Thomas, Ag.C.J.
1. The Secretary of a Co-operative Society (for short 'the Society') was removed from that post by a resolution adopted by the managing committee of the Society. She complained to the Joint Registrar (third respondent herein) against the said resolution. As per the proceedings dated October 15, 1994 (Ext.P8) third respondent rescinded the decision of the managing committee and directed the Society to reinstate the Secretary. Validity of Ext.P8 is now challenged by the President of the Society in the Original Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Single Judge dismissed the Original Petition. Hence this appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act.
2. The main business of the Society is procurement of copra as agent of Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation. First respondent was the Secretary of the Society. On July 2, 1992, in a surprise check, shortage of a huge quantity of copra in the stock was detected. Secretary of the Society was thereupon suspended and an enquiry was conducted. In the meanwhile a new managing Committee has been elected with the present appellant as its President. On the basis of the findings reached in a domestic enquiry the managing Committee decided to remove the Secretary from service. She then sent a petition to the third respondent and later filed an Original Petition in this Court, for directing the third respondent to take a decision on her representation. Pursuanttothedirection issued by this Court, Joint Registrar passed Ext. P8 proceedings purportedly in exercise of the powers under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (for short 'the Rules')
3. Third respondent had gone into the metis of the findings and expressed his dissenting view on such findings. However, third respondent further held that the decision to remove the Secretary is vitiated as the decision was not taken by a Sub-Committee and thereby the right of appeal provided in the Rules was denied to her. Third respondent reached the conclusion that the decision taken against the first respondent is violative of Rule 198 of the Rules. The decision was accordingly annulled.
4. Learned counsel for appellant has advanced two contentions. First is that power under Rule 176 of the Rules could not be invoked in respect of disciplinary action taken by the managing Committee of a Society. Second is, third respondent's view that Rule 198 has been infringed is legally wrong and factually unfounded.
5. Rule 176 of the Rules read thus:
'176. Registrar's power to rescind resolution - Notwithstanding any thing contained in the bye-laws of a registered society, it shall be competent for the Registrar to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society'.
6. There is nothing in Rule 176 to suggest that power under the Rule cannot be invoked if resolution relates to disciplinary action against any employee. Nor is there any need to read such a rider into the rule. Even if the decision relates to disciplinary sphere of its employees the Registrar can nevertheless invoke powers under Rule 176 provided the resolution offends any provision of law or is against any direction issued by the department or is contrary to society's interest.
7. Shri V.M. Kurian, learned counsel for the society, invited our attention to the decisions in President, C.V.V. Co-op. Society v. Project Officer (1981-K.L.T. Short Note 14) and T. Bhaskaran v. Dy. Registrar (1981 Lab I.C. 1512). Both decisions were rendered by Single Judges. In one of them Dr. Kochu Thommen, J. has observed that Registrar has no power to nullify an order passed by the management in the course of disciplinary proceedings. But learned Judge has stated in the same judgment that 'if the management exercised such power improperly or contrary to law or the interests of the society, that would amount to mismanagement of the society which might lead to lawful exercise of power by the Registrar against the management'. In the other Bhaskaran J. (as his Lordship then was) observed that Rule 176 is not meant to be used in respect of disciplinary actions.
8. However, T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. has taken a contrary view in Padmakumari v. I.S.R.O. Employees Co-op. Society 1989(2) KLJ 170. Learned Judge has observed that Rule 176 should be available to check 'wanton discharge or termination of service of the employees'. I think that in the light of the observations of the Full Bench in Aji v. State of Kerala 1995 (1) K.LT 363 it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion as to which among the two contrary views we should follow. Full Bench has observed thus:
'It is not possible to hold that Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of the financial dealings of the society. Rule 176 clothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Byelaws or of any direction or instruction issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. Thus the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not mere passive spectator against an erring society. Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Contention that Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of society is not tenable'
I cannot, therefore, accede to the first contention that the respondent has no power under Rule 176 in respect of any decision relating to disciplinary spheres of a society.
9. While dealing with the next contention I would refer to Rule 198 of the Rules underthe title 'Disciplinary Action'. It enables the society to impose penalties on any member of the establishment for good and sufficient reasons. Sub-rule (3) says that the authority competent to impose various panalties on different categories of employees shall be as shown in the table provided therein. If the employee is the Secretary and if the penalty proposed is either compulsory retirement or dismissal from service, the table shows that the authority competent to impose the penalty is 'the Sub-Committee or Executive Committee'. Sub-rule (4) provides an appeal against the decisions of the Sub-Committee or the Executive Committee in such cases to the Board of Management.
