P. Krishnamoorthy, J.
1. Second Appeal No. 80 of 1983 is by the 1st defendant in O.S. No. 83/76 of the Sub Court, Badagara (originally filed as O.S. No. 160/75 on the file of the Munsiff s Court, Payyoli). Second Appeal No. 107 of 1983 is by the plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4 in O.S. No. 34/75. O.S. No. 83/76 is for specific performance of an agreement of sale and O.S. No. 34/75 is a suit for partition. The subject-matter in both the suits being the same, they were jointly tried. In order to understand the controversy in the appeals it is necessary to state the facts. I shall refer to the parties as they are arrayed in the partition suit viz., O.S. No. 34/75. The suit property in the partition suit belonged in common to three persons Dr. Raghavan, Sri Kanaran and Sri Kunhikannan who purchased the same under the sale deed Ext. Al dated 17-7-1957 for a consideration of Rs. 300/-. Under Ext. B44 sale deed dated 15-2-1966, one-third right of Kunhikannan was assigned to one Mohan-das, Advocate, who is the 2nd defendant in the suit. The partition suit is filed by one of the daughters of deceased Kanaran who died on 28-4-1972. The 1st defendant in the suit is Dr. Raghavan who surrendered his one-third right to the State under the ceiling provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the State is impleaded in the suit as the 6th defendant in view of the above. The 2nd defendant is the assignee of Kunhikannan under Ext. B44. The 3rd defendant is the widow of Kanaran and the 4th defendant is another daughter of Kanaran who is the sister of the plaintiff. The 1st defendant died during the pendency of the suit and the 5th defendant, his wife was impleaded as his legal representative. The 7th defendant is a person in whose favour the 3rd defendant executed Ext. B1 dated 17-10-1972, agreeing to sell the one-third share of herself and her two daughters, plaintiff and the 4th defendant. The plaintiff filed the suit for allotment of one-ninth share in the plaint property to her, the other shares being held by the other defendants.
2. The main contesting defendant in the suit is the 7th defendant who claimed that the 3rd defendant in the suit had entered into an agreement with her for assigning the one-third share belonging to the plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4 to her on receipt o*f an advance of Rs. 1,000/- from her. She also produced Ext. B1 dated 17-10-1972 in support of that. In the meantime she had also filed a suit O.S. No. 160/75 before the Munsiff's Court, Payyoli for specific performance of the agreement of sale as against defendants.' 3 and 4 and the plaintiff, which was later re-numbered as O.S. No. 83/76. She contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in view of the agreement of sale in her favour mentioned above. Defendants 3 and 4 also raised a contention that the plaintiff is entitled to claim her one-ninth share.
3. As stated earlier, the 7th defendant had filed O.S. No. 83/76 for specific performance of the agreement of sale in respect of the one-third share that belonged to Kanaran which devolved on the plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4. It was alleged in that suit that there was an agreement on 17-10-1972 by which the 3rd defendant had agreed to convey the one-third share belonging to her and her two daughters, plaintiff and 4th defendant, to her. According to her the 3rd defendant was managing the property on behalf of her daughters also and that she agreed to sell one-third share in the property belonging to them for a consideration of Rs. 2,250/-. An advance amount of Rs. 1,000/- also was paid and the 4th defendant's husband was also an attestor to the document. It was also alleged by the 7th defendant that she was put in possession of the one-third share and that the 2nd defendant (Mohandas) was managing the property on her behalf also. She further alleged that in pursuance of the agreement of sale she got possession and made considerable improvements in the property. In spite of demand the sale deed was not executed and according to her the defendants are bound to assign their one-third share to her on receiving the balance price of Rs. 1,250/ -. Alternatively she contended that in case it is found that the daughters are not bound by the agreement of sale the plaintiff be granted relief in respect of the share of the 3rd defendant who is bound by the same. O.S. No. 83/76 is filed by the 7th defendant in O.S. No. 34/75. Defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. No. 83/76 are defendants 3 and 4 in O.S. No. 34/75 and the 3rd defendant in O.S. No. 83/76 is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 34/75.
