Kochu Thommen, J.
1. These appeals arise from the common judgment in O. P. Nos. 6991, 6999 and 6992 of 1986 whereby the learned judge held that, in respect of a debt recoverable by recourse to the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 (' the Act'), the bar of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963, was inapplicable. The learned judge stated :
'.....As long as the right is not extinguished and no period isprescribed for resorting to the proceedings for recovery under the Act, the fact that a suit is barred will not disentitle the Bank from resorting to steps in pursuance of the notification by proceeding under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act..... '
2. The provisions of the Act have been made applicable by S. R. O. No. 797 of' 1979 to the recovery of loans advanced by a bank to a person for agriculture or agricultural purposes. It is open to the bank to recover such debts by recourse to the summary procedure under the Act instead of having recourse to the elaborate and time-consuming proce- dure provided under the Civil Procedure Code. The question, however, is whether the debt is recoverable under the Act at any time the bank chooses to recover it or is the bank, as in the case of a civil suit, shut out of remedy once the period prescribed under the Limitation Act has expired.
3. Counsel for the appellants submits that, in the absence of any provision in the Act creating a substantive right and a substantive liability, an amount which is no longer payable by the debtor by reason of the bar of limitation is no longer due from the debtor or recoverable under the Act. The Act creates a special mode of recovery, but does not create any right to recover the amount outside the period of limitation. A time-barred debt, counsel submits, is not recoverable under the Act.
4. Counsel for the respondent-bank contends that the object of the Act is to recover, in public interest, any amount in respect of which the creditor has a right to recover and the debtor has a duty to pay. The Act by providing a special remedy enables the creditor to recover even time-barred debts. So long as the substantive right of the bank and the corresponding substantive obligation of the debtor by reason of the loan are not extinguished, the remedy to recover the loan is preserved by the Act. The Limitation Act, therefore, has, according to counsel, no application.
5. Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators of the Dehra Dun Mussourie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [1933] 3 Comp Cas 207 ; AIR 1933 PC 63, was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1970 SC 1637. Adopting the principles laid down by the Privy Council, the Supreme Court stated that a time-barred debt could not be recovered merely by reason of the special mode of recovery provided by a special enactment. What was recoverable was only money payable, i.e., money legally recoverable, and not money the recovery of which is barred by limitation. The court stated that Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, only provided a special procedure for the Tealisation of rent in arrears and did not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. In Hansraj Guptav. Official Liquidator of the Dehra Dun Mussourie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [1933] 3 Comp Cas 207; AIR 1933 PC 63, 66, the Privy Council observed :
'.....And their Lordships are satisfied that the position in this respect is, in India, the same as in this country, for the reason that in view of the place and context in which these words are found, they must be confined in their Lordships'judgment to money due and recoverable in a suit by the company, and they do not include any moneys which at the date of the application under the section could not have been so recover-ed.'
6. See also Sri Narain v. Union Bank oj India, AIR 1924 Lah 53, 54, Official Liquidator, Palai Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Joseph Augusti [1966] KLT 411 ; AIR 1966 Ker 121 and Raghavan v. Narayanan [1986] KLT 10.
7. Counsel for the bank, however, contends that Section 71, as does Section 68 of the Act refers to money dues. This means that so long as the amount is due, even if the recovery of that money is barred in general law, remedy under the Act, being a special enactment, is still available. This argument, if accepted, would mean that even after a century and a half and more, the bank can suddenly wake up to its right and recover money by recourse to the Act. That was precisely the argument that was considered and rejected in the decisions cited above. Counsel for the bank, however, in his well-prepared arguments persists in referring to RSI Corporation v. Ramdas Reddiar [1980] KLT 425, where a Division Bench of this court stated that in respect of recovery under the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, where substantive rights and substantive liabilities have been created, the period during which recovery could be had should be determined with reference to the special provisions of that Act and not by reference to the Limitation Act. We respectfully agree. But that principle also, the belated enthusiasm of the bank notwithstanding, is not available on the construction of the Act.
8. In the absence of a provision creating a substantive right to recover time-barred debts, the Act providing for summary recovery does not avail once the period prescribed for recovery under the Limitation Act has expired. The Act only provides for easy recovery, not recovery at any time. Time is necessarily limited, unless of course the Legislature provides to the contrary. The question in each case is whether the statute in question has created a substantive right or liability providing, in respect of a debt, a period of limitation different from what is prescribed under the Limitation Act or has altogether removed the bar of limitation in respect of such a debt. If the answer were to be in the affirmative, the bank's counsel would be right in his submission on the point. Butwe do not read the relevant provisions of the Act as creating any such right. The Act creates a special procedure, but not a substantive right to over-come limitation. As stated by the Lahore High Court in Sri Narain v. Union Bank of India, AIR 1924 Lah 53, and cited with approval by the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussourie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [1933] 3 Comp Cas 207 ; AIR 1933 PC 63 :
'...the section does not create new liabilities or confer new rights, but merely creates a summary procedure for enforcing existing liabilities...'
9. The Government Pleader, supporting the contention of the bank, submits that by reason of the notification under Section 71, the money due to the bank has become public revenue and, therefore, the shorter period of limitation applicable to an ordinary debt, cannot be applicable to such a debt. We do not agree. The section only provides for a machinery for recovery of money due to the notified institution. It treats the debt as if it were public revenue for the purpose of recovery and does not convert it into public revenue. . The debt, for that reason, does not assume the attributes of public revenue, for there is no qualitative change in its character. As stated by Madhavan Nair J. in Kunhaminu Umma v. Parn Amma [1967J KLT 596 :
'...It is pertinent to remember here that the Revenue Recovery Act deals only with the process of recovery of revenue and not with (the) inci-dence of revenue.'
10. In the circumstances, we set aside the judgment under appeal, quash the orders impugned in the original petitions, and allow the appeals. No costs.