Judgment:
Per Varghese Kalliath, J
1. This is an appeal by the insurance company against the award of compensation by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Kozhikode. By the impunged order, the Commissioner had awarded an amount of Rs. 21,600/-
2. Counsel appearing for the appellant, insurance company, did not canvass the correctness of the quantum of compensation awarded by the Commissioner. He submitted before us that the facts emerged in the case woulddisentitle the claimant for any compensation at all. He submitted that Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', has no application in this case. Further, he submitted that Section 3(2) of the Act read with Schedule III has no application in the case. The Commissioner has found that the facts revealed in the case would attract Section 3(1) of the Act. The case of the appellant before us that Section 3(2) read with Schedule III has no application of the Act seems to be correct. Wehave no hesitation to hold that the facts disclosed in the case would not attract Section 3(2) of the Act read with Schedule III. Now we shall briefly state the facts.
3. Admittedly, the deceased was the driver of the 2nd respondent. 1st respondent is the claimant, wife of the deceased. The deceased was driver for 7 years with the 2nd respondent. On the fatal day, he started for his work at 6 A.M. At that time, he was quite normal. He took the vehicle for plying it between Kozhikode and Theekoyi which is about 30 km. from Kozhikode. He developed symptoms of heart disease en route (in the course of his employment) at Perambra. He was hospitalised at Perambra. Then he was taken to Western Hospital at Calicut, where he died. These facts are admitted. The question is, whether these facts would be sufficient for attracting the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act. So, we feel that we must quote Section 3(1) of the Act.
'Section 3. Employer's liability for compensation.-(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter;
Provided that the employer shall not be so liable-
(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days;
(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to-
(i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or.
(ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or
(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device
which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen.'
4. Counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the section is not attracted since there is no personal injury caused to the workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, Certainly, the illness showed fatal symptoms during the course of his employment. The question is whether there was any personal injury caused to the workman by accident. How this provision has to be construed has been clearly stated by a Division Bench of this court in Devshi Bhanji Khona v. Mary Burno, (1984-II-LLJ-70). where it was observed thus (p.71):
'The object behind the legislation being protection to the weaker section with a view to do social justice, the provisions of the Act have to be interpreted liberally so that other things being equal, the leaning of the court has to be towards the person for whose benefit the legislation is made. Bearing this principle in mind, the expression 'accident' found in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act has to be understood as meaning a mishap or untoward event, not expected or designed. In other words, the basic and indispensable ingredient of the accident is the unexpectation. In this case, the workman who was already suffering from heart disease, as disclosed by the oral evidence of the co-worker of the 1st respondent's husband and Ext. WI. Medical Certificate, when he was subjected to over-exertion, there was a sudden deterioration of his health which proved to be fatal. But for this over-exertion, which he was not able to bear in the state of health in which he was then, the death, following his fall while carrying the cashew boxes, would not have occurred. In this way, there is a causal connection between the employment and his death in the unexpected way. This could certainly be considered to be an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, which would entitle the dependent legal heir to claim compensation'.
5. From what we have quoted above, it is clear that the 'accident' found in Sub-section (1) of Section3 has to be understood as meaning a mishap or untoward event not expected or designed. Certainly, in this case, the mishap the untoward event-happened in the course of the employment of the deceased at Perambra. As we said earlier, the symptoms of heart attack were seen and the deceased was taken to the hospital and finally he succumbed to death. Counsel submitted that these circumstances will not be sufficient to say that there was a personal injury which is one of the necessary desiderata of Section 3(1) of the Act. We do not agree. An almost similar case was considered by a Division Bench of this court in Executive Engineer v. Janaki. 1978 KLT 897. Narayana Pillai. J. speaking for the Division Bench, observed thus;
'The principles applicable to cases of the instant type are by now well established. Compensation can be awarded only if the accident arose in the course of and out of the employment of the workman and those conditions refer to the lime when the accident happened and the causal connection betweenthe employment and the death. If the workman actually got ill in the course of and on account of the employment and he died as a result of it then there is no scope for a controversy at all'.
6. Here, in this case, there is no scope for a controversy that the workman actually got ill in the course of his employment. Of course, his illness was not an external injury, but it was a serious injury to the heart. The strenuous driving of the vehicle from Kozhikode to Perambra accelerated his illness and that resulted in the death of the claimant's husband. We feel that the object of the section is to give protection to the helpless dependants of such workers and taking a pragmatic and meaningful construction of the section, we feel that the Commissioner has rightly applied the decision reported in Executive Engineer v. Janaki. (supra) The decision rendered by the Commissioner is proper and legal. We see no error of law involved in this appeal. This appeal deserves to be dismissed and we do so. No order as to costs.