10. If the first decision is taken by the Board of Management for imposing a major penalty like compulsory retirement or dismissal from service, the appeal provision envisaged in Rule 198(4) becomes otiose. So, if a Sub Committee is not formed to take a decision the resultant position is negation of the appeal provision prescribed in the Rules. A right of appeal is a valuable right and when a statute has provided such a right it should not be scuttled or frustrated by not forming such a Sub-Committee or executive committee. Adanvantages of an appeal provision are that the aggrieved party can focus on points missed by the first decision taking body and the appellant would be in a better position to project different perspectives or angles. A reappraisal of materials, for reaching different findings can be made by the appellate body. Normally the appellate authority has co- extensive power with the original authority to reach conclusions.
11. No authority should deny an aggrieved party the opportunity for such second hearing or to get a fresh look on the matter. Supreme Court has pointed out in Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1413 that absence of even one appeal with power to review evidence, legal formulation, conclusion and adequacy or otherwise of punishment is a glaring lacuna in any scheme.
12. Shri V.M. Kurian has invited our attention to the decision in Vijayan v. Board of Directors, S.T. Co-op. Bank 1983 KLT 705 in which Bhaskaran, J. (as his Lordships then was) has observed that it might at the worst be only an irregularity and the Board of Management could not be said to have acted without jurisdiction. The observations were made by the learned single Judge when the delinquent officer challenged the dismissal order under Article 26 of the Constitution. In the present case the Joint Registrar interfered with the dismissal order on the premise that the decision is against the Rules. Having obtained a relief from the statutory authority the person concerned cannot afford to iose the benefit. Learned single Judge has not considered the question from the point of view of losing a right of appeal for an aggrieved person and the advantage in having such a remedy. I am therefore, unable to follow the ratio laid down in the above decision.
13. I am of the view that failure to constitute a sub-committee to the decision is contrary to the provisions of the Rules and hence the third respondent was justified in interfering with resolution on that score.
14. Now I have to consider that whether there was infraction of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 198. This sub-rule reads thus:
'(2) No kind of punishment shall be awarded to an employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against and he has been afforded an opportunity including a personal hearing to defend himself. Every order awarding punishment shall be communicated to the employee concerned in writing stating the grounds on which the punishment has been awarded.'
Here the society did not afford the Secretary any opportunity after receiving the enquiry report. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the opportunity granted to the Secretary to participate in the enquiry is sufficient to comply with the requirements in the sub-rule. In support of the contention learned counsel cited the principle involved in the first proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution. The said proviso was added to the Article through the Forty-second (constitution) Amendment Act, 1976. As per the proviso, it is not now necessary to give an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. But the principle involved in the said proviso is of no avail for interpreting Rule 198(2) of the Rules. Be that so, the Supreme Court had repeatedly stressed (while interpreting Article 311 of the Constitution as it remained unamended) the need for affording such an opportunity. Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it remained then read thus:
'No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.'
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar (1963-I-LLJ-295) at page 298:
'It is now well settled that a public officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are intended to be taken is entitled to have two opportunities before disciplinary action is finally taken against him.... When the enquiry is over, and the enquiring officer submits his report, the dismissing authority has to reconsider the report and decide whether it agrees with the conclusions of the report or not. If the findings in the report are against the public officer and the dismissing authority agrees with the said finding a stage is reached for giving another opportunity to the public officer to show why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. In issuing the second notice, the dismissing authority naturally has to come to a tentative or provisional conclusion about the guilt of the public officer as well as the punishment which would meet the requirement of justice in his case and it is only after reaching conclusions in both these matters provisionally that the dismissing authority issues the second notice.'
15. Supreme Court in that case followed the earlier Constitution Bench decision in Khem Chand v. Union of India (1959-I-LLJ-167). The same position was reiterated in State of Mysore v. Manche Gowda AIR 1964 SC 506. A full Bench of this Court has followed it in S. Chandra Das v. Inspector of Post Offices 1968 KLT 718. True, the position is different when it involves a member of the civil service subsequent to the inclusion of the first proviso to Article 311. But in the absence of any such provision in Rule 198 the society cannot contend that principles of natural justice has been complied with even by allowing the Secretary to participate in the domestic enquiry. Hence the Joint Registrar's view that Rule 198(2) has been offended cannot be taken exception to.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly contended that third respondent has no jurisdiction to interfere with the reasoning adopted by the enquiry officer on merits in reaching the findings. I find force in the said contention that a different factual finding or conclusion was not expected from the Joint Registrar while exercising power under Rule 176 of the Rules. Learned counsel made a plea that Society may be permitted to act on the findings of the enquiry officer and proceed against the Secretary afresh in accordance with the Rules. I make it clear that I have not stated anything against the right of the Society to do so.
