Judgment:
Usha, J.
1. An Advocate practicing in the Thrissur Bar is the petitioner herein. He was appointed as Additional Government Pleader and Additional Public Prosecutor, Thrissur for a period of three years under Government order dated October 7, 1991. The challenge in this original petition is against termination of his service as Addl. Government Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor, Thrissur before the expiry of the term of appointment.
2. Ext. P1 order of appointment would show that the appointment was subject to the terms and conditions provided under the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978. Rule 9 of the above Rules provides that the term of appointment of a person appointed as Addl. Government Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor shall be for a period of three years. But Rule 17 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules, the Government may terminate the appointment of any Government Law Officer, other than a Special Government Pleader or Special Public Prosecutor, at any time before the expiry of the term of his appointment without assigning any reasons therefor: Provided that such termination shall not be effected unless one month's notice in writing has been given to him. It is by invoking the above provision under the rules, the service of the petitioner was terminated under Ext. P3 order dated May 23, 1992. Instead of giving one month's notice, an amount of Rs. 270/- was offered as monthly salary.
3. The petitioner attacks Ext. P3 on different grounds. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212) and that of this Court in Mohammed Ashraff v. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 818), the petitioner contends that he holds an office or a post under the State Government, that termination of his services was vitiated by arbitrariness and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, that the decision taken to terminate his service was on the basis of the extraneous considerations and therefore mala fide, that the order of termination was passed in clear violation of principles of natural justice and that the action impugned in this original petition is amenable to judicial review. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the reason behind the decision to terminate his service as Addl. Government Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor was that his name was seen included in an F.I.R. prepared in connection with Crime No. 199/92 registered by the Thrissur East Police Station. It is alleged in the original petition that six petty traders in Sakthan Thampuran Market within the Thrissur Municipality had filed civil suits through petitioner's junior Sri. Sunil Jose, Advocate against the Thrissur Municipality seeking orders of injunction not to demolish the temporary trade shelters put up by the plaintiffs. Interim order of injunction restraining the Municipality from demolishing the structures was also obtained. Separate Advocate Commissioners were appointed in the suits to inspect the spot and to file reports as to whether there were any temporary sheds in existence at the time of the order of injunction. It is further alleged that the Municipal Councillors along with certain other persons attempted to pull down the sheds on May 4, 1992 in violation of the order of injunction. The attempt of the Chairman and the Councillors was resisted by the plaintiffs. Large number of persons including six Advocate Commissioners and the counsel of the plaintiffs were present at the spot when the alleged incident happened. Crime No. 199/92 was registered in connection with the above incident. In the F.I.R. one Lazar is shown as the first accused who is alleged to have committed assault of Mr. K.V. Balan, Ex. Municipal Chairman and present Councillor. The petitioner shown as the secondaccused is alleged to have restrained Sri. K.V.Balan. The other accused are abettors to thecrime. According to the petitioner, he was noteven present at the place of incident at therelevant time. Further allegation in the originalpetition is that the Municipal Council of Thrissur had a grouse against the petitioner as he hadoccasion to appear in many cases against theMunicipality in his professional capacity. Apartfrom the above the Council had a feeling that itwas the petitioner who was behind the order ofinjunction obtained by six petty traders againstthe Municipality. Therefore with an intention toimplicate the petitioner also in the incidentwhich happened on May 4, 1992, they passed aresolution on the same day requesting ChiefMinister as well as Law Minister of the State totake stringent action against the petitioner alleging that it was the petitioner who gave instructions and guidance for the incident which led tostabbing of Sri. K.V. Balan, Ex. MunicipalChairman and present Councillor. A copy of theresolution has been produced as Ext. P4 alongwith the reply affidavit.
