S. Padmanabhan, J.
1. Plaint A schedule property, covered by Ext. A1 mortgage in favour of the first defendant, is 45 1/2 cents. B Schedule 20 cents forming part of A schedule was sub-mortgaged by the first defendant to the plaintiff under Ext. A2 in 1961. C schedule is the balance 251/2 cents in the possession of the first defendant. After purchasing the equity of redemption from the jenmies in 1967 under Ext. A3, plaintiff sued the first defendant for redemption in O.S. No. 277 of 1970. After reference to the Land Tribunal, the claim of tenancy put forward by the first defendant was accepted and the suit dismissed. The decree was confirmed in appeal, evidenced by Exts. B1 and B2. There was no second appeal. Under the Debt Relief Act, the first defendant filed O.P. No. 11 of 1971 to redeem F,xt. A2 sub-mortgage for B schedule property against the plaintiff. The claim of the plaintiff for fixity of tenure under the Land Reforms Act was rejected after reference to the Land Tribunal reserving kudikidappu right to be agitated in execution. Ext. A2 was ordered to he redeemed and it was confirmed in appeal and that decision also has become final.
2. The claim of tenancy of the first defendant was accepted in Exts. B1 and B2 in view of the law interpreted in the Full Bench decision is Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandoz, v. Albert Fernandez 1971 Ker LT 216 : (AIR 1973 Kcr 55), which held the field then. That decision on the question of law relating to tenancy was later overruled by a larger Bench in Vclayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan Sadasivan 1975 Ker LT I. The present suit is lor redemption of A schedule property covered by Ext. A1 on the ground that in view of Vclayudhan's ease 1975 Ker IT I, the earlier decisions, which are legally wrong, cannot operate as resjudicata. Accepting the plea of res judieata, trial court dismissed the suit. But the appellate court ignored the two earlier decisions in the suit and the original petition, so far as B schedule 20 cents is concerned, and declared Ext. A1 as extinguished to that extent though the remaining part of the decree was confirmed accept ing the plea of res judieata. First defendant died and his legal representatives have come up in second appeal.
3. Learned District Judge rejected the plea of resjudicata in relation to B schedule property for two reasons. Firstly, he said that since the mortgagee was not in possession of B schedule property, a decision on the question of tenancy and fixity of tenure was absolutely irrelevant in the first suit. So also, he held that the quest ion whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the mortgage charge in respect of B schedule property extinguished was not decided in that case. For these reasons, he held, that plea of res judieata is applicable only for redemption of C schedule property
4. 1 do not think that the view taken by the District Judge is correct. Now, there are two final and conclusive decisions on the merits inter partes by two competent courts, one holding that the first defendant is a tenant entitled to fixity of tenure for the entire 45 1/2 cents and the other rejecting the tenancy claim of the plaintiff for B schedule 20 cents. That means, first defendant cannot be redeemed in respect of any portion and first defendant is entitled to redeem the sub-mortgage as the plaintiff is not a tenant. As rightly pointed out by the District Judge, it is the finding and not the ground or reasons for the finding that is res judicata. What is decided, that is the decision, alone is res judicata. The matter directly and substantially in issue between the parties in the first suit was whether the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the entire 45 1/2 cents or whether the first defendant was entitled to fixity of tenure for the whole 45 1/2 cents and as such no portion could be redeemed. The finding was that first defendant was entitled to fixity for the whole 45 1/2 cents and he cannot be redeemed. That is why the entire suit was dismissed. If the finding was otherwise, the plaintiff could have been given a decree for redemption or extinguishment of the mortgage for the B schedule 20 cents covered by the sub-mortgage. If such a right was available to the plaintiff, he might and ought to have included it in the earlier suit before suffering a decree rejecting his entire claim based on the equity of redemption he purchased. Decision which operates as res judicata in that case is that first defendant is a tenant entitled to fixity of tenure for the entire 45 1/2 cents and hence plaintiff is not entitled to redeem him. In the original petition, the matter directly and substantially in issue was whether the first defendant was entitled to redeem the sub-mortgage and whether the plaintiff has fixity of tenure under the Land Reforms Act. That was also heard and finally decided after reference to the Land Tribunal. In both these cases, the decision, on the question of tenancy was absolutely necessary to grant or refuse the relief claimed by the plaintiff or defendant. Then how is it possible for the District Judge to say that the question of tenancy and fixity of tenure was absolutely irrelevant in the first suit so far as B schedule property is concerned. At any rate, constructive resjudicata, if not res judicata pure and simple, must apply.