Subject to the above contentions, I dismiss this appeal.
Shanmugam, J.
17. I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment of my Lord Acting Chief Justice Thomas, J. and I am in complete agreement with the first point namely, whether the 3rd respondent has power under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') relating to disciplinary matters and the failure to constitute a sub- committee and the deprivation of right to appeal are contrary to Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 198.
18. However, with regard to the second point namely, the failure to give a second opportunity, with respect, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the same.
19. The relevant portions of the Rule are as follows:
'198. Disciplinary Action.-(1) Any member of the establishment of a Co-operative Society may, for good and sufficient reasons, be punished by imposing any of the following penalties, namely:-
(a) Censure
(b) Fine (in the case of employees in the last grade)
(c) Withholding of increments with or without cumulative effect.
(d) Withholding of promotion;
(e) Recovery from pay of the whole are part of any pecuniary loss caused to the society, by negligence or breach of orders or otherwise;
(f) Reduction to a lower rank;
(g) Compulsory retirement
(h) Dismissal from service
(2) no kind of punishment shall be awarded to an employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against and he has been afforded an opportunity including personal hearing to defend himself. Every order awarding punishment shall be communicated to the employee concerned in writing stating the grounds on which the punishment has been awarded.'
The ingredients of these provisions are : (1) There must be good and sufficient reason for imposing any of the 8 categories of punishment enlisted. (2) The delinquent must be informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action. (3) The delinquent must be afforded an opportunity including a personal hearing to defend. (4) The punishment shall have to be communicated in writing stating the grounds on which punishment has been awarded.
20. A plain reading of the Rule in my view does not give any scope for 'further opportunity before deciding to dismiss'. The sequence of events that have taken place in this case are as follows:
(1) November 20, 1992 - Report of the Cooperative Inspector under Section 66 of the Co-operative Societies Act after getting explanation from the officer and enquiry holding that 'the Secretary's irresponsibility and dereliction of duties have resulted in the Salesman to cause loss to the society. Considering all the circumstances stated above it is recommended that the amount of Rs. 4,21,770/- being the value of... be recovered from the Secretary Smt. Rugminiamma and Salesman Sri. A Sukumaran equally as per bye-law 47(15) and S.47 of the Co-operative Societies Act.'
(2) November 26, 1992: Copy of the report received by the Administrator - No action taken.
(3) January 18, 1993: The present elected Managing Committee took charge of the society.
(4) March 29, 1993: Charge memo and additional charge memos issued on the basis of departmental audit.
(5) September 7, 1993: Enquiry Officer appointed, commences proceedings - Documents perused, file and witnesses examined on both sides.
(6) December 31, 1993: Report submitted finding that 6 of the 8 charges proved against the 1st respondent and holding her guilty.
(7) January 3, 1994; Notice issued by the society intimating the decision of dismissal with effect from January 1, 1994 (Resolution No. 232 dated December 31, 1993).
21. The Joint Registrar, the 3rd respondent herein cancelled the resolution by the impugned order dated October 15, 1994 and ordered reinstatement of the 1st respondent on the grounds that the Committee did not make detailed deliberation, contravened the provisions of the Rules 198(3) and 198(4) and 'the principles of natural justice by not giving a proper opportunity to the employees before deciding to dismiss them'.
22. I am concerned with the latter portion of the findings now. The first respondent Secretary had been given memo of charges, opportunities to explain, filed objections, perused documents and let in documentary and/oral evidence and arguments in the domestic enquiry. These steps, according to me, satisfy the ingredients (1), (2) and (3) of Rules 198(1) and 198(2). Now the question to be considered is whether before awarding the punishment the officer should be given another opportunity as to the nature of punishment proposed to be given. According to me, the plain reading of Rule 198(2) does not say so. The above question whether principles of natural justice require a further opportunity before imposing the punishment was in issue before the Supreme. Court in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala AIR 1969 SC 198. The Supreme court held that such a view is erroneous, in the following words:
'15. There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that Article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law, from that it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available to the person proceeded against or that another inquiry should be held thereafter.'