4. A copy of the above mentioned resolution was sent by the Municipal Chairman to the Secretary, Kerala Bar Council as also to the Secretary, Bar Association, Thrissur requesting them to take suitable action against the petitioner as there is 'clean violation of the ethics of the profession of an Advocate.' A copy of the above letter dated May 4, 1992 is produced as Ext. P4(a). The petitioner submits that the request of the Municipal Council was rejected by the Thrissur Bar Association at its meeting held on May 14, 1992. Ext. P5 is alleged to be copy of the Resolution passed by the Bar Association unanimously on May 14, 1992. While rejecting the request made by the Municipal Chairman to take action against the petitioner, the Association made a request to the Government and other authorities to withdraw the case registered against the petitioner and to stop harassment of the members of petitioner's family by the police. Association expressed its protest against the alleged action of the Municipal Council and authorities insulting six Advocate Commissioners who had gone to the place of incident pursuant to direction issued by the court. It also authorised the Managing Committee to take both civil and criminal actions against the Municipal Council and authorities who were connected with the above mentioned incident.
5. The petitioner has alleged mala fides also against the respondent in terminating his services. It is stated in the original petition that the petitioner is a sympathiser of the political party, the Kerala Congress (M). According to him the above political party is not in cordial terms with another political party Congress (I) in the Thrissur town. He alleges that the Legal Advisor of the Thrissur Municipality Sri. Therampil Ramakrishnan, an M.L.A. belonging to Congress (I) has been responsible for the Municipal Council passing a Resolution on May 4, 1992, implicating the petitioner. It is to be noted at this juncture that neither Sri. Therampil Ramakrishnan nor the Municipal Council has been made a party in this original petition. It may not be therefore possible for this court to consider the justifiability of petitioner's allegation in the absence of the persons against whom the allegations are made on the party array.
5A. It is averred in the original petition and also submitted at the time of hearing on behalf of the petitioner that the mere mention of petitioner's name in the F.I.R. cannot be a reason for terminating his service. In ground 'D' of original petition, it has been stated as follows:-
'No charge sheet has been filed by the police and no charge is framed by the court against the petitioner. It may be mentioned herein that there are several instances of high positioned people continuing in the office inspite of they being made accused in Criminal cases. One of such examples is that of Minister Shri. Balakrisnha Pillai, who is an accused in two pending criminal cases. There is no bar for continuing in office as there is only allegation of commission of an offence under the Indian Penal Code.'
The learned counsel relied on the following decision of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that a mere reference of petitioner's name in the FIR cannot draw an inference against the petitioner. In Hasib v. State of Bihar (AIR 1972 SC 283) and in Shanker v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 851), it has been held that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence though it is important as conveying the earliest information about the occurrence. It can be used only as a previous statement for the purpose contemplated under Section 157 or Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that too for corroborating or contradicting its maker and not other witnesses.
6. In Kunhaman v. State of Kerala 1974 KLT 328, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows, regarding the evidentiary value of a First Information Statement:
'The first information statement is not a piece of substantive evidence. It is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth or falsity of the facts mentioned and omitted to be mentioned in it. The only use to which it can be put is corroboration under Section 157 or contradiction under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. For those purposes it can be used only for or against the witness who gave that statement because it is a prior statement only so far as he is concerned. It cannot be used against other witnesses.'
This Court relied on the decision in Sheikh Hasib (alias) Tabarak v. State of Bihar (1971 (II) SCWR 446). Same view was taken in the later decision of the Supreme Court in Nanhku Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1973 SC 491).
7. Can the Government take disciplinary action against its employee only on the ground that his name finds a place among the accused in a First Information Report? In R.P. Kapur v. Pratap Singh Kairon (1964 (1) Crl. L.J. 244) a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court while considering the argument that no disciplinary proceedings can be commenced against a Government servant for any act in respect of a First Information Report under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed as follows:-
'....We are convinced that in most cases it would be proper and reasonable for Government to await the result of police investigation and where the investigation is followed by an inquiry or trial, the result of such inquiry or trial, before deciding to take any disciplinary action against any of its servants. It would be proper and reasonable also, generally, for Government not to take action against a Government servant when on investigation by the police, it is found that no prima facie case has been made out. Even though this appears to be a reasonable course which we have no doubt is and will ordinarily be followed by Government, we are unable to see any legal bar to the Government ordering a departmental enquiry even in a case where a first information report under Section 154 having been lodged an investigation will follow.'
