Sivaraman Nair, J.
1. The appellant had filed an application under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, claiming an amount of Rs. 5000/- as compensation for amputation of three fingers of his left palm, as a result of injuries which he sustained in an accident on 13.9.1982 when he was working under the respondent. The accident occurred when he was removing veneers from the peeling machine.
2. It was the applicant's case that he was a workman under the respondent and that the accident resulting in injuries to him occurred during the course and out of employment and that the respondent was bound to compensate him for the injury. In his sworn statement, he had stated that he was working as a regular employee in a match factory owned by the respondent and that it was during the course of and out of the employment that the accident occurred, which resulted in injuries to him. The respondent-employer filed a written statement contending that the employment of the applicant was purely casual, that he was engaged only when the regular employee working in the establishment was absent, that he was not employed in the peeling machine and that the accident occurred due to the fact that the applicant meddled with the machine without any knowledge of its working and contrary to the instructions of the management. He claimed that the industrial unit was started only on 6.9.1982. He therefore refuted the claim of the applicant that he was employed by the respondent for over nine months. It was also his case, that he had maintained wage-registers under the Minimum Wages Act, Rules and Notifications. It was his further case that the applicant was not entitled to any compensation, because he was not a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Act and could not, therefore, sustain the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. He submitted further that the accident did not arise out of employment or in the course of employment since the applicant transgressed the specific directions issued by him.
3. The appellant examined himself as A.W-1, a co-worker eye-witness as A.W.3 and the doctor who made entries in the accident register A2 and issued Ext. A1 disability certificate, as A.W.2. The respondent examined himself and his manager as M.Ws. 1 and 2 and proved the muster roll and register of wages for his factory for the period from 6.9.1982 to 30.9.1983.
4. The Commissioner accepted the case of the respondent that there was no proof that the applicant was employed otherwise than as a casual workman in the establishment, that he had no expert knowledge or techinical qualification necessary for operating a peeling machine and that if at all, he was engaged only as a casual workman in the cutting machine on occasions when regular cutter Shri Vasudevan was not available. He therefore found that the applicant was not a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Act, that the accident did not arise out of the employment and therefore dismissed the application. The applicant appeals that decision.
5. The point of law which counsel for the appellant Shri Chitambaresh has formulated is as to whether the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was right in his conclusion, that the applicant-appellant was not a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
6. Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act is in the following terms:
'' 'Workman'' means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is,-
(i) a railway servant as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890) not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or
(ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II,
Whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead includes a reference to his dependents or any of them.''
A person whose employment is of casual nature and who is also employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business is taken out of the definition of workman. Thesetwo conditions are cumulative and conjunctive. It was so held in Sitharama v. Ayyaswami, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 212. Ramaswami J., had considered in elaborate detail all the decisions that far having a bearing on this question. He had also referred to a number of dictionaries to arrive at the correct meaning so as to understand the real scope of the definition. We arc in respectful agreement with the finding, that 'a person to be excluded from the definition of 'workman' as defined in the clause must not only be one ''whose employment is of a casual nature' but also one 'who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business'. Both these qualifications must be satisfied in order to exclude a person from the category of workman under the Act.'
7. The Commissioner proceeded on the assumption that once it was shown that the employment of a person is of a casual nature he would be excluded from the definition. We have to hold that if he is otherwise a workman he can be taken out of the definition of that term only if his employment is of a casual nature and he is one employed otherwise than for the purpose of employer's trade or business. This view found favour with a Division Bench of this Court in Kochu Velu v. Joseph, 1980 KLT 191-1980(2) LLJ 220. Subramonian Poti, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Bench, considered Sitharama (supra) and a host of other decisions subsequent thereto on the very same que- stion and held that unless these -two circumstances are present cumulatively, a person who is otherwise a workman may not cease to be a workman because of the exclusion contained in Section 2(n) of the Act. Another Division Bench of this court in Kochappan v. Krishnan, 1987 (1) KLT 86, also held that
'It is only when both the ingredients are together present, does the exclusion operate. If the person was employed for the purposes of the employer's trade or business, he would be a workman even if his employment was of a casual nature. Likewise if the employment was of a regular nature,the person concerned would be a workmaneven if he was not employed for purpose oftrade or business. In other words, a person can be excluded from the definition of 'workman' only if his employment was at onceof a casual nature and otherwise than for thepurposes of the employer's trade or business'.
8. We have to note that the respondent had no case before the Commissioner that the applicant was not employed for the purpose of his trade or business. In fact, he pleaded just the other way. His only defence was that his employment being only casual, the applicant was not a workman and therefore not entitled to claim compensation. In the light of the decision in Sitharama, Kochu Velu and Kochappan (supra) we have to hold that the Commissioner committed an error of law in considering that the applicant was not a workman.
