Judgment:
K. Narayana Kurup, J.
1. The plaintiff who is the nominee of one Narayanan Nambiar who was holding an L.I.C. policy for a sum of Rs. 10,000 is the appellant in this second appeal. The said Narayanan Nambiar committed suicide on 13.1.1991, admittedly within one year from the date of the policy. After the death of the policy holder, the plaintiff made a request for the dis-bursal of the amount claimed under the policy which was rejected invoking Clause (6) of the conditions of policy under which the policy shall be void if the assured commits suicide before the expiry of one year from the date of the policy. Thereafter, the suit was laid to recover the money covered by the policy. The defendant filed a written statement contending, inter alia, that under Clause (6) of the conditions of policy document, the policy shall be void if the assured commits suicide before the expiry of one year from the date of the policy. The trial court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, found that the policy-holder committed suicide on 13.1.1991, admittedly within one year of the date of the policy and in that view, the nominee under the policy is not entitled to put forward the claim in view of the said Clause. The said decision was confirmed in appeal and hence, this second appeal.
2. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that Clause (6) of the conditions of the policy is penal and, therefore, the same cannot be invoked against the nominee. I cannot agree. On the other hand, I am of the view that the said clause is perfectly valid and binding on the policy-holder. The policyholder entered into the transaction knowing fully well that the policy is subject to the conditions and privileges contained in the policy document including Clause (6) thereof under which the policy shall be void if the assured commits suicide before the expiry of one year from the date of the policy. Having accepted the policy with eyes wide open, it is not open for the nominee of the policyholder to turn round and say that the policy is penal. The policyholder having committed suicide admittedly within one year from the date of the policy, the whole policy ipso facto becomes void and unenforceable. Any other construction will go against public policy under which no man shall be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and this rule is' expressed in the maxim 'ex turpi causa non oritur actio', that is, no cause of action arises out of a wrong. The general rule is that the legal representative(s) of the assured can recover on a life policy of the assured on the latter's death. To this general rule, two exceptions have been recognised, viz.: (i) where death of the assured is caused due to the violation of a rule of criminal law by the assured himself; and (ii) where death is the result of the suicide. Murder will come within the scope of the first exception. On principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the law lays down that a murderer cannot inherit the property of the murdered person and to hold otherwise, it would be allowing a person to take advantage of his own wrong. As a sequel to this principle, it has been observed by Lord Atkin in Beresford v. Royal Assurance Co., 1935 AC 586 at 595, that death caused by wilful misconduct of the assured himself debars the personal representatives from recovering on the assured's life policy. The wilful misconduct of the assured has always been treated as an implied exception in a policy not only in life insurance but in other branches also. For example, in the case of fire insurance where the fire is caused by wilful misconduct of the assured, he is debarred from recovering on the policy. Similarly, where a person takes a life insurance on the life of another and later kills him neither he nor any person claiming under such assured is entitled to recover under the policy either on the ground that there is an implied exception or it is against public policy. The point is well illustrated in Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 1957 Alabama 100 So 2D 696, where a registered nurse effected three policies from three different companies on the life of her niece who was two years old without the knowledge of the parents of the life assured. Later, the nurse killed the child by administering arsenic for which she was prosecuted and convicted for murder. Applying the rule of implied exception and public policy, it was held that the nurse is debarred from recovering on the policy. However, the insurance companies were held liable to pay damages to the parents of the child for their negligence in issuing policies to one who had no interest in the life assured. Again, if the insured violates the law or commits an act punishable with capital offence and if he is sentenced to death, he is said to have brought death on himself and the rule of public policy that no one can make a profit out of his own wrongful or culpable conduct comes into play and debars the assured or his representatives to recover under the policy. In Amicable Insurance Society v. Bolland, (1830) 4 Bligh NS 194 HL, where a person is sentenced to death for committing the murder of another person and loses his life in execution of the sentence, it was held that all persons on whom the right to recover devolves by operation of law and who claim through such a convict are debarred from claiming under the policy. Applying the same analogy it has to be held that when the assured commits suicide the claims under the policy become unenforceable as it would be contrary to public policy to insure a man to benefit upon his death, by the hands of justice. When the event insured against happens due to the wilful and wrongful acts of the assured or his agent, the theory of implied term comes into operation absolving the insurer from liability. Thus, an ordinary life policy may cover the risk of the assured being murdered by third parties and on similar grounds the commission of suicide by the insured while insane should not imply an exception to the risk. The reason is obvious. When a person is insane, in the sense that he does not know the nature of his act, or when he is acting under an irresistible impulse, it is an act, though done by him apparently, which is not one done by him when he is within himself and such an act is not culpable and cannot come within the exception based on the rule that no one can benefit himself out of his own wrong. However, it has to be made clear that this general principle will not apply in a case where death by suicide occurs after the expiry of one year from the date of the policy. In the present case the language of Clause (6) of the policy is clear and admits of no ambiguity. When the intention of the parties was embodied in a written instrument the language of that instrument was evidently the final evidence of the intention. However, I shall not be understood to have expressed anything on the question whether a policy of insurance which contains an agreement to pay the sum insured, even though the assured commits suicide while sane, must be considered as an agreement opposed to public policy, within the meaning of Section 23 of Indian Contract Act and the insurer should not be made liable.
3. In the aforesaid view, the trial court was justified in dismissing the suit and the lower appellate court rightly confirmed the said decision. I find no valid ground to interfere with the concurrent findings entered by the courts below. Accordingly, this second appeal is dismissed in limine.