5. Matter in issue is the right claimed by one and denied by the other. Claim of right in its very inception depends upon proved facts and application of the relevant law Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953. Directly and substantially in issue could be constructively also. Matter in issue may be an issue of faci; an issue of law or one of mixed fact and law. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed fact and law decided by a competent court is finally decided between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The claim of right depends upon proof of facts and application of law relevant thereto. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has already been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. Even though decision on a pure question of law unrelated to facts which gives rise to any right cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue and as such res judicata, when the law is applied to facts which are the foundation of rights and decided, the decision is res judicata. It is a composite decision. The decision on law cannot be dissociated from decision on facts on which the right is founded. In other words, when the finding on an issue is based on a certain view of the law, that view of the law, as an abstract proposition and dissociated from the actual matter in issue, will not be res judicata so as to be applicable to all future disputes between the same parties which may give rise to the applicability of the same abstract question of law. The object of the rule of resjudicata is not to fasten upon the parties, special principles of law as applicable to them inter sc but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent the ascertainment from being nugatory by precluding the parties from re-opening or recontesting that which has been finally decided Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, AIR 1971 SC 2355. Resjudicata is a rule of procedure and it cannot change the law of the land as applicable to specific parties by decisions of courts.
6. The question of irrelevancy noticed by the District Judge has no application. Bar of res judicata cannot be overcome on the ground that right to get the mortgage right extinguished is not covered by the decision. When it is found that the mortgage is not liable to be redeemed by the fixity on account of the tenancy involved in it, the effect of res judicata cannot be overcome by such intcr-pretatory process. Bar of res judicata is mandatory. When it is applicable, it could be avoided only on grounds available under Section 44 of the Evidence Act. Resjudicata is not concerned with the question whether the previous decision is right or wrong. A wrong decision rendered with jurisdiction, if not corrected by appeal, revision, review or other methods available by law will have as much binding force as a right decision. Jurisdiction to decide involves the right to err within the limits of jurisdiction. By such error, if something is done assuming non existent jurisdiction or wrongly omitting to exercise the vested jurisdiction by an erroneous interpretation of law, the question cannot operate as res judicata. The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi judicial body cannot be impeached otherwise than in appeal, etc. unless it relates to a matter of jurisdiction. When the decision is a nullity for want of inherent jurisdiction, no question of res judicata will arise.
7. A finding or decision inter partes based on a certain view of the law connected with the facts relating to right of parties is binding on them even though the abstract proposition of law dissociated from the facts may not be so. Subsequent change of law, statutory or interpretative, cannot take away the binding force of the previous decision inter partes. That does not mean that in spite of the change of law the earlier decision will bind the parties in future disputes. When the cause of action and reliefs are different, the new law alone will govern. That is because the matter in issue in the subsequent proceeding is different since the law to be interpreted is different. A statutory change of law with retrospective effect, depending upon statutory provisions, may be capable of re-opening concluded decisions. But a different interpretation of law overruling an earlier decision not inter partes on the question of interpretation of law cannot have the effect of re-opening the earlier decision which has become final between parties. Otherwise, whenever there is an interpretative change in law, fresh litigations ignoring earlier concluded decisions could be had. Velayudhan's case 1975 Ker LT I (FB), which overruled Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez's case 1971 Ker LT 216 : (AIR 1973 Ker 55) (FB) on the interpretation of the amplitude of tenancy, cannot have the effect of taking away the bar of res judicata on account of previous concluded decisions inter partes and allowing the plaintiff to file the present suit ignoring the earlier decisions. If such an interpretation is allowed, there cannot be any finality of decisions.
8. The effect of the first decision dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff is that the first defendant is a tenant of the entire 45 1/2 cents entitled to fixity of tenure and not liable to be redeemed irrespective of the question whether he is in actual possession or not. That means, the title of a tenant entitled to permanent occupancy was conferred on him. The effect of the second decision is that first defendant is entitled to redeem the sub-mortgage and dispossess the plaintiff on the strength of his permanent right under Ext. A1 declared in the earlier suit since the plaintiff was found to be not a tenant entitled to fixity of tenure on the basis of the sub-mortgage. The effect of these decisions operating as res judicata cannot be easily allowed to be overcome by a declaration of extinguishment of the mortgage right on the strength of the equity of redemption and the possession under the sub-mortgage.
Second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the appellate court are set aside restoring the decision of the trial court dismissing the suit. There will be no order for costs, so far as this court is concerned.