9. The specific case of the respondent-employer in his written statement before the Commissioner was that only when the regular cutter working in the opposite party's establishment was absent, the applicant was given the work of a cutter. His employment was purely casual and his services were utilised only on very rare occasion and that too in an absolutely casual nature. These averments are inconsistent with his claim that the establishment had started only on 6.9.1982 and the only occasion when the applicant was engaged was on 13.9.1982. He produced Exts. M1 and M2, the muster-roll and wages register, which he claimed he was maintaining under the relevant Act and the Notifications to prove that neither the applicant nor his witness, M.W.3, Sobana were employees of his establishment. This case was accepted on the assumption that Exts. Ml and M2 were regularly kept in compliance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. It is curious that in both the registers the names of the regular cutter Vasudevan and the Foreman are not present at all. Nor is the register of wages properly filled up. It does not contain the name of the establishment, name of the father or husband of the concerned workmen, their designation or the Minimum Wages payable to the employees. The entry relating to rates of wages actually paid is filled up by stating piece work. The dearness allowance payable to all workmen is stated to be Rs. 2/-. Ext. M2 register was never produced before any statutory authority. We are not in a position to hold that the Commissioner was right in accepting Exts. Ml and M2 as establishing the respondent's case that the applicant was not a workman under the respondent for the only reason that his name was not mentioned in either of the two registers. It is of course true, that the respondent attempted an explanation, that the cutter Vasudevan was a member of the staff and that his name as also of the foreman are included in a separate register kept for them. We cannot resist the impression that the respondent-employer was holding something back. He could easily have produced the staff register relating to Minimum Wages. He could at least have examined the regular cutter Vasudevan or the foreman to prove his case that the applicant was not a workman, that only techinically qualified or experienced personnel were employed in the peeling machine and that there were definite instructions disabling the applicant from working in the peeling machine. The Commissioner drew inferences in favour of the respondent in spite of the fact that he, who was admittedly in possession of the necessary documents, refused to produce them in court.
10. We have to bear in mind that the (Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial social legislation which was enacted to supply the need to provide compensation to workmen sustaining employment in juries. A strict and ritualistic adherence to the procedural formalities of a trial is neither necessary nor desirable in deciding the question of entitlement of the injured employees for compensation. Nor are the Commissioners who administer that legislation qualified or competent to conduct a formal trial. A more realistic and less formal approach is called for from authorities functioning under this beneficial enactment. They shall not pretend themselves to be courts and try to discover ways to defeat the very purpose of the enactment by adopting a totally negative approach to the claims which the disabled workmen advance before them. Many of the provisions of the statute point out to this need for absence of rigidity on the part of the Commissioner in dealing with claims for compensation. The need for such relaxation was emphasised in various decisions of this Court. We need cite only two of the decisions: In Mohammed Koya v. Balan 1987 I C.L.R.96, A Division Bench of this court held, that the requirement of a notice under Section 10 of the Act to the employer shall not be a reason for a rigid interpretation and that want of notice or any defect or irregularity in notice shall not bar entertainment of a claim if the employer had knowledge of the accident. In Pushpam v. Bonami Estatel 988 (l) KLT 777, It was held, that'
' It is true, that Section 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act confers all the powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, for purposes of taking evidence on oath and the enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling production of documents and material objects. That provision, however, does not constitute the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner as a 'court' for all purposes. Nor does that provision have the effect of disabling the Commissioner from exercising such powers as to further the beneficial objects of that enactment. No provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act disabled an authority like the Commissioner from rectifying an apparent error in the application submitted by an illiterate applicant, where claim for compensation was denied by the employer.''
11. We hold that the Commissioner who was administering a beneficial legislation meant to advance the cause of employees for compensation in respect of employment injuries was obliged to act in furtherance of the intention of the statute and not to stultify the same by rigid and mechanical approaches. If the claimant before him was a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Act, he should have seen to it that the workman receives the compensation. It is unfortunate that he embroiled himself in a highly technical debate which would enable him to exclude the applicant from the purview of the definition adopting an artificiality which was contrary to the terms of the statute as understood by this court in Kochu Velu, 1980 KLT 191: 1980 (2) LLJ 220. The inconsistencies in the plea and the evidence of the employer, his refusal to produce relevant evidence and the total unreliable nature of the evidence consisting of Exts. M1 and M2 which he produced should have alerted the Commissioner to be wary in accepting the defence of the employer. In the light of the decided cases, which we have referred to, we have no hesitation in holding that the claimant was a workman since he was employed in connection with the trade or business of the employer, though such employment was casual in nature. We hold further that the material evidence relating to his employment was deliberately kept back by the employer. We hold that the Commissioner should have drawn inferences adverse to the employer from the above conduct.
12. Counsel for the respondent-employer pleaded for an opportunity to produce relevant documents before the Commissioner. He sought a remand of the matter to the Commissioner for that purpose. The deficiencies in Exts. M1 and M2 were brought to the notice of the respondent at the time of his examination on 1.8.1983. Pointed notice of MW-2 was also drawn to those defects during the course of his examination which commenced on the same day. No attempt was made so far to produce the relevant document or at least to acknowledge the existence of such documents for the past over six years. We are therefore not satisfied that there is any need or justification to remit the matter for reconsideration.
13. In view of this finding that the applicant was not a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Act, the Commissioner had not decided on the question of wages due to the applicant. He had also not worked out the compensation on that basis. In view of the fact that the proceedings should be unduly protracted we do not propose to remit the matter for reconsideration by the Commissioner. The claim of the applicant was that he was receiving a montly remuneration of Rs. 200/-. The extent of disability certified in Ext. A1 was 20%. It may, perhaps be that the workman may be entitled to a larger amount of compensation if this question was reconsidered by the Commissioner. But in view of the fact that the proceedings were pending for a long time before the Commissioner and again in this court, we do not think that it is desirable or necesasry to remit the matter for such reconsideration.
We therefore allow the appeal as also the application to the extent of awarding compensation of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant. This will naturally bear interest at the rate of 10% from the date on which the application was filed. The appellant will get his costs from the respondent.