K. John Mathew, J.
1. Both these claims are filed by the official liquidator who is the liquidator of New Kerala Roadways (P.) Limited in liquidation. Both these claims are for realising unpaid call amounts together with interest thereon. In C. C. No. 205 of 1987, the amount claimed is Rs. 1,088 made up of the principal amount of Rs. 680 and interest Rs. 408. In C. C. No. 210 of 1987, the amount claimed is Rs. 3,008 made up of the principal amount of Rs. 1,880 and interest Rs. 1,128.
2. The contentions raised by the respondents are similar. Since similar questions are raised, these claims are disposed of by this common judgment.
3. According to the respondents, the claims are barred by limitation. According to them, Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies and the prescribed period is 3 years from the date of the winding up order. There is a further contention that there was no proper resolution by the board of directors for making the call.
4. The date of commencement o! the winding up is February 20, 1981. The winding up order was passed on March 23, 1982. These claims were filed on April 7, 1987. According to Sri T. V. Rama-krishnan, learned counsel for the official liquidator, the liquidator is entitled to exclude two periods under Section 458A of the Companies Act, namely (1) the period of pendency of winding up petition and (2) one year immediately following the winding up order. The period of pendency of the winding up petition in this case was 1 year, 1 month and 2 days. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that 1 year 1 month and 2 days plus 1 year and the 3 years prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act brings the last date of filing the claims to April 24, 1987, since the date of the winding up order was March 23, 1982. On the other hand, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents was that if the period of pendency of the winding up is to be taken into account, time will have to be calculated from the date of filing of the winding up petition itself. In other words, the liquidator is only entitled to 4 years from the date of winding up order.
5. Thus, there is no dispute regarding the exclusion of one year following the winding up order. The only controversy is whether the period of pendency of the winding-up petition should be excluded from the period from the date of winding up order or the period from the date of filing of the winding up petition.
6. Section 458A of the Companies Act is as follows :
' Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation.--Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application in the name and on behalf of a company which is being wound up by the court, the period from the date of commencement of the winding up of the company to the date on which the winding-up order is made (both inclusive) and a period of one year immediately following the date of the winding-up order shall be excluded.'
7. The right of the official liquidator to recover the dues of the company accrues only on and from the date of the winding up order. Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation, namely 3 years, begins to run from the date on which the right to apply, accrues, namely the date of the winding up order. Thus, on a plain reading of Section 458A of the Companies Act, the exclusion that is to be made under Section 458A of the Companies Act is the period commencing from the date of winding up order. Sections 12 - 15 of the Limitation Act provide for exclusion of time under certain circumstances. It is well settled that in applying those provisions, the periods excluded have to be added to the prescribed period (see Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap, AIR 1935 PC 85, and Bhagwan Swarup v. Municipal Board, Ujhani, AIR 1970 All 652).
8. The Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kun-haliumma [1976] 4 SCC 634 ; AIR 1977 SC 282 held as follows (p. 285):
'.....The words 'any other application' under Article 137 cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Article 137 would be a petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of the prescribed period when the court is closed and extension of the prescribed period if the applicant or the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period.'
9. Therefore, the article that is applicable in this case is 137.
10. Learned counsel for respondents relied on Mahomed Akbar v. Associated Banking Corporation India Ltd., [1950] 20 Comp Cas 325 where the Bombay High Court held as follows (at p. 331) :
' It is a well-established principle of the law of limitation that once limitation begins to run no subsequent event will prevent the time from running and no authority has been cited, and there is nothing in principle to substantiate the proposition put forward by Mr. Seervai that although limitation began to run under Article 112 from the date when the call was made payable the subsequent order of winding up the company stopped limitation continuing to run and a new period of limitation has to be calculated from the date of the order of winding up.'
