M. Sasidharan Nambiar, J.
1. Petitioner in W.P.(C) 4577/2008 instituted O.S. 61/2006 before Sub Court, Kozhikode for specific performance of an agreement for sale executed by respondent/second defendant as Director of first respondent/first defendant Company M/s. Royal Hospital Private Limited to sell the plaint schedule property in favour of the petitioner. Defendants in the written statement contended that though an agreement was executed, petitioner did not perform his part of the contract within die time provided and the time provided in the agreement is the essence of the contract and therefore petitioner is not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement. An application for appointment of a Commission was filed by the petitioner. A Commissioner was appointed. When the Commissioner inspected the plaint schedule property, the inspection was obstructed by third parties. They filed a statement before the Commissioner asserting their independent right in the property. Petitioner therefore filed I.A. 4667/2007 under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure to implead those third parties as additional defendants 3 to 7. Respondents opposed the petition contending that persons sought to be impleaded are third parties and in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale they are unnecessary parties and therefore petition is to be dismissed. Petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 to get herself impleaded contending that she is a shareholder and a Director of the first defendant Company and the Company was wound up in 1992 and she had alienated her rights in favour of third parties by separate registered sale deeds and there was no resolution by the Company authorising second respondent to execute an agreement for sale and the agreement if any, is not -binding on the company or the assets of the Company and there is collusion of plaintiffs with defendants and therefore petitioner is to be impleaded as additional defendant. Plaintiff did not file any objection to that petition. Respondents defendants filed a counter statement contending that though Company was wound up, subsequently as per a resolution that decision was withdrawn and second respondent was authorised by a resolution to execute an agreement for sale and petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 is not a necessary party to the suit and therefore petition is to be dismissed. Petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 2973/2008 filed Ext. P7 petition in I.A. 1184/2007 for a direction to respondents 2 and 3 to produce the minutes of the General Body and the Director Board of the Company from the period 1992 onwards to show that Company was wound up in 1992.
2. Learned Sub Judge under Ext. P7 order in W.P. (C) 4577/2008 dated 15-11-2007 dismissed I.A. 4667/2007 holding that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale third parties are not to be impleaded as their presence is not necessary for resolving the dispute involved in the suit. As per Ext. P8 order, in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 dated 26-7-2007, I.A. 833/2007 the petition to implead the petitioner as supplemental defendant was dismissed. As per Ext. P9 order I.A. 1184/2007 was dismissed. Petitioner did not challenge Ext. P9 order in I.A. 1184/2007 and challenged only the order in I.A. 833/2007.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P.(C) 4577/2008 as well as senior counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 and learned Counsel appearing for defendants 1 and 2 who are opposing the petitions were heard.
4. The learned senior Counsel appearing for plaintiff petitioner relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Sumtibai and Ors. v. Paras Finance Co. (2007) 10 SCC 82 argued that the three Judge Bench decision in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and Ors. : AIR2005SC2813 was clarified by the subsequent decision holding that the decision in Kasturi's case did not lay down a proposition that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance and that proposition is applicable only in a case where the persons sought to be impleaded has no semblance of title to the property in dispute and if the person sought to be impleaded is setting up a separate title, then in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, third parties could be impleaded and so the trial court was not justified in dismissing the impleading application for the reason that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale, only parties to the agreement need be parties to the suit and third parties cannot be impleaded. Learned Senior Counsel also argued that in the suit a decree for specific performance as well as possession of the property covered under the agreement for sale was sought and as held by a learned single Judge of this Court (as His Lordship then was) in Gopalakrishnan v. Sarojini 1985 KLT 1167 presence of a third party who is setting up independent title is also necessary for a proper adjudication of the dispute in the suit and therefore trial court was not justified in dismissing the application for impleading the proposed defendants who on their part filed a statement before the Commissioner setting up independent right. Learned senior Counsel pointed out that as per the statement filed by them before the Commissioner, the property originally belonged to Keezhedath Bhargavi under document No. 351/1952 of Chevayoor S.R.O. and 1.61 acres was transferred in favour of Patteri Narendran as per document No. 1230/1971 and document No. 111/1971 and the property was sold in execution of the decree obtained by one Balakrishnan Nair in O.S. 310/1979 and was purchased by Sajeev Kumar, the auction purchaser, who took delivery of the property by filing E.P. 152/1992 pursuant to the decree dated 30-1-1981 and there was an order of attachment before judgment from 1979 onwards and subsequently the right of Sajeev Kumar over a portion of the property was assigned in favour of Pappachan and Pappachan transferred it in favour of Muhamed Koya, and from Muhamed Koya, it was obtained by Lona Aboobacker and from Lona Aboobacker, it was purchased by two of the defendants who are sought to be impleaded namely, Jamal and Anwar and the remaining rights of Sajeev Kumar was transferred in favour of K.P. Abdulla, Mammu Haji and M.A. Safiya under registered sale deed of 2002 which was obtained by the additional defendants sought to be impleaded as per registered sale deed of 2004 and registered release deed of 2005 and as they are setting up separate title, they are also necessary parties to the suit in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings. Learned senior Counsel argued that being a suit for specific performance and possession of the property covered under the agreement for sale, it cannot be said that the persons sought to be impleaded are not necessary or proper parties and therefore as held by the Apex Court in Sumtibai's case, as the persons sought to be impleaded as defendants are raising claim based on separate title they are necessary parties and learned Sub Judge should have allowed the application and impleaded them as additional defendants.