The above observation would show that it is open to the Government to order a departmental enquiry even on the basis of a reference of the employee's name in the first information report. But termination of the service of an employee merely on the ground that his name was included in the first information report without even an enquiry cannot in any manner be justified in view of the observation of the Supreme Court that it would be proper and reasonable for the Government to await the result of the investigation even to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
8. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the nature of the post of Public Prosecutors and took the following view:-
'.....This power of the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case is derived from statute and the guiding consideration for it must be the interest of administration of justice. There can be no doubt that this function of the Public Prosecutor relates to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so acting only in the interest of administration of justice. In the case of Public Prosecutors, this additional public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly, invests the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holder of a Public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it.'
9. It was further held that termination of the services of the Public Prosecutors has to satisfy the test of Article 14 even though the appointment stems from a contract. In paragraph 28 it was observed as follows: -
'.....Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Article 14 and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14.'
10. How arbitrariness would vitiate State action even in the field of contract was dealt with in para.35 as follows:-
'35. It is now too well-settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basis to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic lest in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind.'
In Mohammed Ashraff's case (supra), this Court held that even if reasons are not assigned in the order of termination of services issued under Rule 17 of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Services) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978, cogent reasons should exist behind the decision taken to terminate the services. The impugned order Ext. P3 does not give any reason whatsoever. Certain reasons are given in the counter affidavit. The relevant portion in the counter affidavit reads as follows:-
'4. The petitioner himself admits that he is the 2nd accused in Crime No. 199/92 of the Trichur Town East Police Station. The T.P. Message dated May 16, 1992 of the District Collector, Trichur clearly discloses that the petitioner is actively involved in the incident in question which ensued in registering the aforesaid crime under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 324, 307 and 149 of I.P.C. and that he absconded after the incident. The averment that he was not present on the spot or he has no complicity in the matter is highly incredible.
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6. Ext. P3 order of termination was issued on May 23, 1992 under Rule 17 of the Rules. This order is strictly in compliance with the above provision and the decision reported in 1991 (2) KLT 818.
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7. As per Rule 8(2) (ii) of the Rules it is mandatory that the character, antecedents, integrity, reliability and reputation of the persons included in the panel of the District Collector for the appointment of Government Pleaders are to be fit to commensurate to the post. It is expected from a Government Pleader that his integrity, reliability, reputation etc. are to be retained throughout the term of his appointment. The report of the District Collector, Trichur disclosed that the petitioner was actively involved in an incident which culminated in registering a crime case against him as 2nd accused and that he had absconded since the commission of the offence. Never before had the conduct of a Government Pleader created an occasion to register a crime case against him. The petitioner's conduct created a slur on this esteemed and noble institution. Needless to say the continuation of such a person as Government Pleader would be an indelible scar on an institution which upholds dignity, decency, a high standard of morality and reputation. Hence the Government thought it highly improper to retain him in service. It is on this background that his services were terminated.
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9. Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules are not applicable in the case of the petitioner. The petitioner's terms and conditions are governed by the Rules mentioned hereinbefore and his services were terminated in accordance with these Rules. As stated earlier the Government Pleaders are expected to keep up their integrity, reliability, reputation etc. throughout their term of appointment. But by the reported involvement of the petitioner in the Crime case and his subsequent absconding, he has lost the above qualities and hence his continuance is highly improper. So his services as Addl. Government Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor was terminated. No analogy can be drawn between the post of a Government Pleader and of a Minister.'
