involving the likelihood of rioting or grave disturbance of peace existing at the dam-site warranting action being taken Under Section 27 of the Police Act. This Court said that :

'I have already found that on the materials which were available before the 1st respondent no person acting reasonably could arrive at the opinion that there was imminent likelihood of grave disturbance of the peace or rioting so as to necessitate action being taken Under Section 27 of the Act. This also lends further support to the inference that the main purpose of the order was not the prevention of rioting or disturbance to peace but to render the assistance requested for by the Superintending Engineer in his letters Ext. R-46 and R-47. It is well settled that an authority which is authorised by a statute to do an act for a specified purpose will not be permitted to use its powers for any different purpose and that if it attempts to do so the courts will interfere and set aside the action on the ground of its having been taken with an ulterior object not authorised by the statute. Even if the ulterior object appears to the authority to be desirable in the public interest; nevertheless, if the purpose is one not authorised by the particular statutory provision its action is unlawful. Hence, even if it be that the achievement of the purpose of facilitating the execution of the remaining work on the dam by the Board will serve the interests of the public at large, it is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of Section 27 of the Act but is, on the other hand, wholly alien and extraneous to it.'

Another decision referred to is Mustaffa v. State of Kerala (1987) 2 Ker LT 79 : (1988 Cri LJ 816). In that case scope of Section 27 of the Kerala Police Act was considered by this Court. This Court held (at p. 820 of 1988 Cri LJ) :

'The section vests the District Magistrate with a power whose exercise makes substantial inroads into rights of parties. It is intended to meet emergency situations of a grave nature. The very nature of the power delimits its user to be sparing and to cases of extreme emergency (Chellappan v. District Collector ILR 1970 (1) Ker 146). In fact even the assumption of possession is only to be temporary. The inference is obvious, that the dispossession, and disturbance of rights of parties, should be as temporary and limited as possible.'

In this case I am satisfied that the District Magistrate did not exercise his power erroneously in passing Ext. P4 order.

4. But it is seen that the order Ext. P4 is extended from time to time. Such an order passed Under Section 27 is temporary in nature and is intended to prevent or suppress riot or grave disturbance of the peace. That order cannot be extended from time to time mechanically without adverting to the necessity for the same for preventing grave disturbance of peace. The Supreme court has considered the vice of issuing repeated ordinance in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 1987 (1) SCC 378 : (AIR 1987 SC 579) and it was held that the ordinance cannot be repromulgated successively. Therefore, if the Magistrate extends the order from time to time without notice and without examining the question whether facts cry for an extension, the continuance of the order will be in mala fide exercise of power. If further extension is called for it is for the Magistrate to issue notice to the parties and to pass appropriate order after hearing the parties. The order passed Under Section 27 cannot be made as a permanent order by repetition.

5. The petitioner approached the police officers for police aid to enforce the interim order of the Munsiff's Court, Taliparamba. The Madrassa has to be run by the committee, the members of which in the present case were unanimously elected. Respondents 1 to 4 have no manner of right in the administration of the Madrassa according to the petitioner. Minorities whether based on religion or language have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The constitution has made courts as sentinel in the quivive for the protection of these fundamental rights. Counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 5th respondent stated that the followers of E.K. Aboobacker Musaliar have majority in the Mahal and that the petitioners belong to that group. It is also stated that in the election held on 21-3-1990 for electing office bearers of the governing body which controls the Madrassa and other religious property, the followers of E.K. Aboobacker Musaliar were elected. If that be so interference from respondents 1 to 4 are clearly illegal and the interim order of the Munsiff's Court will have to be enforced. The Executive Magistrate may be justified in passing Ext. P4 order to prevent breach of peace but an order of that nature cannot possibly be allowed by repetition to deny the benefit of an injunction order, permanently.

Therefore, I direct the District Magistrate to issue notice to the petitioners and respondents 1 to 4 and hear them before passing appropriate order regarding further extension of Ext. P4. If temporary orders are passed extending Ext. P4 from time to time the petitioners legitimate right to get the appropriate order in the Munsiff's Court will also be defeated. I also direct the respondents 5 to 7 to consider the question of extending police protection to the petitioner in the light of the observations contained in the judgment.

The Original Petition is disposed of as above.


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