P.A. Mohammed, J.
1. The petitioner is a religious institution owning 54 odd acres of agricultural land purchased as per document No. 618 of 1117 M. E. The income derived from this property was being fully utilised for religious, educational and charitable purposes. However, the first respondent, Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Always, completed the assessment under the provisions of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), in respect of the year 1974-75 assigning the status as an 'individual'. Consequently, the first respondent did not allow the benefit available to the petitioner under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act. Being aggrieved by the said order, the assessee filed an appeal before the second respondent, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but it could not succeed. Therefore, a further appeal was filed before the Tribunal. The exhibit P-1 is the copy of the order of the Tribunal dated August 19, 1987, finding that the Agricultural Income-taxOfficer has failed to decide the income in terms of Section 4(1)(b) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal directed the assessing authority to consider the entire case afresh in accordance with law and in view of the observations made therein. Subsequently, in respect of the years 1977-78 to 1981-82, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in appeal, set aside similar orders of assessment for the years 1977-78 to 1981-82 and directed the assessing authority to dispose of the matter afresh in view of exhibit P-1 order of the Tribunal.
2. As far as the year 1984-85 is concerned, the officer passed an assessment order rejecting the exemption claimed by the petitioner under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act. The exhibit P-4 is the order of assessment in respect of the said year. Though the assessee filed an appeal against the said order, it was dismissed as per exhibit P-5. Exhibits P-4 and P-5, orders passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are challenged in this writ petition.
3. Heard counsel for the petitioner and the Government Pleader for the respondents.
4. The petitioner claims that it is a religious and charitable institution entitled to the benefit available under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act. While considering this claim the Appellate Tribunal observed in exhibit P-1 order thus :
'The institution of the Arch Diocese of Varapoly appears to be working under the Canon law applicable to the Catholic church. The Agrl. Income-tax Officer has also not considered the application of income in terms of Section 4(1)(b). The discussion above shows that none of the pertinent aspects of the case or legal issues as well as facts have received the proper attention of the assessing authority. We, therefore, find that the assessment has to be set aside and remanded back to the assessing authority for fresh disposal. Hence setting aside the orders of the lower authorities, we remand the case to the assessing authority for de novo disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.'
5. Though this order was passed in respect of the year 1974-75, it has got a decisive effect on all subsequent assessments under the Act. It is an admitted case that no revised order pursuant to exhibit P-1 has been passed by the first respondent. In respect of the years 1977-78 to 1981-82, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by exhibit P-2 order remanded the case for fresh disposal in view of exhibit P-1 order. In respect of the said years also no revised assessment orders have been passed by the first respondent. I do not find any reason why the same process could be denied in respect of the year 1984-85. However, without adverting to exhibits P-1 and P-2 the first respondent passed exhibit P-4 assessmentorder for the year 1984-85 disallowing the benefit claimed under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act, It appears from exhibit P-4 that the first respondent has not given due regard to exhibit P-1 order of the Tribunal and exhibit P-2 order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The second respondent has also not considered the directions contained in exhibit P-1 while passing exhibit P-5 order.
6. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is a denial of justice in refusing to carry out the direction issued by the Tribunal as per exhibit P-1 order, by the assessing authority. In support of this contention, he relies on the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. ITO : [1960]40ITR618(SC) . The apex court in paragraph 8 of the judgment observed (page 622) :
'By that order the respondent virtually refused to carry out the directions which a superior tribunal has given to him in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. Such refusal is in effect a denial of justice, and is further more destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on a hierarchy of courts. If a subordinate tribunal refuses to carry out directions given to it by a superior tribunal in the exercise of its appellate powers, the result will be chaos in the administration of justice and we have indeed found it very difficult to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the learned Judicial Commissioner while roundly condemning the respondent for refusing to carry out the directions of the superior tribunal, yet held that no manifest injustice resulted from such refusal.'
7. This decision came up for consideration before the same court subsequently in Tobacco . v. CST [1961] 12 STC 87 ; [1961] AIR 1961 SC 402. There, the Supreme Court while adopting the rule laid down in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.'s case : [1960]40ITR618(SC) further held that in order to attract the said principle, it is necessary that there should be an order of a superior Tribunal clear, certain and definite in its terms and without any ambiguity, to which the subordinate authority or officer to whom it is addressed, could give effect. In view of the above observation in Tobacco Manufacturer's case : [1961]2SCR106 , the question required to be considered is whether exhibit P-1 order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is in any way uncertain, indefinite or ambiguous. There is no such case for the respondents. Further, it cannot be said that the directions given by the Tribunal in exhibit P-1 is in any way ambiguous or uncertain. By the said order, the Tribunal has in substance directed the assessing authority to have a de novo disposal of the case in accordance with law and in view of the directions contained therein. In this context, it is pertinent tonote that an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 32 is final subject to the provision contained in Section 60. It is not disputed that the Commissioner has not invoked the said provision as against exhibit P-1 order of the Tribunal.
8. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.'s case : [1960]40ITR618(SC) again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia : [1984]1SCR825 . In that case, it specifically deprecated the practice of non-implementing the orders of the superior Tribunals. In this context, the apex court observed (page 903) :
'It is regrettable that the Board of Revenue failed to realise that like any other subordinate Tribunal, it was subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Just as the judgments and orders of the Supreme Court have to be faithfully obeyed and carried out throughout the territory of India under Article 142 of the Constitution, so should be the judgments and orders of the High Court by all inferior courts and Tribunals subject to their supervisory jurisdiction within the State under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.'
9. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it can definitely be said that there is manifest injustice in refusing to comply with the directions of the Tribunal contained in exhibit P-1 by the assessing authority.
10. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the principle of res judicata will apply to the facts of this case. Since the Agricultural Income-tax Officer is not a court, the doctrine of re judicata or estoppel by record does not apply to his decision ; a finding or a decision of the agricultural income-tax authorities in one year may be departed from in a subsequent year. This question is no longer res Integra in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT : [1963]49ITR137(SC) and M.M. Ipoh v. C7T : [1968]67ITR106(SC) . The Supreme Court in M. M. Ipoh's case : [1968]67ITR106(SC) observed (head-note) :
'The doctrine of res judicata does not apply so as to make a deci sion on a question of fact or law in a proceeding for assessment in one year binding in another year. The assessment and the facts found are conclusive only in the year of assessment ; the findings on questions of fact may be good and cogent evidence in subsequent years, when the same question falls to be determined in another year, but they are not binding and conclusive.'
11. The question that is relevant in this case is whether the findings and observations made by the Tribunal in respect of the year 1974-75 will apply in respect of the year 1984-85 which is under consideration here. In this context, it may be noticed that though the assessment year is1974-75, exhibit P-1 order of the Tribunal was passed on August 19, 1987. It is possible to argue that the conclusions or observations contained in exhibit P-1 will not be applicable to the assessment year 1984-85 inas-a much as the principle of res judicata does not apply in so far as the proceedings before the assessing authority which is not a court is concerned. But the question still remains what is the evidentiary value of a finding or an order recorded by a superior authority in respect of the matters which are relevant for the purpose of the assessment. In this context, it must be recalled what Lord Hanworth MR said in IRC v. Sneath [1932] 2 KB 362 (CA).
'The assessment is final and conclusive between the parties only in relation to the assessment for the particular year for which it is made. No doubt, a decision reached in one year would be a cogent factor in the determination of a similar point in a following year, but I cannot think that it is to be treated as an estoppel binding upon the same party for all years.'
12. This would sufficiently indicate that the orders of the superior Tribunal in respect of an assessment is a cogent factor in relation to the subsequent years. In M. M. Ipoh's case : [1968]67ITR106(SC) , the Supreme Court adopted the same view that the observations and findings of the superior Tribunal are cogent pieces of evidence. In fact this decision was followed by the Division Bench of this court in E.V. Koradu v. Commr. Agrl. I.T. : [1980]122ITR615(Ker) . Another Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Velimalai Rubber Co. Ltd. : [1990]181ITR299(Ker) observed (page 302) :
'Though the principle of res judicata will not apply to income-tax proceedings, when a question of law or fact is decided in the assessee's own case for an earlier assessment year, and the identical question comes up for consideration for a later year, the Appellate Tribunal will be justified in placing reliance on the earlier decision to base its conclusion, in the absence of any new material or change in circumstances or a fresh look necessitated on existing facts on a closer and more intelligent analysis.'
13. In this case this court has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in M. M. Ipoh v. CIT : [1968]67ITR106(SC) .
14. The question now remains to be considered is whether exhibit P-4 assessment order and exhibit P-5 order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner are liable to be interfered with in this case. I have already found that there is a manifest injustice in refusing to comply with the direction of the Tribunal contained in exhibit P-1. Exhibits P-4 and P-5 have been passed by the respective authorities without considering the 'cogent piece of evidence', namely, exhibits P-1 and P-2 orders, available in this case. That the availability of exhibits P-1 and P-2 orders in supportof the contention of the petitioner was specifically brought to the notice of the first respondent as per exhibit P-3 objection filed against the pre-assessment notice dated January 20, 1990, in respect of the year 1984-85. The observations contained in exhibit P-5 cannot be said to be correct in the absence of de novo consideration of the entire matter pursuant to exhibit P-1 order of the Tribunal. The second respondent is legally bound to adopt exhibit P-1 as a 'cogent piece of evidence'. If the observations contained in exhibit P-1 are followed, exhibits P-4 and P-5 could not have been passed by the first respondent in the manner it has been done.
15. It is pointed out that as against exhibit P-5 an effective remedy is available to the petitioner to approach the Tribunal in further appeal. The question is whether in the aforesaid factual background the rejection of this writ petition on that ground would be justified. In the facts of this case, I am convinced that the filing of an appeal by the petitioner against exhibit P-5 order before the Tribunal would only be a futile exercise because the Tribunal had by its earlier order decided in favour of the assessee directing the officer to have a fresh consideration of the entire matter in view of the directions contained therein. Jeevan Reddy C. J. (as he then was) in Mahesh Prasad Kedar Nath v. ITO : [1991]188ITR239(All) ) observed (page 241) :
'It is not so much the question of res judicata. The more relevant aspect is that on these very facts, the Tribunal has opined that registration cannot be refused. If so, it would be an exercise in futility for the petitioner to submit his explanation and follow the remedies as provided by law.'
16. In this context, the following observation of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Filterco v. CST : 1986(24)ELT180(SC) is appropriate (page 322 of 61 STC) :
'The order passed by the Commissioner of Sales-tax was clearly binding on the assessing authority under Section 42B(2) and although technically it would have been open to the appellants to urge their contentions before the appellate authority, namely, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, that would be a mere exercise in futility when a superior officer, namely, the Commissioner has already passed a well considered order in the exercise of his statutory jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 42B of the Act holding that 21 varieties of the compressed woollen felt manufactured by the appellants are not eligible for exemption under entry 6 of Schedule I to the Act.'
17. In view of the discussion hereinbefore, exhibits P-4 and P-5 orders passed by the respondents are set aside. Accordingly, the first respondent is directed to complete the assessment afresh on merits and in view of exhibit P-1 order of the Tribunal. The first respondent is further directed to issue notice to the petitioner before completing the assessment as directed above. The original petition is disposed of as above.