Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. Petitioners challenge Ext.P2 by which the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal decided that a revision filed fey the writ petitioners and three others invoking Section 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), was highly belated. The revision was accordingly dismissed by the Tribunal, as not maintainable, in view of the inordinate delay.
2. Ext.P1 award for realisation of amounts awarded thereby was passed on 28-10-1997, by the Arbitrator under Section 70 of the Act. The revision under Section 84 of the Act was filed on 23-8-1999, more than one year and nine months after the award was passed.
3. The Tribunal held that though Section 84 of the Act does not prescribe any time limit for filing a revision, there cannot be any unreasonable delay in doing so. In arriving at its conclusion as stated above, the Tribunal relied on the decision of this Court in Narayanan v. Rent Controller (1988 (2) KLT 74) and the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Moideen Koya v. Kunhammed Haji (1999 (2) KLT 646).
4. Section 81 of the Act provides for constitution of the Tribunal and Section 82 provides for appeals to the Tribunal. Section 84 provides for a revision by the Tribunal to enable it to call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lies to it. Section 84, thus, provides for a revision against an order which could have been appealed against under Section 82.
5. However, the proviso to Section 84 enjoins that the Tribunal shall not take any action until the time for appeal has expired. It further creates an embargo against revision of a decision or order that, had been made the subject-matter of an appeal. Sub-section (1) of Section 82 provides that the appeal shall be filed within a period of 60 days. This means that any revision against an order which could have been appealed under Section 82, cannot be dealt with by the Tribunal until the expiry of 60 days, the period fixed for filing the appeal.
6. The short question that arises, thus, is as to whether, in the absence of a provision in Section 84 prescribing a period of limitation, did the Tribunal act within jurisdiction in passing Ext.P2 order holding that the revision is belated.
7. In Padmanabha Pillai v. Narayana Pillai (1969 KLJ 614), it was noticed by this Court that litigation can become a long-acting torment, if an order can be challenged years later on the pretext that there is no period of limitation fixed in the Statute. This Court, even in the absence of a legislative prescription as to a period of limitation, stated that it is certainly open to a re visional authority to decline to exercise its discretion when a party moves for relief after a period of indiscreet delay.
8. Revision is a discretionary remedy and in all cases, such discretionary jurisdiction has to be exercised subject to consideration of various matters, including of delay on the part of an applicant (see Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath, ILR 7 Bombay 831). Following the aforesaid principles and the views of this Court in Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd. (1957 KLT 411) and Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 817), this Court held in Narayanan's case (supra) that revisional jurisdiction ought not to be permitted to be invoked after a fairly long period until good reasons are shown to excuse such delay.
9. Even assuming that a period of 90 days is normally treated as a reasonable period for the revisional jurisdiction to be invoked following the aforesaid decision in Narayanan's case (supra) and adding on to it the period of 60 days prescribed for an appeal under Section 82, in all reasonableness the revision petition leading to Ext.P2 order ought to have been filed at least within five months of Ext.P1 award since, as rightly noticed by the Tribunal, the petitioners did not seek any exclusion of time on a ground that the copy of the award was obtained only later on. In such circumstances, the issuance of Ext.P2 order by which the Tribunal refused to entertain the revision filed more than one year and nine months, cannot be treated as unreasonable or arbitrary.
This Original Petition, therefore, fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.