11. The statements quoted above would show that the respondent has already come to the conclusion 'that the petitioner was actively involved in the incident which happened on May 4, 1992, that he was absconding after the incident, that his conduct has created a slur on this esteemed and noble institution, that he has failed to keep up integrity, reliability and reputation befitting a Government Pleader and continuance of such a person in the office would be an indelible scar on an institution which upholds dignity, decency, a high standard of morality and reputation'. Thus the respondent has condemned the petitioner as one who is unfit to be a member of the legal profession. What is the basis of the above finding against the petitioner? Was it only for the reason his name was included in the F.I.R. among the accused? Were there other materials on which the respondent could reasonably come to such a conclusion? What was the nature of the decision-making process? Was the petitioner afforded any opportunity before he was stigmatized with such serious condemnation? One has to search for answers to these questions in the file leading to the order of termination, since the order by itself is silent on all these aspects.
12. The Learned Government Pleader has made available to the court the file leading to issue of Ext. P3. order terminating the services of the petitioner. It is seen from the files that the proceedings against the petitioner started with the letter dated May 4, 1992 addressed by the Municipal Council, Thrissur to the Secretary to Government, Local Administration Department, enclosing its resolution dated May 4, 1992 requesting the Government to take stringent action against the petitioner and also a tele-printer communication dated May 13, 1992 received from the District Collector, Thrissur. The teleprinter message was to the effect that the Superintendent of Police, Thrissur had reported that the petitioner was accused No. 2 in Crime No. 199/92 of Thrissur Town East Police Station, that, in this case, Ex-Minicipal Chairman of Thrissur Municipality was seriously injured due to stabbing and, according to the police, the petitioner was actively involved in the above mentioned incident and that he was absconding since the reported commission of the offence. The above message would show that the source of information of the District Collector was report of the Superintendent of Police, Thrisssur. It is not seen that the District Collector has made any enquiry independently before informing the Government that the petitioner was involved in a criminal offence.
13. The question therefore is whether it is open to the Government to terminate the services of the petitioner on the basis of the above mentioned materials without conducting any enquiry into the allegation and without giving the petitioner an opportunity to put forward his case. In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 283, (1975) 3 SCC 851, 1971 (II) SCWR 446, AIR 1973 SC 491 and 1964 (1) Crl. L.J. 224 (supra), it has to be taken that a mere inclusion of petitioner's name in the F.I.R. cannot be a reason to terminate his services. This is not even a case where any criminal charge has been framed against the petitioner and he is facing a trial. It is open to the Government to enquire into the allegation made against the petitioner without waiting for the culmination of the criminal investigation and further proceedings. If in the enquiry it is found that the petitioner was responsible for any action which would make him unfit to hold the office of Addl. Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor his services can be terminated. Even if Rule 10 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules are not directly applicable to the petitioner as contended in the counter affidavit, the respondent could have even kept the petitioner out of office till such time an enquiry was conducted. The petitioner himself admits justifiability of such an action on the part of the respondent.
14. But in the present case the files would show that on the basis of the letter and resolution of the Municipal Council and the tele-printer message of the District Collector, the respondent jumped into a conclusion that the petitioner was unfit to be continued in the post of Addl. Government Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor. He was found lacking in integrity, reliability and reputation. Before entering such a finding having serious adverse civil consequences on the petitioner, the respondent should have satisfied two conditions of the Rule of audi alteram partem (1) notice of the case to be met (2) opportunity to explain.