4. The 3rd defendant (1st defendant in O.S. No. 83/76) filed a written statement contending that at the time of purchase of the land by her husband the soil was salty, the crop was poor and the cultivation was in a loss and the land was kept fallow for a considerable period. In 1966 Mohandas, the 2nd defendant purchased one-third share of Kunhikannan and even before the said assignment a dam by name Mangamoozhi Dam had come into existence by which the flow of saline water in the plaint property was prevented and the land had been made cultivable. She had no experience in cultivation and in 1972 when she entered into an agreement of sale she was not aware of the construction of the dam by the Government and the improvement caused to the property on account of the construction. The agreement was entered into at the instigation of Mohandas (2nd defendant) and the agreement was taken in the name of the 7th defendant (plaintiff in O.S. No. 83/ 76) who is his brother's wife. Shortly after the execution of Ext. B1 receipt one Chathu, D.W. 2 informed her that the land had considerably improved due to the Mangamoozhi Dam and that if she was aware of the existence of the dam she would not have agreed to self the property. According to her she entered into the agreement of sale without properly understanding the real state of affairs regarding the property and that only at the instigation of Sri Mohandas that the agreement happened to be entered into. She was not aware of the true nature and value of the property at the time of execution of the our of the 7th defendant. She also denied the fact that receipt and in these circumstances the Court the 7th defendant and Mohandas improved should not grant the discretionary relief of the properties. Defendants 2 and 3 in O.S. No. 83/76 who are the plaintiff and 4th defendant specific performance in favin the partition suit, filed a written statement contending that the agreement Ext. B1 is not binding on them as they were not parties to the same. The plaintiff's husband attested the document without knowing the contents and it will not bind them. They contended that in any view of the matter specific performance cannot be granted in respect of their shares.
5. Both these suits were jointly tried. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant was not aware of the improvement of the land as a result of the construction of Mangamoozhi dam and that there are sufficient reasons for refusing specific performance under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and consequently dismissed the suit for specific performance. In the partition suit a preliminary decree was passed by allotting one-ninth share to the plaintiff and one-ninth share each to defendants 3 and 4. Correspondingly shares were allotted to the other defendants also. Against the dismissal of O.S. No. 83/76 the plaintiff (7th defendant in the partition suit) filed an appeal and against the partition decree defendants 2 and 7 therein filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court disagreed with the trial Court and granted a decree for specific performance in respect of the one-ninth share belonging to the 3rd defendant in the partition suit. No decree for specific performance was granted in respect of the share of the plaintiff and 4th defendant in the partition suit. Consequently, modifications were made in the preliminary decree for partition also. The lower appellate Court also held that defendants 2 and 7 are also entitled to the value of improvements which they have made in the property, the quantum of which was directed to be determined in the final decree. Two appeals against the above decree are filed by the 1st defendant in O.S. 83/76 and by plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4 in O.S. No. 34/75. A Memorandum of Cross-objection has been filed in S. A. No. 80 of 1983 by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 83/76, challenging the refusal of a decree for specific performance in respect of shares of defendants 2 and 3 in that suit (shares of plaintiff and 4th defendant in the partition suit).
6. The decree in the suit for partition will depend upon the decree in the specific performance suit. The main question to be decided in the appeal is regarding the correctness of the decree in the specific performance suit. Counsel for the appellant challenged the decree on two grounds; (1) that in the facts and circumstances of this case the Court should have refused the discretionary relief of specific performance, and that the case will come under Section 20(2)(a) of the Specific Relief Act; and (2) that, in any view of the matter, as the whole contract could not be specifically performed, the plaintiff has not satisfied the conditions mentioned in Section 12 and that the Court should not have decreed specific performance of a part of the contract. Counsel for the respondent in support of the Memorandum of Cross Objection contended that the Court should have decreed the specific performance in full as the 3rd defendant had implied authority to enter into the agreement of sale on behalf of the plaintiff and 4th defendant. He further contended that under Section 187 of the Contract Act, an agent's authority is stated to be implied when it can be inferred from the circumstances of the case.