5. Learned senior Counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 argued that though petitioner therein contended that subsequent to the dissolution of first defendant Company her right was assigned in favour of third parties it is the case of the defendants that the winding up resolution was later withdrawn and being a shareholder, she has right in the properties of first defendant Company and first defendant never authorised second defendant to execute any agreement for sale and suit is filed in collusion between the plaintiff and defendants and in such circumstances, learned Sub Judge should have allowed the petitioner to be impleaded as an additional defendant.
6. Learned Counsel appearing for respondent/defendants relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Kasturi's case argued that it has been laid down by the Apex Court that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale, a third party who is setting up a rival claim against the vendor cannot be impleaded and the facts in Sumtibai's case are entirely different. According to the learned Counsel, in Sumtibai's case persons who are sought to be impleaded were claiming under the very same title, as the title deeds stood not only in favour of the executant of the agreement for sale but his children also who are sought to be impleaded and therefore the later decision by a smaller Bench cannot alter the law laid down by the larger Bench and the trial Court was justified in dismissing the application to implead third parties, who are third parties to the agreement for sale. Learned Counsel also argued that though a decision was taken in 1992 to wind up the Company, subsequently that decision was withdrawn and the Company is even now subsisting and a pin number was allotted to the company in 2007 which establishes that the Company is continuing to exist and therefore petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 has no right to get hereself impleaded. It was also argued that the said petitioner has nor right to alienate the properties of the Company and based on the alienation also she is not entitled to come up on record as additional defendant.
7. In the suit, apart from a decree for specific performance of the agreement for sale, petitioner plaintiff sought a decree for possession as provided under Section 22(1)(a) of Specific Relief Act. Sub-section 1(a) of Section 22 provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, any person suing for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property, in appropriate case may ask for possession or partition and separate possession of the property in addition to such performance. The suit is for specific performance of the agreement for sale executed by second defendant for the first defendant company as well as for possession of the property covered under the agreement. It is admitted case that a Commissioner was appointed to identify the property covered under the agreement for sale and when the Commissioner inspected the property persons who are sought to be impleaded in I.A. 4667/2007 objected to the inspection setting up independent right and they filed a statement before the Commissioner setting up their claim. As pointed out by the learned senior Counsel, the said persons are setting up title under Patteri Narendran, under whom first defendant Company is also setting up title. What was claimed by the persons, who are sought to be impleaded as additional defendants, was that rights of Patteri Narendran v, as sold in court auction in execution of the decree in O.S. 310/1979 and the property which was earlier attached before judgment was sold and purchased by Sajeev Kumar the auction purchaser and by change of hands by various sale deeds, the right and title vests with the persons who are sought to be impleaded. First defendant company is also tracing out title from Patteri Narendran.