15. Even though Ext. P3 would come within the realm of administrative action it is no longer open to the respondent to contend that the petitioner is not entitled to such an opportunity. In Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner (AIR 1978 SC 851), a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the relevance of doctrine of natural justice in the matter of administrative decisions. In para. 72, V.R. Krishna Iyer (J), who wrote the main judgment, observed as follows:-
'We consider it a valid point to insist on observance of natural justice in the area of administrative decision-making so as to avoid devaluation of this principle by 'administrators, already alarmingly insensitive to the rationale of audi alteram partem'. 'In his lecture on 'The Mission of the Law' Professor H.W.R. Wade takes the principle that no man should suffer without being given a hearing as a cardinal example of principle 'recognised as being indispensable to justice, but which (has) not yet won complete recognition in the world of administration.....The goal of administrative sporadic and ex post facto judicial review. The essential mission of the law in this field is to win acceptance by administrators of the principle that to hear a man before he is penalised is an integral part of the decision-making process. A measure of the importance of resisting the incipient abnegation by the courts of the firm rule that breach of audi alteram partem invalidates, is that if it gains ground the mission of the law is doomed to fail to the detriment of all.'
(P.60: Public Law Spring 1975 Stevens Natural Justice: Substance and shadow)'
The necessity of fairness or fair procedure in administrative action has been further emphasisted in a later decision in Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal (AIR) 1990 SC 1402. It was observed by the Supreme Court as follows, in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment.'
'22. An administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. It means that the decision-maker should afford to any party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case. A large number of authorities are on this point and we will not travel over the field of authorities. What is now not in dispute is that the person concerned must be informed of the case against him and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Ridge V.Baldwin (1963 (2) All. ER 66) (supra) ; State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, (1967-II-LLJ-266)
23. The shift now is to a broader notion of 'fairness' or 'fair procedure' in the administrative action. So far as the administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly...For this concept of fairness, adjudicative setting are not necessary, nor it is necessary to have lites inter parties. There need not be any struggle between two opposing parties giving rise to a 'lis'. There need not be resolution of lis inter parties. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. All these types of non-adjudicative administrative decision-making are now covered under the general rubric of fairness in the administration...'
16. The order impugned in this Original Petition certainly involves adverse civil consequences as far as the petitioner is concerned. In Mohinder Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court considered what is civil consequence. It was held that civil consequences undoubtedly cover infraction not merely property or personal but rights to all civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecunray damages. As far as the petitioner is concerned, apart from the fact that the termination of his service as Addl. Govt. Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor would cause pecuniary loss, it has a more serious and deeper adverse effect on his reputation as also on his entire future professional career. The petitioner is fully justified in his grievance that he was 'condemned unheard'.
17. The file leading to Ext. P3, shows that the necessity to conform to the principles of natural justice never bothered those who processed the same making notings as usual from bottom to top and top to bottom. The file is not seen placed before the Minister of Law before the decision to terminate the service of the petitioner was taken. Discussion with the Minister which the Law Secretary had, was over the telephone. Later, the order was issued on May 27, 1992 and it was ratified by the Minister on May 27, 1992. Whether the Minister was at any time apprised of the fact that no notice was given to the petitioner before issuing the order of termination of his service on the finding that he is wanting in integrity, reliability and reputation, befitting a Govt. Pleader, is not discernible from the file. I am constrained to observe that perusal of the file could give the feeling that an anxiety to act fairly was unfortunately absent in the decision-making process which led to issue of Ext. P3. What the Constitutional Bench observed in Mohinder Singh's case (supra) 'administrators are already alarmingly insensitive to the rationale of audi alleram partem' stands good even after a decade.
18. It is from the counter-affidavit of the respondent that the petitioner gets the information about the most damaging findings entered against him on the basis of the resolution of the Municipal Council and the teleprinter message of the District Collector, Thrissur. The petitioner then took the contention in the reply affidavit that the action is unwarranted, illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
18-A. In Muhammed Ashraf's case (supra) this court upheld the termination of the services of Govt. Pleaders in the High Court by the respondent by invoking Rule 17. In the above case, one month's notice was given and the reason given in the notice was the Govt. considered that the service of the particular Govt. Pleader was no more necessary for them and therefore decided that the appointment of the Government Pleader shall be terminated immediately. It was further clarified in the counter affidavit filed by the Govt. as follows:
'Since the Government do not require his services as Government Pleader any more as the Government do not have the same confidence and trust which they should have in the lawyer of the State Government. Even assuming that the petitioner was discharging his functions properly and efficiently and that there was no room for any complaint against him regarding his conduct of Government cases, it is open to the Government to terminate his appointment and to appoint persons who are sufficiently competent and in whom Government have sufficient trust and confidence.'