7. I shall first consider the question as to whether the lower appellate Court was correct in granting the relief of specific performance and whether the appellant has made out any case for refusing the discretionary relief of specific performance. The fact that she entered into agreement of sale with the 7th defendant and that she received an advance amount of Rs. 1,000/- is admitted. Ext. B1 dated 17-10-1972 is the receipt executed by her for a sum of Rs. 1,000/-, received on that day as advance. The terms of the agreement are also clear from the recitals in Ext. B1. The only contention raised by the 3rd defendant against specific performance is that at the time of entering into the agreement she was not aware of the real nature and potentiality of the plaint property because of the coming into existence of Mangamooshi dam. Counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in Ramakrishna v. Palaniappa, AIR 1963 Mad 17. In that case, the defendant had no knowledge that a scheme for irrigation by digging a channel was in progress which had increased the value of the land to a considerable extent. But the plaintiff who had knowledge of it had suppressed it from the defendant and the price was also inadequate. It was also found in that case that the defendant wound up his business at Chidambaram and went away to his native place, that at the time of entering into the agreement he was not aware of the existence of a scheme for irrigation was in progress. In those circumstances, their Lordships held that the parties were not at equal footing, and the plaintiff was aware and the seller being ignorant of the real value of the land sold the bargain was oppressive and unconscionable and that it was not appropriate to grant the relief of specific performance. If the 3rd defendant, as alleged by her, was not aware of the existence of the dam and the value of the property on the date of the agreement of sale, there is force in her contention. It was also urged by counsel for the appellant that at the time the 3rd defendant was a widow who lost her husband just about six months prior to the date of the agreement and that the 2nd defendant being an advocate was able to obtain the agreement of sale by suppressing the real state of affairs. On going through the evidence I am satisfied that no condition exists on the facts and circumstances of this case which will warrant a refusal of a decree for specific performance. The 3rd defendant was examined in this case as D.W.1. She is a graduate. She had admitted that from 1968 onwards she was managing the properties of her husband who was laid up from that time and that she had a power-of-attorney also from him. The 4th defendant and her husband were in Germany from 1969. The plaintiff was also married in 1969 and her husband was in Kohima. She further admitted that the co-owners attempted to cultivate the property in 1958 and that it was a failure, that there was no cultivation of the land till 1972 and that she was not prepared to cultivate the land as it will end only in a loss. In her evidence she also stated that she enquired to Dr. Raghavan, the other co-owner, whether he was willing to purchase her share. He was not prepared to buy it. She admitted that she enquired about the price of the land with him. It is also admitted by her that there was a detailed discussion between her and Mr. Mohandas, the 2nd defendant regarding the price, that she demanded a price of Rs. 5,000/- and that after bargaining the price was fixed at Rs. 2250/-. It has come out in evidence that the plaintiff was also present at the time. The son-in-law of the 3rd defendant is also an attester to the document. It is her admitted case that none of her daughters or sons-in-law were prepared to cultivate the land. Over and above all, these, it has come out in evidence that, the Mangamooshi dam had come into existence in 1966 itself and that she had surrendered possession of her share to the 7th defendant. From the evidence it is clear that the 3rd defendant was quite competent to look after her affairs, that she made all enquiries regarding the price and other matters and that before entering into the agreement of sale she had every information regarding the property. From the evidence it is clear that the assertion of the counsel for the appellant that she was a helpless widow cannot be accepted and it is evident that the 3rd defendant was managing the affairs of her husband from 1968 and that she was aware of the value of the land at the time of entering into the agreement. No attempt is made by her to show that the price agreed upon for the one-third share is below the market value. It is pertinent in this connection to note that the whole property was purchased in 1957 for Rs. 300/ -. The one-third share was purchased by 2nd defendant in 1965 for Rs. 1500/- and the price agreed for the one-third share under the present agreement is Rs. 2,250/-. These facts indicate that the price agreed upon is reasonable. It is admitted by her that in 1972 under the agreement of sale possession was handed over to the vendee. It has come out in evidence that after the agreement the 2nd and 7th defendants together have improved the property and that the price also increased after 1972. On the evidence I am satisfied that on the date of the agreement the plaintiff was well-versed with the real nature of the property and that she is objecting to the execution of the sale deed only because the land was improved after 1972 by the 2nd defendant and the 7th defendant. The trial Court refused the relief of specific performance also on account of the fact that there was delay in filing the suit and counsel for the appellant reiterated that ground before me also. It is true that the suit was filed just before the expiry of the period of limitation. But it is well-settled that mere delay without any conduct of the plaintiff which would cause prejudice to the defendant is no ground for refusing the relief of specific performance. Unlike in England, in India the statute prescribes the period of limitation,and if the suit is within time, delay issanctioned by law. In Satyanarayana v.Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405, construingSection 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to Section 20 of the 1963 Act) theirLordships observed as follows (at p.1409):-
'(7) Mr. Lakahmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a Court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems - English and Indian -- qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay -- the time lag depending upon circumstances may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises.'
'(11) The result of the aforesaid discussion of the case law may be briefly stated thus: While in England mere delay or laches may be a ground for refusing to give a relief of specific performance, in India mere delay without such conduct on the part of the plaintiff as would cause prejudice to the defendant does not empower a Court to refuse such a relief. But as in England so in India, proof of abandonment or waiver of a right is not a pre-condition necessary to disentitle the plaintiff to the said relief, for if abandonment or waiver is established, no question of discretion on the part of the Court would arise. We have used the expression 'waiver' in its legally accepted sense, namely, 'waiver is contractual, and may constitute a cause of action: it is an agreement to release or not to ascert a right' see Dawson's Bank Ltd. v. Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki Kaisha, 62 Ind App 100 at p. 108: (AIR 1935 PC 79 at p. 82). It is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a Court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff.
But they must be such that the representationby or the conduct or neglect of the plaintiff is directly responsible in inducing the defendant to change his position to his prejudice or such as to bring about a situation when it would be inequitable to give him such a relief.'
In this case there is no plea or any evidence that by the mere delay any prejudice has been caused to the defendant or that there is any change of situation which would make the granting of the relief of specific performance inequitable in any way. No circumstances exist in this case to refuse specific performance as contended by counsel for the appellant. The lower appellate court exercised the discretion properly in decreeing specific performance of the agreement.
8. The next contention of counsel for the appellant is that, in any view of the matter, as admittedly the 3rd defendant cannot specifically perform the whole of the contract, a decree should not have been passed as the conditions in Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act have not been complied with. Before considering the question it will be advantageous to consider the Memorandum of Gross Objection filed by the 7th defendant as to whether she is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of the entire agreement. If that is held in favour of the 7th defendant, the contention on the basis of Section 12 may not arise. It is clear from the facts of the case that the 3rd defendant had only a one-ninth right over the property. She agreed to sell one-third interest in the property belonging to herself the plaintiff and the 4th defendant. As the plaintiff and the 4th defendant were majors at the time of agreement, the 3rd defendant admittedly cannot enter into a contract to bind them. But the contention of counsel for the respondent is that the 3rd defendant was acting as the agent of her daughters also and that she had an implied authority to bind them also. He relied on the circumstances that the 3rd defendant was managing the entire property, that she was looking after the affairs of her daughters also and that in these circumstances she was acting as the agent of them in entering into the agreement. But it is clear from Ext.Bl itself that she was not acting as the agent of the plaintiff and the 4th defendant. In Ext. B1 it is stated that the 3rd defendant shall execute a sale deed along with her daughters also and there is no statement in it that she was acting as the agent of plaintiff and defendant No. 4. The recital in Ext.Bl itself is a negation of an agency and on the face of the recital therein it is difficult to accept the contention of counsel for the respondent that she acted as the agent of her daughters. As admittedly the 3rd defendant had only one-ninth she was competent to enter into an agreement only regarding her share and the agreement made by her will not affect the share of plaintiff or the 4th defendant. I confirm the finding of the lower appellate court on that point.