8. The question is, in such circumstances, whether in a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale and also for possession of the property covered under the agreement for sale, third parties who are setting up rival claims against the executant of the agreement for sale, could be impleaded as additional defendants and that too at the instance of the plaintiff. A learned single Judge in Gopalakrishnan's case (supra) considered the question whether in a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale, where possession was sought under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, third parties to the agreement for sale are necessary and proper parties. Following the decision of High Court of Allahabad in Gyasa v. Risalo 0043/1977 : AIR1977All156 , it was held that the crucial words in Section 22 of Specific Relief Act to the effect, any person suing for the specific performance of contract for the transfer of immovable property may 'in an appropriate case' ask for possession, would seem to indicate, that when the property is in the possession of a third party in order to render the decree for specific performance of the contract of sale effective and meaningful, so that the plaintiff can get the required relief, he can in such 'appropriate cases' implead such third party also for obtaining possession. It was held that those persons are necessary parties and the suit cannot be limited to the relief as against the executant of the agreement for sale and postpone the adjudication of the plea of the other defendants and therefore in such a suit third parties to the agreement for sale could also be impleaded. Another learned single Judge of this Court in Abraham v. Chadi Rosamma 1988 (2) KLT 659 has also taken a similar view.
9. The three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Kasturi's case interpreting Sub-rule 2 of Rule 10 of Order 1 held that a bare reading of the provision namely second part of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 10 of Order 1 clearly show that necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives, as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor and in equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes the rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties and the following to tests are to be satisfied namely (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings and (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. It was further held that the question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract and if the person seeking addition is added in such a suit the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title and therefore for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Analysing the earlier decision, it was held that necessary parties in such a suit are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceeding and proper parties are those whose presence before the court would be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. On the facts, it was found that respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are not necessary parties to the suit as there was no semblance of right. It was held:
In our view, third party to the agreement for sale without challenging the title of respondent No. 3, even assuming they are in possession of the contracted property, cannot protect their possession without filing a separate suit for title and possession against the vendor.
The argument of the learned Counsel appearing for respondents is that in view of this dictum a third party to an agreement for sale cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance of that agreement, when they are setting up rival claim against the vendor, the executant of the agreement. As pointed out by learned senior Counsel the decision in Kasturi's case was explained by the later Bench of the Apex Court in Sumtibai's case as follows:
Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal. He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 12-8-1960 by which the property was purchased shows that the shop in dispute was sold in favour of not only Kapoor Chand, but also his sons. Thus prima facie it appears that the purchaser of the property in dispute was not only Kapoor Chand but also his sons. Hence, it cannot be said that the sons of Kapoor Chand have no semblance of title and are mere busybodies or interlopers.
It is therefore not possible to hold that in view of Kasturi's case in all cases a third party to an agreement for sale cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale. It is more so when the prayer in the suit includes a prayer for possession of the property covered under the agreement for sale as provided under Section 22(1)(a) of Specific Relief Act. In such a suit the right of the rival claim of the defendants, who claim possession would also necessarily be decided especially to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. When persons who are sought to be impleaded as defendants are setting up right with semblance of title and that too by a series of registered deeds, it cannot be said that they are not necessary parties to the suit as explained by the Apex Court in Sumatibai's case.
10. Ext. P7 order is set aside. I.A. 4667/2007 stands allowed and additional defendants 3 to 7 are impleaded. Learned Sub Judge is directed to issue summons to them and proceed with the suit after granting opportunity to file a written statement in accordance with law. In the light of the said findings, it cannot be said that petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/ 2008 is not a necessary party to the suit. The argument of the learned Counsel appearing for respondents is that subsequent to 1992 the said petitioner received the amount due from first defendant and issued a receipt in 1994 and that petitioner cannot be heard to contend that the Company was wound up in 1992. Learned Counsel also argued that petitioner who is only claiming as sharer in the company is not entitled to alienate the property and in such circumstances petitioner is not a necessary party and therefore she cannot be impleaded. What was contended by the petitioner was that the agreement entered into by second defendant in favour of plaintiff was not binding on the company as the Company has not authorised second defendant to execute an agreement for sale. Apart from the said contention it was pleaded that Company was not in existence when the agreement for sale was executed and the Company had wound up in 1992 itself. The correctness of these contentions are not to be decided in the application. When the agreement for sale is alleged to be executed by the second defendant, for the first defendant Company and the fact that petitioner is a shareholder of the company was not disputed and plaintiff did not oppose the application for impleading, learned Sub Judge should not have dismissed the application (I.A. 833/2007) and instead should have impleaded petitioner therein as additional defendant. Ext., P8 order is therefore quashed. I.A. 833/2007 stands allowed and petitioner in W.P.(C) 2973/2008 stands impleaded as additional defendant No. 8. Petitioner is entitled to file a written statement.
11. Writ petitions are disposed of as above.