11. However, in Voluntary Liquidator, Bharat Traders Ltd. v. Rattan Singh [1978] 48 Comp Cas 427 the Punjab and Haryana High Court, while considering an application under Section 518 read with Section 418 of the Companies Act, 1956, adopted the dictum laid down in Bharat Traders Ltd. (In Liquidation] v. Sadhu Singh [1968] 38 Comp Cas 537 (Punj) and held as follows (p. 430) :
' The main contention of learned counsel for the respondent thus being negatived, the only other question that remains for consideration is whether there is any limitation period fixed for the court passing such an order and if so, what that provision is The contention of learned counsel for the respondent was that these proceedings are in the nature of a suit, for which he has to take permission as laid down in Section 512 and for a suit, the limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act is three years and that this application was made more than three years after the date of winding-up proceedings and even if the terminus a qua is taken to be the date of winding up, this application was barred by time, being in the nature- of a suit. I do not find myself in agreement with this contention. Once the provisions of Section 468 are found applicable, then that section provides that the court can pass an order ' at any time'. No limitation is laid and the matter is entirely left to the discretion of the court. '
12. On this reasoning, the court reversed the finding that the claim was barred by time.
13. In Official Liquidator v. Kadir [1977] KLT 39 this court held as follows (at p, 42):
' From the above conclusion, it follows that a right to resort to the summary procedure by way of an application accrues to the liquidator representing the company only on the commencement of the winding up. Till then, this is not a right available to the company. The Limitation Act has prescribed periods of limitation to file suits and applications. A claim application is not a suit. In Bank of Deccan Ltd. (In liquidation) v. E. K. John this court had occasion to consider whether a claim is in the nature of a suit or a suit and it was held that it is not. That was in connection with the interpretation of Section 3 of Act 30 of 1975. The same principle applies to the expression ' suit' used in the Limitation Act. In Hansraj v. Dehra Dun M. E. T. Co., [1933] 3 Comp Cas 207 (PC) their Lordships of the Privy Council had occasion to consider whether the periods of limitation provided for suits in the Limitation Act will apply to applications made by the liquidator under the Companies Act and their Lordships held that the liquidator's application to realise an asset due to the company is not a suit. I respectfully agree with the principle laid down therein and applying it I hold that the periods of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for suits do not apply to claim applications filed by the liquidator.
.....The question is, therefore, when can the liquidator's right to apply accrue This right to apply accrues to him when the winding up order was passed or when a provisional liquidator is appointed.
Previously, the company's remedy was only by way of a suit. A new remedy to make a claim application accrued only when the company is wound up.....'
14. In Faridabad Cold Storage v. Official Liquidator of Ammonia Supplies Corporation (P.) Ltd. [1978] 48 Comp Cas 432 ; AIR 1978 Delhi 158, a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court held as follows (p. 436, 437 of 48 Comp Cas) :
'One of the basic principles for interpretation of statutes is that different provisions in the Act ought to be harmoniously construed so that they do not militate against each other. Keeping this principle of construction of statutes in view and for the purpose of avoiding anomalous situations, the expression 'any claim' occurring in Section 446(2)(b) of the Act will have to be interpreted as a claim which is legally enforceable. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the expression 'any claim' in Clause (b) of Section 446(2) of the Act means any claim enforceable at law.
The next question which arises is as to the date on which it is to be seen whether the claim was enforceable at law or not. The right to avail of the remedy by filing a claim petition, as against the suit, conferred by Clause (b) of Section 446(2) can be availed of only in a court which is winding up the company and, therefore, it goes without saying that the right to avail of the remedy provided by the aforesaid Clause (b) will arise only after the passing of the winding-up order. So long as the winding-up order is not passed, no claim can be preferred under Clause (b) of Section 446(2). Under Section 458A, which we have already reproduced above, apart from the period between the date of the commencement of the winding-up of the company and the date on which the winding-up order, a period of one year immediately following the winding-up order is also excluded for purposes of computing the limitation. As the right to avail of the remedy provided by Clause (b) of Section 446(2) of the Act arises only after the passing of the winding-up order, the appropriate date to be seen for purposes of determining whether the claim was enforceable at law or not is the date of the winding-up order. Of course, the claimant will be entitled to the full benefit of Section 458A of the Act.'
15. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning of this court in Official Liquidator v. Kadir [1977] KLT 39 and that of the Delhi High Court in Faridabad Cold Storage v. Official Liquidator oj Ammonia Supplies Corporation (P.) Ltd. [1978] 48 Comp Cas 432 ; AIR 1978 Delhi 158 [FB]. Accordingly, I hold that the liquidator is entitled to add both the periods specified in Section 458A of the Companies Act to the three year period prescribed in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, I hold that the claims are not barred by limitation.