9. Now coming to the applicability of Section 12 it is contended by counsel for the appellant that this is a case which will come under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act whereas counsel for the respondent contended that it will come under Section 123) of the Act. According to the respondent, the contract entered into by the 3rd defendant shall be treated as three separate and independent contracts in regard to her share and the shares of her daughters. As the agreement by the 3rd defendant regarding her share is independent of the agreement regarding the other shares, she is entitled to specific performance of her share at least by paying the proportionate value. Section 12(4) of the present Specific Relief Act corresponds to Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act came up for consideration before the Madras High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Abdul Sammad, AIR 1937 Mad 596. There, the defendant agreed to sell to plaintiff a plot of land in which he had only 1 / 3rd share and the remaining 2/3rd share belonged to his children. Out of the agreed consideration, certain sum was paid as advance also by the plaintiff, the contract became incapable of performance as the two sons were unable to fulfil it and in a suit by the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract the Madras High Court held 'that as the contract was not divisible into two parts, one relating to a third of the plot and the other relating to the remaining two thirds, the Court could not substitute a new bargain and force a new contract) on the parties by decreeing the plaintiffs claim with respect to one-third share of the defendant, on payment of the price in proportion to that share. The specific performance of the contract with respect to the defendant's share could not therefore be granted under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act'. In Parthasarathi v. Venkata Kondiah, AIR 1965 Mad 188 it was stated as follows construing Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 : 'A contract for sale of property in one lot will generally be considered as indivisible, as the conveyance of item 2 does not stand on a separate and independent footing'.
10. The facts of this case are in pari materia with the above case and I agree with the dictum laid down in that decision. The contract being indivisible and as the agreement relating to the share of the 3rd defendant does not have any independent existence Section 12(4) of the Specific Relief Act has no application.
11. Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act reads thus:
'(3) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which must be left unperformed either-
(a) forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of compensation in money; or
(b) does not admit of compensation in money; he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance; but the court may, at the suit of the other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, if the other party-
(i) in a case falling under clause (a), pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed and in a case falling under clause (b), pays or has paid the consideration for the whole of the contract without anyabatement; and
(ii) in either case, relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all right to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant.'
The 3rd defendant had agreed to sell one-third right over the plaint property which belonged to her and her two daughters. Admittedly, she had only one-ninth share in the property. The daughters are not willing to join the sale deed. In these circumstances, it is clear that the 3rd defendant is unable to perform the whole contract. In other words, she is in a position to perform the contract only to an extent of one-third and the remaining two-third cannot be performed. It can thus be seen that the part which is left unperformed forms a considerable part of the whole contract. The phrase 'admitting of compensation' implies that there are data for ascertaining a fair and reasonable amount as the money value of the difference between what can be performed and the express subject-matter of the contract. If a reasonable estimate of the amount, as the money value can be made, it will be a case where the compensation is ascertainable. The fair and reasonable compensation can easily be determined in this case with reference to the amount of sale consideration fixed for the original contract. The contract was in respect of a one-third share. As already noticed, two-third of it cannot be performed so that there is no difficulty in ascertaining the amount in difference between what can be performed and the subject-matter of the contract. In these circumstances, the ingredients of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act are present in the instant case,
