S. Padmanabhan, J.
1. Appellant Pushpakaran, belonging to Chenganacherry, married respondent Sarojini from Adimali on 5-2-1976. Their marital life was not happy. Sarojini moved the S.N.D.P. Branch at Aladi on 9-11-1978 by Ext. B1 application to get a divorce. The S.N.D.P. Branch contacted the Malanad S.N.D.P. Union, which contacted the Cheganacherry S.N.D.P. Union Though the Perunna S.N.D.P. Branch, appellant was requested to go over to Kattappana for a settlement on 7-1-1979. Appellant went there and had a discussion, which resulted in Ext. A1 arbitration agreement referring the disputes to some office-bearers of the S.N.D.P. for arbitration. The award is Ext. A2. It was made a rule of court in O. P. No. 24 of 1980 by the Subordinate Judge, Thodupuzha.
2. Appellant moved for setting aside the award on the grounds of misconduct and absence of an arbitration agreement. The application was dismissed. A.S. No. 387 of 1988 is against that order. A.S. No. 386 of 1988 was filed by him to set aside the decree on the ground that it is not in conformity with the award. Civil revision petition is against the decree in so far as it purports to be in conformity with the award. The two appeals were originally filed before the District Court, Thodupuzha. They were re-called to this court for being heard along with the civil revision petition.
3. The application for setting aside the award on the grounds of misconduct and! want of proper arbitration agreement was dismissed for the sole reason that it was barred by limitation. Article 119 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Period of limitation is 30 days and it starts from the date of service of notice of the filing of the award. No notice was given by court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration, Act of the filing of the award. There is not even a proper filing of the award before court of notice of making and signing the award, as contemplated by Section 14(1). The suit to make the award a rule of the court was brought by the respondent and not by the arbitrators. A copy of the award was not sent to the appellant and no notice was issued that the award was filed in court. Limitation under Article 119 starts only from the date on which notice of filing the award was served. There-fore, the objection to set aside the award could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation, as held in Dewan Singh v. Champat Singh AIR 1970 SC 967. A.S. No. 387 of 1988 has to be allowed on this ground alone. The objection to the award was not considered on the merits.
4. The appellant has a case that he was not a willing party to any arbitration agreement and that he was coerced to sign Ext. A1. The trial court rejected that objection for want of evidence. I do not think that there is any reason to interfere with that finding. But the objections of misconduct and want of a proper arbitration agreement were not at all considered. Ext. A1 does not contain any terms of reference or the matters to be decided. It contains only a general statement that the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the named arbitrators. What is the subject on which their decision is sought or what are the matters to be decided by them are not mentioned in Ext. A1. Even reading Ext. B1 application filed by the respondent as part of Ext. A1 agreement for arbitration, the maxi-mum that could be said is that the reference was whether the marriage is to be dissolved or not and nothing else. Whether marriage has to be dissolved or not is not an arbitrable dispute. If it is not by consent of parties, divorce can be effected only by an order of a competent court, which operates as a decision in rem. Sanctity and binding nature of an award by a third party has its origin in the fact that the arbitrator was selected by the parties, who agreed to abide by his or their decision on matters agreed to, except when the arbitration is under a statute. That agreement on specified matters is the authority. Anything beyond that is unauthorised and not having the force of law except to the extent authorised by the Arbitration Act or any other law.
5. There is no award on the question of dissolution of marriage. What the arbitrators did by making Ext. A2 award was to take the following decisions:
(a) Rs. 7,001/- and a ring (no details of weight, size or metal) given by the wife's father should be returned to him;
(b) Since the wife insists that she cannot continue the alliance, she must pay Rupees 1,750/- to the husband;
(c) Necklace given by the husband at the time of marriage (without any details) should be returned and the husband should return a ring given by the wife (no details);
(d) Expenses that become necessary for divorce should be met by the wife; and
(e) These decisions should be implemented within 45 days.
None of these matters comes under the agreement or terms of reference even if Ext. b1 is read as part of Ext. A1. It is not known who gave the arbitrators the authority to decide these matters. Their decisions are vague and incapable of implementation on many aspects. Decision on matters not referred or agreed will be misconduct and in excess of the authority.
6. A judgment, order or decree in exercise of the matrimonial jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character not as against any specified person but absolutely, could be rendered only by a competent court having jurisdiction and it is a decision in rem and not in personem alone. That is a matter which cannot be referred to arbitration and decided by the arbitrators. Further the respondent did not rely on the award for that purpose and no decree was passed in that connection. Respondent filed O.P. No. 25 of 1980 as an independent proceeding for divorce and it was allowed on the basis of a joint petition. Decree is only on the remaining matters which cannot be accepted by any stretch of imagination to be matters referred for arbitration. That means, the award is unauthorised and beyond reference, if any.
7. The decree passed by the Sub Judge, claiming to be in terms of Ext. A1 award, is for payment of Rs. 5,251/- and two rings to the respondent by the appellant. I have earlier narrated the matters decided by the arbitrators. The decree is not in terms of the award and it does not cover everything included in the award. There is no provision in the award making the appellant liable to pay Rs. 5,251/-to the respondent. The decree cannot stand for that reason also, The award itself is not having any competence. The authority of the arbitrators is only on the basis of the agreement of parties and the terms of reference. A decision on a matter which is not referred is not binding on the parties and the award is not having any force. The decree, even to the extent it is in conformity with the award, itself cannot be sustained because the award cannot be accepted and made a rule of court. What the respondent wanted she was able to achieve by an order of court. If the parties are entitled to any further relief, their remedy lies only before a competent court.
The two appeals and the revision petition are allowed and the decree of the trial court is set aside. The award itself is set aside for the reasons stated above. No costs.