23. Another decision in S.S.Rly. Co. v. Workers Union AIR 1969 SC 513 took the view that no law provides for a second opportunity and the only class of cases where notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Article 311 and even that by reason of the amendment does not appear to be necessary. The Supreme Court held so in the following words:
'18. As regards the modification requiring a second show cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions given by Courts or the Tribunals such a second show cause notice in case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Article 311 . Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that Article. To import such a requirement from Article 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in a short time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should therefore be set aside'.
The Supreme Court went on to say that if reasons for discharging an employee are furnished to the employee concerned, he not only has the satisfaction of knowing why his services are dispensed with but it becomes easy for him in appropriate cases to challenge the order on the ground that it is either not legal or proper which in the absence of knowledge of those reasons it may be difficult, if not impossible for him to do.
24. In A.C.C. Ltd. v. T.C. Shrivastava (1984-II-LLJ-105) the Supreme Court was concerned with the Standing Order No. 17 and the relevant portion is as follows at page 109:
'All dismissal orders shall be passed by the Manager or Acting Manager who shall do so after giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation.'
The question posed before the Supreme Court was whether the above Standing Order contemplates giving of a second opportunity to the delinquent to show cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal after he has been found guilty or the opportunity spoken of is the opportunity to meet the charges in the domestic inquiry? After referring and following its earlier decision in Saharanpur Light Railway Co.'s case AIR 1959 SC 513 the Supreme Court laid down as follows:
' It is thus clear that neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. This, of course, does not mean that a Standing Order may not provide for it but unless the Standing Order provides for it either expressly or by necessary implication no inquiry which is otherwise fair and valid will be vitiated by non-affording of such second opportunity. The question is whether para 3 of the Standing Order No. 17 provides for such second opportunity being given to the delinquent? The relevant words are 'all dismissal orders shall be passed by the Manager.... after giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation1. The underlined words are wholly inappropriate to convey the ideal of a second hearing or opportunity on the question of punishment but appropriate in the context of seeking an explanation in regard to alleged misconduct charged against him. An 'explanation' is to be called from the 'accused' which suggests that the same is to be called for prior to the recording of a finding that the delinquent is guilty of misconduct; it is the alleged misconduct that is to be explained by him and not the proposed punishment. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment is contemplated either expressly or by necessary implication. In other words, it is clear to us that the opportunity spoken of by para 3 of S.O.17 is the opportunity to be given to the delinquent to meet the charges framed against him'
25. In Hamdard Dawakhana Wakf v. Its workmen (1962-II-LLJ-772) the Supreme Court held that the Manager in that case was not bound to hear the concerned workman once again after he received the report of the enquiring officer. Requirements of natural justice did not warrant that the Manager should have granted an opportunity to the concerned worker to meet him after he received the report of the enquiring officer.
26. A Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985-II-LLJ-206) dealt with the interpretation of Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India and in particular Clause (2) of Article 311 after' the amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. The Supreme Court in that case after referring to Khem Chand v. Union of India (supra) held that the reasonable opportunity as contemplated by the said decision has now been incorporated in Article 311(2). The Supreme Court further went on to deal with the second show- cause notice as follows:
'It should be borne in mind that the show-cause notice at the punishment stage was originally there as a result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee in Lall's case AIR 1948 PC 121 and by this Court in Khem Chand's case (supra) upon the phrase a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Clause (2) as substituted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act merely reproduced the substance of what was held in Khem Chand's case (supra). The words which originally found a place in Clause (2), a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him', do not any more feature in Clause (2). All that Clause (2) now provides is an inquiry in which the government servant is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Clause (2) taken by itself even without the first proviso does not provide, expressly or impliedly. for any opportunity to make a representation against the proposed penalty. After the Constitution (fifteenth Amendment) Act, this second opportunity formed a separate part of Clause (2), which part was deleted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, thus, when the second proviso states in its opening words that provided further that this clause shall not apply', it means that whatever safeguards are to be found in Clause (2) are wholly taken away in a case where any of these clauses of the second proviso is attracted. In this connection, the following observations of this court in the case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala (supra) are pertinent: 'There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice, Law may or may not prescribe such a course.'
In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T.C. Shrivastava (supra) this Court held that at p. 109 neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. Since a right to such opportunity does not exist in law, it follows that the only right which the Government servant had to make a representation on the proposed penalty was to be found in Clause (2) of Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act. This right having been taken away by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, there is no provision of law under which a Government servant can claim this right.'