12. The further question to be considered is whether the 7th defendant (plaintiff in the specific performance suit) has satisfied the condition in Section 12(3)(ii). Counsel for the appellant contended that under the above subsection if a plaintiff wants performance of a part of a contract, he must relinquish all his claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all right to compensation either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained fay him through the default of the defendant. According to the 3rd defendant, there is no allegation in the plaint that she is prepared to do so and even in the courts below she had not relinquished her claims as contemplated under the above sub-section. It was further pointed out that even in this Court the plaintiff has filed a Cross Objection claiming specific performance of the whole contract and that in these circumstances, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree as contemplated under Section 12(3) of a part of the contract. Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff in the specific performance suit) submitted that she is prepared to relinquish all her claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all right to compensation either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by her through the default of the defendant in case this Court finds that the contract can be performed only in part. The question to be considered is at what stage is the relinqnishment to be made by the plaintiff. In Kalyanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 165 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the relinquishment of claim to further performance of the remaining part of the contract and of rights to compensation can be made at any stage of the litigation. In view of the above decision, it is clear that the relinquishment can be made at any stage of the litigation including the appellate stage. See also Parthasarathi v. Venkata Kondiah, AIR 1965 Mad 188. The claim of the plaintiff for grant of benefit under Section 12(3) cannot therefore be rejected on the simple ground that it was not made at the trial stage but has been made for the first time at the appellate stage. In my view, the claim also cannot be rejected on the ground that it was not incorporated in the plaint or was not set forth in writing before the trial court. In many cases, it may be doubtful and may require an enquiry and trial to come to a conclusion as to whether a person will be entitled to perform a contract only in part or not and to refuse relief to a plaintiff on the sole ground that re inquishment was not made at ar earlier stage will highly prejudice his right. In these circumstances, I feel that the plaintiff is entitled toperformance of the contract in respect of the3rd defendant's share in the property underSection 12(3) of the Act.
13. If the case comes under Section 12(3)(a), the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement on her paying the agreed consideration reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed. But in this case, in view of the fact that the plaintiff was not prepared to relinquish her claim regarding part which could not be performed till the case came up before this Court, I feel that the plaintiff must be directed to pay the full consideration agreed upon for the whole property, namely Rs. 2250/-though she is entitled to get a decree only in respect of the share of the 3rd defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff also submitted before me that in case this Court feels that the whole price should be paid, he is agreeable to the same. In view of the above, I hold that the plaintiff will be entitled to a decree for specific performance of the share of the 3rd defendant in case she pays the whole consideration agreed upon and stated in Ext. B1. I also make it clear that the plaintiff has relinquished all her claims as contemplated under Section 12(3)(ii).
14. Coming to the partition suit, counsel for the appellants contended that the direction by the courts below that defendants 2 and 7 will be entitled to the value of improvements which they have made in the property is wrong. According to him defendants 2 and 7 being only co-owners of the property are not entitled to the same. On going through the evidence and judgments of the courts below I feel that this is a matter which has to be decided in the final decree proceedings. The question as to whether they are entitled to any improvements made in the property and the equities between the parties in that respect will be decided in the final decree proceedings. The direction for payment of value of improvements to defendants 2 and 7 is vacated subject to the above direction.
15. In the result, the two Second Appeals and the Cross Objection are disposed of as follows: In O.S. No. 83/76 the plaintiff is given a decree for specific performance of the contract to the extent of the share of the 1st defendant therein on the plaintiff paying the whole sale price less the amount already paid. On her depositing the amount, the 1st defendant therein shall execute the assignment to the extent of her share, failing which the court shall execute the assignment deed on her behalf at the expense of the plaintiff. The direction of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff shall be entitled to get back the expenses of the execution of the document from the 1st defendant is vacated. The decree in the partition suit is modified to the extent that the one-ninth share of Santha shall be allotted to Rathnam (plaintiff in the specific performance suit) in case she complies with the directions and gets the sale deed executed as decreed in O. S. No. 83/76. The question as to whether defendants 2 and 7 are entitled to any value of improvements which they have effected in the property shall be decided in the final decree proceedings and the finding in the judgment regarding that question is vacated. Subject to the above modifications the decrees in the two suits are confirmed. The parties shall bear their costs in this Court.