18-B. In para 16 of the above judgment, the Division Bench referred to earlier decisions of this court where the nature of the relationship between Government and its counsel had been considered. The Division Bench further observed that the relationship being fiduciary is on a higher plane, in a different context and at a different level. Though it may be an office under the State, it is one which necessitates an extraordinary degree of confidence on the part of the State. In the present case, it is not the contention of the respondent that the service of the petitioner was terminated because 'the Government do not have the same confidence and trust which they should have in the lawyer of the State Government.' The definite stand taken by the respondent is that 'the petitioner has forfeited the necessary standard of integrity, reliability and reputation for holding the post of Govt. Pleader, that his conduct had created a slur on this esteemed and noble institution and continuance of petitioner as Govt. Pleader would be an indelible scar on an institution which upholds dignity, decency, a high standard of morality and reputation.' The respondent has entered a finding against the petitioner that he had actively got involved in an incident which culminated in registering a case against him as second accused and that he had absconded after the offence. For these reasons, it was submitted that the Government thought it highly improper to retain him in service and it was in this background that his services were terminated.
18-C. Therefore, the facts in the present case are entirely different from the facts in Mohammed Ashraff's case (supra) or the earlier cases referred in para. 16 of the judgment. No contention was put forward on behalf of the respondents that special circumstances are available in the case which would disentitle the petitioner a notice before such serious findings are entered against him.
19. No attempt is made on behalf of the respondent to show that it is open to the Government to terminate the service of the petitioner immediately on receipt of the message that his name is included in the first information report as an accused. In Mohinder Singh's case, (supra) the Constitutional Banch had observed as follows in para 55 of the judgment:
'Normally, natural justice involves the irritating inconvenience for men in authority of having to hear both sides since notice and opportunity are its very marrow. And this principle is so integral to good government, the onus is on him who urges exclusion to make out why...'
20. In Maneka Gandi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597, Bhagavathi (J) observed:
'Natural Justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action'.
In the facts of the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that the order of termination of the service of the petitioner was issued in clear violation of principles of Natural Justice and therefore unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974-I-LLJ-172, it was pointed by the majority, 'from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and it is therefore violative of Article 14'. This statement has been quoted in Maneka Gandhi's case also.
21. 'In India once again the Supreme Court has stretched the broad umbrella of Article 14 so as to include natural justice as a component part of the right to equality and equal protection. Fairness goes hand in hand with reasonableness.' (Public Law in Britain and India, The Nambyar Lectures, Second Series by Prof. Sir William Wade.).
22. In the light of the above discussion, it has to be held that termination of the service of the petitioner under Ext.P3 was in clear violation of his fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution.
23. Before concluding, I must refer to the contention of the petitioner that Ext. P3 does not satisfy even the conditions under Rule 17.
24. In Ext. P3, the petitioner has been offered an amount of Rs. 270/- in lieu of one month's notice. A reading of Rule 17 would show that there is no provision for paying the salary in lieu of one month's notice. Apart from the above, it is not known as to how the respondents fixed the amount of Rs. 270/- as the monthly salary of an Addl. Govt. Pleader and Add. Public Prosecutor. No explanation is forthcoming from the counter-affidavit or from the files.
25. The action of the respondent in terminating the service of the petitioner on the basis of the finding that he is unfit to hold the post of Add. gOVT. Pleader and Addl. Public Prosecutor as he is lacking in the qualities of integrity, reliability and reputation, is vitiated for violation of Principles of Natural Justice. The action is unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and has resulted in infraction of petitioner's fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For these reasons, I set aside Ext. P3 and the original petition is allowed to the above extent.