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court went on and dealt elaborately on the question of natural justice and the principles contained thereunder and finally approved the decisions in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala (supra) and A.C.C. Ltd. v. T.C. Shrivastava (supra) in the following words:
'96. The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in theses Appeals and Writ Petitions, namely, the audi alterant partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submiting his explanation thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him, and to inspect the documents which are relied upon to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him examined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alterant partem rule in a quasi judicial or administrative inquiry. If we look at Clause (2) of Article 311 in the light of what is stated above, it will be apparent that that clause is merely an express statement of the audi alterant partem rule which is implicitly made part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 as a result of the interpretation placed upon that Article by recent decisions of this Court. Clause (2) of Article 311 requires that before a Government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, an inquiry must be held in which he is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being beard in respect of those charges. The nature of the hearing to be given to a Government servant under Clause (2). Article 311 has been elaborately set out by this Court in Khem Chand's case (supra) in the passage from the judgment extracted above. Though the case related to the original Clause (2) of Article 311 the same applies to the present Clause (2) of Article 311 except for the fact that now a Government servant has no right to make any representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him, but as pointed out earlier, in the case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala (supra) such an opportunity is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice and as held in Associated Cement Companies Ltd v. T.C. Shrivastava (supra) neither the ordinary law of the land nor industrial law requires such an opportunity to be given. The opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penalty was only the result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lal's case (supra) upon Section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was accepted by this Court in Khem Chand's case.'
The Supreme Court further held that the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in came sua (no man shall be a judge in his own cause) and audi alterant partem (hear the other side) are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules. The Constitution Bench referred to and approved the decision in Union of India v. Col. J.M. Sinha (1970-II-LLJ-284) wherein it was held that if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. The principle laid down by the Constitution Bench was followed in R.S. Dass v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 593. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee AIR 1977 SC 965 Krisha Iyer, J. Speaking for the Court observed:
'Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction.'
27. The society is governed by its own bye-laws. The terms and conditions of appointment of its employees are contractual. Their services cannot be compared to that of a Government servant. In this case the Joint Registrar in his impugned order imported the principles of natural justice without reference to the rule and the earlier finding of the co-operative Inspector under Section 66 of the Act
28. The Supreme Court has laid down the principles of interpreting and construing a statutory provision in Hiralal Ratan Lal v. S.T.O.S.III, Kanpur AIR 1973 SC 1034 as follows.
'In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If the provision, is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid onlywhen the legislative intent is not clear.'
The said rule was also found approved in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra). In Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows:
'One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity.'
29. By applying this rule of interpretation Rule 198 is unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear. A second opportunity that can be thought of is excluded by stating that every order awarding punishment shall be communicated to the employee concerned in writing stating the grounds on which the punishment has been awarded. The decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent may not directly apply to the question in issue. The decision in U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan AIR 1980 SC 840 is based on the particular statutory regulation of the Corporation and no issue regarding the principles of natural justice was raised and decided in this case except the observation made thereunder. The decisions in State of Mysore v. Manche Gowda (supra) and State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar AIR 1963 SC 1612 are in respect of the cases of Government Servants and based on Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the Full Bench decision in S. Chandra Das v. Inspector, Post Offices (supra) is in reference to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India which required second opportunity.
30. Therefore, I am of the view that the impugned order holding that there is violation of the principles of natural justice is unsustainable in law and on facts.
31. The appellant in Ground-R of the Memorandum of Appeal has stated that the managing Committee met at 2.30 p.m. to discuss this subject only and after elaborate discussion and consideration of the matter took decision at 8.pm. The attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to this fact that the Managing Committee which was convened only for the purpose of considering the question of the report deliberated the issue for more than 5 1/2 hours before coming to the conclusion. Therefore, there is considerable force in the submission that conclusion was arrived at after proper deliberation. However, in the fight of the finding that the action of the appellant in not constituting the committee and affording an opportunity to appeal against contravened Sub-clauses (3) and (4) of Rule 198, the impugned order of the 3rd respondent has to be sustained.
32. Yet another contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that under Rule 176 the Joint Registrar has no authority to order reinstatement. A reading of the Rule 176 enables the Registrar to rescind a resolution and does not authorise the Registrar to issue a direction of reinstatement. That is exclusively the province of the Society governed by its own bye-laws. However, that portion of the order which says that there is violation of the principles of natural justice and the 1st respondent must be reinstated in service is not in accordance with law.
In the above circumstances the Writ Appeal is dismissed with liberty to the society to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings in the light of my findings stated above.