16. I am fortified in coming to the above conclusion by the following principles usually adopted in interpreting the provisions relating to limitation. It is well-settled that the language of an enactment especially like the Limitation Act must receive its natural meaning (see for example Norendra Nath Sarcar v. Kamalbasini Dasi [1895-97] ILR 23 Cal 563 PC and Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi [1909-10] ILR 36 Cal 1003 at 1014 PC. The courts have noticed that the fixation of periods of limitation must always, to some extent, be arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. However, the courts have held that in considering such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words' is the only safe guide. (See Kunju Naina v. Eapen Chacko, AIR 1954 TC 499, Boota Mal v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1716 and Siraj-ul-hag Khan v. Sunny Central Board of Wakf [1959] SCJ 367, 375. The courts have also held that where the language is dubious, the construction should be that which favours the right to sue rather than that which bars the right. (See Jethmal v. Ambsingh, AIR 1955 Raj 97 [FB] and Raghuraj Singh v. Sobhaman, AIR 1951 All 485 [FB]).
17. In that view, it is not necessary to consider the contention that in any case, the liquidator is entitled to approach this court under Section 470 of the Companies Act for making a call and that these claims may be treated as such a prayer.
18. On merits, the contentions raised by the respondents cannot be accepted. In C. C. No. 205 of 1987, where the claim is for an amount of Rs. 1,088 out of which the principal amount is Rs. 680, the contention is that the first and second calls were remitted by the respondent in full. According to the respondent, the call on February 12, 1977, was highly suspicious since no resolution was seen passed regarding the call on February 12, 1977, and the directors have not signed the resolution regarding the call made. The call made on April 5, 1977, is also suspicious. The respondent remitted a total sum of Rs. 3, 156 without there being proper calls. The calls made on November 30, 1976, and April 5, 1977, were subsequently cancelled in 1977 itself. It was, therefore, contended that no unpaid call amount is due from the respondent. The contention of the respondent in C. C. No. 210 of 1987 is substantially the same, except for the fact that the amount paid by him varies. The respondent therein remitted a total sum of Rs. 9,080, according to him, without proper calls.
19. These claims were tried together. Exhibit A-1(a) is the share ledger in respect of the respodent in C. C. No. 205 of 1987. He was the owner of 42 shares. Exhibit A-1(b) is the share ledger in the name of the respondent in C. C. No. 210 of 1987 who was holding 120 shares. As per exhibit A-2(a) share transfer, certain shares were transferred in the name of the respondent in C.C. No. 210 of 1987. The minutes of the board meeting held on February 2, 1977, is exhibit A-2(c) and the resolution relating to the meeting held on April 5, 1977, wherein the board decided to call Rs. 40 per share is marked as exhibit A-2(c). By exhibit A-3(a) resolution of the board meeting held on July 13, 1978, the call for Rs. 40 per share was cancelled. By exhibit A-2(d) resolution dated September 27, 1978, exhibit A-3(a) resolution was cancelled. Exhibit A-2(d) meeting was attended by the respondent in C.C. No. 210 of 1987, who was a director of this company. It is on this basis that the liquidator filed these claims for arrears of call money. In C.C. No. 205 of 1987, the total call amount was Rs. 3,836, out of which the respondent paid Rs. 3, 156. The claim is for the balance amount of Rs. 680 and interest. The liquidator has produced the notice as annexure A to the application which is marked as exhibit A-4. The notice in C.C. No. 210 of 1987 is marked as exhibit A-6. In exhibits A-1(a) and A-1(b), the respective amounts paid by the respondents, namely, Rs. 3,156 and Rs. 9,080 are seen credited. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that there are certain corrections in exhibit A-2(d) minutes book and two minutes books were maintained for the same period and that is highly suspicious. In this connection, it may be mentioned that exhibit A-2(d) and several other resolutions were passed in board meetings attended by the respondent in C. C. No. 210 of 1987. It was up to him to explain all these matters in court. He did not go to the box. Therefore, such contentions cannot be accepted.
20. In the claims, twelve per cent. interest from March 23, 1982, is claimed. There is no resolution in the minutes regarding payment of interest. Under the circumstances, interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the date of filing of the claim, namely. April 7, 1987, alone is allowed. The claims are decreed for the respective principal amounts together with interest at six per cent. on the respective principal amounts from April 7, 1987, till date of payment with costs.